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Abstract 
 
Reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the electricity sector will be a 
central part of Australia’s efforts to make deep cuts in its national emissions. This is 
because the country has high electricity GHG emissions. In turn, renewable electricity 
(RES-E) is likely to play a major part in cutting Australia’s electricity sector emissions 
because it is less resource-constrained, and more mature, than the alternative low emission 
electricity techologies of fossil-fuel carbon capture and storage and next-generation nuclear 
technologies.  
Because RES-E generation is currently dearer than fossil-fuel-generated electricity 
(even given a politically likely carbon price), support mechanisms are needed to allow it to 
compete with fossil-fuel-generated electricity. In this thesis I show that there is a case for 
providing support to RES-E in Australia, above that likely to be provided by carbon 
pricing; and that currently high-cost solar and geothermal types of RES-E should receive 
more support than currently low-cost RES-E types. The thesis also shows that the largest 
2020 GHG reduction target being considered by the Australian government will make only 
the least expensive type of RES-E (wind) competitive with coal generated electricity, and 
will not make other RES-E types competitive with it. 
In the thesis I examine the lessons Australia can learn from the overseas experience 
of RES-E support policy, particularly in Western Europe and the USA. The thesis 
specifically examines the generation and subsidy price performance of Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS) RES-E support mechanisms (where governments determine how much 
RES-E will be generated and RPS tradable certificate markets determine its price), and 
Feed-in Tariff (FIT) support mechanisms (where governments determine RES-E prices and 
electricity generation markets determine how much will be generated), in the USA, eight 
Western European countries and Australia. I also examine RES-E  subsidies provided by 
the federal government in Australia as well as electricity transmission in the country 
compared to Europe and the USA. I show that Australia’s has modest transmission levels 
which hinders the development of its RES-E. The cost of transmission expansion in 
Australia is large, and may need financing across all electricity consumers. It may also need 
some government subsidisation, and regulation, if market-based transmission planning is 
not effective. 
The thesis’s analysis of Australia’s RES-E development, compared to that of the 
European Union and the USA, shows that RES-E has a lower electricity generation share 
(including a lower non-hydro RES-E generation share), and is less diverse, in Australia 
than in the other two regions/countries. I also show that Australia’s current level of RPS 
RES-E subsidy compares poorly with equivalent levels of wind and solar subsidisation in 
Germany, Spain and the UK. 
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 Two major conclusions in the thesis, which together form its most significant 
contribution to knowledge, are that radical RES-E expansion (rapid increases in RES-E 
generation share) will require RPS mechanisms to adopt some features normally found in 
FITs. The most important of these are 'type-specific support' (different levels of 
subsidisation for different types of RES-E), and a high level of RES-E investor certainty 
about subsidy levels. Achieving radical RES-E expansion will also require FITs to adopt 
features normally found in RPSs, the most important of which are a high level of generation 
outcome certainty and a close connection between subsidy levels and electricity generation 
performance. However, the extent to which the RPS and the FIT can be hybridised will not 
be known with certainty for another three to four years. Until then, recently established 
RPS banding (variable traded certificate multipliers), as used in the UK and Italy, carve-
outs (RPS submarkets dedicated to a particular type of RES-E), as used in the USA, and 
flexible FIT degression (subsidy reductions linked to RES-E generating capacity changes), 
as used in Germany and Spain, will not have reliable generation and price histories. 
Institutional inertia means the RPS will very likely remain the main form of RES-E 
support in Australia, so the need I have shown for an RPS to adopt features normally found 
in FITs means that banding should be introduced into its RPS, so that it gives different 
levels of subsidisation for different RES-E types (particularly for solar and geothermal 
electricity). It also means that an implicit or explicit price floor is needed to make RPS 
tradable certificate prices less volatile than at present. 
 Comparison of particular features of Australia’s RPS with the equivalent features of 
the RPSs used in the USA and Western Europe reveals other major flaws in Australia’s 
RPS.  To remedy them, the thesis also makes the case that pre-RPS RES-E generation 
should be removed from Australia’s RPS; banking of its tradable certificates should be 
restricted in it; unusual energy sources (especially solar hot water heaters) should be 
removed from it; and its target should be a generation share, not an absolute quantity of 
generation. In the thesis I also show that if Australia is to make deep cuts in its GHG 
emissions, its RPS target needs to be significantly increased so that it at least absorbs all the 
projected increase in Australian electricity demand. I also recommend in the thesis that 
Australia’s different state and territory FITs be replaced with a national gross FIT for small 
to medium scaled RES-E, differentiated according to location. 
In general, I find that while Australia has made a reasonable start in its RES-E 
development, significant redesign of its RPS is needed if the country is to make deep cuts 
in its electricity generation GHG emissions through radical RES-E expansion. 
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Glossary 
 
450 CO2e ppm GHG  A global greenhouse gas agreement that agrees to 
concentration stabilisation  limit the increase in global GHG concentrations to 
regime no more than 450 CO2e ppm.  
 
Absolute generation The amount of electricity generated from a specific source 
(compare to Relative generation).  
 
Banding A design feature of a Renewable Portfolio Standard 
whereby different amounts of tradable certificates are 
issued for 1MWh of generation from different types of 
RES-E according to how expensive, and immature, they 
are (see also Multipliers, compare to Carve-out).  
 
Banking The ability of RES-E generators, or electricity retailers, to 
hold RPS tradable certificates before selling or 
surrendering them for RPS liability acquittal.  
 
Biomass electricity Electricity generated, directly or indirectly, from organic 
waste: includes generation from the residues of sugarcane, 
sewage, landfill and sawmilling.  
 
Capacity The maximum power that can be generated by an 
electricity generator. 
 
Capacity factor The fraction of maximum generation achieved by the 
actual generation from an RES-E generator over a 12 
month period or longer. 
 
Carbon Sometimes used as shorthand for combined greenhouse 
gases. 
 
Carbon Pollution The Australian greenhouse gas emissions trading  
Reduction Scheme (CPRS) scheme once planned to commence in about 2013.  
 
Carbon price The price of carbon under a carbon tax or (carbon) 
emissions trading scheme.  
 
Carbon (emissions) tax An alternative to an emissions trading scheme where all 
greenhouse gas emission sources pay the same tax 
(compare to (carbon) Emissions trading scheme).  
 
Carve-out Part of an RPS that can only have generation from a 
specific type of RES-E counted towards it: effectively an 
RPS sub-market (compare to Banding and Multipliers). 
 
Deep connection charge Transmission connection charges where the connecting 
generator pays for any grid reinforcement that its 
connection might necessitate (compare to Shallow, and 
Super shallow, connection charge).  
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Deep cuts Large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, generally 
consistent with an aim to stabilise global greenhouse gas 
emission at about 450 CO2e ppm, or lower.   
 
Degression A feed-in tariff design feature that reduces the amount of 
the feed-in tariff subsidy extended to a generator for each 
year that has passed since a baseline year before it begins 
operating.  
 
Differential cost A German RES-E term that refers to the amount of a 
Feed-in Tariff subsidy net of the wholesale price of 
electricity.  
 
Diversity The use of several RES-E types (at least three) to make up 
a jurisdictions’s mix of RES-E sources.  
 
Effectiveness The ability of an RES-E support mechanism design 
element to attain its design goal(s) with a minimum of 
both administrative and subsidy cost.  
 
( Emissions trading  A scheme that provides for the trading of   
    greenhouse gas emission rights 
(compare to Carbon (emissions) tax).   
 
Feed-in Tariff (FIT) Government-mandated subsidy paid for RES-E fed into 
the grid in order to lower the price of RES-E. Usually 
paid for by increasing the price of electricity to all 
consumers; in rare cases funded by government. Unless 
otherwise stated, there are different subsidy levels for 
different types of RES-E (compare to Renewable 
Portfolio Standard).  
 
Flexible degression Degression linked to the installation amount of a type of 
RES-E in the previous year (compare to Degression). 
 
Generation The quantity of electricity generated over a particular time 
period.  
 
Generation capacity See Capacity. 
 
Generation cost The direct cost of generating electricity. Includes three 
main types of cost: amortisation of the cost of capital 
(including interest), fuel operation and maintenance. Does 
not include indirect overhead costs.  
 
Generation performance Output of different RES-E types achieved by the RPS or 
the FIT mechanism in different jurisdictions (compare to 
Effectiveness).  
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Generating potential The maximum amount of RES-E a country, or 
jurisdiction, can generate (from its natural endowment) 
before experiencing significant increases in the marginal 
generating cost of RES-E. Sometimes just called 
‘resource’.  
 
Generating potential A country’s generation as a proportion of its 
performance generating potential (compare to Generation 
performance). 
 
Geothermal electricity Electricity generated by using water heated by 
subterranean heat: can either be hydro-thermal (where 
water naturally comes to the surface) or hot rock (where 
water is pumped down a well and steam collected at the 
surface) (compare to Hot rock and Hydro-thermal 
electricity).  
 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) Gases involved in the warming of the earth’s atmosphere 
and surface through the absorption and emission of 
radiation within the infrared range.  
 
Gross electricity trade The amount of electricity traded between jurisdictions 
equal to export volume plus import volume (compare to 
Net electricity trade).  
  
Herfindahl RES-E The sum of the squares of the generation shares of 
concentration index  different RES-E types in a jurisdiction in a given year. 
Generally expressed in this thesis as an inverse of the 
index (see also RES-E diversity and Portfolio 
development). 
   
Hot Rock electricity A type of electricity generation technology that exploits 
geothermal energy by pumping water underground then 
back to the surface (compare to Geothermal and Hydro-
thermal electricity).  
 
Hydro-thermal electricity A type of geothermal electricity that exploits energy made 
available by heated underground water naturally coming 
to the earth’s surface (compare to Hot rock and 
Geothermal electricity).  
 
Large-scale Renewable  The RPS in Australia that took over from the RET, along  
Energy Target (LRET) with the SRET, from January 2011. Only includes large  
 RES-E generation (from generators more than about 5 kW 
in capacity) (compare to MRET, SRET and RET). 
 
Learning curve A line that describes reductions in an energy technology’s 
cost that come with increased production: generally 
expressed as the cost reduction that comes with every 
doubling of production. 
 xxiii 
 
Least-cost RES-E Those RES-E types that have the lowest generating costs 
out of all RES-E types: currently wind and biomass 
(compare to Portfolio development). 
 
Liberalised electricity Electricity markets that have been significantly  
markets deregulated with competition allowed between different 
electricity generators and between retailers.  
 
Long-run marginal cost The direct, incremental costs associated with the 
production of the last unit of generation from a specific 
source in the long run. Takes into account annualised 
capital costs. 
 
Mandatory Renewable The RPS mechanism that operated in Australia from  
Energy Target (MRET) 2001 to 2009 (compare to RET, MRET, LRET and 
SRET).  
 
Mature The phase in the development of electricity technology, 
including RES-E, where major learning curve cost 
reductions become insignificant or non-existent.  
 
Merit order The ranking of electricity generation technologies 
according to their different marginal generating costs 
(starting from least expensive).  
 
Multipliers An alternative term for banding. Generally expressed as a 
number of certificates issued per 1 MWh of RES-E 
generation (see also Banding, compare to Carve-outs).  
 
Net electricity trade The amount of electricity traded between jurisdictions, 
equal to export volume minus import volume (compare to 
Gross electricity trade). 
 
Non-compliance charge The penalty fee applied when an electricity retailer does 
not meet its obligations under an RPS, particularly its 
RES-E tradable certificate obligations. 
 
Non-hydro RES-E RES-E generated from sources other than hydro (see also 
Non-hydro RES-E generation share).  
 
Non-hydro RES-E  The percentage of annual electricity generation in a  
generation share jurisdiction accounted for by generation from RES-E 
sources other than hydro (see also Non-hydro RES-E). 
   
Portfolio development RES-E development that includes significant generation 
from a diversity of RES-E types, generally more than two 
types (compare to least-cost RES-E, see also Herfindahl 
RES-E concentratoin index and RES-E diversity).  
 
Potential See Generating potential. 
 
 xxiv 
Premium resources High quality resources needed for RES-E generation, eg 
prime wind sites, high standard biomass feedstock. 
 
Price mechanism A support mechanism that directly subsidies the 
generating price of RES-E, either an RPS or an FIT, but 
not a capital cost subsidy, which only provides an indirect 
subsidy. 
 
Price performance The total amount of RES-E subsidy used to generate the 
output of a given type of RES-E in a given jurisdiction. 
 
Production tax credit A tax subsidy paid to RES-E generators in the USA per 
unit of RES-E generated. 
 
Radical RES-E A level of RES-E generation expansion in Australia that  
expansion would allow a majority of its electricity to be generated 
by renewable energy by 2050. 
 
Regulated Asset Base The value of transmission assets used by the Australian 
Energy Regulator to determine transmission charges 
(includes depreciation).  
 
Relative generation The amount of electricity generated from a specific source 
measured as a percentage of another source (e.g. RES-E 
relative to total electricity generation) or a reference year 
(compare to Absolute generation).   
 
RES-E diversity See Diversity.  
 
RES-E generation share The percentage of annual electricity generation in a 
jurisdiction accounted for by generation from RES-E 
sources (including non RES-E generation).  
 
RES-E types Different types of renewable electricity eg. hydro, wind, 
solar, biomass, ocean or geothermal.  
 
Renewable electricity Electricity generated from renewable energy. 
(RES-E)  
 
Renewable Energy  The name of the tradable certificates in Australia’s  
Certificate (REC) RPS: 1 REC = 1 MWh (see also Tradable certificate).  
 
Renewable Energy The RPS mechanism that operated in Australia from 
Target (RET) 2009 to 2010 (compare to MRET, LRET and SRET). 
 
Renewable Portfolio  An RES-E support mechanism based on government 
Standard (RPS) mandated quantities of RES-E generation the liability for 
which electricity retailers acquit by purchasing RES-E or 
RPS tradable certificates. Lowers unit price of RES-E (see 
MRET, RET, LRET and SRET). 
 
 xxv 
Repowering  Replacement of old RES-E generators with new RES-E 
generators of the same type (eg replacing old wind 
turbines with new wind turbines). 
 
Resource See Generating potential. 
 
RPS target The absolute amount (in GWh/yr), or generation share 
(expressed as % of electricity generation), an RPS 
mechanism aims to generate by a specified point in its 
period of operation.  
 
Shallow connection charge Transmission connection charges where the connecting 
generator does not pay for any grid reinforcement that its 
connection might necessitate (compare to Deep and Super 
shallow connection charge). 
 
Small Renewable Energy The RPS in Australia that took over from the RET, along  
Target with the LRET, from January 2011. Only includes small 
RES-E generation (from generators less than about 5 kW 
in capacity) (compare to MRET, LRET and RET). 
  
 Solar photovoltaic  Solar generation technology using semiconductor 
electricity (solar PV) cells to convert the sun’s radiation into electricity  
     (compare to solar thermal electricity).  
  
   Solar thermal electricity Solar generation technology that uses mirrors or lenses to 
concentrate the sun’s radiation to generate  
electricity (sometimes called ‘concentrated solar thermal 
electricity’; compare to solar photovoltaic electricity). 
 
Spillover market failure An electricity market failure where the benefit of a 
company’s development of a technology, or practice, is 
exploited by other companies for free. Can include, but is 
not restricted to: legal, workplace, social acceptance, 
research and development and support sector costs. 
 
Super shallow  Where an RES-E generator connecting to a transmission 
connection charge  system pays none of the costs associated with the 
connection, not even the cost of connecting to the nearest 
transmission line (compare to Deep and Shallow 
connection charge). 
 
Tradable certificate Certificates issued under a Renewable Portfolio Standard 
or ETS where one certificate generally equals one 
megawatt-hour of RES-E generation or one tonne of 
CO2e (see also Renewable Energy Certificates and 
Emissions trading).  
 
Type (of RES-E See RES-E types. 
technology)  
 
 xxvi 
Type-neutral mechanisms Electricity support mechanisms that do not discriminate in 
favour of any type of technology, either broadly across all 
types, or narrowly across just RES-E types (compare to 
Type-specific mechanisms).  
 
Type-specific mechanisms Non-neutral electricity support mechanisms that 
discriminate in favour of a particular technology.  Used 
only for RES-E (compare to Type-neutral mechanisms). 
 
Undifferentiated Feed-in A feed-in tariff that is uniform across all RES-E types  
Tariff (compare to Feed-in Tariff). 
 
Unlimited banking The ability to use an RPS tradable certificate to discharge 
an electricity retailer’s RPS liability at any time after the 
certificate has been created (without time limit). 
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1.1 Thesis issues, questions and justification 
This thesis is concerned with the design of Australia’s renewable electricity 
(RES-E: covering electricity generated by wind, wave, hydro, solar, biomass and 
geothermal energy) support policies. In it I examine what Australia can learn from the 
overseas experience of such policy. The thesis is specifically focused on the design of 
RES-E support policy needed for Australia to make major cuts in its electricity 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Such reductions are broadly thought, in the thesis, 
to be the sort Australia would be required to make if it was to play an appropriate part 
in a global agreement to stabilise GHG concentrations at about 450 C02e ppm 
(hereafter generally referred to as deep cuts). However, deep cuts would also be 
required if the country was to play an appropriate part in a global agreement to 
stabilise global GHG concentrations at a level moderately higher, or lower, than 450 
CO2e ppm. A global GHG concentration of about 450 ppm (measured in 
standardised, GHG carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) units per million units of 
atmosphere) is thought to be the limit that GHG concentrations should be allowed to 
rise to if human-induced global warming is to be limited to about two degrees Celsius 
(Garnaut 2008a: 247). The thesis concentrates on how Australia’s RES-E policy 
settings may need to be changed to achieve deep GHG emission cuts consistent with 
this goal. This is likely to require RES-E to expand from generating a small 
proportion of the country’s electricity to a majority of it by about 2050 (hereafter 
generally referred to as radical RES-E expansion) (Hayward et al 2011, MMA 2008c: 
15).  
Most scientific opinion argues that a failure to reduce human induced GHG 
emissions will result in (and has already resulted in) significant increases in global 
atmospheric temperatures which could disrupt global biodiversity and human living 
conditions (IPCC 2001). Electricity generation is a major emitter of GHGs. It 
currently produces a third of all the world’s non land-use GHG emissions (World 
Resources Institute (WRI) 2009). Australia is a significant contributor to the world’s 
GHG emissions because it has one of the highest levels of per capita GHG emissions 
(Garnaut 2008a: 153) and is one of the world’s 20 largest GHG emitters (WRI 2009). 
Because Australia is very dependent on brown and black coal for most of its 
electricity generation, such generation is a major contributor to the country’s high 
level of GHG emission and is a higher contributor to the nation’s emissions than in 
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any other developed country belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (WRI 2009, International Energy Agency (IEA) 2009d). These 
factors mean that both around the world, and in Australia, electricity generation 
should be a major focus of GHG emission reduction efforts.  
Although RES-E is well suited to GHG emission reduction from technology 
readiness and resource supply points of view, it is currently more expensive than 
fossil fuel generation without carbon pricing of GHG emissions (ie putting a price on 
GHG emissions either through carbon taxes or carbon (emissions) trading) (‘carbon’ 
being shorthand for easily measured GHG emissions). At present, all forms of RES-E 
have generating costs that are between two times and four times that of fossil fuel 
generation without a carbon price (Graham et al 2008). Solar and the type of 
geothermal generation being developed in Australia – hot rock geothermal – have 
higher generating costs than the other commercialised types of RES-E. There are 
several mechanisms that can help RES-E overcome its generation cost disadvantage 
with fossil fuel electricity generation. These include: carbon pricing; government 
subsidisation of RES-E capital costs, diffusion costs and research and development; 
and subsidisation by governments, or electricity consumers, of RES-E generation (per 
kWh). In this thesis I mainly focus on the last class of RES-E support. The thesis also 
considers the RES-E support likely to flow, in Australia, from various GHG 
reductions in a proposed Emissions Trading Scheme for the country but does not 
analyse RES-E capital cost or research and development subsidies. This is because a 
proper analysis of the effectiveness of these RES-E support instruments would require 
detailed examination beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The two main support mechanisms used to extend electricity consumer subsidies 
to RES-E generation around the world are Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)  
where governments mandate certain amounts of RES-E that electricity retailers must 
purchase and where RPS tradeable certificate markets determine the price of those 
purchases  and Feed-In Tariffs (FIT), where governments mandate the level of 
subsidisation that must be extended to RES-E generation while electricity generation 
markets determine what amount of RES-E generation it results in.  
The RPS has been mainly used to support RES-E in North America, and in some 
national or sub-national jurisdictions in Asia and Europe, while the FIT has been 
mainly used in Europe, and some national or sub-national jurisdictions in 
Central/South America, Asia and the Pacific (Renewable Energy Policy Network 
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2009). The RPS was first used in the late 1990s while the FIT was first used (in its 
modern form) in the early 1990s. Because there has been no template for the design of  
 either mechanism, many variations on both have been developed. In recent years there 
has also been some crossovers between key features of the two. Neither mechanism is 
necessarily distinguished by the amount of RES-E expansion it can be used to support, 
but the RPS is better connected than the FIT to electricity price changes, and therefore 
the total amount of subsidy it results in (Menanteau et al 2003: 809), while the FIT 
offers more certainty than the RPS about subsidy levels and in practice (if not in basic 
principle), is more able to support high-cost types of RES-E (Finon 2006: 332, 
Mendonça et al 2010). Menanteau et al (2003: 809) specifically argue that, under an 
RPS, RES-E support is ‘no longer unrelated to electricity price changes, as was the 
case with competitive bidding and feed-in tariffs’. FITs are more able than RPSs to 
provide support to high-cost types of RES-E because it is easier for the FIT than for 
the RPS to offer different levels of subsidisation to different types of RES-E. As I 
argue in the thesis, the USA and the UK are the countries where the potential 
weaknesses of the RPS are most apparent, while Western Europe is the area where 
both the strengths and weaknesses of the FIT are clearest. In the USA, state based RPS 
mechanisms suffer from a lack of national coverage, many exemptions and weak non-
compliance penalties (Wiser and Barbose 2008). In the UK, the unpredictability of 
RPS subsidy levels has led to a higher subsidy level per unit of RES-E generation than 
equivalent subsidies extended by the FIT in Germany (Mitchell et al 2006, Toke 2005, 
Butler and Neuhoff 2004). However, although the FIT has succeeded in significantly 
increasing RES-E generation in several European countries, its solar PV subsidy levels 
have recently required a large amount of refining in Spain and Germany (Renewable 
Energy World 2008, Renewable Energy Focus 2010). In recent years there has been 
some hybridisaton of FIT and RPS design with solar PV FIT subsidies linked more 
directly linked to electricity generation performance in Spain and Germany 
(Mendonça et al 2010, Lauber 2010b), while refinements have been made to the RPS 
in the UK, Italy and in some US RPS states to allow it to support high-cost RES-E 
(Mitchell et al 2011, Coenraads et al 2008, Union of Concerned Scientists 2010). Key 
research questions that flow from this overseas experience of the RPS and the FIT are: 
‘Is the RPS or the FIT necessarily more effective at supporting radical RES-E 
expansion?’ and ‘If an RPS is to be relied upon to deliver most of Australia’s RES-E 
support under a radical RES-E expansion scenario, what can overseas experience tell 
us about changing it to make this possible?’ 
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Since 2001, Australia has mainly used an RPS to subsidise its RES-E 
generation, so I have made this thesis principally concerned with the design of that 
RPS and what the country can learn from the overseas experience of RPS design.  
 However, because Australian RES-E support is not confined to its RPS, neither is this 
thesis: it also considers the design of FITs (which are used in several Australian 
states), the influence that possible future carbon pricing could have on RES-E 
generation, and the effect that transmission has on the use of RES-E in the country. 
The main weaknesses of Australia’s RPS are that it has not lifted the share of the 
country’s electricity generated by RES-E (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (ABARE) 2010c); it has given limited support to high-cost types 
of RES-E (Green Energy Markets 2010); and it has delivered an erratic, but generally 
low level of subsidy (Green Energy Markets 2010). A key research question that 
arises from Australia’s RPS experience is: ‘Is there a case for Australia’s RPS 
supporting high-cost, as well as low-cost, types of RES-E?’  
Other forms of RES-E support in Australia, apart from its RPS, also have major 
flaws. Australia’s state/territory (sub-national jurisdictions) based FIT subsidies are 
mostly only extended to small-scale generators; carbon pricing is unlikely to start in 
the country before 2012, and will probably not be high enough to support a lot of 
RES-E; and the country’s government subsidisation of RES-E capital costs, diffusion 
costs and research and development is too restricted to support a major amount of 
additional RES-E capacity (as measured by the maximum power that can be generated 
by an electricity generator). In 2009, legislation was unsuccessfully introduced to 
Australia’s parliament to establish an emissions trading scheme (ETS: the trading of 
GHG emissions licences) with GHG emissions cuts of between 5% and 25% on 2000 
levels by 2020. Such legislation is now unlikely to be passed before the end of 2011. 
In addition to all the afore-mentioned factors, until recently Australia has had an 
unconnected state/territory based transmission system designed to service centralised 
coal based generators. Key research questions that therefore flow from Australia’s 
experience of non-RPS RES-E mechanisms and policies are: ‘To what extent can an 
ETS be relied upon to support RES-E in Australia?’; ‘What can overseas experience 
tell us about changing Australia’s state-based FITs so they are more effective at 
supporting RES-E?’; and ‘What can overseas experience tell us about the level of 
transmission connectivity in Australia and its consequences for RES-E support?’  
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The weaknesses of Australia’s RPS, and non-RPS, RES-E support mean that 
although a number of studies have concluded that for the country to source deep cuts 
in its electricity GHG emissions it will need radical RES-E expansion with major  
amounts supplied by high-cost RES-E (Hayward et al 2011, MMA 2008c), Australia 
does not presently have the policy settings that will allow this to happen. 
There are several justifications for my researching and writing a PhD thesis on 
redesigning Australian RES-E support policy to make it more appropriate for major 
reduction of its GHG emissions. Firstly, there was significant official review of 
overseas RPS design before Australia’s original RPS  the Mandatory Renewable 
Energy Target (MRET)  was introduced in 2001, and again when it was reviewed in 
2003, but there has been none since. There was therefore no ‘global best practice’ 
assessment of the country’s RPS when it was changed to the Renewable Energy 
Target (RET) in 2009 (under the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 
2009) or when legislation was passed in 2010 to separate the RET’s target into large 
and small markets (the Large Renewable Energy Target (LRET) and Small 
Renewable Energy Target (SRET)) (under the Renewable Energy (Electricity) 
Amendment Bill 2010). The federal-state Renewables Target Working Group (1999), 
that originally developed the design of MRET, referenced a proposed national US 
RPS mechanism. Similarly, the 2003 federal government review of MRET (MRET 
Review Panel 2003) reviewed the RPS mechanisms of the UK and Texas, and it also 
included a broader analysis of the RES-E targets of 18 overseas countries. However, 
when the RET’s proposed design was reviewed by the Working Group on Climate 
Change and Water of the Council of Australian Governments (a group of federal and 
state government representatives) (2008) there was no reference to any overseas use 
of the RPS mechanism. This was despite the fact that there was greater global use, and 
experience, of the RPS by 2008 than there had been in 2001.  
 A second justification for the thesis lies in the fact that Australia’s proposed 
emissions trading scheme (planned in 2008 but unlikely to begin before 2012, details 
discussed in s5.4) and RES-E policies, have been developed independently of each 
other. This has meant that while RES-E policy in the country has been developed 
around various generation share targets, it has not been developed with specific GHG 
emission reduction targets in mind. GHG emission reduction has largely been seen as 
a by-product of RES-E policy design rather than as an endpoint that RES-E policy 
should be designed around. 
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 A third justification lies in the fact that there has been limited contemporary 
academic, or government, examination of integrated RES-E policy in Australia, 
especially in terms of how it should be designed to facilitate major reductions in the  
country’s GHG emissions and how different RES-E types should be supported. Kent 
and Mercer (2006) analysed the original version of Australia’s RPS, and Saddler et al  
(2007) mapped scenarios for how RES-E and energy efficiency can be used to lower 
Australia’s GHG emissions, but there has been little analysis since. Kann (2010) 
examined the specific issue of wind finance, Valentine (2010) examined wind support 
in Australia, MacGill (2009) analysed the integration of wind into the national 
electricity generation market and Jakrawatana et al (2009) discussed regional 
bioenergy systems in the country but none considered overall RES-E policy in an 
integrated way, especially with regard to national GHG emission reduction.  
 The consequence of these three justifications is that Australia’s RES-E policy 
design has evolved in a vacuum despite the preponderance of international experience 
that can be drawn upon. This thesis attempts to remedy this. 
Data availability necessarily played a major part in directing the areas of this 
thesis’s research. The regions that have the best availability of RES-E data and 
information are Western Europe and the USA. The European Commission (EC) and 
the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) have particularly good electricity 
and RES-E data availability. For that reason, in the thesis I compare the design of 
Australia’s RES-E support mechanisms with those in Western Europe and the USA. 
Public RES-E data availability is not particularly good in Australia: private 
approaches had to be made to the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ABARE), and to the Australian Energy Market Operator, for useful data. 
Throughout the thesis, the most-up-to-date available data has been used, this meant 
RES-E generation data up to 2009 for Australia, the UK, Italy, the USA and 
Germany; generation data up to 2008 for US states; and generation data up to 2007 for 
Spain, Denmark, Belgium and Sweden (apart from coarse data which was available up 
to 2008 for those countries).  
 
 
1.2 Thesis structure and contributions to knowledge 
The substantive chapters of this thesis are broadly arranged into three groups: 
chapter 2 is a thesis context setting chapter; chapters 3 to 5 are profiles of the RES-E 
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support mechanisms used in different clusters of countries and in Australia; and 
chapters 6 and 7 are cross-country RES-E analyses.  
Chapter 2 sets the context for the thesis: in it I explain the climate change issue 
and the part that RES-E can play in it, especially in Australia. The chapter also 
considers the different types, generating costs and generating potentials of RES-E in  
Australia as well as the aims and justifications for its support in the country. It 
discusses the inter-related issues of RES-E generating costs, maturity (stage of 
commercial readiness), learning curve (economies of scale) cost reductions, and long-
term rising marginal costs (the cost of the last unit of generation). The chapter's main 
contribution is to build an Australia-specific case for focusing GHG abatement policy 
on a radical expansion of RES-E generation, and hence for supporting RES-E by more 
than just a carbon price, and within RES-E for supporting solar thermal and 
geothermal more strongly than other types of RES-E. The chapter answers the above-
mentioned research question, ‘Is there a case for Australia’s RPS supporting high-
cost, as well as low-cost, types of RES-E?’ in the affirmative. 
Chapter 3 discusses the use of the main RES-E support mechanism considered 
in the thesis  the RPS mechanism  in the USA, the UK, Italy, Sweden and Belgium. 
It also discusses the mechanism’s origins and evolution. It particularly focuses on the 
generation and subsidy price performance of the RPS mechanism, as well as its 
specific design characteristics, in each of the countries. Generation performance refers 
to the generation levels of different types of RES-E and subsidy price performance 
refers to the RES-E subsidy levels extended under each country’s RES-E support 
mechanism. This chapter partly answers the questions: ‘If an RPS is to be relied upon 
to deliver most of Australia’s RES-E support under a radical RES-E expansion 
scenario, what can overseas experience tell us about changing it to make this 
possible?’ and ‘Is the RPS or the FIT necessarily more effective at supporting radical 
RES-E expansion?’ The chapter also introduces the concepts of type-neutral RES-E 
mechanisms (ones that discriminate in favour of all RES-E sources but give the same 
incentive to all RES-E types) and type-specific mechanisms (ones that discriminate in 
favour of all RES-E types but give different incentives to different RES-E types). An 
RPS is a type-neutral RES-E mechanism because it extends the same support to all 
types of RES-E while the FIT is a type-specific form of RES-E support because it 
extends different levels of support to different types of RES-E. 
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 Chapter 4 discusses the evolution of the FIT mechanism and its use in Germany, 
Spain and Denmark. It parallels Chapter 3 by focusing on the generation and subsidy 
price performance of the FIT in each country, as well as country-specific mechanism  
characteristics. This chapter partly answers the questions: ‘Is an RPS or an FIT 
necessarily more effective at supporting radical RES-E expansion?’ and ‘What can  
overseas experience tell us about changing Australia’s state-based FITs so they are 
more effective at supporting RES-E?’  
 Chapter 5 discusses the major design elements of all the RES-E support policies 
used in Australia: its RPS, state/territory-based FITs, proposed emission trading 
scheme, and government RES-E subsidies. It also compares transmission in Australia 
to transmission in overseas countries. It answers the question: ‘To what extent can 
emissions trading be relied upon to support RES-E in Australia?’ and ‘What can 
overseas experience tell us about the level of transmission connectivity in Australia 
and what are its RES-E support consequences?’ An innovation in the chapter, that 
partly answers the first question, is a calculation of the support that emissions trading 
could provide to different types of RES-E under different GHG emission reduction 
regimes, and a calculation of the different levels of carbon price needed to make 
different types of RES-E competitive with black coal electricity generation in 
Australia. Another innovation is a comparison of levels of interjurisdictional 
transmission electricity trade in Australia (inter-state), the USA (inter-state) and the 
EU (between major countries). 
 Chapter 6 draws on data from chapters 3-5 to provide an analysis of the 
generation and subsidy price performance of the RPS and the FIT mechanisms across 
the countries considered in those chapters. The main research question answered in 
this chapter is: ‘Is the RPS or the FIT necessarily more effective at supporting radical 
RES-E expansion?’ A contribution in the chapter is a comparison of Australia’s RPS 
and FIT wind and solar PV subsidies with equivalent ones in Spain, Germany and the 
UK. Other contributions include analyses of: the RES-E generation performance of 
the USA, Western Europe and Australia; how much use each has made of their 
different RES-E generating potentials; and the diversity of RES-E generation in each 
country or region. 
 Chapter 7 compares major design elements of the RPS mechanisms referenced 
in the preceding four chapters to answer the research question: ‘If an RPS is to be 
relied upon to deliver most of Australia’s RES-E support under a radical RES-E 
expansion scenario, what can overseas experience tell us about changing it to make 
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this possible?’ It compares a number of specific design elements of Australia’s RPS to 
the equivalent elements in RPSs used in Western Europe and the USA. These  
elements include RPS target size, tradable certificate banking, exemptions and 
penalties, treatment of pre-existing and unusual RES-E (especially solar water  
heaters), as well as support of immature RES-E. A major contribution of the chapter is 
a set of desirable RPS and FIT design elements drawn from the overseas experience of 
the RPS and the FIT referenced in chapters 3, 4 and 6. This is the most significant 
contribution of the thesis; from this set of desirable design elements one can broadly 
conclude that if either an FIT or an RPS mechanism is to be able to achieve radical 
RES-E expansion, it will need to adopt design elements normally found in the other. 
A further contribution, drawing on analysis in chapter 5, is a comparison of the design 
of Australia’s RPS against this set of desirable RPS and FIT design elements, leading 
to a comprehensive set of recommended changes for Australian RES-E policy.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets the context for the thesis. Major issues covered in it include an 
overview of climate change and the role that RES-E can play in its mitigation, 
explanation of the various types of RES-E, and justifications for their use and support.  
This chapter presents the first comprehensive case for Australia’s GHG 
reduction policy to be focused on radical RES-E expansion through RES-E support, in 
addition to any support likely to be provided by an emissions trading scheme (ETS) in 
the country. There have been some broad assessments of RES-E resources and 
generating potential in Australia, including by ABARE (2010d) and CSIRO (2006). 
There has also been discussion about specific design elements of Australia’s main 
RES-E support mechanism, including by the COAG Working Group on Climate 
Change and Water (2008). And there has been discussion of the efficiency and 
interaction of all of Australia’s climate change measures by Wilkins (2009) and of the 
potential interaction of Australia’s proposed ETS with its RES-E support mechanism 
by Garnaut (2008a). However, the inter-related issues of RES-E generating potential, 
RES-E support mechanisms and proposed emissions trading in Australia have not 
been brought together before. Australian energy policy generally suffers from a lack 
of integrated assessment. 
This chapter begins, in section 2, with an outline of the climate change problem 
and the dominant part that electricity generation plays in it, especially in Australia. 
The section also discusses the different major types of electricity generation and the 
role that electricity generated by RES-E can play in reducing GHG emissions. The 
chapter then discusses, in section 3, the costs and aims of RES-E support in Australia 
before conclusions are drawn in section 4. 
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2.2 The climate change problem and different ways to reduce GHG 
emissions 
 
This section describes the climate change problem, the status of low emission 
electricity technologies, as well as the unique characteristics of Australia’s electricity 
sector and GHG emissions. It is intended to generally set the context for the thesis, as 
well as for the remainder of the chapter. 
 
 
2.2.1 The Climate Change Problem 
RES-E policy would not be as significant as it has become were it not for the 
climate change issue. The presence of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the earth’s 
naturally occurring atmosphere, although accounting for less than 1% of its volume, 
allows short-wave radiation from the sun to reach the globe’s surface while at the 
same time enabling it to trap long-wave radiation that is reflected back from its 
surface. This makes the earth about 33° C warmer than it would be without the 
phenomenon (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007a: 946). The 
climate change problem is a product of a significant increase in atmospheric GHG 
concentrations since about the eighteenth century when the Industrial Revolution 
began. Since that time, global carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations have increased 
from approximately 280 CO2 ppm to 383 CO2 ppm in 2007 (Garnaut 2008a: 25, 45). 
Significant scientific opinion, most notably expressed by the IPCC, holds that this 
increase is trapping increasing amounts of reflected long-wave radiation causing the 
earth’s average temperature to increase. In its 2007 Fourth Assessment report, the 
IPCC concluded that there is a 90% chance that ‘the global average net effect of 
human activities since 1750 has been one of warming’ (IPCC 2007a: 3). Scientific 
opinion holds that a failure to stabilise GHG concentrations will cause further 
warming. It also holds that even if GHG concentrations were kept at 2000 levels, the 
long life of some forms of GHG will commit the earth to further warming of about 
0.6° C by 2100 (Garnaut 2008a: 88). This increase would be in addition to an 
estimated increase of 0.76°C ± 0.19° C that has already occurred since the mid 
nineteenth century, shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Average global air temperature change, 1850 to 2005. 
 
Source: Garnaut 2008a. 
 
The increase in global GHG concentrations between since the mid eighteenth 
century has been mainly driven by the significant increase in CO2 concentrations. 
This increase was driven by a large increase in human-induced GHG emissions. As 
shown in Table 2.1, the annual global emission of non land-use GHG has increased 
from 5.7 Gt carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) in 1950 to 28.4 Gt CO2e in 2006. The 
Table 2.1 author calculations show that, even though the rate of growth in emissions is 
lower today than it was between 1950 and 1980, it has markedly increased since 1990 
(WRI 2009). 
 
Table 2.1: Global annual GHG emissions excluding land use change, 1950 to 2006 
Year Global GHG 
emissions: Gt 
CO2e/yr (1) 
Increase on 
previous 
period (2) 
1950 5.7  
1960 9.0 +58% 
1970 13.9 +55% 
1980 18.5 +33% 
1990 20.8 +12% 
2000 23.7 +14% 
2006 28.4 +20% 
Source: WRI 2009 (col. 1), author calcs (col. 2). 
 
In its 2001 Third Assessment Report, Working Group III of the IPCC identified 
five key ‘reasons for concern’ about climate change. These were: 1) risk to unique and 
threatened species (vulnerability of threatened species and unique ecosystems etc.); 2) 
risk of extreme weather events (such as increased frequency, and intensity, of heat 
waves, floods etc.); 3) distribution of impacts (some regions and population groups 
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suffering greater climate change impacts than others); 4) aggregate impacts (overall 
monetary, life expectancy impacts etc.); and 5) risks of large-scaled discontinuities 
(potential for events to occur that have large impacts, such as deglaciation of West 
Antarctica and Greenland) (IPCC 2001). In the IPCC’s 2007 Fourth Assessment 
Report it stated that the Third Assessment Reports reasons for concern remain a 
‘viable framework for assessing key vulnerabilities’ (IPCC 2007c). Smith et al (2009) 
revised sensitivities of the Third Assessment Reports ‘reasons for concern’, and 
argued that their findings were ‘supported by a more thorough understanding of the 
concept of vulnerability that has evolved over the past 8 years’. They concluded that 
smaller increases in global mean temperatures were ‘now estimated to lead to 
substantial consequences in the framework of the 5 ‘reasons for concern’’.  
A significant proportion of the increase in global GHG emissions is attributable 
to an increase in worldwide electricity generation. Between 1973 and 2007, global 
electricity generation more than trebled from 6.1 PWh/yr to 19.8 PWh/yr. In 2006, the 
average GHG intensity of the world’s electricity supply was 526.6 g CO2e/kWh (WRI 
2009): this means that in 2006 electricity generation GHG emissions equalled about 
34% of global non-land-use-change GHG emissions. As shown in Table 2.2, the large 
amount of global electricity GHG emissions is a product of its use of fossil fuels (that 
emit CO2) for much of its generation: in 2007 68% of global electricity generation 
was from generators that use fossil fuels (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2009a: 
1.3).  
 
Table 2.2: Source of global electricity generation, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IEA 2009a, Global Wind Energy Council 2008. 
 
The IEA predicts that global electricity demand will increase by 76% between 
2005 and 2030. It also estimates that this increase will account for more than half of 
its reference scenario/business-as-usual projected increase in global GHG emissions 
Fuel source 2007 
generation: 
PWh/yr 
Percentage 
of total 
generation 
Nuclear 2.7 14% 
Fossil fuels 13.5 68% 
Hydro RES-E 3.2 16% 
Wind RES-E 0.2 1% 
Other RES-E 0.3 1% 
Total 19.9 100% 
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over the period. This is mainly due to a projected 60% increase in coal-fired electricity 
generation emissions between 2005 and 2030 (IEA 2009b: 1, 5).  
The IEA calculates that to stabilise GHG concentrations at about 450 ppm CO2e 
 which it says would limit to 50% the probability that the global average temperature 
will rise by no more than a further 2° C   would require global CO2 emissions to 
peak at 30.9 Gt/yr before 2020 then decline to 26.4 Gt/yr by 2030 (IEA 2009c: 1, 5). 
The Garnaut Climate Change Review (2008a: 206) argued global GHG emissions 
under this scenario would have to be about 20 Gt/yr by 2050 and less than 10 Gt/yr by 
2100. This thesis will also, broadly, use the 450 CO2e ppm long-term GHG 
concentration scenario as the benchmark against which RES-E policy effectiveness 
will be judged although concentrations close to this level are also appropriate. Such a 
GHG reduction benchmark is consistent with the accord adopted at the December 
2009 conference of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). That accord said that it was agreed that deep cuts in global GHG 
emissions would be required ‘with a view to reducing global emissions so as to hold 
the increase in global temperature below two degrees Celsius’ (UNFCCC 2009: 2). 
This GHG reduction benchmark was reaffirmed at the December 2010 UNFCCC 
meeting at which its Cooperative Action Working Group decided that ‘deep cuts in 
global greenhouse gas emissions are required according to science….with a view to 
reducing global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global average 
temperature below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels’ (UNFCCC 2010:2). 
Energy efficiency is capable of delivering a large part of the GHG emissions 
reduction needed for GHG concentrations to stabilise at about 450 CO2e ppm. The 
IEA argues that energy efficiency is the largest contributor to its 450 CO2e ppm 
stabilisation scenario accounting for more than half of the needed global CO2 
emissions reduction. However, its 450 CO2e ppm scenario also assumes that coal-
fired electricity generation will be reduced by half compared to its reference scenario 
(IEA 2009c: 8). Achieving this level of reduction will require significant use of low or 
zero emission electricity generation technologies, including RES-E. In addtion to the 
IEA’s electricity GHG emission reduction scenarios, the significance of RES-E in 
GHG reduction is also demonstrated in Diesendorf (2007a: 19, 20) which maps a 
course for achieving a 30% reduction on Australia’s projected 2020 level of GHG 
emissions. In it, RES-E accounts for 33% of the targeted reduction with energy 
efficiency improvement accounting for a further 20% and reductions in fugitive GHG 
emissions a further 18%. Another way of viewing the GHG reduction effort needed to 
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stabilise global concentrations at about 450 CO2e ppm is provided by Pacala and 
Socolow (2004). They argue that GHG emission reduction strategies can be grouped 
into ‘wedges’, each of which can reduce global emissions by 1 Gt CO2e/yr by 2050. 
If the global GHG emissions growth of the past 30 years continues, they contend that 
seven such wedges will be needed for stabilisation of global GHG concentrations at 
about 450 CO2e ppm. Greater electricity use efficiency in buildings  sufficient to 
reduce building and appliance GHG emissions by quarter over 50 years   makes up 
one of their wedges so use of RES-E, or other types of low emission technology, 
would need to make up a number of the remaining six wedges. 
 
2.2.2 Non RES-E low emission electricity technologies: carbon capture and storage 
and nuclear 
This subsection discusses the status of the two low GHG emission technologies 
that could be used instead of RES-E to reduce global electricity GHG emissions. 
The three main low, or zero, GHG emission electricity generation technologies 
are coal or gas fired generation using carbon capture and storage (CCS), nuclear 
generation and RES-E. Although some types of RES-E are not yet mature (ie have not 
yet achieved significant reductions in their non resource constrained generation costs, 
see ss2.3.3), RES-E is generally more mature than CCS and later-stage nuclear 
technology, as will shortly be shown. Also, as will be discussed in ss2.3.5 to ss2.3.7, 
RES-E is less resource-constrained in the long term. What this subsection therefore 
shows  albeit rather superficially  is that RES-E is generally more available for 
diffusion, and less constrained by long-term resource limits, than CCS or next 
generation nuclear and hence deserves at least as much support as the other two 
technologies. This greater level of commercial readiness and resource availability are 
crucial features of RES-E in terms of GHG reduction, because they mean it can 
replace a lot of fossil fuel electricity generation within a reasonably short time frame 
(and therefore help global GHG emissions to peak within the next decade) and be 
unencumbered by resource limits until it reaches very high levels of generation. 
 Although there are currently some CCS demonstration plants in the world, there 
are no commercial scale plants. There are differing views about when CCS might 
become commercially available. The IPCC (2007b: 285) says CCS deployment is 
‘anticipated from 2015 onwards’ but also says ‘other studies show no significant use 
of CCS until 2050’. The Australian Treasury department’s 2008 modelling of the 
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economics of climate change mitigation (p. 125) assumed CCS will not be ready for 
commercial use until some time between 2020 and 2025. In December 2010, the 
Queensland government announced that it was abandoning its subsidisation of its 
‘Zerogen’ Australian electricity generation CCS project due to cost overruns. Zerogen 
had originally aspired to be the world’s first commercial-scale CCS based electricity 
generator beginning operation in 2015 (Walker 2010). None of these predictions or 
developments fit with the IEA’s argument that global GHG emissions have to peak 
before 2020 if global GHG concentrations are to stabilise at about 450 CO2e ppm. An 
additional problem with CCS in Australia is its storage sites. MacGill et al (2006: 
757) argue that deep saline aquifers offer the best storage sites for CCS emissions but 
that they are poorly understood and could be relatively expensive to use. Mc Neil 
(2009: 135), also argues that, in Australia, only Western Australia and Victoria have 
potential CCS storage sites within 300 km of their fossil-fuel electricity generators.  
Although coal is a relatively abundant resource, it is nonetheless a finite one. It 
has a high level of rapidly increasing consumption, as shown by Figure 2.2, and 
cannot be forever relied upon for electricity generation. Recent increases in global 
coal consumption led to the 32% fall in the global coal reserve to production ratio 
during 1998-2006 shown in Table 2.3. This ratio was derived by adding together 
global deposits of black and brown coal (the latter being much more emission 
intensive, when used in electricity generation, than the former) then dividing by their 
annual consumption. If one assumed that for GHG emission reasons, the electricity 
generation use of brown coal was phased out and that only black coal was used, 
Korpela (2008: 77, 79) has shown that at current rates of consumption there is only 
enough currently identified black coal around the world to last 77 years. Mohr and 
Evans (2009: 1) argue that, like oil production, global coal production will eventually 
peak: they claim this will occur between 2010 and 2048, on a mass basis, and between 
2011 and 2047, on an energy basis.  
 At the current rate of global consumption, world gas supplies are more 
constrained than coal supplies. The IPCC (2007b: 266) says proven global supplies of 
natural gas are currently estimated at 6,500 EJ but current global consumption is about 
100 EJ/yr so at that rate these reserves would last 65 years. 
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Figure 2.2: Global coal consumption, 1980 to 2006 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2008. 
 
Table 2.3: Global coal reserves to production ratio, 1998 to 2006 
Year Reserve to 
production 
ratio: years 
1998 218 
1999 230 
2000 227 
2001 216 
2002 204 
2003 192 
2004 164 
2005 155 
2006 147 
Source: Korpela 2008. 
 
As for nuclear technology, present reactor designs range from Generation I 
(1950s to 1960s) through to Generation III (1990s to present). The IPCC (2007b: 270) 
says new Generation III+ and Generation IV nuclear technologies are being planned 
that promise to deliver lower generation costs, as well as simpler and more effective 
safety systems, compared to earlier generations of nuclear technology. However,  the 
IPCC also says Generation III+ reactors will not become available until the 2010 to 
2020 period while Generation IV reactors will not become available until ‘after about 
2030’. The IPCC has projected that these new types of nuclear reactor will deliver 
significant generating cost reductions but given that the technologies are not yet 
commercially available, it is impossible to be certain that these will occur in time. 
Like CCS technology, the Generation III+ and Generation IV nuclear technologies 
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will not be ready in time to help global GHG emissions to peak, then decline, before 
2020. Generation III technology could be used, however, but it generally has a high 
generating cost. The IPCC (2007b: 271) also argues that the currently identified 
uranium resources suitable for use in light-water reactors at prices up to US$130/t 
should be sufficient for about 100 years’ supply at the 2004 level of consumption. 
Sevior (2006: 866) says that in 2006 the world’s provable uranium reserves equalled 
85 years of supply at the extraction rate that existed at the time. Diesendorf (2007c: 
253) argues that high-grade uranium deposits are very limited and that if nuclear 
energy was expanded to the point where it generated about half the world’s electricity, 
the world’s premium grade deposits would last for no more than about 20 years. 
 The extent of the global coal, gas and uranium resource depends on price, the 
quality and accessibility of the resource, as well as the efficiency and extent of its use. 
Given these variables, it is difficult to be definitive about the number of years of use 
of resource that remain for all three types of the above mentioned fuels but ss2.3.5 to 
ss2.3.7 will show that the Australian RES-E resources of wind, biomass and solar are 
much less constrained in the long term than the fuels used by CCS and nuclear 
techologies. 
 A further disadvantage of nuclear and CCS technologies is their significantly 
higher lifecycle GHG emissions compared to RES-E. As shown in Table 2.4, all  
RES-E technologies have lower lifecycle GHG emissions per unit of generation than 
coal based CCS technology. Also, the mid range of the concentrating solar thermal 
(CST), wind and hydro technology emissions are lower than that for nuclear 
technology. Lifecycle emissions include those associated with construction, operation 
and decommissioning of the generation plants of each technology. 
 
Table 2.4: Lifecycle equivalent CO2 GHG emissions of different electricity 
technologies 
Electricity technology Equivalent 
lifecycle emissions: 
CO2e/kWh 
Solar PV 19–59 
CST 8.5–11.3 
Wind 2.8–7.4 
Geothermal 15.1–55 
Hydro 17–22 
Nuclear 9–70 
Coal CCS 255–442 
Source: Jacobson 2008. 
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2.2.3 Australia’s GHG emissions and the significance of its electricity GHG 
emissions 
Australia has a high level of per capita GHG emissions, a large proportion of 
which is made up of electricity generation emissions (Garnaut 2008a). This means 
that, if the country is to make deep cuts in its overall GHG emissions, it will have to 
make deep cuts in its electricity generation GHG emissions. Australia also has a high 
relative level of coal-based electricity generation, and a low level of RES-E 
generation, so there is significant capacity for deep GHG cuts through radical RES-E 
expansion in the country. 
In overall terms, Australia is not one of the world’s dominant GHG emitters: in 
2005 its non-landuse change GHG emissions of 549 Mt CO2e/yr were equal to 1.45% 
of the world’s total GHG emissions. However, despite the country’s small 
contribution, in 2005 it was still the seventeenth largest GHG emitter in the world 
(WRI 2009). In 2006, Australia’s per capita GHG emissions, including landuse 
change, of 28 t CO2e/yr were the sixth highest in the world: equal to more than four 
times the global average per capita level of GHG emission and nearly twice the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) per capita average 
(Garnuat 2008a: 153). Not only does Australia have high per capita GHG emissions, 
its economy has a relatively high GHG intensity as well. The GHG intensity of 
Australia’s economy is less worse than its per capita GHG emissions compared to 
other developed countries, but is still high. Figure 2.3 shows the GHG intensity of all 
OECD countries in 2005 in terms of CO2e released per US$1m of GDP. Australia’s 
economy (in red) was the most GHG-intensive of all economies belonging to the 
OECD that year being 70% more GHG intense than the (unweighted) OECD average 
(in yellow) (WRI 2009). This means that most of Australia’s greater per capita GHG 
emissions, compared to the OECD average, are due to the greater GHG intensity of its 
economy rather than its greater affluence. 
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Figure 2.3: GHG emission intensity of OECD economies, 2005 
 
Source: WRI 2009. 
 
As shown in Figure 2.4, electricity generation is a major contributor to 
Australia’s high relative level of GHG emissions. In 2009, it accounted for 38% of the 
country’s net national emissions (excluding land use, land use change and forestry) of 
537 Mt CO2e/yr (Department of Climate Change (DCC) 2010: 3) and it is one of the 
country’s fastest growing emission sources. In 1990, electricity generation accounted 
for 129 MtCO2e/yr, or 31% of the nation’s net GHG emissions of 416 MtCO2e/yr 
(DCC 2008a: 2). This means between 1990 and 2009 Australia’s net national GHG 
emissions increased by 28% while its electricity generation emissions increased by 
57%, about double the rate of its overall national GHG emission increase. 
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Figure 2.4: Australia’s non-land clearing GHG emissions,  
1990 and 2009 
 
 
Source: DCC 2010. 
 
In 2000, electricity generation was a larger percentage contributor to Australia’s 
GHG emissions than it was to the GHG emissions of any other OECD country. Figure 
2.5 shows the proportion of national GHG emissions contributed by electricity 
generation for all OECD countries. Electricity accounted for 36% of Australia’s net 
GHG emissions in 2000, twice the (unweighted) OECD average that year of 18%  
(WRI 2009, IEA 2009d). This means there is a stronger comparative case for 
reduction of electricity GHG emissions in Australia than in any other OECD country 
(all other things being equal). 
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Figure 2.5: Proportion of OECD nations’ GHG emissions accounted for by 
electricity generation, 2000 
 
Source: WRI 2009, IEA 2009d. 
 
The high contribution of electricity generation to Australia’s GHG emissions is 
mainly caused by the high GHG intensity of its electricity supply. The GHG 
emissions intensity of Australia’s electricity supply is the highest of any country in the 
OECD. In 2000, it took 0.86 kg of CO2 to generate each MWh of electricity in the 
country: 2.4 times the OECD average that year of 0.35 kg (WRI 2009). The 
significantly higher GHG intensity of Australia’s electricity supply, compared to the 
OECD average, is a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1971, the GHG intensity of 
Australia’s primary energy supply was similar to the OECD average (Garnaut 2008a: 
153). This means the influences that have made electricity a large contributor to 
Australia’s GHG emissions have become more pronounced in the last two decades of 
the 20th century. These two influences are mainly (but not exclusively) its dependence 
on coal, and its relatively low use of RES-E for electricity generation. As shown in 
Figure 2.6, in 2006, Australia was the second-most coal-dependent OECD country (in 
percentage terms) for electricity generation. In that year coal (both black and brown 
(lignite)) supplied 76% of the country’s electricity generation compared to an OECD 
(unweighted) country average of 37%.  
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Figure 2.6: The percentage of electricity generated by coal in OECD countries, 
2006. 
 
Source: IEA 2009d. 
 
Figure 2.7 shows that in 2006 Australia’s use of RES-E was significantly lower 
than the country average for the OECD. In that year, 7.6% of Australia’s electricity 
generation was supplied by RES-E compared to an OECD (unweighted) country 
average of 16.4%. As discussed later in ss5.2.2, the proportion of Australia’s 
electricity supplied by RES-E declined from 23% in 1965 to 9% in 2000 (MRET 
Review Panel 2003: 10). This reduction contributed to both Australia’s comparatively 
low RES-E electricity generation share, as well as to its relatively high GHG intensity 
of electricity generation. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show there is scope for Australia to 
reduce its electricity generation GHG emissions through greater use of RES-E, at least 
in comparison to other OECD countries.  
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Figure 2.7: The percentage of electricity generated by renewable energy in 
OECD countries, 2006. 
 
Source: IEA 2009d. 
 
A further contributing factor to the significant proportion of GHG emissions 
accounted for by electricity generation in Australia is the relatively low cost of its 
electricity. Low cost discourages efficient electricity use. Figure 2.8 compares the 
industrial retail electricity price in Australia (averaged across all states and territories) 
with other OECD countries in 2004. In that year, Australia’s price was the ninth 
lowest in the OECD and was 84% of the (unweighted) average for the group. 
Assuming similar mark-ups between wholesale and retail electricity prices in each 
country, as well as a roughly equivalent cost of RES-E in each, this means RES-E in 
Australia faces a larger price disadvantage, and therefore requires a more generous 
mechanism to overcome its generation cost gap with non-RES-E electricity, than in 
most other OECD countries.  
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Figure 2.8: OECD retail industrial electricity prices, 2004. 
 
Source: IEA 2009a. 
 
 
2.2.4 Australia’s unusual electricity infrastructure and institutional characteristics 
This subsection discuses the infrastructure and institutional factors that make 
Australia’s electricity sectors different to those of other developed countries. 
There are a number of unusual characteristics of Australia’s electricity sector 
that have to be kept in mind when comparing it to other developed countries. One is 
that, physically, the country has limited hydro generating potential which, as ss2.3.5 
will make clear, has been largely exploited. ‘Generating potential’ is an expression of 
the theoretical potential of a fuel to generate electricity: it is broadly indicative of the 
extent to which RES-E generation, in particular, can increase before it meets 
significant rising generation costs as a result of increasing resource scarcity (discussed 
later in ss2.3.4). Also, Australia also has no history of electricity generation through 
nuclear generation and the current federal government is opposed to nuclear 
generation development. A very significant additional physical factor is that Australia 
has large reserves of coal which, at current rates of extraction, will last 100 years in 
the case of black coal, and 500 years in the case of brown coal (Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) 2009a: 4).  
At an infrastructure and institutional level, Australia has a tradition of planning 
its electricity sector at a state and territory level instead of at a national level. As 
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discussed in chapter 5, this has significantly affected the development of its 
transmission infrastructure as well as the implementation of electricity policy. 
Electricity tariffs, for instance, are still determined by state and territory jurisdictions 
and are not set nationally. 
 However, one has to also consider other unusual Australian elements against 
these physical, infrastructural and institutional factors. As will be discussed in ss2.3.5 
to ss2.3.7, Australia has a significant RES-E generating potential that is much larger 
than that of many other developed countries and that is much larger than its current 
level of electricity generation. Also, as discussed in ss5.2.2, Australia has had a 
national RES-E support mechanism in operation since 2001 which straddles all its 
state and territory jurisdictions. In addition, the country has had a national electricity 
demand market since 1998 (which excludes Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory) which has stimulated extra transmission capacity between state and territory 
electricity grids. Basically, Australia has some physical and historical institutional 
influences which have led to it being a large GHG per capita emitter. However, it also 
has other physical and newer institutional influences which could enable it to become 
a much lower electricity sector GHG emitter. 
 
 
2.2.5 The place of RES-E in Australian GHG emission reduction 
This subsection discusses two projections of Australia’s electricity generation 
mix under an international regime designed to limit global warming to 2°C or less. 
The two projections validate this thesis’s argument that radical RES-E expansion is 
likely to play a significant part in an effort in Australia to source deep GHG emission 
cuts; they also quantify how much RES-E generation would be needed under such a 
regime. Only the broad conclusions from both the projections are presented, and the 
detailed data and arguments behind them are not available publicly, so I could not 
compare these studies against my own data and arguments above. 
Given the high GHG emissions intensity of Australia’s electricity supply, as 
well as the large proportion of the country’s GHG emissions it accounts for, it is 
unsurprising that the electricity sector is seen as a major source of potential GHG 
emissions reduction in the country. Figures 2.9 to 2.11 show two electricity emission 
reduction scenarios for Australia consistent with achieving a long-term stabilisation of 
global GHG concentrations at about 450 CO2e ppm. The 2008 Garnaut Climate 
Change Review argued Australia’s proportionate contribution to such a scenario, 
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consistent with long-term convergence of global per capita GHG emission 
entitlements, was a 25% reduction on the country’s 2000-01 level of GHG emissions 
by 2020 and a 90% reduction by 2050 (Garnaut 2008a: 209). Figure 2.9 shows a 
generation and demand reduction scenario for the Australian electricity sector 
consistent with such a reduction. Communication with the person responsible for its 
development revealed that it was generated by a model that projected future RES-E, 
and non-RES-E, electricity generation costs under an assumption that investment 
would always be drawn to the lowest-cost forms of generation. Figure 2.9, an 
Australian 450 CO2e ppm electricity GHG reduction scenario developed by the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), shows 
electricity generation GHG emissions to be nearly zero by 2050, with about 30% of 
the emissions reduction from the reference case achieved through demand reduction, 
about 40% achieved through RES-E generation, with the balance achieved through 
use of coal and gas generation using CCS. 
 
Figure 2.9: Australian electricity generation GHG emission reductions under a 
450 ppm CO2e regime as developed by CSIRO. 
 
Source: Graham and Wright 2009. 
 
 
Figure 2.10 shows the CSIRO’s projected Australian electricity generation mix 
under its 450 CO2e ppm scenario. It shows total electricity generation of about 420 
TWh/yr by 2050, about three-quarters of which would be generated by RES-E. Within 
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the projected 2050 RES-E generation, about a quarter would be generated by wind 
and about 40%  by solar (both solar PV and CST). 
 
Figure 2.10: Australian electricity generation mix under a 450 ppm CO2e regime 
as developed by the CSIRO. 
 
Source: Hayward et al 2011. 
 
 
Figure 2.11 shows another RES-E generation scenario developed by McLennan, 
Magasanik Associates (MMA) for Australia’s Treasury in 2008 under another 450 
CO2e ppm scenario. Its overall electricity sector generation mix under this scenario 
assumed a lower total 2050 level of electricity generation than the CSIRO’s: 338 
TWh/yr (MMA 2008b: 37). It also projected a lower proportion would be generated 
by RES-E: about 50% (with the balance generated by coal and gas using CCS). 
Within the RES-E generation, it assumed most of the generation would come from 
geothermal and wind rather than solar and wind as the CSIRO assumed (MMA 2008c: 
15). 
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Figure 2.11: Australian RES-E generation mix under a 450 ppm CO2e regime as 
developed by MMA. 
 
Source: MMA 2008c. 
 
 
Despite their differences, the CSIRO and MMA both assume RES-E will 
generate at least half of Australia’s electricity by 2050 under a 450 CO2e ppm 
scenario. As shown in Table 2.5, in 2008, RES-E generated 6.8% of all the country’s 
electricity. Radical RES-E expansion would obviously be needed, then, to expand 
form this generation share to more than 50% over the next 40 years. 
 
Table 2.5: Proportion of Australia’s electricity generated by fossil fuels and  
RES-E, 2008. 
 
Fuel 2008 generation: 
TWh/yr 
% of total 
generation 
Black coal 143 54.0% 
Brown coal 60 22.6% 
Oil 2 0.8% 
Natural gas 42 15.8% 
RES-E 18 6.8% 
Total 265 100.0% 
Source: ABARE 2010c. 
 
As shown in Table 2.6, projections by the CSIRO of an Australian 2020 
electricity mix consistent with  450 CO2e ppm GHG stabilisation show a significant 
rise in the country’s RES-E generation share. The Table 2.6 2020 RES-E generation 
share includes an assumption, made by the author, that hydro generation will remain 
at the level of output (in MWh terms) that it had in 2007-08. The CSIRO’s 450 CO2e 
ppm projections incorporate the Renewable Energy Target’s (Australia’s RPS from 
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2009 to 2010) 2020 RES-E target, a carbon price consistent with a 25% reduction in 
Australia’s 2000 GHG emissions by 2020 (the GHG reduction needed for a 450 CO2e 
ppm stabilisation), and its forecasts of changes in electricity technology generation 
costs.  
 
Table 2.6: 2007-08 and projected 2020 and 2050 Australian electricity generation 
shares considered by the CSIRO to be consistent with 450 CO2e ppm 2020 GHG 
stabilisation scenarios  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ABARE 2010b, Graham and Wright 2009. 
 
 
It is a central argument of this thesis that the use of RES-E technology is one of 
the most significant ways in which Australia can make deep enough cuts in its 
electricity GHG emissions soon enough for it to play a commensurate part in a 450 
CO2e pm GHG concentration stabilisation regime. The central question this thesis will 
attempt to answer is whether Australia’s current RES-E policy settings are sufficient for 
it to be able to reach the type of 2020 RES-E generation shares projected by the CSIRO 
and MMA consistent with a global regime of stabilising GHG emissions at about 450 
CO2e ppm.  
The next section examines the part that RES-E subsidisation can play in the type 
of radical RES-E expansion suggested by the CSIRO and MMA and the part that 
current and future RES-E generating costs will play in it. 
Fuel 2007-08 
electricity 
generation 
shares 
2020 450 CO2e 
ppm electricity 
generation shares 
projected by the 
CSIRO 
2050 450 CO2e 
ppm electricity 
generation 
shares projected 
by the CSIRO 
Fossil fuels 92.8% 73.3% 22.5% 
Solar 0% 2.1% 31.1% 
Geothermal 0% 4.0% 19.0% 
Wind 1.6% 8.9% 19.4% 
Hydro 4.8% 3.9% 2.2% 
Biomass 0.8% 7.8% 5.1% 
Total RES-E 7.2% 26.7% 77.5% 
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2.3 The aims, costs and justification of RES-E support in Australia 
As shown in the CSIRO and MMA projections, there are several different types 
of RES-E, and they are at different stages of commercial readiness (maturity), but all 
have current generating costs higher than that of fossil fuel generated electricity 
without a carbon price. This section discusses the current and future costs of RES-E in 
Australia, and the part that RES-E subsidisation can play in its radical expansion.  
 
2.3.1 Aims of RES-E support  
Different commentators have developed a range of different aims for RES-E 
support. Included amongst these have been: 
● to support RES-E technological progress (Sanden and Azar 2005, Jaffe et al 
2005); 
● to achieve GHG emission reduction targets at lowest public cost (Menanteau et 
al 2003); 
● to help correct electricity market failures, including ‘free-riding’/knowledge 
spillover market failures (Jaffe et al 2005); 
● to support RES-E diffusion (Menanteau et al 2003); 
● to improve the competitiveness of RES-E (Menanteau et al 2003); 
● to exploit ‘learning curve’ RES-E generation cost reductions (Nemet 2006, Neij 
2008, Mc Donald and Schrattenholzer 2001, Junginger et al 2005, Papineau 
2006); 
● to achieve an effective allocation of surpluses and savings between RES-E 
producers and consumers (Menanteau et al 2003); 
● to achieve RES-E technological diversity (Awerbuch 2006, Li 2005); 
● to avoid electricity technological ‘lock-in’ (Sanden and Azar 2005); 
● to minimise electricity price and supply volatility (Awerbuch 2006, Li 2005, 
Sonneborn 2004); and 
● to compensate for low emissions trading carbon prices (Blanco and Rodrigues 
2008). 
Many of these aims overlap and are of different orders of importance to others. 
This thesis will assume the following hierarchy of aims. 
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 The most important aim  the ultimate aim of RES-E support mechanisms  is 
to minimise the total discounted social cost over the long run of achieving a given 
amount of GHG emission reduction in the electricity sector through the use of RES-E. 
This means achieving deep cuts in GHG emissions through radical RES-E expansion 
at lowest possible discounted cost over the long term. Generally, the principal aim of 
GHG reduction policy is to achieve optimum, long-term, cost-effective reductions in 
GHG emissions. Given the large proportion of Australia’s GHG emissions accounted 
for by electricity, in the country this can reasonably be interpreted to mean achieving 
a given total cut in electricity GHG cost-effectively. Using the arguments of s2.2.5 
about the place of RES-E in Australian GHG reduction, this could be further 
interpreted to mean minimising the cost of reducing electricity GHG reductions 
through the use of RES-E. Renewable energy can be used in transport, direct 
combustion and electricity generation in Australia, all of which generate significant 
GHG emissions. Since this thesis focuses on the use of renewable energy in electricity 
generation, the minimisation of the cost of using renewable energy in electricity 
generation is its principal aim. Although supply security is a major reason for 
supporting RES-E in North America and Europe, this is not a priority in coal-
abundant Australia, but reduction of GHG emissions is, particularly given the 
country’s very high per capita GHG emissions (see ss2.2.3 above). 
 Energy policy in general, and RES-E support policy in particular, can be 
analysed through many different perspectives, which have many different aims, of 
which only one is minimising the total discounted social cost over the long run of 
achieving a given amount of GHG emission reduction in the electricity sector through 
the use of RES-E. This thesis does not attempt to cover a broad range of energy 
policy, or RES-E policy, perspectives and is narrowly cast principally around the 
RES-E policy design needed in Australia to significantly increase its generation of 
RES-E through use of subsidies financed from electricity tariffs. This does not mean 
that other ways of analysing energy, electricity and/or RES-E policy, as applied either 
in Australia or around the world, are not valid, but it does mean that the policy scope 
of this thesis is limited.  
The next six subsections present a case for supporting RES-E in Australia and 
for providing greater support to less mature types of RES-E in the country than to 
mature ones.  
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2.3.2 The different types and costs of Australian RES-E 
There are six broad types of RES-E in Australia: 
 1. hydro; 
 2. biomass; 
 3. wind; 
 4. solar; 
 5. hot rock geothermal; and 
 6. ocean. 
 As shown in Table 2.7, hydro currently dominates Australian RES-E generating 
capacity, with wind and biomass having the next largest, though much smaller, shares. 
 
Table 2.7: Generating capacity of different RES-E types in Australia, 2009. 
RES-E technology Capacity: MW % of total 
capacity 
Hydro 7,938.0 80.00% 
Wind 1,272.0 13.00% 
Biomass – bagasse 
and landfill 
604.0 6.00% 
Biomass – other 127.0 1.00% 
Solar photovoltaic 4.2 .04% 
Geothermal 0.1 ~0.00% 
Total 9,945.3 100.04% 
                                                            Source: Needham 2009. 
 
At the moment RES-E generates a small proportion of all of Australia’s 
electricity, as shown in Table 2.5, with most generated by black and brown coal. In 
2007-08, 76% of Australia’s electricity (grid and off-grid) was generated by coal and 
7.5% was generated by RES-E (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics 2010c). 
As shown in Figure 2.12, the major non-hydro types of RES-E currently have a 
higher generating cost than fossil fuel generated electricity in Australia (without a 
carbon cost included). The generating costs in Figure 2.12 assume the use of premium 
(ie high quality) resources unconstrained by long-term supply limits and therefore at 
an early stage of their marginal cost curves. Marginal cost is the cost of generating the 
last unit of a generator’s output. Whilst RES-E fuel costs are lower than they are for 
fossil fuel generated electricity, with the exception of biomass, and RES-E operating 
and maintenance costs are not a lot higher, RES-E capital costs are significantly 
higher. None of the costs shown in Figure 2.12 include transmission. 
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Figure 2.12: Australian fossil fuel and RES-E generating costs, 2008 
 
Source: Graham et al 2008. 
 
 
As will be further discussed in ss2.3.5 to ss2.3.7, Australia has significant  
RES-E generating potential but, unlike its coal based electricity generating stations, it 
is dispersed across its land mass. A sense of this is given in Figure 2.13 which shows 
the location of the nation’s current RES-E generating stations. This dispersal has 
significant implications for the country’s transmission infrastructure, discussed in 
s5.6.  
Before discussing the generating potentials of different types of RES-E in 
Australia, it is important to discuss why RES-E support is justified in principle. This 
will be done in the following two subsections, ss2.3.3 and ss2.3.4, before turning to 
discussion of Australian RES-E generating potentials in ss2.3.5 to ss2.3.7. 
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Figure 2.13:  RES-E power stations in Australia, 2007 
 
Source: Singh 2008. 
 
NT: Northern Territory, WA: Western Australia, QLD: Queensland, 
SA: South Australia, VIC: Victoria, TAS: Tasmania, NSW: New South Wales 
 
 
 
2.3.3 Justification of general RES-E support: bringing forward reductions in  
RES-E generating costs 
A major advantage of RES-E support is that it can help bring forward RES-E 
cost reductions. This is important because such cost reductions allow radical RES-E 
expansion at lower cost, making it more likely that it can play a significant part in 
reducing global GHG emissions after peaking the emissions by 2020. This is 
particularly important in Australia whose electricity generation is dominated by coal 
(as shown in Table 2.5) which costs significantly less than its RES-E (as shown in 
Figure 2.12). RES-E will also bring forward the time when RES-E support is no 
longer needed. The bringing of RES-E capital cost reductions introduces dynamic 
efficiency into GHG reduction: the sustaining of increased short-term cost so that 
long-term costs can be reduced. Dynamic efficiency needs to be contrasted against 
static efficiency: the minimisation of short-term costs, regardless of long-term 
consequences. It needs to be remembered, however, that fossil fuel electricity 
generation is also expected to experience decreased generating costs and that not all 
RES-E types will necessarily decrease their generating costs at a faster rate than fossil 
fuel technologies. As shown in Figure 2.14, the IEA project that offshore wind and 
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biomass will reduce their generating costs between 2010 and 2050 at roughly the 
same rate as fossil fuel electricity technologies, but onshore wind, solar PV and CST 
are projected to decrease their generating costs at a faster rate. 
 
 
Figure 2.14: IEA 2010 and projected 2050 fossil fuel and RES-E generating costs  
 
Source: IEA 2010. 
 
 
Evidence that bringing forward RES-E cost reductions can bring forward the 
time when RES-E support is no longer needed can be found in Germany. The German 
government expects the total cost of its RES-E support to peak at €6.2 billion in 2015 
(2007 prices) after which it is expected to fall to less than €0.5 billion by 2030 (BMU 
2007a: 12). There are two main forces behind the expected reduction. Firstly, the 
government expects both onshore and offshore wind to become competitive with non-
RES-E electricity so they will be able to compete with it without any RES-E support 
(after about 2016 in the case of onshore wind). Secondly, degression (the progressive 
reduction in RES-E support rates as new, more productive RES-E technology is 
installed) is expected to lower the level of support over time. It is important for RES-E 
support to be eventually phased out. If an eventual phaseout is not planned, RES-E 
developers have no incentive to become competitive with fossil-fuel generated 
electricity with fully effective carbon pricing and, as a result, will only be able to 
increase generation shares through ongoing use of RES-E support mechanisms. 
The main driver of future RES-E generating cost reductions is economies of 
scale (ie cost reductions that come with increased volume including increased 
production knowledge). Such economies are known as ‘learning curve’ economies. 
The learning curve theory was first developed by Arrow (1962). Figure 2.15 compares 
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the changes in the generating cost of different RES-E and non-RES-E generating 
technologies with each doubling of generation. The bracketed numbers in the figure 
show the speed of cost reduction (ie the speed of learning): 65% means, for instance, 
that unit costs are 65% of the previous level after a doubling of production. These cost 
reduction rates drive down the capital running cost components shown in Figure 2.12. 
Note these are past costs, and not future costs, but also note that their geographical 
applicability is not stated. In Figure 2.15, supercritical coal and natural gas combined 
cycle (NGCC) are mature electricity generation technologies because a doubling of 
output produces a negligible change in generating cost. However solar PV, wind 
power and biomass are all relatively immature because, in each case, a doubling of 
output produces major generating cost reductions.  
 
Figure 2.15: Changes in electricity technology costs with a doubling of output 
 
Source: Stern 2008. 
 
 The rate of learning curve cost reduction largely depends on the stage of 
technological development an energy technology has reached: it would normally be 
expected that energy technologies at early stages of development can achieve higher 
learning curve cost reductions than ones at later stages of development. The six types of 
RES-E referred to in ss2.3.1 are at very different stages of development and maturity as 
shown in Table 2.8. The classifications and the reasons behind each of them (apart from 
ocean) are discussed in ss2.3.5 and ss2.3.6. The order of classifications, from the most 
developed to the least developed, is: commercial, supported commercial, pre 
commercial, demonstration.  
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Table 2.8: Stages of development of different RES-E types 
RES-E type Stage of development Maturity level 
Hydro Commercial Late stage mature 
Onshore wind Supported commercial Early stage mature 
Biomass Supported commercial Early stage mature 
Solar PV Supported commercial Early stage mature 
Concentrating solar thermal Pre commercial Immature 
Hydro thermal geothermal Commercial Late stage mature 
Hot rock geothermal Demonstration Immature 
Ocean Demonstration Immature 
Source: Foxon et al 2005, author classifications. 
 
It cannot be assumed, however, that RES-E generating costs necessarily have a 
medium to long term future of falling generating costs, even if they are currently 
immature, as might be interpreted from Figure 2.15. This is because, eventually, 
different types of RES-E face resource constraints as premium sites and/or fuels etc 
run out; this has already happened with hydro in Australia. As shown in Figure 2.16 
(in relation to wind), all regions of the world have RES-E generation costs that 
eventually experience steeply rising marginal costs because of exhaustion of premium 
resources. However, Hoogwijk et al (2004) believe most regions of the world only 
experience sharply increasing marginal costs when generation volumes reach very 
high levels. The existence of potential long-term marginal cost increases for the early 
stage mature RES-E types such as wind and biomass qualifies the learning curve 
understanding of long-term energy price movements. Several observers have 
questioned the unqualified use of energy learning curves (Nemet 2006, Papineau 
2006, Neij 2008, Junginger et al 2005). Junginger et al (2005: 136) argue ‘the 
explanatory and predictive power of experience curves is limited’. Learning curve 
analysis necessarily has to take account of potential long-run resource constraint: it is 
applicable only if such constraints will be reached after very large increases in 
generation which do not affect current, or near term, RES-E generating costs. 
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Figure 2.16: The regional long-run marginal costs of wind generation around the 
world 
 
Source: Hoogwijk et al 2004. 
 
The long-term potential for resource constraints to eventually increase the price 
of RES-E is also encapsulated in Table 2.9 which shows solar PV generating costs 
around the world falling between 2010 and 2050 but the upper end of the global cost 
range of more resource constrained wind and biomass costs rising between 2030 and 
2050. 
 
Table 2.9: Estimates of the future global generating cost ranges of wind,  
solar PV and biomass electricity  
 
RES-E type Current 
generation 
cost 
(US$/kWh) 
Short term 
(2010-2020) 
generation cost 
(US$/kWh) 
Medium term 
(2030) 
generation 
cost  
(US$/kWh) 
Long term 
(2050) 
generation 
cost 
 (US$/kWh) 
Wind 0.05-0.13 0.03-0.08 0.03-0.05 0.03-0.10 
Solar PV 0.25-1.25 0.25-0.40 0.15-0.30 0.06-0.25 
Biomass 0.05-0.10 0.03-0.08 0.03-0.04 0.03-0.10 
Source: De Vries et al 2007. 
 
Exhaustion of premium sites and resources is not the only influence that can 
increase RES-E generating costs, in spite of falling capital costs. Access to 
transmission can also affect the cost of RES-E, particularly if new transmission has to 
be built to enable RES-E to be generated. In some cases, it will be too expensive to 
build new transmission which might mean that some remote types of RES-E, such as 
solar and geothermal, might face rising costs quite early in their development as 
affordable transmission is exhausted. The implications of transmission access for 
RES-E in Australia are discussed in s5.6.  
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2.3.4 Justification of differentiated RES-E support: avoiding high marginal costs of 
mature RES-E types 
As will be detailed in ss2.3.5 to ss2.3.7, the most mature non-hydro RES-E 
technologies  wind and biomass  have more limited generating potentials, and are 
therefore more likely to face early rising marginal costs, than the less mature non-
hydro RES-E technologies of solar and geothermal, especially in Australia. This 
means RES-E support mechanisms risk pushing these more mature technologies into 
high marginal cost generation before they start supporting less mature RES-E 
technologies if they provide the same level of support to all types of RES-E (given 
that less mature types of RES-E have higher current generating costs than more 
mature types, as shown in Figure 2.12).  As already discussed in ss2.3.3, the marginal 
costs of the more mature RES-E technologies can be expected to rise as their premium 
resources (high quality wind sites, biomass feedstock, good hydro sites etc) become 
exhausted. Figure 2.17 shows, in simplified form, the general case for using RES-E 
support mechanisms to drive the development of immature RES-E technologies in 
Australia with greater support given to immature RES-E types than to mature types. It 
was developed with the assistance of my supervisor, Dr Jack Pezzey. A targeted  
RES-E support mechanism aimed at the diffusion of less mature RES-E types (solar 
and hot rock geothermal in Australia) can begin pushing them down their cost curves 
without first driving wind and biomass generation into high marginal cost. This may 
come at significant public cost, however, and the potential reaction to this has to be 
balanced against the potential reaction to high wind and biomass marginal cost 
generation. RES-E mechanisms targeted at the higher cost RES-E types nonetheless 
have the potential to deliver an overall saving in RES-E development costs.  
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Immature RES-E: 
solar and hot rock 
geothermal in 
Australia 
QW QS QS' QW' 0 
C, long-run marginal 
cost of generation 
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Q, generation 
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Mature RES-E: wind, 
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Australia 
Figure 2.17: RES-E cost performance with and without early forced development 
of solar/geothermal sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The two curves, CWA'A and CSBB', show two different, general ways of how the 
long-run marginal cost of RES-E may change as Q, the total rate at which electricity is 
generated, expands over time in order to generate significant amounts of RES-E. 
CWA'A, represents mature technologies which, on the scale of generation relevant to 
major amounts of RES-E generation, start out with slightly falling generating costs 
thanks to learning curve cost reductions. However, beyond a certain point, such falling 
costs are outweighed by diminishing returns from resource limits. CSBB', represents 
immature RES-E technologies, where generation costs are initially much higher than 
mature technologies (at CS rather than CW). From this point, thanks to learning curve 
cost reductions, significant falls in costs (to C') will occur. Once generation reaches 
level QS , generation costs become broadly constant, rather than diminishing over the 
range shown. In the case of Australian solar and geothermal, this is because of the 
large amount of quality sunshine and hot dry rock resource available, resulting in the 
constant cost curve BB' shown beyond generation level QS (see ss2.3.6). 
With such cost curves, we can then compare two different policy paths which 
each achieve a total generation amount of QW + QS over a certain period of time. In 
Path 1, defined as ending at points A and B, the RES-E support policy maintains 
policy neutrality between technologies (ie does not discriminate between 
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technologies). An increasing demand therefore increases the cost of RES-E. This 
happens, firstly, by mature generation expanding through A' up to QW  at  A. At this 
point, the mature generation cost has increased to CS, so that immature technologies 
instead start expanding, reducing their long-run marginal cost to C' as their generation 
expands to QS. In the alternative Path 2, defined as ending at points A' and B', before 
mature generation volumes reach the point A', targeted RES-E policies start forcing 
immature generation to expand from CS down towards B. Under this path, mature 
generation expands no further than A' (generation amount QW'), and immature 
generation expands instead to QS' at B', where QW' + QS' = QW + QS. In either path, the 
economy must pay the immature development cost of area Y; but Path 2 avoids the 
extra cost, X, of establishing high-cost, marginal mature capacity that is first needed 
in Path 1 to trigger the onset of immature development.  
An advantage of Path 2 is that it avoids the use of high marginal cost mature 
capacity which may bring with it significant political cost. This happens if the 
marginal cost of mature technologies rises too high, which increases the electricity 
bills of electricity consumers, possibly creating a public backlash. However, the 
potential for such a backlash needs to be balanced against the public cost of expanding 
immature generation from CS down towards B, so that mature generation expands no 
further than A'. This also has the potential to create an adverse public reaction, though 
it should not be as bad if area Y remains smaller than area X. However, this diagram 
omits a key factor that needs to be considered. On Path 2, the immature development 
cost must be expended earlier, which increases its net present value, because it is less 
discounted.  
As discussed in ss2.3.5 and ss2.3.6, the generating potentials of hydro, wind, 
biomass, solar and hot rock geothermal in Australia fit the two curves, CWA'A and 
CSBB'. Wind, biomass and hydro in Australia fit curve CWA'A because, as shown in 
Table 2.13, they have significantly smaller generating potentials in Australia than 
solar and hot rock geothermal. Also, as shown in Table 2.8, wind, hydro and biomass 
are all at either a commercial, or supported commercial stage of development. 
Similarly, solar and hot rock geothermal in Australia fit curve CSBB' because, as 
shown in Table 2.13, solar and hot rock geothermal have significantly larger 
generating potentials in Australia than hydro, wind and biomass. Also, as shown in 
Table 2.8, hot rock geothermal is at a demonstration stage while CST is at a pre 
commercial stage (although solar PV is at a supported commercial stage). The 
following two subsections discuss the different levels of maturity, generating 
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potentials and generating marginal costs faced by the various RES-E types in 
Australia. The subsections give justification to the contention that the mature RES-E 
types of wind, biomass and hydro, and the immature types of hot rock geothermal and 
solar, fit the marginal cost curve described in Figure 2.17 and that there is therefore a 
case for providing greater support to the immature types than to the mature ones, at 
least in Australia. 
An Australian emissions trading scheme (ETS: where tradable GHG emission 
permits are required for emissions within government determined limits) is not likely 
to provide the RES-E support described by Figure 2.17. As detailed in s5.4, in 2009, 
the Australian government proposed a type of ETS that would reduce the country’s 
GHG emissions by between 5% and 25% of 2000 emissions by 2020. As also detailed 
in s5.4, such an ETS is unlikely to commence in the country before 2012. Table 2.10 
takes the prices per tonne of released CO2e that Treasury (2008) said would be 
associated with cuts of 5%, 15% and 25% of 2000 emissions by 2020 under an 
Australian ETS design that allowed unlimited use of overseas derived emission 
licences. The table shows that even the price associated with a 25% reduction would 
not make the generating cost of CST competitive with any type of fossil fuel 
generated electricity and would only make hot rock geothermal’s generating cost  
competitive with brown coal generation. The table also shows that none of the RES-E 
types would become competitive with fossil fuel generation with the permit prices 
associated with a 5% or 15% reduction. 
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Table 2.10: 2007 fossil fuel and RES-E generating costs with carbon costs 
associated with zero, 5%, 15% and 25% Australian GHG reductions by 2020 
Electricity 
generation 
technology 
GHG emission 
intensity: 
tCO2e/MWh 
(1) 
Generating 
cost without 
carbon price: 
A$/MWh (2) 
Generating 
cost with 5% 
cut by 2020 
carbon price 
A$/MWh (3) 
Generating 
cost with 15% 
cut by 2020 
carbon price 
A$/MWh (4) 
Generating 
cost with 25% 
cut by 2020 
carbon price 
A$/MWh (5) 
Black coal 0.9 $38 $59 $67 $85 
Brown coal 1.2 $35 $63 $73 $97 
Gas 0.6 $44 $58 $63 $75 
Wind 0 $79 $79 $79 $79 
Solar thermal 0 $156 $156 $156 $156 
Biomass 0.15 $82 $85 $87 $90 
Hot rock 
geothermal 
0 $89 $89 $89 $89 
Source: CSIRO 2006 (col. 1), Graham et al 2008 (col. 2), author calculations (cols. 3, 4 and 5). 
 
 
2.3.5 The Australian generating potential of hydro, wind and biomass 
The last two subsections set out the general, in-principle case for RES-E support 
(in ss2.3.3) and for differentiated RES-E support (in ss2.3.4). As mentioned at the end 
of ss2.3.2, this chapter now turns to discussion of the generating potentials, and levels 
of maturity, of specific types of RES-E in Australia. The discussion in this subsection 
and ss2.3.6 and ss2.3.7 validates the assertions made in ss2.3.2 to ss2.3.4, particularly 
in relation to the different generating potentials and levels of maturity of different 
types of RES-E. This subsection, and ss2.3.6 and ss2.3.7, should be read in 
conjunction with Figure 2.13 which shows the broad geographic location of different 
types of RES-E resources around Australia.  
Hydro power has been used to generate electricity in Australia since 1895 when 
the Duck Reach power station opened near Launceston, Tasmania. After significant 
development throughout the twentieth century, particularly in the Snowy Mountains 
and Tasmania, this RES-E type is thought to have little, if any, scope for significant 
expansion in the country, apart from small hydro development (Needham 2009: 15, 
16, Harries et al 2006a: 805). However, there is some scope for the output from 
existing large hydro schemes to be marginally increased through refurbishment 
(Harries et al 2006a: 805). Using the definitions of the stages of technological 
development formulated by Foxon et al (2005: 2126, 2127), hydro can be classed as 
‘commercial’, ie able to compete with fossil fuel technologies without any support. As 
shown in Table 2.7, hydro generators account for 80% of Australia’s current RES-E 
generation capacity. 
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Wind technology can be divided into vertical and horizontal axis generation 
technologies; horizontal axis generators have become the most common (Needham 
2009: 9). Australia’s first major grid-connected wind farm was opened at Crookwell, 
near Goulburn, in 1998 (De Blas 2000). Although wind technology is well 
established, it is still maturing with a trend towards larger and simpler generation 
units. The Crookwell wind farm has eight 600 kW towers each 45m high; in contrast, 
a wind farm located not far from it and opened in 2009 – the Capital Wind Farm near 
Tarago – has 63 2.1 MW turbines each about 80 metres high. As shown in Table 2.7, 
wind generators account for 13% of Australia’s current RES-E generation capacity. 
Australia has a significant supply of wind resource although, unlike the supply 
of its solar and geothermal resources, it is not better endowed with wind generating 
potential than the rest of the world (Jacobson and Delucchi 2011). Outhred (2003: 16) 
estimated that in South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales there was about 
200,000 km2  of land with good wind resource, not located in urban areas or parks, 
that was close to the transmission of the National Electricity Market (NEM). He 
estimated this land could accommodate 7,000 MW to 14,000 MW of wind capacity at 
densities employed in Germany and Denmark. Using a 30% average capacity factor, 
the top end of this range would generate 37 TWh/yr. However, the CSIRO (2006:18) 
estimated Australia’s total identified wind resource (in all states, irrespective of 
proximity to transmission), that could generate for US 8c/kWh or less, as capable of 
generating 200 TWh/yr. As shown in Table 2.7, by 2009, Australia had only installed 
1,272 MW of wind generation capacity which, using an average 30% capacity factor, 
would generate about 3.5 TWh/yr. This means only a very small proportion of the 
country’s potential quality wind sites have so far been developed. It also means it will 
be some time before a lack of good quality sites will affect the marginal cost of 
generating wind in Australia. As shown in Figure 2.18, most of Australia’s prime 
wind areas are located along the coastal strip of the southern half of the country.  
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Figure 2.18: Mean annual wind speed at 80m above ground level across 
Australia, 2009. 
 
Source: Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage the Arts 2009a. 
 
Biomass electricity generation commenced in Australia in 1954 when 
Independent Sugar North Ltd installed a bagasse (sugarcane waste) cogeneration plant 
at its mill at Mossman (Redding Energy Management 1999: 72). As shown in Table 
2.7, today bagasse and landfill generation currently accounts for 83% of all biomass 
generating capacity in the country and biomass, in general, currently accounts for 7% 
of Australia’s RES-E generating capacity. Although there are significant unexploited 
biomass resources in Australia, the technology that converts it to electricity generation 
(either through combustion or gasification) is fairly mature. However, there is a lot of 
technological development currently taking place in the thermochemical and 
biochemical processing of biomass feedstock (Needham 2009: 16).  
 The extent of Australia’s long-term biomass resource largely depends on the 
success, or otherwise, of the utilisation of agricultural residues, particularly stubble. If 
significant amounts of the waste are utilised, the national long-run biomass generation 
could reach 72 TWh/yr, equal to 20% of Australia’s projected 2030 electricity 
demand, and could even go higher if supplemented with purpose-grown crops (Clean 
Energy Council 2008: 5, Diesendorf 2007c: 151). The CSIRO (2006: 18) estimated 
Australia’s biomass generating potential as 330 PJ/yr, equal to 92 TWh/yr. To date, 
however, the only agricultural waste that biomass generation in Australia has been 
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successful at significantly exploiting is sugarcane waste. Future expansion of biomass 
generation from sugarcane waste may be constrained by fluctuating global sugar 
prices and concerns about the ongoing viability of the sugar industry in Australia: 
limitations that are already dampening biomass generation investment in Queensland 
(Ernst and Young 2008a: 12). However, biomass can also be used to co-fire coal 
based electricity generation and has already been taken up by several coal generators 
around Australia (Shuck 2006: 826).  
The biomass sector believes it can generate 10.6 TWh/yr of electricity by 2020, 
which would be about 9.2 TWh/yr more than it currently generates. It expects to 
generate most of this 2020 projected generation from sugarcane, wood waste and 
landfill gas from 1,845 MW of installed capacity: about 1,200 MW more capacity 
than it currently has (Clean Energy Council 2008: 20). However, there is limited 
potential for increased landfill gas generation in the country because most sites have 
already been developed. Like wind, it will be some time before the lack of premium 
resource necessarily increases the cost of biomass generation in Australia, but even 
the short-term cost of this type of RES-E generation will probably depend on the cost 
of new types of feedstock other than sugarcane waste. This makes it is hard to predict 
the future marginal cost of Australia’s biomass.  
As shown in Figure 2.19, most of Australia’s potential biomass electricity 
generating resource is concentrated in the south-east and south-west corners of the 
country (CSIRO 2006). This means that, despite Australia’s large size, the areas 
where biomass generation could feasibly be conducted are fairly restricted. 
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Figure 2.19: Australia’s potential biomass energy resources 
 
Source: CSIRO 2006. 
 
 
 
2.3.6 The Australian generating potential of solar and hot rock geothermal 
Although the global RES-E potential capacity of wind and biomass is significant, 
there is little doubt that the generating potential of the world’s solar resource is much 
larger. As shown in Table 2.11, an evaluation of global renewable energy resources by 
De Vries et al (2007: 2607) found that the world’s solar generating potential, generated 
by solar PV technology, was five to 15 times that of wind and 13 to 16 times that of 
biomass. This finding is in line with those of a similar evaluation published by the 
United Nations Development Program in 2000 (‘World Energy Assessment’ in Table 
2.11).  
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Table 2.11: Comparison of the long-term global generating potential of wind, 
biomass and solar PV electricity as reported by de Vries 2007 and the World 
Energy Assessment. 
Source: De Vries et al 2007. 
 
Solar technology can be divided into solar photovoltaic (PV) and concentrating 
solar thermal (CST) types. Silicon based solar PV is reasonably mature (although 
greater efficiencies are being sought) however it may evolve into a second-generation 
of technology, thin film technology, which is reasonably immature. Although CST 
technology underwent significant development during the 1980s, the technology was 
fairly dormant until the ‘Solar One’ generator was opened in Nevada (in the USA) in 
2006. The two major types of CST technology – trough and point-concentrated – are 
both experiencing significant refinement in terms of energy conversion efficiency and 
generator size though through technology is more mature and favoured by generators. 
Another major front of refinement is the usage of storage mediums (particularly 
molten salts) to allow 24 hour-a-day generation. 
Like the world in general, the extent of Australia’s solar resource dwarfs that of 
its wind and biomass resource. The country is particularly well endowed with solar 
resources compared to most other countries. Graham et al (2008: appendix 1, p. 24) 
argue that an area measuring 35 km by 35 km, located in a region in Australia with 
good sun and little cloud cover, could generate enough electricity to meet all of the 
country’s current electricity consumption needs if covered with a CST generation 
system. This could be achieved with a 70% capacity factor (requiring storage) and a 
14% solar radiation to electricity conversion rate. Lovegrove and Dennis (2006: 791) 
argue that Australia receives the highest average amount of solar radiation of any 
continent on earth. They also say that an area 138 km by 138 km covered in solar 
generators could generate enough electricity to supply all of Australia’s energy needs 
(including heat and transport). However, as shown in Table 2.7, solar PV generators 
currently account for less than 1% of Australia’s RES-E generating capacity. CST 
technology currently has no significant generating capacity in Australia. 
Study Wind  
(PWh/yr) 
Biomass 
(PWh/yr) 
Solar PV 
(PWh/yr) 
Total 
(PWh/yr) 
De Vries et al A1 scenario 80-39 72-58 1188-607 1341-705 
De Vries et al A2 scenario 62-23 25-20 317-0 403-38 
De Vries et al B1 scenario 80-38 63-51 945-603 1089-692 
De Vries et al B2 scenario 74-32 49-39 623-0 745-62 
World Energy Assessment 53 62-35 13844-438 13959-526 
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Given the national abundance of sunny sites, the long-term marginal cost of 
Australia’s solar generation is mostly tied to the long-term trend in solar technology 
costs. This means it is probably safe to assume solar’s long-run marginal cost will 
decrease in Australia, although access to transmission infrastructure could affect its 
future marginal cost trends (as discussed in s5.6).  
Figure 2.20 show Australia’s solar exposure (both direct and diffuse (ie scattered 
by cloud)) across a full year. However, even though the northern half of Australia has 
the best average annual solar exposure, its exposure is less than in the southern half of 
the country when the monsoon season is underway (from November to March). This 
means that the most commercially attractive solar sites in the country are not 
necessarily in its north: they may be in areas with more consistent, but weaker, annual 
exposure. This is particularly so given that northern Australia has poor transmission 
infrastructure. 
 
Figure 2.20: Average annual solar exposure (direct and diffuse) in Australia 
 
Source: Bureau of Meteorology 2009. 
 
 
Australia has a very large solar generating potential. The CSIRO (2006: 18) only 
estimated it as being ‘very large’. Table 2.12 shows the solar electricity generating 
potential of 1% of the country’s land area. At 44.3 TWh/day it is equal to 59 times 
Australia’s current level of electricity generation. This is equal to about 16,170 
TWh/yr. If, eventually, a significant proportion of this solar generating potential is 
developed in Australia, it will probably be mainly harnessed via CST technology, 
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rather than solar PV, despite it being currently being less mature, as shown in Table 
2.8. This is because, as long as there is transmission access, CST technology can be 
located away from coastal areas where it can receive direct sunlight which can be 
converted at higher temperature, and therefore greater efficiency, than diffuse 
sunlight. Diffuse sunlight (made diffuse by cloud cover) is the most common type of 
sunlight received in Australia’s coastal areas where most of its urban development is 
located and where most solar PV can be expected to be installed. 
 
Table 2.12: Calculation of the solar generating potential of 1% of Australia’s land 
surface 
Quantity description Quantity amount 
1% of Australia’s land surface 76,000 km2 
Daily solar energy received by 1 % 
of land surface at 15 MJ/m2/day 
1,140,000 TJ/day 
Electricity generation potential of 
solar energy at 14% conversion 
efficiency 
159,600 TJ/day 
Equivalent electricity generation 
potential in TWh 
44.3 TWh/day 
Australian daily electricity 
generation 
0.75TWh/day 
Source: author calculations. 
 
 There are two types of geothermal electricity technology: hydro thermal and hot 
rock geothermal. In both cases, electricity is produced by underground superheated 
water, but in the case of hydro-thermal electricity, the water comes to the surface 
naturally. In the case of hot dry rock electricity, deep holes have to be drilled through 
which water is pumped to exploit the subterranean heat. Hydro-thermal is a 
reasonably mature type of RES-E and is used extensively in countries close to tectonic 
plates, like New Zealand and Iceland. However, as shown in Table 2.8, hot rock 
geothermal is not mature and has significant potential for future generating cost 
reduction. The Australian hot rock industry believes there is significant capacity for 
reducing the generation cost of hot dry rock generation in the country as the 
technology moves from a demonstration to a commercial phase (MMA 2008a). Using 
the definition of energy technology development stages devised by Foxon et al 
(2005), hydro-thermal technology is at a commercial stage, whereas hot rock 
technology is only at a ‘demonstration’ stage because it is still at a prototype stage 
with few units installed to date. Currently hot rock geothermal demonstration plants 
are being developed in France, Japan and Australia (Nicholson 2009: 68). Australia 
has the largest concentration of extractable hot rock resource anywhere in the world 
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(Sandeman 2006: 725). Australia does have some hydro-thermal potential under the 
Great Artesian Basin (in the middle of the country), and two remote small scaled 
generators have used it to generate electricity (Needham 2009: 9). However, most of 
its hydro-thermal resource is in remote locations and its water temperature is 
relatively low (Harries et al 2006b: 816). ). As shown in Table 2.7, geothermal 
generators currently account for less than 1% of Australia’s RES-E generation 
capacity. 
Like its solar resource, Australia is well endowed with geothermal generating 
potential. It has been claimed that 1% of Australia’s geothermal energy could supply 
26,000 times the country’s current total annual electricity demand (Ferguson 2008: 1). 
The CSIRO (2006: 18) said Australia’s total identified hot rock resource was equal to 
2,500 EJ: if this potential was used each year with a 90% capacity factor, and a 15% 
conversion efficiency, then it could generate 821,249,460 TWh/yr; therefore just 1% 
of it (the proportion assumed in Table 2.13, below) would generate 8,212,495 
TWh/yr. Figure 2.21 shows the distribution of Australia’s hot rock geothermal 
resource. The largest, hottest resource is concentrated in the remote eastern part of 
central Australia in the north-east of South Australia and the south-west of 
Queensland. The remoteness of this resource has major transmission access 
implications, discussed in chapter 5. 
 
Figure 2.21: Geothermal heat potential of Australia 
 
Source: Sommerville et al 1994. 
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2.3.7 Australia’s overall RES-E generating potentials and why they justify extra 
support for solar and geothermal 
The generating potentials of all RES-E types in Australia, apart from ocean 
(because of its technological infancy), using the references in this section, is 
summarised in Table 2.13. The generating potentials of the first three categories  
hydro, wind and biomass  is 310 TWh/yr, equal to 126% of Australia’s 2007-08 
electricity generation of 247 TWh/yr but only 85% of the 366 TWh/yr ABARE 
(2010a: 34) predicts will be generated in the country by 2029-30. Hydro, wind and 
biomass therefore cannot be relied upon to generate all of Australia’s electricity in the 
long term. This is particularly the case given that marginal generating costs will rise 
as each of them nears the limits of their generating potentials.  
The significantly larger generating potentials of solar and hot rock geothermal 
explain why Figures 2.10 and 2.11, above, predict that solar and/or hot rock 
geothermal will need to be relied upon to generate a large proportion of Australia’s 
electricity if deep cuts in electricity generation are one day to be sought through 
radical RES-E expansion. Although both solar and hot rock geothermal could generate 
much larger volumes of electricity before they start to experience rising marginal 
costs, it has to be remembered that hot rock geothermal is only at demonstration stage 
and probably cannot be relied upon, for a few years yet, to generate significant 
amounts of electricity. As discussed in s5.6, both solar and hot rock geothermal are 
subject to potentially major transmission constraints. 
 
Table 2.13: Australia’s annual RES-E generating potential 
RES-E type Potential assumptions Annual generation 
potential: TWh/yr  
Hydro (1) Assume minor enhancement by 
small hydro 
18 
Wind (2) Assume small technological 
improvement 
200 
Biomass (3) Assume significant use of 
agricultural residues is used 
92 
Solar (4) Assume 1% of energy falling on all 
of Australia’s land surface is used 
16,170 
Hot rock geothermal (5) Assume 1% of national resource is 
used 
8,212,495 
Total  8,228,975 
Source: CSIRO 2006 (rows 2, 3 and 4), author calcs (rows 1, 4 and 5). 
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 The hierarchy of Australia’s RES-E generating potential is very different to that 
of the European Union, shown in Table 2.14. In the European Union, the high-cost 
RES-E types of solar PV and geothermal have relatively low generating potentials, 
whereas the low-cost RES-E types of biomass, hydro and wind have the highest 
generating potentials. If most electricity is to one day be generated from RES-E, as part 
of a global GHG emission reduction effort, this means there is a stronger case for higher 
levels of support being extended to high-cost types of RES-E in Australia than in the 
European Union. 
 
Table 2.14: The European Union’s annual RES-E generating potential 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Renewenergy 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the first comprehensive case for Australia’s GHG 
reduction policy to be focused on radical RES-E expansion through RES-E support, in 
addition to any support likely to be provided by an ETS in the country. A particular 
feature of this case is a detailed justification for supporting solar and geothermal 
power more significantly than the other types of RES-E. As detailed in s2.1, there 
have been assessments in Australia of its RES-E resources, and there have been 
discussions about the country’s RES-E support policy and its proposed ETS as well as 
its general GHG policy, but there has not been any integrated discussion about all 
these elements which this chapter has attempted to redress. Ultimately, Australia’s 
RES-E type  EU 27 
generating 
potential: 
TWh/yr  
Solar PV 154 
Geothermal  667 
Biomass  764 
Hydro  908 
Wind  1,517 
Total RES-E  5,738 
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RES-E technology, its RES-E resources, its proposed ETS, and its RES-E support 
mechanism need to work together and this chapter has discussed, for the first time, 
how this could happen. 
For various historic reasons – including its abundance of relatively inexpensive 
coal and its exhaustion of major hydro generation potential – Australia has a high 
level of electricity generation GHG emissions, which has been a major contributor to 
its high per capita level of GHG emission (as argued in ss2.2.3). Radical RES-E 
expansion could significantly reduce its GHG emissions. Indeed, several major 
scenarios project that RES-E will be needed to make major reductions in the country’s 
electricity generation GHG emissions (as shown in ss2.2.5). Radical RES-E expansion 
enabled by major RES-E support can bring forward RES-E generation cost reductions 
while avoiding potential long-term increases in some RES-E marginal generating 
costs (as shown in theoretical form in ss2.3.4). Fortunately, unlike many countries 
around the world, Australia has significant amounts of RES-E generating potential, 
particularly of hot rock geothermal and solar (as demonstrated in ss2.3.5 and ss2.3.6). 
This generating potential is far in excess of the country’s current levels of electricity 
generation. RES-E support mechanisms will need to be used to support the country’s 
RES-E because of the generating cost disadvantage that RES-E currently has 
compared to fossil-fuel generated electricity. In Australia in particular, RES-E support 
needs to give stronger support to immature RES-E, notably solar and hot rock 
geothermal. This is because those two types of RES-E have significantly greater 
generating potentials than other types of RES-E in the country but are currently less 
mature, and have higher generating costs, than the other types (as argued in ss2.3.5 
and ss2.3.6). Differentiated RES-E support is therefore essential if deep GHG 
emission cuts are to be achieved in Australia.  
 
.
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Having discussed the physical and policy context of RES-E support in the 
previous chapter, this chapter discusses the on-the-ground use of the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard (RPS) mechanism in various Western European countries and the 
USA. The two regions were chosen because they have the best data availability of all 
regions that use the RPS throughout the world. The discussion includes commentary 
of key RPS features including generation, subsidy price, unique design features and 
historic evolution. The term ‘generation performance’, used throughout the chapter, is 
the output of different RES-E types achieved by the mechanism in each jurisdiction; 
the ‘price performance’ term is the total amount of the subsidy used to generate the 
output. Generation and price are symbiotic and strongly influence each other. They 
are the major benchmarks by which RES-E support mechanisms are often judged. 
 Reviews of overseas RPS and FIT (Feed-in Tariff) use are a central part of this 
thesis. They inform chapters 6 and 7 and are a contribution in their own right. Such 
reviews have been done before but they have been narrow in their coverage. Van der 
Linden et al (2005), for instance, only covered the UK, Sweden and the USA, while 
Wiser and Barbose (2008), and Wiser et al (2007a), only covered RPS use in the 
USA. The coverage in this chapter is therefore broader in geographical terms, and 
more up to date, than previously published reviews. 
Section 3.2 discusses the different types of RES-E support, as well as the origin 
of the RPS mechanism; s3.3 discusses RPS use in the USA; s3.4 covers the 
mechanism’s use in the UK; s3.5 discusses its use in Sweden, Italy and Belgium; and 
s3.6 draws conclusions from the preceding five sections. 
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3.2 The different types of RES-E support policy and the evolution of 
the RPS mechanism 
 
Having outlined the aims and justifications of RES-E support mechanisms in 
s2.3, this section discusses the different types, and categories, of RES-E support as 
well as the different end points each is designed to achieve. It also discusses the 
evolution of the RPS mechanism before profiling the use of the RPS mechanism in the 
USA, as well as in Western Europe. 
 
 
3.2.1 The different types of RES-E support mechanism 
The aims of RES-E support, discussed in s2.3, can be achieved through several 
categories of mechanism. Some of the mechanisms are neutral (i.e. create the same 
price incentive to reduce CO2 emissions) across all renewable and non-renewable 
types of technology, which I will call broad type-neutral. The best known such 
mechanisms are GHG emission trading systems (ETS) and GHG emission (or carbon) 
taxes. Within the RES-E spectrum of technologies, there are further mechanisms that 
discriminate in favour of all RES-E sources, and against all non-RES-E sources, but 
give the same incentive to all RES-E types, which I will call narrow type-neutral (the 
‘narrow’ effectively meaning ‘confined to RES-E’). The best known such mechanism 
is the RPS. There are also narrow type-specific mechanisms which give different 
incentives to different types of RES-E (‘specific’ effectively meaning ‘specific to 
particular types of RES-E’). The best known such mechanism is the Feed-in Tariff 
(FIT). 
The major difference between the FIT and the RPS mechanisms is that with FIT 
mechanisms governments control the price earned by RES-E generators while with 
the RPS mechanisms they control their generation share (quantity). From an economic 
perspective, the choice of either a price-based mechanism, like the FIT, or a quantity-
based mechanism, like the RPS, should be determined by the gradient of the marginal 
benefit curve of the RES-E type(s) either instrument is applied to. If the marginal 
benefit curve is relatively flat over the relevant range, there is an economic case for 
using a price-based mechanism. This is because small, uncertain movements in price 
can cover most of the marginal benefit curve and therefore cover the point where 
marginal benefit intersects with marginal cost. Alternatively, quantity-based 
mechanisms are more desirable where marginal benefits vary markedly over the  
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 relevant range so that their curves are quite steep (Weitzman 1974, Baumol and Oates 
1988).  
As noted, the main feature of FIT mechanisms is a government-mandated 
minimum price that electricity retailers have to pay for RES-E. The prices generally 
vary according to RES-E type and, in some countries, even vary between different 
locations of RES-E generators. This means FIT mechanisms are in practice, though 
not in principle, type-specific, even within the different types of RES-E: they are 
‘narrow type-specific’ (see Table 3.1). The main feature of RPS mechanisms is a 
government-mandated share (or amount) of an electricity generation market that must 
be satisfied from RES-E types. This is an obligation imposed on electricity retailers to 
purchase a minimum, prescribed quantity of their electricity from RES-E sources. In 
most jurisdictions, this obligation is transferable via tradable certificates that represent 
a standard unit of RES-E generation (normally one MWh of generation). Most 
adaptations of the RPS mechanism do not discriminate between RES-E types. This 
means that, unlike FIT mechanisms, RPS mechanisms are generally ‘narrow type-
neutral’. However, it is theoretically possible to design the FIT mechanism so that the 
same price is mandated for all RES-E types, in which case the mechanism would also 
be narrow type-neutral. It is also possible to design RPS mechanisms that have 
different tradable certificate weightings (‘bands’ or ‘banding’), or separate sub-
markets (or ‘carve-outs’) for different RES-E types (discussed further in ss3.3.5 and 
ss3.4.2 below): this would make the mechanism narrow type-specific. Much of the 
remainder of this thesis considers how narrow type-neutral mechanisms, like the RPS, 
can be more like narrow type-specific mechanisms, like the FIT. It also considers 
how, and whether, a choice should be made between the two types of mechanism. As 
the thesis will show, historically, the two types have had very different functions and 
expectations placed upon them but, as the need for GHG reduction increases, the 
demarcation between the two is breaking down and it is increasingly no longer 
relevant to consider the two as utterly different types of mechanism. 
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Table 3.1: Technology neutrality categorisation of main RES-E support 
mechanisms 
Mechanism Normal technology 
neutrality category 
ETS (in principle and practice) Broad type-neutral: same 
CO2 abatement incentive 
for all technologies 
RPS (in principle and practice) Narrow type-neutral: same 
abatement incentive for all 
RES-E types 
FIT (in practice) Narrow type-specific: 
different abatement 
incentives for different 
RES-E types 
 
This thesis mainly focuses on the narrow type-neutral RPS and the narrow type-
specific FIT mechanisms, ss2.3.4 also considered, and s5.4 will consider, the support 
potential of (broad type-neutral) GHG emissions trading. However, there is another 
major mechanism not considered in a lot of detail in this thesis: government budget 
support for RES-E, whether type-specific or type-neutral. Examples of such support 
include low-interest loans provided by the German government for solar photovoltaic 
installation in the late 1990s (Jacobsson and Lauber 2004) and the RES-E production 
tax credit provided by the USA government (Wiser and Bollinger 2008). This type of 
support is not considered in a lot of detail (apart from in s5.5) because this thesis is 
primarily concerned about the design of RES-E support mechanisms that use 
subsidies financed by electricity consumers. 
 
 
3.2.2 Origins of the RPS  
The RPS mechanism began in the USA. It was developed by the American 
Wind Energy Association (AWEA) which was keen to advance a mechanism that 
would boost RES-E generation but still make significant use of liberalised (ie 
deregulated) electricity markets. The AWEA official most credited with creating the 
mechanism, Nancy Rader, argued that ‘the flexible, market-based implementation of 
the standard would ensure achievement of policy goals at least cost’ (Rader and 
Norgaard 1996: 44). The least-cost part of her argument had particular appeal. A least-
cost, electricity generation market based approach became a political imperative in the 
USA after the Republican Party won control of both houses of its Congress in 1994, 
and after a wave of electricity market deregulation began to sweep through many US 
state legislatures in the late 1990s. The 1995 commencement of the trading of sulphur-
dioxide emission licenses under the nation’s Clean Air Act  the predecessor of GHG 
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emissions trading widely viewed in the USA as a cost-effective way of reducing 
sulphur-dioxide emissions  also influenced the renewable energy political landscape 
of the time (Quince 2008: 2). FIT mechanisms, which pre-dated RPS ones, were not 
viewed as politically acceptable in the USA at the time. This was because they were 
not seen as being particularly cost effective. The tradable certificate feature of RPS 
was inspired by a similar device used in New Jersey housing developments (where a 
proportion of such developments had to be low-cost but could be on-sold if in surplus) 
(Wood 2007: 2). 
  
 
3.2.3 The use of RPS mechanisms around the world 
The use of both RPS and FIT mechanisms is largely, though not exclusively, 
confined to developed countries. Within that group, RPS mechanisms have extensive 
use throughout North America, and in some European countries, as well as in some 
countries of Asia and the Pacific, as summarised in Table 3.2. This shows that the 
number of national governments that use the RPS at a national level is small, 
especially when compared to the number of countries that use the FIT at a national 
level. However, the mechanism is used by a significant number of sub-national 
governments. Table 3.2 also makes clear that the RPS is popular in North America 
while the FIT is popular in Europe. 
Table 3.2: RPS and FIT jurisdictions around the world, 2008 
Region No. of 
countries 
with an RPS 
No. of sub-
national 
governments 
with an RPS 
No. of 
countries 
with an FIT 
No. of sub-
national 
governments 
with an FIT 
Europe 5 0 28 0 
North America 0 27 0 3 
Central and South 
America 
1 0 5 0 
Asia 3 5 6 12 
Middle East 0 0 1 0 
Pacific 1 0 0 5 
Africa 0 0 3 0 
Total 10 32 43 20 
Source: Renewable Energy Policy Network 2009. 
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3.3 Experience of the RPS in the USA 
 
 
3.3.1 The generation performance of the RPS mechanism in the USA 
 As well as being the incubator for the RPS, the USA has the oldest and most 
diverse implementation history of the RPS of any country in the world and is the 
obvious one in which to start an international evaluation of the mechanism. However, 
as the remainder of this section makes clear, the use of the RPS in the USA is riddled 
with inconsistencies and systemic weaknesses. As shown in Figure 3.1, by 2007, half 
of all US states (25) had adopted the RPS as well as the District of Columbia. Each 
jurisdiction had adopted it in a different way.  
 
Figure 3.1: US states that by 2007 had RPS mechanisms and their goals for  
RES-E supply (as % of total electricity where stated). 
 
 
Source: Wiser and Barbose 2008. 
 
 
The first, and most obvious, observation that can be made about the generation 
performance of the RPS in the USA is that, as shown in Table 3.3, it has not managed 
to restore RES-E generation, as a proportion of all US electricity generation, to the 
level it experienced in the second half of the 1990s. The best it has been able to do is 
to arrest the decline in RES-E generation share. Part of the reason for this could be 
that by 2008 only 13 of the 25 states that had adopted the mechanism had been using 
it for at least five years. Another cause is that hydro generation declined over the 
period while overall national electricity generation increased. As shown in Figure 3.2, 
between 1995 and 2009, the hydro RES-E generation share in the USA (the share of 
electricity generated by hydro) fell. This reduction was largely due to a decrease in 
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rainfall in the Pacific North-West region which is home to about 60% of the country’s 
hydro-electric generation capacity (Menz 2005: 2398, 2399), and had nothing to do 
with any state the RPS mechanism.  
In 2000, electricity GHG emissions accounted for 33.0% of all the GHG 
emissions the USA was responsible for. This compared to an average, that year, of 
18.3% for the OECD and 35.6% for Australia (World Resources Institute, 2009). 
 
Table 3.3: the USA electricity generation and RES-E generation share, 
 1995 to 2009 
 
Year Total RES-E 
generation:  
TWh/yr (1) 
Total 
electricity 
generation: 
TWh/yr (2) 
RES-E % of 
electricity 
generation 
(3) 
1995 382 3,353 11.4% 
1996 420 3,444 12.2% 
1997 429 3,492 12.3% 
1998 396 3,620 10.9% 
1999 393 3,695 10.6% 
2000 341 3,802 9.0% 
2001 279 3,737 7.5% 
2002 335 3,858 8.7% 
2003 347 3,883 8.9% 
2004 343 3,971 8.6% 
2005 351 4,055 8.7% 
2006 379 4,065 9.3% 
2007 346 4,157 8.3% 
2008 365 4,110 8.9% 
2009 409 3,953 10.3% 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2010 (cols. 1 and 2), author calcs (col. 3). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The USA electricity generation share of hydro and non-hydro RES-E,  
1995 to 2009 
 
 
Source: EIA 2010. 
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Collectively, the 13 US states that had been using the RPS for at least five years 
by 2008 were responsible for 31% of the 2006 national electricity generation. Those 
13 states are listed in Table 3.4, while the remaining 12 RPS states that have adapted 
the mechanism since 2003 are listed in Table 3.5. The Table 3.5 (late adopter) RPS 
states were responsible for 20% of US electricity generation in 2006: this means that 
once all the current US RPS mechanisms are in force, they will cover states 
responsible for about half of the US’s electricity generation. Some US states have 
voluntary RPS mechanisms, this evaluation does not include them amongst the states 
defined as using the RPS mechanism. 
Table 3.4: Summary of US states, and their targets, that adopted the RPS 
by 2003 
Source: Wiser et al 2007a, Wiser and Barbose 2008. 
Table 3.5: Summary of US states, and their targets, that adopted the RPS after 
2003 
State RPS start date RPS RES-E electricity target 
Colorado 2007 20% of electricity by 2020 
Delaware 2007 20% of electricity by 2019 
Hawaii 2005 20% of electricity by 2020 
Illinois 2007 25% of electricity by 2025 
Maryland 2006 9.5% of electricity by 2019 
Montana 2008 15% of electricity by 2015 
New Hampshire 2006 23.8% of electricity by 2025 
New York 2006 24% of electricity by 2013 
North Carolina 2008 10% or 12.5% of electricity by 2020 
Oregon 2011 25% of electricity by 2025 
Rhode Island 2007 16% of electricity by 2020 
Washington 2012 15% of electricity by 2020 
Source: Wiser et al 2007a, Wiser and Barbose 2008. 
In 2001, there was an attempt to introduce a national US RPS mechanism via its 
Congress but it failed to gain the support of both houses after the Republican Party  
 
State RPS start date RPS RES-E electricity target 
Arizona 2001 15% of electricity by 2025 
California 2003 20% of electricity by 2010 
Connecticut 2000 10% of electricity by 2010 
Iowa 1999 about 2% of electricity by 1999 
Maine 2000 30% of electricity by 2000 
Massachusetts 2003 15% of electricity by 2020 
Minnesota 2002 25% or 30% of electricity by 2020-25 
Nevada 2001 20% of electricity by 2015 
New Jersey 2001 22.5% of electricity by 2020 
New Mexico 2002 20% of electricity by 2020 
Pennsylvania 2001 18% of electricity by 2020 
Texas 2002 about 4.2% of electricity by 2015 
Wisconsin 2000 10% of electricity by 2010 
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 gained control of the Congress in 2002 (Lauber 2005: 251). Since then there have 
been four further unsuccessful attempts to do the same thing.  
As shown in Figure 3.3, between 1996 and 2008, hydro generation dominated 
US RES-E. Biomass was the next largest source of RES-E followed by wind. The 
USA generates more geothermal electricity than any other country in the world 
(Nicholson 2009: 68) but, despite this, it only accounted for 0.3% of the country’s 
total electricity generation in 2008. There is very little solar generation in the USA: 
only 0.7% of all non-hydro RES-E generation in 2008 (Wiser and Barbose 2008b: 13, 
EIA 2010). 
 
Figure 3.3: Generation performance of different RES-E types in the USA, 
 1996 to 2008 
 
 
Source: EIA 2008. 
 
3.3.2 The influence of the US government Production Tax Credit 
A significant influence on the support of RES-E in the USA, that is impossible 
to disentangle from the support of its RPSs, is its national Production Tax Credit. It 
was introduced in 1992 as part of the Energy Policy Act to support the generation of 
RES-E. It provides a production-based tax credit for the first ten years of operation of 
an RES-E generator. The tax credit was originally set at US1.5c/kWh and is adjusted 
each year for inflation. Being a national incentive, the tax credit should not alter the 
relative RES-E performance of different states but could influence the uptake rate of 
RES-E across the country. The tax credit generally has a one or two year life and is  
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 often renewed at the end of each eligibility period (although there is no certainty 
about this). By 2007, the tax credit equalled about $US20/MWh (Wiser et al 2007b: 
2). The Production Tax Credit is effectively like an undifferentiated FIT (an FIT that 
does not have different subsidy rates for different types of RES-E).  
 
3.3.3 The price performance of the RPS mechanism in the USA 
Apart from generation, the other important benchmark that the performance of 
the US RPS mechanism should be judged against is that of subsidy price, particularly 
since a major selling point of the mechanism is the claim that it generates RES-E at 
least-cost. 
 Table 3.6 shows that the price performance of RES-E tradable certificates in US 
RPS states is highly variable. At the low end, the certificates have traded for as little 
as 30 USc/MWh in Maine (excluding the wholesale cost of electricity), where they 
represented just 0.3% of the state’s retail electricity price. At the high end, they have 
traded for $US 50/MWh in Rhode Island, where they represented 36% of the state’s 
retail electricity price. It is therefore impossible to generalise about the price of RPS 
tradable certificates in the USA. It should be stressed that the tradable certificate 
prices quoted here represent RPS RES-E certificate spot market prices: in some states, 
certificate markets account for the bulk of traded RES-E but in others a lot of RES-E 
is sold via contracts (as discussed in ss3.3.4, below).  
 
Table 3.6: The price of US RPS tradable certificates, and of retail electricity, in 
selected US RPS states in 2007 or 2008 
State 2007 or 2008 
tradable 
certificate price 
($US/MWh) (1) 
2008 retail 
electricity price 
($US/MWh) (2) 
Tradable 
certificate  price % 
of retail electricity 
price (3) 
Massachusetts  $47.50 $150.45 31.60% 
Maine  $0.30 $118.00 0.30% 
Rhode Island  $50.00 $139.80 35.80% 
Pennsylvania  $8.50 $86.80 9.80% 
Texas  $5.25 $103.40 5.10% 
Connecticut class III $28.00 $148.30 18.90% 
Delaware new 
tradable certificates $12.00 $101.30 11.80% 
New Jersey class I $19.00 $118.80 16.00% 
Maryland tier I $0.95 $99.50 1.00% 
Washington DC tier I $1.75 $110.80 1.60% 
Source: Evolution Markets 2008 (col. 1), EIA 2008 (col. 2), author calcs (col. 3). 
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Linares et al (2008: 380, 382, 383) argue that RPS tradable certificate prices 
represent the difference between the perceived long-run marginal cost of RES-E and 
that of non-RES-E electricity. If it is assumed that the intrinsic cost of RES-E 
generation, without major resource constraint, is roughly similar for the same RES-E 
type across the USA, the large difference in US tradable certificate prices must be 
evidence that long-term RES-E marginal cost is significantly influenced by the size of 
RES-E production increase that each state’s RPS target requires.  Low certificate 
prices, then, do not always mean that RPS mechanisms have been hugely successful at 
supporting RES-E generation, they could simply indicate that a legislature’s RPS 
target is modest. Texas is widely regarded as having one of the better designed RPSs 
in the USA and its certificate price, as indicated in Table 3.6, is amongst the lowest in 
the country. But, as shown in Table 3.4, Texas has a modest RPS target, equal to 
about 4.2% of state electricity generation by 2015. And it has the second most 
abundant wind resource out of all states (see Table 6.10 below), so its low tradable 
certificate price largely reflects its low RPS target and the ease with which RES-E 
supply has so far been able to meet it. Unsurprisingly, Texas has often met its RPS 
target ahead of schedule (Langniss and Wiser 2003: 529).  
As shown in Figure 3.4, US RPS tradable certificate prices can move through 
wide bands. The low prices that have pervaded the tradable certificates of Texas, 
Maryland, Pennsylvania and Washington DC were a product of the perceived surplus 
of RES-E supply in those states relative to the targets in their RPSs (Wiser et al 
2007a: 18). The very low certificate price listed for Maine reflects the fact that when 
that state’s RPS commenced, it already had enough RES-E generation to reach its 
RPS target. Conversely, the high price listed for Massachusetts reflects the fact that in 
that state RES-E demand was perceived to be running ahead of supply under its RPS 
(Van der Linden et al 2005: 47). Without exploring the precise influence that RPS 
design has on tradable certificate prices in different states, the best that can be said 
about the US RPS tradable certificate price experience is that its state RPS mechanims 
are capable of delivering low certificate prices but generally at the expense of modest 
RPS targets.  
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Figure 3.4: Tradable certificate prices in selected US RPS states, 2002 to 2006 
(Texas: TX, Maryland: MD, Pennsylvania: PA, Washington DC: DC). 
 
 
Source: Wiser et al 2007a. 
 
 
Unfortunately, there has been little analysis of the cost impact of the US RPS on 
electricity prices. However, some analysis has suggested that US electricity tariff 
increases that were a direct result of RPSs amounted to 1%, or less, of the household 
electricity price, on average, in 2007. However, the analysis also concluded that, 
unless tradable certificate prices fall, the RPS induced electricity price increases will 
increase over time as RPS targets increase (Wiser and Barbose 2008: 29). The claim 
that us state RPS subsidies only added about 1% to relevant state electricity prices in 
2007 is somewhat contradicted by the third column of Table 3.6. The average 
proportion of 2008 retail electricity prices represented by the 10 state categories of 
RPS tradable certificates listed in the table is 13.1% 
 
 
3.3.4 The influence of RES-E contracts in US RPS states 
RES-E supported by the RPS does not have to rely on the income from the spot 
market sale of tradable certificates, it can rely on income from the contracted sale of 
tradable certificates. This is income derived from long-term tradable certificate supply 
contracts between electricity retailers and RES-E generators. RES-E investment relies 
on the two types of income to different extents in different US RPS states; the degree 
to which it relies on one or the other can have a major influence on RES-E investor  
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 confidence. In Massachusetts, most RPS RES-E income comes from tradable 
certificate spot market sales, this has tended to erode RES-E investor confidence and 
has slowed RES-E development in that state (Wiser et al 2007a: 23). Part of the 
reason for this is the volatility of tradable certificate prices in the state (see Figure 
3.4). Some states have attempted to overcome the destabilising influence of excessive 
tradable certificate spot market reliance by using various types of government 
procurement programs to create investor conditions similar to those created by 
tradable certificate contracts. Other states overcome excessive reliance on tradable 
certificate spot markets by requiring certificate contracts to be written between RES-E 
generators and RPS liable parties. Amongst the original 13 US RPS states, this is the 
case in California, Iowa, Nevada and Pennsylvania (Cory and Swezey 2007: 21). 
However it is achieved, the experience in the USA makes it clear that subsidy price 
certainty can be an important part of successfully developing RES-E under the RPS. If 
RPS states are excessively exposed to tradable certificate spot markets, then it is 
desirable that ways of mitigating income insecurity are explored. These could include 
use of certificate contracts and/or the use of implicit or explicit RPS tradable 
certificate price floors. 
  Toke (2011) argues that the most important effect of the introduction of the 
RPS, especially in the USA, has been the incentive it created for electricity utilities to 
offer contracts (power purchase agreements (PPAs)) to RES-E generators. He 
specifically says: ‘the inducement to offer long term contracts to renewable 
developers is the most important effect of RPS systems, rather than their character as 
a device that involves trading in renewable energy credits [tradable certificates]’. 
 
3.3.5 The unique design features of different US state RPS mechanisms 
Like their tradable certificate prices, the design of US state RPS mechanisms is 
far from consistent. The six most distinguishing design features are: 
• the balancing between the RPS target and RES-E supply;  
• exemptions, or escape clauses;  
• non-compliance charges and cost caps;  
• different eligibilities for different RES-E types;  
• the use of carve-outs; and 
• treatment of out-of-state RES-E. 
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These will be briefly discussed in so far as they operate in the 13 US states that 
had RPS mechanisms by 2003. 
Most US states express their RPS target as an RES-E share of electricity 
generation but some, including Texas and Iowa, express it as an absolute target 
(measured in generation hours), which commentators generally convert to 
approximate electricity generation share for comparison’s sake. An absolute  
 RPS target is relatively unusual, and those that are not expressed in generation share 
terms, like those of Texas and Iowa, if not converted to generation share ones, should, 
at the very least, be periodically reviewed against generation share benchmarks.  If 
found to be under (or over) performing, they will need adjustment.  A high RPS target 
is not necessarily the same as a hugely ambitious RPS target. As shown in Table 3.7, 
amongst the original 13 RPS states, Maine has the highest RPS target of 40% by 2017 
but its target represents a modest ambition because the state had a large amount of 
RES-E when its RPS began, sufficient to meet its RPS target as soon as it came into 
effect.  
 
Table 3.7: RPS targets and 2008 non-hydro RES-E generation of US states that 
had RPS targets by 2003 
State RPS start 
date 
RPS RES-E electricity 
target 
2008 non-
hydro RES-E 
% of electricity 
generation 
Arizona 2001 15% by 2025 0.1% 
California 2003 20% by 2010 12.0% 
Connecticut 2000 13% by 2020 2.4% 
Iowa 1999 about 2% by 1999 9.6% 
Maine 2000 30% by 2000 23.7% 
Massachusetts 2003 15% by 2020 2.9% 
Minnesota 2002 25 or 30% by 2020-25 10.7% 
Nevada 2001 20% by 2015 4.4% 
New Jersey 2001 22.5% by 2020 1.4% 
New Mexico 2002 20% by 2020 4.5% 
Pennsylvania 2001 18% by 2020 1.3% 
Texas 2002 about 4.2% by 2015 4.4% 
Wisconsin 2000 10% by 2015 2.8% 
Source: EIA 2008. 
 
As can be shown in Table 3.7, Arizona, Nevada, New Jersey and New Mexico 
had the largest gaps between their non-hydro 2008 RES-E electricity generation share 
and their RPS target. Out of those four RPS states, by 2007 all, except New Mexico, 
were not expecting to reach their RPS targets by the assigned dates (Wiser et al 
2007a: 7). This suggests they were either overly ambitious and/or are subject to 
systemic weaknesses in their design. In general, however, there seems to be a 
reasonably high level of attainment of RPS targets in the USA: of the 14 RPS states 
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for which 2006 data was available, by 2008 nine had compliance levels greater than 
95% (Wiser and Barbose 2008: 21).  
 A key aim of RPS mechanism design should be to increase the development of a 
jurisdiction’s non-hydro RES-E generating potential. Systemic weaknesses that 
dampen the effectiveness of most of the RPS mechanisms in the pre-2003 US RPS  
states can be found in the exemptions and escape clauses that pervade their RPSs. A 
common US RPS exemption is to allow publicly owned generators – which are 
responsible for about a quarter of all electricity generation in the USA – to be 
exempted from the RPS. Of the pre-2003 RPS states, only Minnesota and Wisconsin 
do not have this exemption. This exemption has a minimal impact in some states but a 
significant one in others. After allowing for its public utility exemption, in Arizona 
only 56% of its electricity generation is covered by its RPS, while 75% of generation 
is covered in Texas after a similar exemption is factored in (Wiser and Barbose 2008: 
9).  
Another common US RPS escape provision is to allow the public regulator that 
oversees a state’s electricity generators to waive all, or some, of an RPS’s obligations. 
This can be done if it is satisfied that reasonable effort has been made to comply with  
the RPS, or if it believes there is insufficient RES-E resource in the state to meet 
interim RPS targets. Eight of the 13 pre-2003 states have such provisions. Such 
exemptions and escape clauses are not desirable, they either dilute RPS targets or 
make the subsidy cost burden greater on other electricity consumers. They should be 
designed to be only capable of use in extreme circumstances.   
The ability to bank tradable certificates (ie hold them after their creation for use 
in a later period) is treated differently across the RPS states though most put some 
form of limitation on it. California and Massachusetts allow unlimited banking but 
Texas, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Delaware, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, 
Montana, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington and 
Wisconsin allow banking for limited periods of between one and five years. 
Connecticut and Iowa do not allow any banking, but Connecticut allows small deficits 
to be carried forward (Union of Concerned Scientists 2009).  
 Further systemic weaknesses in the US adaptation of the RPS are evident in the 
non-compliance charges and cost caps that most RPS states use. In several states, 
non-compliance charges exert a powerful influence over RPS mechanisms because 
they effectively become a ceiling on the cost of complying. In states where there is 
insufficient RES-E to satisfy an RPS obligation, non-compliance charges can make up 
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a large part of the discharge of the obligation. In Massachusetts, for instance, between 
2004 and 2006 ‘alternative compliance payments’ accounted for between 26% and 
36% of the discharge of its RPS obligation (Division of Energy Resources 2008: 8). 
Incredibly, Iowa and New Mexico have no explicit non-compliance charge while  
some states, like Maine and New Jersey, can waive such charges if electricity 
generation market conditions are deemed to disallow reasonable compliance, or if 
adequate compliance effort is considered to have been made. Other states have 
explicit caps on the cost of complying with their RPSs. Of the 26 US RPS 
jurisdictions, only five lack a device that directly, or indirectly, limits the cost of 
complying with their RPSs. This may help explain why the RES-E generation 
performance of US RPS states has generally been poor. Out of the 26 US RPS states 
or districts, explicit enforcement action has only ever been taken in two: Connecticut 
and Texas (Wiser and Barbose 2008: 7, 23, 31). 
 There is more design uniformity amongst the pre-2003 RPS states about which 
RES-E types are eligible for their RPS targets but, again, some diversity is evident. 
All the states include the standard RES-E types of wind, solar, biomass and 
geothermal. There is some divergence, however, in the treatment of hydro-electricity 
which is the main type of RES-E generation that pre-dated the RPS in most states. A 
majority of states count electricity from small hydro generators towards their RPS 
target but some do not allow any hydro to be counted, while others only allow hydro 
electricity generated from new turbines. Some of the most eccentric eligibility criteria 
are found in Nevada and Pennsylvania. Nevada allows energy efficiency measures to 
be counted towards its RPS (as do Hawaii and North Carolina amongst the post-2003 
RPS states). Pennsylvania allows electricity generated from ‘waste coal’ to count 
towards its RPS target. In general, it is not desirable to include RES-E generation 
capacity that existed before an RPS mechanism began to be included in its target.  
 A significant design feature of the mechanisms in three of the pre-2003 RPS 
states is one that creates different classes or carve-outs for different RES-E types. 
These are, effectively, submarkets of an RPS market that can only have specific types 
of RES-E used within them. Connecticut has two classes of RES-E within its RPS one 
of which includes small hydro and biomass, this class is not allowed to count for more 
than 3% of state electricity generation. Connecticut’s other RPS class – which 
includes solar, wind and landfill gas – has a target that grows from 1% of state 
electricity generation in 2004 to 7% in 2010. Pennsylvania and Nevada have taken the 
RPS carve-out concept further by having separate carve-outs that have to be met from 
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one RES-E type: solar. Nevada requires at least 5% of the RES-E sold each year under 
its RPS to be solar.  
Using carve-outs for the support of high-cost RES-E types is becoming a 
favoured means of supporting these RES-E types in the USA: 11 states, as well as 
Washington DC, use the device (Wiser and Barbose 2008: 16). There has been mixed 
success in reaching carve-out targets: some states have reached their targets but 
others, like Arizona and Nevada, have only been able to satisfy a small proportion of 
them (Wiser and Barbose 2008: 21). Separate RES-E tradable certificate markets for 
different RES-E types split RPS markets into smaller ones than would otherwise exist, 
this reduces the depth, and therefore the liquidity, of the tradable certificate markets 
(although this can be overcome by trading between states that have similar carve-
outs). However, carve-outs are capable of achieving greater diversity of RES-E 
generation than an undifferentiated RPS and some unique design needs to be built into 
an RPS mechanism to ensure immature RES-E types are adequately developed or the 
mechanism needs to be complemented by a dedicated FIT for higher cost RES-E 
types if anything but least-cost RES-E types are to be supported by the mechanism.  
 A final design difference, which evenly divides the pre-2003 RPS states, is 
whether out-of-state RES-E generation can count towards an RPS. Amongst the 13 
RPS states, eight (Arizona, California, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas 
and Wisconsin) will only allow RES-E generated in the state, or RES-E directly 
interconnected to the state, to count towards their RPS targets. Other states will count 
RES-E generated outside their state but it must be generated within their regions 
(Cory et al 2007: 8). The main potential pitfall of counting out-of-state RES-E is that 
it may be double-counted in both the receiving and generating states. To avoid this, 
most regions of North America have established tradable certificate tracking systems 
(Cory et al 2007: 7). The complexities of counting out-of-state RES-E generation 
would be avoided if the USA had a national RPS. 
 In general terms, there is little consistency in the design of the RPS mechanisms 
in pre-2003 US RPS states. The biggest design flaws appear to be: unambitious RPS 
targets, exemption of publicly-owned electricity generators, overly broad eligibility of 
RES-E types, and overly lax non-compliance charges or escape clauses. 
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3.3.6 General conclusions about the effectiveness of the RPS mechanism in the 
USA 
As one would expect in a country that has the oldest and most diverse 
adaptations of the RPS, the US experience of it shows what can go right with the  
 mechanism, as well as what can go wrong. On the ‘right’ side, the seven-fold increase 
in national wind generation between 1995 and 2008 shows that the RPS is capable of 
delivering a lot of additional RES-E generating capacity within a short timeframe. 
However, there is at least as much that has gone wrong with the RPS in the USA as 
has gone right. The most significant thing to go wrong is its failure to be applied 
across all states. Some would also argue that the failure of the RPS in the USA to 
significantly support other types of RES-E, other than wind, has also been a failing of 
the mechanism. However, it could equally be validly argued that since wind is the 
least costly of all RES-E types, apart from hydro, this is the outcome to be expected 
from an undifferentiated RPS. 
The mechanism’s failure to generate an amount of RES-E that does anything 
more than compensate for the non-RPS related loss of hydro-electric generation is 
also a negative which will significantly affect the ability of the USA to make cuts in 
its GHG emissions. This seems to be partly related to the lack of ambition in the RPS 
target of many states, as well as to the myriad exemptions, escape clauses and cost 
caps that exist in many states’ RPSs. In the broad, it can be said that a few states have 
shown how an RPS system can be properly, and effectively, designed but too many 
have shown how it can be poorly designed.  
 
 
3.4 Experience of the RPS in the United Kingdom 
 
 
3.4.1 United Kingdom evolution of the RPS 
If the USA has the oldest, and most diverse, uses of the RPS mechanism then the 
United Kingdom has its most widespread, uniform application. Arguably, the UK and 
the USA are the global leaders in RPS design by virtue of their size and length of RPS 
use. The UK began using mechanisms to support RES-E in 1990 with a system of 
competitive tendering that lasted until 1998. Although successful in delivering low-
cost RES-E, a high proportion of its successful bids were not constructed because of 
overly low tendered prices, so the new Blair Labour government (elected in 1998) 
sought a replacement system. The UK RPS ‘Renewables Obligation’ (RO) was the 
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new system; it began operating in 2002. It was the first compulsory application of the 
RPS in Europe (although a voluntary RPS in the Netherlands began in 1998). Being a  
 uniform application across one of the world’s major economies, the UK RPS 
represents the largest consistent use of the mechanism anywhere in the world. 
 
Figure 3.5: Use of the RPS and the FIT throughout Europe 
 
Source: Rickerson et al 2007. 
 
 
3.4.2 The generation performance of the RPS in the United Kingdom 
RES-E has traditionally made up a modest proportion of the electricity generated 
in the UK, representing only 6.7% of electricity generation in 2009 (Department of 
Energy and Climate Change 2010: 184). Initially, the UK’s RPS target was set at 10% 
by 2010-2011 but is now 20% by 2020 (Mitchell et al 2011). As part of an EU goal of 
sourcing 20% of all energy use (electricity, heat and transport) from renewable 
sources by 2020, the UK is committed to sourcing 15% by 2020. In order to comply 
with the commitment, there is an unofficial target of sourcing 30% of the country’s 
electricity from RES-E by 2020 (Secretary for Energy and Climate Change 2009: 52). 
In 2000, electricity GHG emissions accounted for 27.7% of all the GHG emissions the 
UK was responsible for. This compared to an average, that year, of 18.3% for the 
OECD and 35.6% for Australia (World Resources Institute, 2009). 
A superficial analysis shows that the UK’s RPS has had limited success in lifting 
RES-E generation to date, however, its RES-E generation share doubled between 
2001 and 2007 (EC 2010a). As shown in Figure 3.6, the UK’s RPS has had a 
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particularly strong effect on the uptake of wind of which the UK has some of the best 
quality resources in Europe. Between 2002 and 2009, installed wind capacity in the 
UK increased from 552 MW to 4,424 MW: an increase of 701% (Global Wind 
Energy Council 2009a, Department of Energy and Climate Change 2010). 
 
Figure 3.6: Generation performance of different RES-E types in the United 
Kingdom, 1990 to 2009 
 
Source: EC 2010a, Department of Energy and Climate Change 2010. 
 
The increase in wind capacity has translated into a significant increase in wind 
generation, as shown in Figure 3.6. Another RES-E type that has experienced a 
significant increase in generation under the UK RPS has been biomass, particularly 
landfill gas. The aspiration that the UK source 30% of its electricity generation from 
RES-E by 2020 is intended to be met mainly from onshore and offshore wind. As 
shown in Figure 3.7, the government projects that these would be responsible for 
about 70% of this level of RES-E generation by 2020 (Secretary for Energy and 
Climate Change 2009: 44). By 2009, however, the UK only had about a fifth, or less, 
of the installed wind generating capacity that Spain or Germany had (BMU 2009: 47). 
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Figure 3.7: Projected UK RES-E generation to meet a 30%-by- 2020 RES-E 
generation share target 
 
Source: Secretary for Energy and Climate Change 2009. 
To date, the UK’s RPS has not supported a broad spectrum of RES-E 
generation. The UK government seems more than prepared to admit this. A 2008 
government consultation paper on renewable energy said: ‘We acknowledge that in 
the past the overall effectiveness of the RO has been hampered by the fact that it did 
not incentivise a sufficiently wide range of technologies’ (Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2008: 91). The failure to support a wide range of 
RES-E is not necessarily a problem, but if it is RES-E types with major generating 
potentials that are not supported, as is the case in Australia (discussed in s2.3), it is a 
problem if radical RES-E expansion is desired. A major change in the UK RPS, 
effective from April 2009, that addresses its inability to support a wide range of  
RES-E types, is the introduction of banding. This assigns different RPS tradable 
certificate weightings to different RES-E types, resulting in more tradable certificates 
being created for each immature RES-E MWh of generation compared to generation 
from mature RES-E. This change was prompted, in part, by a concern that existing 
homogenised RES-E tradable certificate prices would be insufficient to support uptake 
of the country’s considerable offshore wind resources. Banding is an RPS device that 
affects the price of tradable certificates, it is therefore a different type of device to 
carve-outs, discussed in ss3.3.5 above, which is a quantity based device (also capable  
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 of supporting high-cost RES-E within the RPS). The UK banding rates are given in 
Table 3.8, below: they are generally more differentiated than the banding used in 
Italy’s RPS (given in Table 3.12, later). The UK introduction of significantly 
differentiated banding is a major step in the evolution of the RPS. Banding makes the 
RPS mechanism more like the FIT and makes it possible for it to support higher cost 
types of RES-E. If less mature, higher cost, types of RES-E have significant 
generating potentials, which is the case in Australia, banding makes it possible to 
generate greater quantities of RES-E. This should help countries with significant 
immature RES-E generating potentials to make deep GHG cuts (in the case of 
Australia, this is discussed in ss2.2.5). 
The adoption of banding was a major policy change for the UK government, as 
recently as 2001 it had declared that ‘banding would be too rigid an approach for a 
long-term policy such as the [Renewables] Obligation, and would require the 
Government to dictate the contribution of each energy source. This approach would be 
contrary to the market-led basis of the Obligation’ (Department of Trade and Industry 
2001: 26). Given the change since then, one could reasonably ask why the UK 
government did not consider abandoning its RPS and adopting the FIT instead. The 
government argued that this would be too disruptive and would erode business 
confidence. In 2008, in its UK Renewable Energy Strategy, it argued: ‘A change of 
scheme could be expected to lead to considerable uncertainty for several years’ 
(Secretary for Energy and Climate Change 2009: 93). However, when the UK 
government changed in 2010, there was speculation that the new government might 
abandon the Renewables Obligation but its May 2010 coalition governing agreement 
(between the Conservative and Liberal-Democratic parties) included a commitment to 
‘maintenance of banded ROCs [UK tradable RPS certificates]’ (Guardian 2010). In 
December 2010, however, the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change 
published a consultation paper on electricity market reform in which it stated that its 
‘preferred package of reforms’ was one which included a premium based RES-E FIT, 
operating alongside a carbon price, rather than an RPS (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change, 2010b: 111). This may mean that banding will be relied up for a 
relatively short time to deliver differentiated support to the UK’s RES-E. 
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Table 3.8: UK RPS banding rates, 2009. 
RES-E type Banding weight 
Landfill gas 0.25 
Sewage gas and biomass cofiring 0.5 
Onshore wind, hydro, other cofiring 1.0 
Offshore wind, wave, solar PV, 
geothermal 
2.0 
Source: Enviros 2009 
The UK government also introduced an FIT in April 2010 for small-scaled  
RES-E generation (from generators with less than 5 MW capacity). Unlike in 
Australia, small generators will only be able to benefit from FIT income and will not 
be able to earn income from RPS tradable certificates as well. However, small 
generators can elect to stay in the RPS, instead of generating under the new FIT 
scheme. This will mainly leave the UK RPS tradable certificate market to larger RES-
E generators.  
As shown in Figure 3.8, if nothing else, the UK’s RPS has succeeded in 
significantly lifting the non-hydro RES-E generation share of national electricity 
consumption.  
 
Figure 3.8: Hydro and non-hydro RES-E generation share of electricity 
consumption in the United Kingdom, 1990 to 2009. 
 
Source: EC 2010a, Department of Energy and Climate Change 2010. 
For most types of RES-E, the new banding tradable certificate multipliers were 
applied to generators that received accreditation after the device was foreshadowed in 
July 2006. RES-E generators accredited before that time were grandfathered with one  
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 tradable certificate per MWh of generation, regardless of RES-E type. The major 
exception to this was biomass and mixed waste generators which received the new, 
banded number of tradable certificates regardless of when they were established 
(Department of Energy and Climate Change 2008: 17-20). Table 3.9 shows the 
change in RES-E generation between 2006, when banding was announced, and 2009, 
the latest year for which data is available. The largest increases were recorded by 
offshore wind, onshore wind and solar PV. Of these, offshore wind is the standout 
because onshore wind did not receive any increase in tradable certificates under 
banding and solar PV generation increased off a very modest 2006 base. 
 
Table 3.9: UK RES-E generation, 2006 and 2009. 
RES-E type 2006 
generation: 
GWh/yr(1) 
2009 
generation: 
GWh/yr(2) 
2006 to 
2009 
change(3) 
Hydro 4,922 5,262 +7% 
Landfill gas, 
sewerage 
       4,756             5,590             +18% 
Biomass, municipal 
waste and cofiring 
4,347 5,046 +16% 
Offshore wind 403 1,740 +329% 
Onshore wind 2,501 7,564 +202% 
Solar PV 8 20 +150% 
Total 16,936 25,222 +49% 
Source: Department of Energy and Climate Change 2010 (cols. 1 and 2), author calculations (col. 3). 
 
 
3.4.3 The price performance of the UK RPS 
As shown in Figure 3.9, the price of the tradable certificates attached to the 
UK’s RPS (excluding the wholesale cost of electricity) was generally stable between 
2002 and 2006 but has since experienced some increase and was more volatile over 
the 2007 to 2010 period than over the 2002 to 2007 one.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: The Use of the Renewable Portfolio Standard in the United States and Western Europe 
86 
Figure 3.9: Tradable RPS certificate auction prices of the UK RPS (excluding the 
wholesale cost of electricity), 2002 to 2010 
 
Source: NFPAS 2011. 
 
A recent RPS change in the UK, that will affect tradable certificate prices, is the 
introduction of guaranteed headroom in its annual RPS targets. This was a 2009 
change where annual interim targets were no longer pre-determined but instead would 
be set from year to year at ‘a certain level above the forecast level of renewables 
deployment’ (Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2008: 96). 
The level above forecast deployment is currently 8% but may rise to 10% by 2014-15 
(Secretary for Energy and Climate Change 2009: 57). This change is designed to 
effectively act as a tradable certificate price floor and makes the RPS trajectory a 
minimum one. In practise, however, the guaranteed headroom feature will only be 
invoked if the level of RES-E generation comes close to its RPS target level (Ofgem 
2009:30). For this to happen, there would have to be little, if any, payment of the non-
compliance charge (called ‘buyout fee’ in the UK) in lieu of RES-E generation. This 
seems unlikely given that the buyout fee is below the current tradable certificate price 
and there is recycling of the penalty fee amongst complying electricity retailers 
(discussed further in ss3.4.4, below). The influence of the buyout fee aside, like the 
introduction of highly differentiated banding into the UK RPS, the introduction of the 
guaranteed headroom minimum price feature is a major evolutionary step for the RPS. 
It will enable it to provide more RES-E investor certainty and will make it more like 
the FIT by, effectively, implicitly creating a tradable certificate price floor. 
Like all RES-E generators, those in the UK receive income from two sources: 1) 
the sale of tradable certificates or contracted sale to electricity retailers; and 2) the 
wholesale price of electricity. As will be discussed in ss6.5.1 and ss6.5.2, the 
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wholesale price of electricity in the UK is high by European standards and in 2009 
was about 77% higher than the equivalent wholesale price in Germany and about 44% 
higher than that of Spain (NPAS Limited 2011, Spanish Government 2004, BMU 
2009). It has also become more volatile in recent years. Between winter 2002-03 and 
winter 2006-07, the UK wholesale price of electricity traded in a £0.90 band between 
£4.10 and £5.00. However, between summer 2007 and summer 2011, it traded in a 
£2.08 band between £4.60 and £6.68 (NPAS Limited 2011). This has diminished the 
predictability of total RES-E generator income in the UK and has, therefore, increased 
the liklihoold that RES-E developers will demand a ‘risk premium’ in their tradable 
certificate prices (discussed in ss6.5.4). 
 
3.4.4 The unique design features of the UK RPS 
Four distinctive characteristics of the UK RPS are: 
• its exclusion of generation from large, existing hydro-electric  
generators from counting towards its RPS obligation;  
• its recycling of buyout fee payments amongst complying 
electricity retailers;  
• its restriction on tradable certificate banking; and  
• its expression of its RPS target as a percentage of each unit of 
electricity sales.  
The exclusion of hydro-electric capacity, that existed before the UK RPS began, 
meant that the amount of RES-E that qualified for the RPS was equal to less than 1% 
of overall electricity generation when it commenced. However, when the UK RPS 
began in 2002, hydro generation was only equal to 1% of electricity consumption (EC 
2009a) so its inclusion did not make a huge difference to the UK RPS RES-E 
generation share. 
The non-compliance charge applied to electricity retailers for not purchasing 
their required volume of tradable certificates each year is £36.99/MWh for 2010/11 
(Mitchell et al 2011). The buyout fee charge is recycled amongst complying 
electricity retailers. When combined with the high degree of ownership concentration 
in the UK electricity industry, it is often argued this recycling gives the industry an 
incentive to under-invest in new RES-E capacity. This happens through the 
concentrated UK RES-E generators restricting the supply of RES-E, thereby keeping 
tradable certificate prices high, which increases the incentive for electricity retailers to 
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pay the buyout fee instead of purchasing tradable certificates. Because buyout fee 
charges are recycled amongst complying electricity retailers that purchase tradable 
certificates, and because the retailers are also in many cases RES-E generators, it is 
argued they have a vested interest in restricting RES-E supply to increase the amount 
of buyout fee income that comes back to them. When combined with the fact that full 
attainment of each year’s RPS target would have caused the UK tradable certificate 
price to crash before the guaranteed headroom feature was introduced, the recycling 
phenomenon is often credited with being the driving force behind the low attainment 
of the UK annual RES-E targets, shown in Table 3.10. Whether the UK buyout fee is 
too low or too high depends on whether an electricity generator in the country is also 
an RES-E generator; it also depends on what type of RES-E is being considered. The 
combined value of the buyout fee and the amount recycled from the buyout fund can 
act as an RPS tradable certificate price ceiling if set too low: for 2008-09 the 
combined value of the two was £35.76 + £18.61 = £54.37. If an electricity retailer is 
also an RES-E generator, then the cost to it of generating wind is less than this amount 
and it would, therefore, be worth the retailer generating this type of RES-E instead of 
paying the buyout fee. This is also the case if a retailer is not a generator and has to 
buy RES-E tradable certificates on the open market. In winter 2010-11, the cost of a 
UK tradable certificate was £52.22, again less than the effective £54.37 cost of the 
buyout fee. Similar calculations apply to biomass and offshore wind, after factoring in 
their multipliers, as shown in Table 3.8. However, wave and solar PV are more 
expensive to generate than the effective value of the buyout fee, even after factoring 
in their multipliers, in which case the retailer would be better off paying the buyout 
fee, if it was also an RES-E generator.  
Table 3.10: UK RPS annual targets, attainment rates, buyout fee and recycled 
buyout fund amount, 2002-03 to 2008-09 
Year RPS target: 
% of 
electricity 
generation 
RPS % 
achieved 
% of RPS 
target 
achieved 
Buyout 
fee: 
£/MWh 
Recycled 
buyout 
fund 
amount: 
£/MWh  
2002-03 3.0% 1.8% 60% £30.00 £15.94 
2003-04 4.3% 2.2% 51% £30.51 £22.92 
2004-05 4.9% 3.1% 63% £31.59 £13.66 
2005-06 5.5% 4.0% 73% £32.33 £10.21 
2006-07 6.7% 4.4% 66% £33.24 £16.04 
2007-08 7.9% 4.8% 62% £34.30 £18.65 
2008-09 9.1% 5.4% 59% £35.76 £18.61 
                               Source: Ofgem (various), Department of Energy and Climate Change 2010b,  
Mitchell et al 2011. 
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The UK RPS only allows a limited form of tradable certificate banking: a 
maximum of 25% of an electricity retailer’s obligation can be met from certificates 
issued the previous year (Agnolucci 2007: 3356). Previously, up to 50% of an 
electricity retailer’s obligation could be met from banked tradable certificates but this 
was narrowed following a public consultation (Department of Trade and Industry 
2001: 25). 
It is also often argued that, historically, the construction of new wind capacity in  
the UK has been thwarted by local planning resistance. However, for large scaled 
RES-E developments at least, there is now more national government coordination of 
their planning and the grounds for objection to any scale of RES-E development have 
been narrowed. Large-scale RES-E developments are now approved (or disapproved) 
at a national level, and aesthetic grounds can no longer be used as the basis for an 
RES-E planning objection alone.  
 
3.4.5 General conclusions about the effectiveness of the UK RPS mechanism 
In recent years in particular, the UK RPS has been effective at supporting the 
uptake of RES-E. There is growing confidence that the country will go close to 
meeting its RPS target of 20% of electricity generation by 2020 although there is little 
solid confidence that it will necessarily reach its unofficial 30%-by-2020 target. Wind, 
in particular, has been a significant beneficiary of the mechanism. However, because 
electricity retailers can elect to pay a fairly low, recycled non-compliance charge there 
is no guarantee the 20% target will be reached. The UK RPS has not supported a wide  
variety of new RES-E to date, although the banding changes that came into effect in 
2009 may alter this and there are signs that offshore wind is benefiting from the 
innovation. The 2009 and 2010 introduction of banding and the guaranteed headroom 
minimum tradable certificate price, into the UK RPS, were major evolutionary steps 
for the mechanism that will probably put development of the mechanism further ahead 
in the country than in any other in which it is used. It will be very interesting to see 
what future effect they have on UK RES-E development. 
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3.5 Experience of the RPS in Sweden, Italy and Belgium 
 
 This section discusses the use of the RPS in the three continental European 
countries of Sweden, Italy and Belgium. As shown in Figure 3.5, within the EU, the 
RPS is also used in Poland and Romania. 
 
3.5.1 The generation performance of the RPS mechanism in Sweden, Italy and 
Belgium 
In continental Western Europe, the RPS has been in use in Sweden since 2003, 
in Italy since 2001,and in the three regions that make up Belgium since between 2002 
and 2004. In none of the three countries has progress towards their RPS targets been 
particularly inspiring.  
 
Table 3.11: National RPS targets in Sweden, Italy and Belgium 
Country National RPS RES-E target 
Sweden 51% of electricity by 2010/ extra 
17 TWh between 2002 and 2016 
Belgium 6% of electricity by 2010 
Italy 25% of electricity by 2010 
 
As shown in Figure 3.10, hydro has been, and remains, the dominant type of 
RES-E in Sweden. Although Sweden’s biomass generation by 2007 was more than 
five times what it had been in the first half of the 1990s, hydro still accounted for 85% 
of the country’s RES-E by that year. In the country there is concern its RPS will not 
support much uptake of offshore wind RES-E capacity (Van der Linden 2005: 43). As 
shown in Figure 3.11, Sweden generated between 40% and 50% of its electricity from 
RES-E in the first half of the 1990s before its RPS began, nearly all it from hydro. 
Pre-RPS RES-E generation capacity currently counts towards the country’s RPS  
 target. Although the hydro and non-hydro RES-E generation share of all electricity in 
Sweden increased between 1997 and 2005, it has since fallen largely because large-
scale hydro-electric generation is decreasing due to adverse weather conditions. The 
European Commission says ‘Sweden is moving away from its  RES-E [RES-E] target’ 
(EC 2007c: 1). In 2000, electricity GHG emissions accounted for 5.8% of all the GHG 
emissions Sweden was responsible for. This compared to an average, that year, of 
18.3% for the OECD and 35.6% for Australia (World Resources Institute 2009). 
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Figure 3.10: Generation of different RES-E types in Sweden, 1990 to 2007. 
 
Source: EC 2010a. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Hydro and non-hydro RES-E generation share of electricity in 
Sweden, 1990 to 2007. 
 
Source: EC 2010a. 
 
 
Belgium’s 1.1% RES-E share of electricity in 1997 was the lowest RES-E 
generation share of all the 15 countries that belonged to the EU that year. Even though 
by 2007 the country had increased its RES-E generation share to 4.2%, the EC argues 
that Belgium’s ‘national target of 6% [its 6%-by-2020 RES-E generation share target] 
is still far away’ (EC 2007c: 1). In 2000, electricity GHG emissions accounted for 
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15.1% of all the GHG emissions Belgium was responsible for (World Resources 
Institute 2009). As shown in Figure 3.12, Biomass dominates the country’s RES-E: in 
2007 it accounted for 78% of the country’s RES-E generation. This means the 
country’s RES-E is not particularly diversified. This is despite the existence of a 
fallback fixed-price FIT that can be used instead of the country’s RPS (Coenraads et 
al 2008: 15). Although the country has limited solar generating potential, it has a 
significant wind generation potential it has hardly begun to exploit.  
 
Figure 3.12: Generation of different RES-E types in Belgium, 1990 to 2007. 
 
Source: EC 2010a. 
 
Figure 3.13: Hydro and non-hydro RES-E generation shares of electricity in 
Belgium, 1990 to 2007. 
 
Source: EC 2010a. 
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Like Belgium and Sweden, Italy also has a narrow base of RES-E generation. 
Unlike Belgium and Sweden, however, Italy’s RPS is banded (beginning in 2008) as 
detailed in Table 3.12. Italy’s RPS banding is not particularly differentiated and is 
certainly less differentiated than the UK’s banding (see Table 3.8). Italy’s banding 
does not seem to have significantly diversified its RES-E generation to date. 
 
Table 3.12: Banding of RES-E types in Italy’s RPS 
RES-E type Tradeable 
certificate 
weighting 
Onshore wind 1.0 
Offshore wind 1.1 
Geothermal 0.9 
Wave and tidal 1.8 
Biodegradable biomass 1.1 
Biomass 1.8 
Biogas biomass 0.8 
Source: Coenraads et al 2008. 
 
Like Sweden, hydro dominates Italy’s RES-E, as shown in Figure 3.14. In 2009 
it accounted for 71% of the country’s RES-E, although non-hydro RES-E has climbed 
from being equal to 1.3% of the country’s electricity generation in 1990 to 6.0% in 
2009, as shown in Figure 3.15. Italy has experienced some increase in geothermal, 
wind, solar and biomass generation, but not enough to rival its hydro generation. The  
 increase in solar generation in Italy is the result of a separate FIT that exists for solar 
PV in the country. In 2000, electricity GHG emissions accounted for 20.6% of all the 
GHG emissions Italy was responsible for (World Resources Institute 2009). 
With regard to the chances of Italy reaching its RPS target of 25% RES-E 
generation share by 2010, the EC argues ‘Italy is far from the [RPS] targets set at both 
the national and European level’ (EC 2007c: 1). In April 2006, the EC took legal 
action against Italy for failing to properly report its progress towards RPS targets, and 
for not taking sufficient measures to support the uptake of RES-E (Coenraads et al 
2008: 83). A large part of the failure of Italy to make progress towards its RPS target 
is the fact that its target has not kept pace with national electricity generation growth 
(ie it is not set as a share of electricity generation) (Lorenzoni 2008: 37). Italy’s 
experience shows why it is desirable to periodically review non-generation-share RPS 
targets against generation share performance with adjustment if the targets are not 
likely to be reached.  
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Figure 3.14: Generation of different RES-E types in Italy, 1990 to 2009. 
 
Source: EC 2010a, Terna 2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.15: Hydro and non-hydro RES-E generation shares of electricity in 
Italy, 1990 to 2009. 
 
Source: EC 2010a, Terna 2010. 
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3.5.2 The price performance and the unique design features of the RPS in Sweden, 
Italy and Belgium 
All three countries have tradable certificates attached to their RPS mechanisms. 
In the case of Sweden, in order to protect against excessively low certificate prices, a 
minimum price guarantee operated for an introductory period between 2003 and 2007  
(Wang 2006: 1216). Starting in 2005, an RPS non-compliance charge began in the 
country that was equal to 150% of the average certificate price of the most recent 
accounting period (ie 50% more than the average certificate price) (Van der Linden 
2005: 34). This creates a strong incentive to comply with the RPS instead of paying 
the charge. It was introduced because a large part of the RPS obligation was being 
discharged through non-compliance charges (a quarter of the total RPS obligation in 
2004). Sweden’s experience with non-compliance charges shows why it is desirable to 
have high non-compliance charges that do not effectively become low ceilings on 
RPS tradable certificate prices. As shown in Table 3.13, the 2008 Swedish tradable 
certificate price (inclusive of the wholesale price of electricity) was significantly 
lower than that of Italy and Belgium in 2006 or 2007. This was largely because 
significant surpluses of tradable certificates were created in the first three years of 
Sweden's RPS, many of which were banked (Van der Linden 2005: 35). The large 
surpluses were the result of government underestimation of RES-E capacity existing 
before its RPS commenced. It is often argued that the Swedish RPS is too generous to 
pre-existing RES-E generators. However, at the end of 2012, some RES-E generators 
will be phased out of the country’s RPS mechanism which will reduce the number of 
available tradable certificates. To accommodate this reduction, the Swedish RPS 
target will reduce in 2013 before climbing again (Coenraads et al 2008: 150). The 
Swedish experience with pre-existing RES-E capacity shows why it is undesirable to 
include pre-existing capacity in an RPS target. RPS targets should seek to support new 
RES-E capacity, inclusion of pre-existing capacity can decrease tradable certificate 
prices thereby decreasing RES-E support, which can be crucial if seeking radical 
RES-E expansion.  
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Table 3.13: Tradable RPS certificate prices (including the wholesale price of 
electricity) in Belgium, Italy and Sweden, 2006 to 2008. 
Source: Coenraads et al 2008. 
 
 
Italy has the opposite problem to Sweden, it has too little RES-E capacity with 
the result that there has always been insufficient RES-E generation to satisfy its RPS  
target although the amount of the shortfall has decreased over time (suggesting that its 
early RPS target may have been too ambitious) (Coenraads et al 2008: 80). The 
shortfall has resulted in a high Italian tradable certificate price, as shown in Table 
3.13. The shortfall has been accentuated by a perceived lack of political support 
towards RES-E development in the country (Lorenzoni 2003: 41). Italy’s non-
compliance charge is vague and weak so there is a significant incentive not to comply 
with its RPS (Coenraads et al 2008: 82). The weak penalties are largely the result of 
ambiguous legislation (EC 2007c: 1). When there is insufficient Italian RES-E 
generation, its power services administrator can sell tradable certificates to prevent 
their prices rising too high which, effectively, creates a tradable certificate price cap 
(Coenraads et al 2008: 80). Other major disincentives to developing new RES-E 
capacity in the country include its high grid connection costs and its unpredictable 
planning processes (Coenraads et al 2008: 83). The lack of political support for the  
RPS in Italy shows why it is important for RPS mechanisms to be reinforced with 
support from government.  
Belgium’s RPS is divided into three separate sub-national generation markets in 
Flanders, Walloon and Brussels each of which has a separate RPS target. Up until 
2008, tradable certificate transactions had only occurred in Flanders and Walloon 
(Coenraads et al 2008: 14). All three sub national generation markets have minimum 
mandated RPS prices. The high tradable certificate prices in Flanders and Walloon are 
largely the product of the ambitious RPS targets both have (7% of electricity in 
Walloon by 2007 and 6% of electricity in Flanders by 2010), as well persistently poor 
weather conditions in Walloon which has reduced hydro-electric generation (EC 
2007c: 1). All three regions have low non-compliance charges so it is generally more 
favourable to pay the charges than to purchase tradable certificates. This has resulted 
Country RPS tradable 
certificate price period 
RPS tradable certificate price 
(€/MWh) 
Belgium - Walloon First qtr of 2007 90.8 
Belgium - Flanders First half of 2006 110 
Italy 2007 130 
Sweden Feb-08 29-31 
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in thin trading of their tradable certificates (EC 2007c: 1). In the Flanders region, pre-
existing RES-E capacity is allowed to create RPS tradable certificates (Nielsen and 
Jeppesen 2003: 9). 
 
 
3.5.3 General conclusions about the effectiveness of the RPS in Sweden, Italy and 
Belgium 
There are some salient lessons in the RPS experience of Sweden, Italy and 
Belgium. Sweden’s experience shows that being overly generous to RES-E generation 
capacity that existed before an RPS commences can undermine the effectiveness of  
the RPS in realising an increased share of a jurisdiction’s non-hydro RES-E 
generating potential, particularly if the pre-existing capacity is poorly assessed. The 
experience of Sweden and Belgium demonstrates, again, that undifferentiated RPS 
mechanisms are generally not successful at supporting a wide variety of RES-E 
beyond wind and biomass. Italy’s experience shows how an RPS can be undermined 
if RES-E investors do not believe there is sufficient political support for the RPS 
mechanism. The fact that many electricity generators in Italy and Belgium pay non-
compliance charges, instead of purchasing tradable RES-E certificates, underscores 
the importance of having sufficiently high non-compliance charges. Generally, all 
three countries have had limited success with their RPS mechanisms as a result of 
some glaring design faults from which much can be learnt. 
 
 
 
3.6 Conclusions about the use of the RPS mechanism in Western 
Europe and the USA 
 
The five RPS countries covered in this chapter have implemented the 
mechanism in a number of different ways from which a number of conclusions can be 
drawn. When evaluated according to generation performance, the experience in the 
USA and Western Europe makes it clear that the RPS mechanism is mainly successful 
at supporting wind and biomass. Other higher cost types of RES-E  such as solar, 
geothermal and wave  are not supported by an undifferentiated RPS. As mentioned 
several times in this thesis, this is not necessarily a weakness of the RPS: it was 
unambiguously designed as a type-neutral mechanism to support least-cost RES-E. 
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Since wind and biomass are the lowest cost types of non-hydro RES-E, it should be no 
surprise that the mechanism is most successful at supporting those two RES-E types. 
It also needs to be remembered that some of the countries discussed in this chapter 
have a limited range of RES-E types with significant generating potentials. As Figure 
3.7 makes clear, for instance, the UK aims to generate most of its targeted 2020 level 
of RES-E generation from wind. 
If there are technological, or generating potential, reasons for wanting a wide 
variety of RES-E to be developed, or for wanting high-cost types of RES-E to be 
developed   such as wanting to generate an amount of RES-E commensurate with 
achieving deep cuts in GHG emissions (as discussed, in Australia’s case, in ss2.2.5)   
  it is clear that a narrow, undifferentiated,  technology-neutral RPS mechanism, 
alone, cannot be relied upon to deliver it unless a country has a lot of undeveloped 
onshore wind, biomass and/or hydro generating potential. It needs to be remembered, 
however, that in relatively densely settled areas like Western Europe and the USA, it 
may be possible to import RES-E instead of generating it locally, which may be more 
cost-effective. To support a wide variety of RES-E, the RPS needs to be made narrow 
type-specific  through different classes (carve-outs) or weightings (bands) for the 
tradable certificates of different RES-E types  or it needs to be augmented by another 
non-neutral mechanism such as the FIT. Using different weightings, or bands, to make 
the RPS mechanism narrow type-specific is probably better than using different 
classes to do the same thing because it preserves the liquidity of a larger tradable 
certificates market and allows more flexibility within the mechanism. The UK has  
recently taken a major RPS evolutionary step by introducing a highly differentiated 
banding system. 
By making the RPS narrow type-specific, banding and carve-outs make the 
mechanism more like the FIT. Another RPS device that makes it more like the FIT is 
tradable certificate price floors. In the countries analysed in this chapter, these have 
taken the form of minimum certificate prices in Sweden between 2003 and 2007, the 
minimum certificate price that operates in Belgium, and the implicit minimum price 
the UK has through its ‘guaranteed headroom’ RES-E target system. All three devices 
reduce the volatility of RPS tradable certificate prices which can undermine RES-E 
investor confidence. The use of RPS tradable certificate price floors could, potentially, 
replace the function that RES-E contracts serve. Contracts in the RPS mechanism 
provide financial security, both to the RES-E generator and the RES-E financier. But 
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price floors could serve the same function, thus allowing the tradable certificate 
market to be more liquid by freeing RES-E generation from contracts. 
Aside from design elements that converge the RPS with the FIT, there are 
several other important lessons that can be learned from RPS experience in the USA 
and Western Europe. The most significant is that it is highly desirable to have national 
coverage in the RPS. The experience of the USA shows that the effectiveness of the 
RPS can be significantly compromised by a lack of national coverage. Another 
fundamental RPS lesson from the USA is that RPS mechanisms need to be 
compulsory, not voluntary as they are in some US states. A further important lesson is 
that charges for non-compliance with the RPS need to be set at a rate higher than the  
prevailing price of tradable certificates and need to be rigorously enforced with no 
get-out clauses. The experience of several US states shows that the RPS can be 
compromised if non-compliance penalties are not properly designed and enforced. 
The experience in nearly all of the US RPS states also suggests that having major 
exemptions to an RPS  as they do for publicly owned electricity utilities    can 
significantly compromise the RPS: the more universal its coverage, the better. 
Another significant design consideration highlighted by this chapter is the way 
in which pre-existing RES-E capacity is dealt with by the RPS. The experience in 
Maine and Sweden, in particular, shows that the emphasis of the RPS should be on 
supporting new RES-E capacity, not rewarding pre-existing capacity. This is central 
to maximising the percentage of long-term non-hydro RES-E potential generated by  
 RES-E at a given date. Pre-existing RES-E capacity should be left out of an RPS, 
otherwise its support of new RES-E capacity can be compromised.  
Finally, on a political front, the experience of Italy shows that even a fairly well 
designed RPS mechanism can be rendered impotent if RES-E investors do not 
perceive that the mechanism has sufficient political support.  
With the right architecture, RPS mechanisms can be very effective, but only 
within the design constraints that are set for them. The performance of the RPS 
mechanism is nearly always dynamic and needs regular reassessment and re-
evaluation, as has recently occurred in the UK. The design of the RPS also needs to 
keep pace with the new expectations that are being put on it, such as the expectation 
that it might be used for radical RES-E expansion, including high-cost RES-E: an 
expectation that was not thought of when the mechanism was first developed. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Having examined the design and effectiveness of the RPS, as experienced in a 
number of overseas countries in the previous chapter, this chapter turns to the other 
major type of electricity price based RES-E support: the Feed-In Tariff (FIT), which 
offers prices rather than demands quantities of RES-E to be supplied. The chapter 
evaluates the experience of the FIT in Germany, Spain and Denmark selected, as 
before, because they had good data availability and are all major users of the 
mechanism. The discussion in this chapter includes commentary of key FIT features 
including generation, subsidy price, unique design features and historic evolution. The 
chapter tests whether the FIT is necessarily better than the RPS at supporting a diverse 
range of RES-E and examines key features that differentiate it from the RPS. 
 Although there have been more published evaluations of the FIT than there have 
been of the RPS, like RPS evaluations, FIT ones tend to be focused on a single, or 
narrow, range of countries and are invariably dated. For instance, Mendonça (2007) 
focused on Germany, Spain and the USA; Ortega and Perez (2006) focused just on 
Spain; while Ragwitz and Huber (2005) only examined Germany and Spain. This 
evaluation is therefore more broadly based, and up to date, than previous ones. 
 Section 4.2 examines the evolution of the FIT. Section 4.3 analyses the 
experience of the mechanism in Germany while s4.4 examines its use in Spain. Section 
4.5 analyses the FIT’s experience in Denmark while s4.6 draws conclusions from the 
previous five sections.  
 
 
4.2 Evolution of the FIT mechanism 
 
As introduced above, the FIT is an RES-E support mechanism that extends a 
government mandated price-based subsidy to RES-E generators, generally 
differentiated according to RES-E type, and most often financed through a levy on all, 
or most, consumption of electricity in a jurisdiction. In some countries the FIT 
subsidy is degressed: this means it is reduced for newly established RES-E generators 
for each year that has passed since a baseline year before they begin operating. This 
means the subsidy equals b(1-dt) where b is the initial subsidy rate (in, say, cents per 
kWh), d is the degression rate per year and t is the number of years since the baseline  
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 year. As shown in Table 3.2, by the end of 2008, the FIT was used in 43 countries 
across the world and in 20 sub-national jurisdictions. Two-thirds of the countries that 
used it by then were European ones although some countries in Africa, Asia and 
Central/South America also used it (Renewable Energy Policy Network 2007, 2009).  
The first modern enactment of an FIT was the Portuguese FIT in 1988, followed 
by the German FIT in 1990 and the Danish FIT in 1992 (Mendonça et al 2010: 77). 
However, it is sometimes argued that the origins of the FIT reach back to the 1978 US 
Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) (Mendonça 2007:26). This initiative 
was a response to the first world oil price shock of 1973. It stipulated that electricity 
utilities had to purchase electricity from independent generators at its ‘avoided cost’: 
what it would have cost the utilities to generate the electricity themselves. It attracted 
a lot of wind development to California in particular. The similarities between 
PURPA and the FIT are limited, however, because they have different historic 
contexts.  
 
4.3 Experience of the FIT in Germany 
 
4.3.1 German evolution of the FIT   
The origin of the German FIT lies in the 1970s oil price shocks. West Germany 
responded to them by increasing its support for coal-powered electricity and nuclear 
energy as well as limited RES-E research (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006: 261, Lauber 
and Mez 2004: 599). The 1986 accident at Chernobyl, however, turned West German 
public opinion against nuclear energy (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006: 263). The year 
after the accident, the West German chancellor, Helmut Khol, became one of the first 
global leaders to advocate GHG emission reduction. These developments significantly 
increased support for RES-E in West Germany. In 1990, the West German 
government introduced the world’s second FIT legislation after Portugal (Mendonça 
et al 2010: 77). Originally, it was proposed that electricity retailers would strike 
voluntary subsidy agreements with RES-E generators but when they failed to do so 
the nation’s first FIT legislation was passed (Lauber 2004: 1406).  
The 1990 FIT legislation was significantly different to later German incarnations 
of the FIT. Two of the major differences were that it only provided a significant 
subsidy to wind and small hydro electricity generation, and it was a premium subsidy 
calculated as a percentage of the average retail electricity price. This means the price 
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paid to an RES-E generator is p(1+a)  €c/kWh where p is the wholesale (non-RES-E) 
electricity price and a is the premium on the wholesale price paid to RES-E. Another 
distinguishing feature was that it only allowed for distribution of the cost of RES-E 
subsidies amongst regional, rather than national, electricity consumers which, over 
time, made for significant regional differences in the distribution of the subsidy’s 
costs. This is because, like most countries, Germany’s RES-E resources are not evenly 
distributed throughout the nation (Mendonça 2007: 28, 30, Lauber and Mez 2004: 
601).  
In the mid 1990s, there was a backlash against the FIT led by German electricity 
utilities. In 1996, they lodged a complaint with the EC’s competition authority that 
asserted that the country’s FIT was a violation of EU state aid rules. The complaint 
was rejected and an attempted subsidy reduction was narrowly defeated in parliament 
(Lauber and Mez 2004: 603, Jacobsson and Lauber 2006: 265). 
 An important context of the original German FIT was that it was in place before 
the country’s national electricity generation and demand market was deregulated. In 
contrast, the RPS was developed after electricity deregulation in the USA, and the 
politics of liberalised electricity markets significantly shaped the architecture of that 
mechanism (noted above in ss3.2.2). The German electricity industry was deregulated 
in 1998, causing a fall in electricity prices and hence in FIT premium-based subsidies. 
This threatened the ongoing growth of national wind generation capacity and 
prompted a review of the FIT in 1999 (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006: 267). The review 
led to a new German FIT law in 2000: the ‘Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz’ (EEG). 
 The 2000 FIT legislation was different from the 1990 legislation in many 
significant respects. It guaranteed FIT subsidies for 20 years and it differentiated the 
tariffs according to RES-E technology, size and location. It also extended significant 
FIT subsidies to new types of RES-E including solar PV and geothermal. In addition, 
it degressed (reduced) the subsidies over time for new generators and it instituted 
national distribution of the subsidy’s costs (Mendonça 2007: 31-32, Jacobsson and 
Lauber 2006: 268, Lauber and Mez 2004: 610).  
Another major change in 2000 was that Germany’s FIT subsidy was made 
independent of the electricity price. This means the price paid to an RES-E generator 
was p+b  €c/kWh, where p is the wholesale electricity price and b is the feed-in tariff 
subsidy that is ‘fixed’ (in €c/kWh terms) for a particular RES-E type. This has 
advantages and disadvantages. Advantages are that a fixed subsidy gives an RES-E 
generator more certainty than premium ones, and generally results in lower overall 
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payments. Disadvantages include the fact that a (non-premium) FIT does not integrate 
the subsidy system with electricity demand and supply and is not adjusted for inflation 
each year (which means it has an in-built type of degression even if it is not formally 
recognised as such) (Couture and Gagnon 2010).  
The 2000 act was amended in 2004 to reduce the subsidies extended to on-shore 
wind generation and to increase the ones extended to off-shore wind as well as solar 
PV generation (Lauber and Mez 2004: 611). The 2000 act was further amended in 
2008. These changes were mainly designed to facilitate an increase in Germany’s 
RES-E target (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety (BMU) 2008a). Another 2008 change was the introduction of flexible 
degression rates for solar PV which changed according to changes in the rate of 
installation of the technology (Mendonça et al 2010: 50). Degression is designed to 
take advantage of learning-by-doing RES-E technology advances instead of allowing 
an RES-E generator to retain increased profits that might flow from them.  Under 
German FIT laws passed in 2010, the standard degression rate for solar PV is 9%/yr 
but it increases by 1%/yr for each 1,000 MW by which the installation of solar PV 
was above a preordained corridor of installation in the previous year and it falls by 
0.5%/yr for each 500 MW that the previous year’s installation was below the corridor 
(Lauber 2010a). In early 2010, the German government reduced the FIT solar PV 
subsidy. This was in response to a surge in solar PV installation in 2009 (Renewable 
Energy Focus 2010). A similar reaction against a surge in solar PV installation took 
place in Spain in 2008 (to be discussed in ss4.4.1). 
 
4.3.2 Generation performance of the German FIT 
The German FIT has helped increase the percentage of national electricity 
consumption generated from RES-E sources from 3.1% in 1990 to 16.1% in 2009 
(BMU 2010).  
The German 2000 FIT law did not provide any subsidy to hydro electricity 
generated from old schemes of more than 5 MW capacity, so the amount of RES-E 
supported by the EEG is less than the total amount of RES-E generation in the 
country. As shown in Figure 4.1, the non-hydro RES-E generation share in Germany 
has risen quite significantly in Germany under the EEG. 
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Figure 4.1: Hydro and non-hydro RES-E generation shares in Germany, 1990 to 
2009 
 
Source: BMU 2010. 
 
Germany aims to generate 20% of its electricity from RES-E by 2020 and 50% 
by 2050 (Lauber and Mez 2004: 608). Germany is one of the few EU countries likely 
to reach its RES-E targets. In a 2007 EC assessment of the progress of member states’ 
towards their RES-E targets, Germany was listed as one of only three members that 
were ‘perfect’ (EC 2007c: 7). In 2000, electricity generation GHG emissions 
accounted for 28.2% of all the GHG emissions Germany was responsible for. This 
compared to an average, that year, of 18.3% for the OECD and 35.6% for Australia 
(World Resources Institute 2009). 
Although the overall RES-E generation increase in Germany has been large, the 
diversity of the RES-E types its FIT has supported has not been particularly large 
although in recent years it has become significantly more diverse. As can be seen in 
Figure 4.2, wind and biomass generation significantly increased in Germany between 
1990 and 2009 but other types of RES-E generally did not although solar PV 
generation doubled between 2007 and 2009 (BMU 2010). However, as mentioned in 
ss4.3.1, there was a backlash against the high rate of solar PV installation in 2009 
leading to a reduction in its FIT subsidy in 2010. 
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Figure 4.2: Generation of different RES-E types in Germany, 1990 to 2009 
 
Source: BMU 2010. 
 
Although wind, biomass and hydro electricity generation have dominated 
German RES-E to date, the government plans to diversify its future RES-E by 
developing a significant amount of offshore wind generation which, by about 2030, it 
hopes will exceed the amount of onshore wind generation. This is similar, in ambition, 
to the UK’s offshore wind plans (as shown in Figure 3.7) but that country seeks to 
achieve major offshore wind development through RPS banding whereas Germany 
seeks to achieve it through its FIT. In many ways, offshore wind should be seen as a 
different RES-E type to onshore wind: it has higher capital costs, but can also 
generate more electricity than onshore wind because it can exploit stronger and more 
consistent wind currents. If both Germany’s FIT and the UK’s RPS mechanisms are 
successful at supporting offshore wind in future years, this means neither mechanism 
can claim to have a monopoly on supporting high-cost RES-E types. It also means 
that either mechanism could be used by Australia (or any other country) to achieve 
deep cuts in GHG emissions through radical RES-E expansion. 
A key feature of the German FIT, which enhances RES-E generator financial 
security in the country, is the ‘purchase obligation’ that grid operators in the country 
have with respect to RES-E generation. This requires grid operators to purchase and 
distribute all electricity generated by RES-E, regardless of prevailing electricity 
demand conditions; it means that they cannot prioritise fossil fuel generated electricity 
over RES-E generation, particularly when demand is subdued (Mendonça et al 2010: 
30).  
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4.3.3 Price performance of the German FIT 
There is a refreshingly large amount of cost information published by the 
German Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
(BMU) about the cost of its FIT. Germany sets a standard with respect to RES-E 
mechanism transparency that other countries could emulate.  
As shown in Table 4.1, the total amount of the FIT subsidy paid under the 
German EEG (‘EEG total fee paid) rose from €1,580 m in 2001 to €9,900 m in 2009. 
These payments, however, included the wholesale price of the generated electricity as 
well as the FIT subsidy paid on top of the wholesale price to RES-E generators. After 
the wholesale electricity price is subtracted from the total EEG subsidy, the balance is 
referred to by the BMU as the ‘differential cost’ of the EEG. The differential cost 
therefore equals the all-important discrete FIT subsidy cost to the German electricity 
consumer. As can be seen from the author calculations in column 5 of Table 4.1, the 
differential cost fell as a proportion of the total EEG fee paid from 76% in 2001 to 
51% in 2008. This fall is largely explained by the significant rise in German 
wholesale electricity prices over the period that resulted in wholesale prices more than 
doubling (BMU 2009:23).  
 
Table 4.1: German EEG fees, differential cost and annual quota, 2001 to 2009 
Source: BMU 2008b, 2009 and 2010 (cols. 1, 2, 3), author’s calcs (cols. 4, 5, 6). 
 
The rise in wholesale electricity prices does not explain all of the fall of the 
differential cost as a proportion of the total EEG subsidy. It is also partly explained by 
the fall in the differential cost per unit of FIT subsidised generation it was applied to. 
Year EEG total 
fee paid: 
million € 
(non cpi 
adjusted) 
(1) 
EEG 
differential 
cost: 
million € 
(non cpi 
adjusted) (2) 
EEG RES-E 
generation:  
GWh (3) 
EEG fee per 
GWh of EEG 
generation: 
million 
€/GWh (non 
cpi adjusted) 
(4) 
EEG  
differential 
cost as % of 
total EEG fee 
(5) 
EEG 
differential 
cost per 
GWh of EEG 
RES-E 
generation: 
1,000 € 
(non cpi 
adjusted) (6) 
2001 1,580 1,200 18,145 0.087 76% 66.13 
2002 2,230 1,800 24,970 0.089 81% 72.09 
2003 2,610 1,900 28,417 0.092 73% 66.86 
2004 3,610 2,500 38,511 0.094 69% 64.92 
2005 4,500 2,800 43,967 0.102 62% 63.68 
2006 5,810 3,300 51,545 0.113 57% 64.02 
2007 7,900 4,300 67,120 0.118 54% 64.06 
2008 9,020 4,600 71,148 0.127 51% 64.65 
2009 9,900  71,715 0.138   
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As shown in column 6 of Table 4.1, by 2008 the EEG differential cost per kWh of FIT 
supported RES-E was less than it had been in 2003 and preceding years (even though 
increasingly larger proportions of high-cost RES-E, especially solar PV, were being 
supported by the EEG). This was probably due to the degression of the German FIT  
the decreasing FIT premium paid to new RES-E generators over time  which made 
up for the increasing penetration of high-cost RES-E.  
New RES-E introduced to German electricity generation as a result of the EEG 
competes with existing high marginal cost non-RES-E electricity generation. Studies 
commissioned by the German government have concluded that the ‘merit order’ 
impact of this competition decreased wholesale electricity prices by €5.8/MWh to 
€6.7/MWh in 2008 (BMU 2010: 29). This is consistent with the argument of 
Rathmann (2007). Merit order impact means that by reducing the demand for non-
RES-E electricity, the EEG made electricity generated from the most expensive non-
RES-E generators uncompetitive and their generation was withdrawn from the 
national electricity supply. In 2006, the amount of the merit order decrease was almost 
the same amount as the EEG differential cost per kWh of liable electricity generation. 
This means almost all of the EEG differential cost that year was balanced out by the 
fall in wholesale electricity prices induced by increased RES-E. It also meant that the 
net impact of the EEG on household electricity prices that year was almost nil. The 
German government specifically argued that: ‘If we consider the system as a whole, 
the BMU believes this [merit order] effect can be compared to the differential costs’. 
However, it also cautioned that merit order analysis can only be applied to short term 
marginal costs and that to take a long term view ‘a model would be required which 
considered both decisions to operate facilities and decisions to decommission/add 
capacity’ (BMU 2007b: 9).  
 
4.3.4 The structure of German FIT payments 
The structure of the EEG’s payments, under the changes to its legislation passed 
in 2008, are detailed in Table 4.2. In broad terms, there are five major tiers in the tariff 
rate paid by the mechanism. The lowest is occupied by wind (onshore, offshore and 
repowered (ie replacement of old wind generators with new ones)). The most 
generous subsidy is given to solar PV (‘solar attached to buildings’). A major 
omission from the EEG payments is any type of FIT for wave energy. There also does 
not appear to be any dedicated FIT for solar thermal. With regard to the EEG’s 
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degression rates, the solar PV rates are higher than the rest although onshore wind 
also has a high degression rate. From the Table 4.2 tariff and degression rates it can be  
 broadly concluded that the German government considers wind and biomass to be the 
least-cost types of RES-E and geothermal and solar PV to be the highest cost. But it 
also seems clear that the government expects solar PV and onshore wind technology 
to improve  in terms of cost competitiveness and generation efficiency  at a faster 
rate than the other RES-E types.  
 
Table 4.2: Structure of German FIT tariffs under 2008 legislation 
RES-E type FIT tariff (per kWh) Degression rate (%/yr subsidy decline 
according to date of construction) 
Onshore wind 5.02€c: basic rate 
9.2€c: premium rate for first 5 years 
extended for plants with capacity 
below 1.5 times reference 
5% after 2014 
Repowered wind Basic wind rate plus 0.5€c if at least 
double old capacity 
1% after 2010 
Offshore wind 3.5€c: basic rate 
13.0€c: premium rate for first 12 
years if built before 2016, extended if 
built in more than 20m of water at 
least 12 nautical miles from shore 
5% after 2015 
Landfill gas 9.0€c: first 500 kW 
6.16€c: 500 kW to 5 MW 
1.5% after 2010 
Mine gas 7.16€c: first 1 MW 
5.16€c: 1MW to 5 MW 
4.16€c: greater than 5 MW 
1.5% after 2010 
Sewerage gas 7.11€c: first 500 kW 
6.16€c: 500 kW to 5 MW 
1.5% after 2010 
Biomass 11.67€c: first 150kW 
9.18€c: 150 kW to 5 MW 
7.79€c: 5 MW to 20 MW 
1% after 2010 
Small hydro 12.67€c: first 500 kW 
8.65€c: 500 kw to 2 MW 
7.65€c: 2 MW to 5 MW 
1% after 2010 
Geothermal 16.0€c: first 10 MW 
10.5€c: greater than 10 MW 
1% after 2010 
Solar (free 
standing) 
31.94€c: general tariff 1% after 2010 
9% after 2011 
Solar (attached 
to buildings) 
43.01€c: first 30 kW 
40.91€c: 30 kW to 100 kW 
39.58€c: 100 kW to 1 MW 
33.0€c: greater than 1 MW 
8% in 2010 and 9% after 2011 for up to 
100 kW 
9% after 2011 or 10% in 2010 and 9% 
after 2011 for up to 100 kW depending 
on total installed capacity 
Source: BMU 2008a, Fell 2008. 
 
4.3.5 Conclusions about the German FIT 
Germany’s FIT is considered something of a ‘gold standard’ version of the FIT 
mechanism. This reputation is at least partly deserved in terms of the increase in the 
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RES-E generation share it has been responsible for in the country. However, the 2010 
reduction in Germany’s solar PV FIT rate, following a surge in installation of the  
 technology in 2009, showed that its FIT subsidies can sometimes become 
significantly disconnected from electricity price and generation realities and at times 
need to be more responsive to price and generation conditions than they presently are. 
Making FIT subsidies more connected to price and generation conditions may 
necessitate more frequent adjustments of FIT subsidy rates than has historically been 
the case; this would, in effect, make the FIT mechanism more like an RPS. The 2008 
introduction of flexible degression of solar PV FIT subsidies in Germany, discussed in 
ss4.3.1, should help develop a stronger connection between FIT subsidy rates and 
price and generation realities. 
 Considering FIT mechanisms are sometimes derided for their (claimed) inability 
to contain RES-E subsidies, it is ironic that a strong part of the German FIT’s 
performance to date has been its subsidy cost performance. The German FIT’s 
subsidy, exclusive of the wholesale cost of electricity, has fallen per unit of RES-E 
generation it is applied to (as shown in Table 4.1). The subsidy cost is largely 
balanced out by the short-to-medium term merit order falls in the wholesale price of 
electricity it has induced in the country. However, it remains to be seen if the German 
FIT’s subsidies are contained, to the extent planned, once offshore wind and solar PV 
start generating significant amounts of electricity. 
 
 
4.4 Experience of the FIT in Spain 
 
 
4.4.1 Evolution of the Spanish FIT  
Spain was an early adopter of FIT laws, in 1980 it introduced a law that 
guaranteed RES-E electricity grid access and above-wholesale-market RES-E prices. 
As was the case in Germany, this was largely a response to the two oil price shocks of 
the 1970s (Mendonça 2007: 47, 48). However, it was not until legislation was passed 
in 1994 that minimum RES-E prices were guaranteed in the country (Ortega and 
Pérez 2006: 218). 
The architecture of the current Spanish FIT was mainly established in 1998. 
Legislation passed in that year set the basic framework for the generation, 
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transmission and distribution of electricity in the country (Policy Action on Climate 
2008: 1). Like Germany’s FIT, Spain’s was in place before its electricity sector was  
 deregulated. However, unlike Germany, Spain’s FIT is relatively simple and is mainly 
based on an RES-E premium (paid in addition to the wholesale price of electricity). 
However, it also has the option of a fixed subsidy (where the subsidy is independent 
of the wholesale cost of electricity). Spain’s premium-based FIT can be characterised 
by the formula p(1+a) €c/kWh where p is the non-FIT wholesale price and a, the FIT 
subsidy, is a percentage of p, (however, in 2007 the premium subsidy was delinked 
from the wholesale electricity price). Unlike most countries that use a premium FIT 
subsidy, Spain has a ceiling and a floor on its FIT subsidy.  
 The choice between a premium and a non-premium RES-E tariff has continued 
to this day (Del Rio 2008: 2920). Because the premium rate is less certain, it has a 
higher inbuilt maximum rate of return (Mendonça et al 2010: 42). Most European 
countries that use the FIT do not use a premium-based system. Only the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Spain use such a system (Couture and Gagnon 2010: 
960).  
 The 1998 changes supported a nearly eightfold increase in wind generation 
capacity in Spain between 1998 and 2003 (Mendonça 2007: 49). The 1998 changes 
also differentiated FIT payments according to RES-E type for the first time, allowed 
for annual revisions, and established a national target of 12% of energy consumption 
to be supplied from renewable sources by 2010 (Del Rio 2008: 2923-2925, Ortega and 
Pérez 2006: 218).  
Changes to the Spanish FIT in 2004 differentiated the FIT payments according 
to the capacity of different RES-E types and allowed for revisions every four years 
(instead of every year). The 2004 changes also decreased the overall level of FIT 
support (Del Rio 2008: 2919, 2924-2926, Del Rio and Guel 2007: 999). Unlike the 
German FIT, the Spanish FIT generally does not degress (reduce) FIT payments for 
new RES-E generators each year although, like the German FIT, it does have flexible 
degression for solar PV where the degression changes according to the rate of 
installation of the technology (Mendonça et al 2010: 50).  
Further changes to the Spanish FIT took place in 2007. These changes were 
mainly designed to build more RES-E investor certainty into the Spanish FIT. The 
2007 changes de-linked the premium payments from the wholesale price of electricity 
(instead linking it to changes in the consumer price index). The 2007 changes also 
established a new target of 30.3% of electricity consumption to be generated from 
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 RES-E sources by 2010 and introduced tariffs for solar thermal electricity (Del Rio 
2008: 2919, 2921, 2926). Table 4.3 details the Spanish FIT rates struck in 2007.  
 Further changes to the Spanish FIT took place in 2008. In that year, amidst a 
surge in the installation of new solar PV capacity that added 2.6 GW of new solar PV 
in 2008 alone, the Spanish government introduced a cap on the amount of new solar 
PV capacity that could be added in any one year. For 2009 and 2010, the cap was set 
at 500 GW/yr: a fifth of the amount of new capacity added in 2008 (Renewable 
Energy World 2008, Renewable Energy Policy Network 2009: 18). A similar reaction 
against a surge in solar PV installation took place in Germany in 2010 (already noted 
in ss4.3.1). Changes to the Spanish FIT, that were expected to be passed in 2010, set a 
3,000 MW solar PV cap for the 2011 to 2013 period (Gipe 2010a). Most of the 
Spanish FIT is financed by a levy on electricity consumers but, because Spanish 
electricity prices are still regulated, part of the FIT subsidy is covered by the national 
government’s budget (Mendonça et al 2010: 61). 
 The most recent changes to the Spanish FIT occurred in 2010 following a 
significant increase in the government deficit ascribable to its FIT. In that year, a 35% 
reduction was made in the FIT for wind farms built after 2008, and a cap was placed 
on the total number of wind generation hours that its FIT could be applied to. Also, a 
major reduction was made to the FIT applied to ground mounted solar PV, widely 
seen as likely to reduce future development of large scaled solar PV in the country. A 
reduction was also made to the total number of annual generation hours that the solar 
PV FIT could be applied to (Solar Server 2010, Platts 2010).  
 
4.4.2 Generation performance of the Spanish FIT 
The generation performance of Spain’s FIT has been mixed. As can be seen in 
Figure 4.3, the absolute generation of total RES-E (in GWh/yr) in the country 
generally experienced significant, though erratic, growth between 1990 and 2007. 
However, the growth of non-hydro RES-E was much smoother, and predictable, over 
the period. Despite this, by 2007 hydro still accounted for about half of the country’s 
RES-E generation. By the end of the period, Spain’s RES-E generation was double its 
1990 level: this growth appears to be the source of much of the respect often paid to 
the Spanish FIT. 
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Figure 4.3: Generation of RES-E types in Spain, 1990 to 2007 
 
Source: EC 2010a. 
 
As well as RES-E generation doubling between 1990 and 2007, national 
electricity consumption also doubled during the period. The result was that by 2007 
the RES-E generation share was only slightly higher than it had been in 1990 (17.2% 
in 1990, 20.0% in 2007), as shown in Figure 4.4. However, as also shown in Figure 
4.4, non-hydro RES-E significantly increased its generation share over the period. In 
2000, electricity generation GHG emissions accounted for 22.7% of all the GHG 
emissions Spain was responsible for. This compared to an average, that year, of 
18.3% for the OECD and 35.6% for Australia (World Resources Institute 2009). 
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Figure 4.4: Total hydro and non-hydro RES-E percentage of Spanish electricity 
consumption, 1990 to 2007 
 
Source: EC 2010a. 
 
Spain’s RES-E generation share track record highlights the unavoidable 
Achilles’ heel of a price-based mechanism like the FIT: it has no control over 
quantity. The country’s relatively poor RES-E generation share performance means it 
has little chance of reaching its target of having 30.3% of its electricity generated from 
RES-E sources by 2010. However, Figure 4.4 also makes it clear that, despite Spain’s 
rapidly increasing electricity consumption, non-hydro RES-E did manage to gain a 
steady increase in electricity generation share.  
Spain’s RES-E generation share experience highlights the desirability for FIT 
subsidies to have interim RES-E generation targets, and to be periodically changed if 
the targets are likely to be under or overshot. This would help FIT mechanisms 
achieve some of the generation certainty that they generally lack but which RPS 
mechanisms generally have. There is no point setting an FIT RES-E generation share 
target and simply hoping its subsidies will be sufficient to enable RES-E generation to 
reach it, generation performance needs to be reviewed against subsidy levels. Spain’s 
experience also highlights the need for RES-E support mechanisms to be 
accompanied by electricity demand reduction programs.  
In 2007, the EC issued a report on the progress of member countries towards 
their RES-E targets. It said Spain had gone backwards, in RES-E generation share 
terms over the period it reviewed, but found the country had increased the generation 
share once RES-E generation levels were ‘normalised’ (adjustment for abnormal 
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climatic conditions like drought). It also said ‘the strong growth in electricity 
consumption overshadows the impressive level of renewable deployment’ (EC 2007c: 
7,8). 
The increase in the diversity of Spain’s RES-E has been mediocre. During the 
first half of the twentieth century, Spain undertook a major hydro-electric 
development program (Ortega and Pérez 2006: 216). The result was that that type of 
RES-E dominated Spain’s RES-E until the introduction of its FIT. As shown in Figure 
4.3, only wind generation has made a significant addition to the diversity of Spain’s 
RES-E. Unlike Germany, not even biomass has significantly added to its RES-E 
diversity (Del Rio and Guel 2007: 1001). However, it could be that the high FIT 
subsidies extended to solar PV and offshore wind have not been in place long enough 
to make a significant difference to the country’s RES-E. In 2007, Spain was the 
second largest national installer of solar PV panels in the world (Sawin 2009: 39) so 
that type of RES-E will soon show up in the country’s RES-E data as a significant 
generator, as has been the case in Germany.  
Like Germany, Spain has an RES-E purchase obligation that obliges grid 
operators to purchase and distribute all RES-E generation, regardless of prevailing 
demand conditions (Mendonça et al 2007: 54). This gives RES-E generators in the 
country significant enhanced revenue security. 
 
4.4.3 Price performance of the Spanish FIT 
The generation levels, average and total payments (premiums, wholesale prices 
and fixed tariffs combined) under the Spanish FIT between 1990 and 2005 are shown 
in Table 4.3. The author calculations in Table 4.3 show that average payments 
generally remained within a 6€c/kWh to 7€c/kWh band before rising above 8€c/kWh 
in 2005 (when differentiation of premiums according to RES-E capacity began). From 
the English language information available, it is not clear whether the significant 
increase in average payments between 2004 and 2005 was due to an increase in the 
average FIT premium and fixed tariff payments, or whether it was due to an increase 
in the wholesale price of electricity. However, the increase was probably due to the 
large increase in wholesale electricity prices that occurred between 2004 and 2006 
which significantly increased wind generator revenues and prompted the 2007 
changes to the country’s FIT (Klessmann et al 2007: 3651). 
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The fairly constant nominal per kWh average FIT payments made between 1990 
and 2004 meant they declined, in real terms, over the period. The total amount of the 
payments made in 2005 was 42 times what it had been in 1990 but the FIT RES-E 
generation level that year was 31 times what it was in 1990.  
 
Table 4.3: RES-E generation and total average subsidy paid under  
Spanish FIT, 1990 to 2005. 
 
Year RES-E generation 
under Spanish FIT: 
TWh/yr (1) 
Total FIT paid: 
€m (2) 
Average Spanish 
FIT payment: 
€c/kWh (3) 
1990 1.6 102 6.2 
1991 3.1 212 6.8 
1992 4.0 277 6.9 
1993 5.7 391 6.9 
1994 8.5 562 6.6 
1995 10.0 636 6.4 
1996 14.1 928 6.6 
1997 16.5 1,058 6.4 
1998 20.4 1,244 6.1 
1999 25.1 1,475 5.9 
2000 27.5 1,646 6.0 
2001 31.2 1,962 6.3 
2002 36.2 2,387 6.6 
2003 42.2 2,575 6.1 
2004 46.7 2,860 6.1 
2005 51.4 4,280 8.3 
Source: Comisiōn Nacional de Energīa 2006 (cols 1 and 2), author calcs (col. 3). 
 
The structure of both the fixed and premium Spanish FIT payments, as enacted 
in the 2007 legislation, is given in Table 4.4. Onshore wind and hydro generally 
receive the lowest subsidies while the most generous subsidies go to solar PV and 
solar thermal. The relatively low level of the payments extended to wave electricity 
suggests the Spanish government does not see a lot of potential in that type of RES-E. 
Despite their low current levels of generation, the FIT subsidy structure also suggests 
that the country’s government sees significant potential in solar PV and solar thermal 
as well as biomass. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: The Use of Feed-in Tariffs in Western Europe 
 
118 
Table 4.4: Structure of main Spanish FIT premiums as enacted in 2007 legislation 
RES-E type Spanish FIT fixed tariff: 
€c/kWh 
Spanish FIT premium: 
€c/kWh 
Solar PV: less than 100kW 
Solar PV: 100kW to 10MW 
Solar PV: 10MW to 50MW 
Solar thermal 
44.04 
41.75 
22.98 
26.94 
 
 
 
25.40 
Wind: onshore 
Wind: offshore 
7.32 2.93 
8.43 
Wave and geothermal 6.89 3.84 
Hydro: less than 10MW 
Hydro: 10MW to 50MW 
7.80 2.50 
2.10 
Biomass: energy crops and residues 
Biomass: agriculture and industry 
10.75 to 15.89 
5.36 to 7.99 
6.19 to 11.53 
3.08 to 3.78 
Source: Spanish Government 2007. 
 
 
4.4.4 Conclusions about the Spanish FIT 
To date, the Spanish FIT has had as many weaknesses as it has had strengths. Its 
strengths have been the significant increase in the absolute amount of RES-E 
generation it has been responsible for, as well as the very large increase in the 
absolute, and relative, amount of non-hydro RES-E it has been successful in 
developing. Also, at least until 2004, the containment of the average per-kWh subsidy 
payments made under it has been a major achievement. Its weaknesses have been its 
failure to significantly lift the generation share of RES-E in Spain’s historically 
rapidly expanding electricity demand market, and its failure to significantly broaden 
its RES-E base beyond hydro and wind electricity (although solar PV should soon 
show up as a significant generator).  In 2008, it also failed to anticipate, or quickly 
respond to, the surge in solar PV installation that took place that year. Its poor RES-E 
generation share performance is at least partly related to unusual climatic conditions 
and the effect they have had on hydro generation. However, its lacklustre RES-E 
generation share performance highlights the need for FIT mechanisms like Spain’s to 
have interim RES-E generation targets instead of just medium/long-term ones. The 
2008 response to the surge in solar PV installation that year also shows that, like the 
German FIT, the Spanish FIT sometimes need to be more responsive to price and 
generation conditions (an inherent weakness of the FIT). As mentioned in ss4.3.5, a 
greater responsiveness to price and generation conditions could take the form of more 
frequent adjustments of FIT subsidy rates than has historically been the case, and the 
introduction of flexible degression, where degression rates are determined by the 
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capacity development rate of an RES-E type in the preceding year. Both of these FIT 
changes would make the mechanism more like an RPS. 
Spain has begun to broaden its RES-E base with its support of solar PV but it 
still does not have a particularly diverse range of RES-E, although it is possible its 
large FIT subsidies for solar and offshore wind have not been in place for long enough 
to make a major difference to the country’s RES-E diversity. Like Germany, its FIT 
tariff structure may succeed in supporting significant future amounts of offshore wind 
as well as solar. It is possible, though, that the large reductions and caps put on the 
country’s wind and solar PV FITs in 2010 will significantly reduce the pace and 
diversity of its RES-E development. Even without such a reduction, if the Spanish 
electricity demand market keeps expanding at a rapid pace (which it may not in the 
wake of its Global Financial Crisis experience), it is hard to see how its RES-E 
generation will do much more than keep up with it, let alone reach the high RES-E 
generation share target the government has set itself, unless it can manage to very 
significantly increase its non-hydro RES-E generation. More so than most other 
national uses of the FIT, the Spanish RES-E experience, to date, shows how impotent 
a price-based RES-E mechanism can be when significant RES-E generation increases 
are required to reach RES-E targets in the face of erratic hydro output and rapidly 
increasing electricity demand. It also shows the desirability of having FIT (and RPS) 
mechanisms accompanied by meaningful electricity demand management programs. 
 
 
4.5 Experience of the FIT in Denmark 
 
4.5.1 Danish evolution of the FIT  
Denmark has a long history of RES-E support that stretches back to wind power 
development in the late nineteenth century (Meyer 2007: 349). Despite this, the 
country relied on oil for about 90% of its electricity generation before the two oil 
price shocks of the 1970s (Meyer 2004: 26). Denmark’s reaction to the shocks was to 
increase oil and gas exploration of the North Sea and to convert a large proportion of 
its electricity generation system to coal (Krohn 2002: 1). However, Denmark has no 
terrestrial fossil fuel resources and it was an early advocate of GHG emission 
reduction. This meant its need to reduce its GHG emissions, along with its lack of 
alternative energy resources, left it with little alternative but to turn to renewable 
energy to solve both its GHG emission and energy self-sufficiency problems.  
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 RES-E increasingly featured in national government energy plans from 1976 
onwards which had an emphasis on wind development (Nielsen 2005: 101). In the 
early 1990s, agreement could not be reached with the country’s electricity utilities on 
a new voluntary RES-E arrangement. In reaction to this, in 1992 Denmark’s 
government introduced a premium-based FIT that guaranteed wind generators 85% of 
the residential retail electricity price. The premium FIT continued until 2001 when it 
was replaced by a fixed FIT making it similar, in overall design, to Germany’s type of 
FIT subsidy (see ss4.3.1). The person most credited with designing Denmark’s RES-E 
policies during the 1990s is Svend Auken, minister of the environment from 1994 to 
2001 (Ryland 2010: 81). 
Denmark’s fixed FIT was intended to be replaced by a national RPS, which the 
country planned to introduce in the belief that all of the European Union was going to 
adopt the mechanism. But the EU-wide RPS never eventuated, so Denmark retained 
its FIT. Like many countries that use the mechanism, Denmark’s FIT was introduced 
before its electricity supply market was deregulated in 1999. 
 By 1995, Denmark’s RES-E initiatives resulted in 5.8% of national electricity 
consumption being sourced from RES-E (EC 2010a). They had also helped establish a 
major national wind energy export industry which, by 2006, supplied about a third of 
the global wind export market (O’Brien and Høj 2001: 17). In 1991, the country 
established its first offshore wind generator (Meyer 2004: 30). In 2001, a new 
conservative government changed Denmark’s FIT, again, generally making it less 
generous. This resulted in a stalling of national RES-E capacity growth (Lipp 2007: 
5487). The FIT was changed, again, in 2006 in a way that capped the fixed FIT 
subsidy and gradually reduced it over time for new generators (ie degressed it). Unlike 
most FIT countries, Denmark does not impose on obligation on electricity retailers to 
purchase RES-E in the case of wind electricity (Ragwitz et al 2007: 100). 
 
4.5.2 Generation performance of the Danish FIT 
In RES-E generation share terms, until recently the generation performance of 
Danish RES-E has been impressive. However, as shown in Figure 4.5, its RES-E 
generation share growth plateaued between 2004 and 2006 (EC 2010a). As shown in 
Figure 4.6, in recent years there has been a levelling off of national wind generation 
capacity. This appears to be partly a response to the lowering of the FIT in 2001 and is 
possibly also a result of the exhaustion of premium onshore wind generation sites in 
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the country. In 2000, electricity generation GHG emissions accounted for 14.7% of all 
the GHG emissions Denmark was responsible for. This compared to an average, that 
year, of 18.3% for the OECD and 35.6% for Australia (World Resources Institute 
2009). 
 
Figure 4.5: Hydro and non-hydro RES-E generation shares in Denmark,  
1990 to 2007 
 
 
Source: EC 2010a. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Changes in Danish wind electricity capacity, 1997 to 2008 
 
Source: Danish Energy Agency 2009. 
 
As shown in Figure 4.7, in 2007 wind was responsible for a large proportion 
(65%) of Denmark’s RES-E (EC 2010a). Unlike Spain, and more so than Germany, 
Denmark’s RES-E generation share performance has been helped by very low growth 
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in overall electricity consumption. Between 1996 and 2007, the country’s electricity 
consumption only grew by 0.08% (EC 2010a).  
 
Figure 4.7: Generation of RES-E types in Denmark, 1990 to 2007 
 
Source: EC 2010a. 
 
Denmark’s RES-E target is to generate 29% of its gross electricity consumption 
from RES-E by 2010 (EC 2007d: 1) and the EU has mandated that the country reach a 
30% RES-E generation share by 2020. Given that in 2007 the country already had a 
29% RES-E generation share, it should easily reach these targets. In a 2007 
assessment of member countries’ performance against its RES-E targets, the EU said 
Denmark was one of only three member countries ‘on track for meeting the 2010 
target’ (EC 2007c: 7). 
In terms of the diversity of Denmark’s RES-E, the country has a narrow 
generation base. As shown in Figure 4.7, wind and biomass generate nearly all of the 
country’s RES-E. The country has no significant hydro or geothermal resources and 
has negligible solar resources. In terms of achieving a diversified RES-E base, 
Denmark has little ability to develop such diversity although it does have capacity to 
develop it at a regional level in cooperation with neighbouring countries. The country 
relies, for instance, on hydro electricity generated in Norway to balance out the 
intermittent electricity generated by its wind generators (IEA 2007: 11). However, 
Denmark has developed very little of its limited solar annual generating potential. 
Some national RES-E diversity has been achieved through offshore wind 
development. Like other countries that border the North Sea (but unlike countries that 
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border the Mediterranean), Denmark has significant offshore wind generation 
potential. In 2002, the country introduced a dedicated FIT subsidy for offshore wind 
(Mendonça et al 2009: 387). The Danish Energy Authority has estimated that, by 
2030, offshore wind could generate more than two-thirds of the nation’s electricity 
consumption (Meyer 2007: 352).  
Some generation from RES-E generators in Denmark is covered by purchase 
obligations, where output from the generators has to be purchased by grid operators 
regardless of demand conditions, but some is not. Operators of onshore wind turbines, 
connected since 2003, are not covered by a purchase guarantee but other RES-E 
generators are (Mendonça 2007: 93). This means some RES-E generators have 
enhanced income security from the purchase obligations, but some do not.  
 
4.5.3 Price performance of the Danish FIT 
There is less public information available about the price performance of the 
Danish FIT than there is about the German or Spanish FITs. Because Denmark’s FIT 
subsidy (inclusive of the wholesale price of electricity) is fixed, when its wholesale 
electricity price increases, its FIT subsidy (exclusive of the wholesale price) 
decreases. Its wholesale price-exclusive FIT is known as the ‘Public Service 
Obligation (PSO)’ surcharge. In 2005, the PSO surcharge was reduced from 9.8øre to 
6.8øre per kWh in Western Denmark and from 9.1øre to 6.8øre per kWh in Eastern 
Denmark in anticipation of higher wholesale electricity prices (IEA 2006: 104). In 
2004, total national expenditure on the RES-E subsidy part of the PSO surcharge was 
DKK 2,088 billion (A$522 billion using exchange rate of 8th April 2009).  
As in Germany, Denmark’s FIT subsidy is recovered through a surcharge on 
electricity use. The Danish RES-E FIT subsidy is a smaller part of the Danish 
household retail electricity price than the equivalent subsidy in Germany: in 2007 it 
was equal to 4.8% of the household electricity price. As has been the case in 
Germany, over time the amount of Denmark’s RES-E subsidy (exclusive of the 
wholesale cost of electricity) paid per kWh of electricity consumption has decreased. 
Between 1990 and 2001 it fell by 11.5%, in real terms, although the OECD argues 
that because wind turbines became four times more efficient during this period, it 
should have fallen by a greater amount (O’Brien and Høj 2001: 19). Its failure to do 
so is probably due to the late introduction of degression. 
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4.5.4 Conclusions about the Danish FIT 
Denmark’s RES-E experience contains some salutary lessons for countries that 
have reached a high level of RES-E development. Although it has developed much of 
its onshore wind generating potential, it still has significant unused biomass and 
offshore wind generating potential. It will therefore have to ensure its biomass and 
offshore wind subsidies remain reasonably high if it is to keep increasing its RES-E 
generation share. The recent stalling in wind generation capacity suggests its onshore 
wind FIT subsidies are not high enough to support significant new onshore wind 
development. Like German and Spanish FIT rates for solar PV, there is case for 
Danish FIT wind subsidies being more responsive to price and generation conditions. 
As mentioned in ss4.3.5, a greater responsiveness to electricity price conditions could 
take the form of more frequent adjustments of FIT subsidy rates than has historically 
been the case; this change would make the mechanism more like an RPS. 
The recent generation and cost performance of Denmark’s FIT would probably 
have been better if it had not reduced its FIT subsidies in 2001 and had introduced 
degression earlier than 2006. As with Spain, and to a lesser extent Germany, there is a 
need for Denmark’s FIT subsidies to be better connected to their RES-E generation 
results. The great weakness of FITs is their uncertain RES-E generation outcomes: 
Denmark’s FIT needs more refinement so that it avoids suffering from this Achilles 
heal. 
 
4.6 Conclusions about the use of the FIT in Germany, Spain and 
Denmark 
There are a number of significant lessons to be drawn from the FIT experiences 
of Germany, Spain and Denmark. The most important one comes from the Spanish 
and Danish FIT experiences. Both countries’ experience shows how impotent a price-
based mechanism can be in terms of delivering a predictable level of quantity (RES-E 
generation). Denmark’s experience shows that insufficient FIT subsidies can deliver 
insufficient RES-E generation. Spain’s experience shows how ineffectual the FIT can 
be in raising RES-E generation share in a rapidly expanding electricity demand 
market. The surge in Spanish solar PV installation in 2008, and of German PV in 
2009, and the reactions of the two governments to them, show that FIT subsidies 
sometimes need more connection with price and generation conditions. In both 
countries, the FIT subsidies for solar PV were probably too high before the surges in 
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installation but there was no adjustment of the subsidy levels until the surges had been 
happening for some time. These experiences demonstrate the desirability of FIT 
mechanisms having annual or biannual targets  not just medium to long term ones  
against which its subsidy levels should be adjusted over time. This may require more 
frequent adjustments of FIT subsidy rates than has historically been the case. It may 
also necessitate introducing flexible degression (if it has not been introduced already) 
where degression rates are adjusted according to the rate of RES-E capacity increase 
in the previous year. By making the mechanism’s subsidy levels more responsive to 
price and generation conditions, the FIT would become more like an RPS. It would 
also mean the choice of either an FIT or an RPS mechanism to support RES-E would 
become less important if a country wanted to develop a large amount of RES-E, as 
Australia might as part of a deep GHG emissions cuts policy. Either mechanism is 
capable of radical RES-E expansion. 
Spain’s experience also shows how important it is for demand management to 
accompany the FIT mechanism. Rapidly rising electricity consumption puts a major 
strain on any RES-E mechanism making it difficult to maintain, let alone increase, 
RES-E generation share. RPS mechanisms would also be challenged to increase RES-
E generation share in such circumstances. To be effective then, FIT and RPS 
mechanisms both need to be accompanied by electricity demand management 
schemes that contain consumption increases. 
 When considering subsidy price performance, conclusions are difficult to draw 
because Germany adopted degression early, while the other two countries adopted it 
fairly recently. Comparisons are also complicated by all three making several changes 
to their FIT rates, including Germany and Spain having both premium and fixed FITs 
at different times. All three countries have declining per unit electricity price RES-E 
subsidies (that are separate to the wholesale price of electricity) and Germany and 
Denmark expect their total amount of RES-E subsidy to reduce over time. The only 
clear lesson seems to be that it is desirable to introduce degression early so that  
RES-E generators do not make windfall profits out of learning-by-doing technology 
advances. Another clear lesson from Denmark is that as a limited RES-E resource 
becomes exhausted, a country needs rising, not falling, subsidies to be able to 
continue development of that resource otherwise capacity will stall (although a point 
will obviously be reached where it is unjustifiably expensive to keep pursuing 
development of an RES-E resource).  
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 FIT mechanisms can be effective in both generation and cost terms but much 
depends on their design and their reaction to local circumstances.  
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Buckman G., and Diesendorf, M., 2010, ‘Design Limitations in Australian Renewable 
Electricity Policies’, Energy Policy, 38:7, 3365-3376; Addendum, Energy Policy, 38:11, 
7539-7540. Buckman was the principal author of the orginal Energy Policy paper, with 
some text and suggested refinements from Diesendorf, while Diesendorf was the 
principal author of the Addendum, with suggested refinements from Buckman. The 
Addendum mainly dealt with the Australian government’s announcement, in February 
2010, of the creation of the new Small and Large Renewable Energy Targets. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Having reviewed, and analysed, the experience of the RPS and FIT mechanisms 
in Western Europe and the USA in the previous two chapters, this chapter examines 
how the two operate in Australia so that chapters 6 and 7 can directly compare the 
experiences of all three jurisdictions. This chapter also examines the part that 
(proposed) emissions trading scheme (ETS) can play in supporting RES-E 
development in Australia, the role of government RES-E subsidies in performing the 
same task, and the influence that transmission has on RES-E in the country. 
 There has been relatively little academic discussion of Australia’s current, 
overall RES-E policy design. Commentators such as Kent and Mercer (2006), 
Valentine (2010) and Kann (2010) have evaluated specific parts of the country’s  
RES-E support policy but none have taken an integrated view. Governments in 
Australia have also failed to apply much contemporary, holistic analysis to the 
country’s RES-E policy. Both academic and government commentary will often 
consider RES-E support or emissions trading or government RES-E subisidies or 
transmission in isolation, but they are never considered together as they are in this 
chapter. In addition to this, there has not been any recent ‘global best practise’ review 
by government of its RES-E support policies in Australia. There was significant 
official review of overseas RPS design before Australia’s original RPS  the 
Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET)  was introduced in 2001, and again 
when it was reviewed in 2003, but there has been none since. There was therefore no 
global best practice assessment of the country’s RPS when it was changed to the 
Renewable Energy Target (RET) in 2009, or when RET’s target was separated into 
large and small sections in 2010 (begining in 2011). The comprehensive, integrated 
review in this chapter is therefore valuable in its own right, as well as enabling the 
comparative analyses in chapters 6 and 7. 
 This chapter is ordered as follows: s5.2 examines the use of the RPS in Australia 
while s5.3 analyses the country’s use of the FIT. Section 5.4 discusses various aspects 
of proposed emissions trading in the country and s5.5 examines the use of government  
subsidies to support RES-E in Australia. Section 5.6 analyses transmission and RES-E 
development in Australia while s5.7 concludes. 
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5.2 Use of the RPS in Australia 
 This section discusses the main form of RES-E support in Australia: its RPS 
mechanism. 
 
 
5.2.1 Major design elements and evolution of Australia’s Mandatory Renewable 
Energy Target mechanism 
Since 2001, Australia has used its Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
(MRET) as its main RES-E support mechanism. The MRET is an RPS, similar to 
those of the USA, the UK, Sweden, Italy and Belgium discussed in chapter 3. The 
MRET mechanism was originally part of Australia’s response to the 1997 negotiation 
of the Kyoto Protocol, an international GHG emission reduction agreement linked to 
the UNFCCC.  
 In early 1998, the Renewables Target Working Group was established to 
develop implementation proposals for the MRET. Although the group did not reach 
agreement on some key design issues, it recommended the following major design 
elements for the mechanism (all but the first dot point were eventually enshrined in 
the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 under which the MRET operated): 
● the mechanism should aim to increase the RES-E generation share of electricity 
from 10.5% in 1996-97 to 12.5% in 2010, or from 10.7% in 1996-97 to 12.7% in 
2010, depending on whether non grid-connected electricity providers were 
included (the lower proportions are for grid-connected generation only); 
● generation from a broad range of RES-E types should be able to be used to 
discharge the mechanism’s liability, including solar hot water heating, pumped 
hydro generation and renewables co-firing; 
● the liability that the MRET imposed on electricity retailers, and other major 
purchasers of wholesale electricity, should be discharged through the surrender of 
tradable certificates called Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs), each of which 
would equal one MWh of RES-E generation; 
● there should be no electricity consumer exemptions to the MRET; 
● RECs should be bankable for use in any later year during which the mechanism 
operated; and 
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● the MRET should contain no special incentives for less mature, and more 
expensive, RES-E types, or, in this thesis’s terminology, it should be type-neutral 
(Renewables Target Working Group 1999: 8-24). 
Other key design features of the mechanism were determined by the federal 
government before the MRET commenced in April 2001. These features included: 
● generation from RES-E sources, that existed before the mechanism commenced, 
could be used to create RECs when their generation exceeded pre-determined 
baselines; 
● the MRET’s target should be expressed as generation hours, not a generation 
share, and should be set at 9.5 TWh/yr by 2010 (with graduated annual steps to 
that target); 
● the MRET would only apply to grid-connected electricity supply (of greater than 
100 MW capacity); and 
● a non-indexed, non tax-deductable, non-compliance charge of A$40 would 
apply for each MWh of liable electricity purchases not matched by the appropriate 
number of RECs. 
Kent and Mercer (2006: 1059) argue that the MRET’s legislation lacked clarity 
and purpose and, as a result, there has been confusion about is goals. In September 
2003, a report was published by a panel appointed by the federal government to 
review the MRET. The review’s recommendations were largely ignored by the federal 
government although its recommendation that long-term banking of RECs by 
generators should cease was adopted.  
The federal government’s muted response to the review, as well as a 2002 review 
by the Council of Australian Governments of Australia’s (COAG) energy market 
committee that recommended the abolition of the MRET, triggered a significant loss 
of faith in the future of the mechanism and of RES-E support in Australia in general. 
This was most manifest by a significant fall in the price of RECs between late 2004 
and late 2006 (see ss5.2.4). However, confidence was restored in 2007 when both the 
federal government and the then Labor Party opposition indicated they were 
considering an extension, and increase, in the MRET’s target as part of their campaign 
for that year’s federal election. The Labor Party (which won the election) promised to 
extend the MRET so that it would achieve generation of 20% of Australia’s grid- 
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 connected electricity supply by 2020. This promise was partly justified as a 
rationalisation of an increasing number of state based RPS mechanisms. The 
extension to the MRET became known as the Renewable Energy Target (RET). In 
August 2009, the RET’s legislation was passed by the federal parliament (summarised 
below). 
The major design elements of the RET were similar to those of the MRET. Like 
the MRET, the RET was expressed as a generation-hour target. The RET aimed to 
generate 60 TWh/yr RES-E by 2020. Unlike the MRET, however, the RET’s target 
included RES-E generated before any RPS operated in Australia (deemed to be 15 
TWh/yr). The RET’s target would be maintained after 2020 at 60 TWh/yr when the 
federal government anticipates its proposed ETS will support RES-E (see s5.4 for 
analysis of this). Some commentators, such as Valentine (2010: 3373), have suggested 
the RET needs increasing targets after 2020. The relationship of the RET to the 
MRET and RES-E generation that predated MRET is shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Pre-MRET, MRET and RET 2020 RES-E target generation levels 
RES-E mechanism RES-E generation 
at end of 
mechanism:  
TWh/yr 
No mechanism:  
pre-MRET 
15 
MRET 9.5 
RET 35.5 
Total 60 
 
 
In addition to the RES-E generation levels detailed in Table 5.1, waste coal mine 
gas will be able to be used to generate up to 850 GWh/yr between 1st July 2011 and 31 
December 2020, however these RECs will not be counted towards the RET’s target. 
Unlike the MRET, the RET had significant customer exemptions which are 
detailed in ss7.4.1; it also had an increased non-compliance penalty detailed in 
ss7.4.2. Another feature of the RET, that differed from the MRET, was its ‘Solar 
Credits’ scheme. Under it, between 2009-10 and 2014-15, extra RECs would be given 
to small scaled RES-E generators of 1.5kW capacity or less. Originally, it was decided 
that five times the normal number of RECs would be given in 2009-10, 2010-11 and 
2011-12; then four times in 2012-13; then three times in 2013-14 then two times in 
2014-15 before the scheme finished. However, in December 2010, the federal 
government announced that the five-RECs-per-MWh multiplier would finish at the  
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 end of 2010-11 and that the whole scheme would finish a year earlier at the end of 
2013-14 (Maher 2010). In May 2011, a more radical winding down of the Solar 
Credits scheme was announced with the scheme now set to finish at the end of 2012-
13 (Energy Matters 2011). Although the extra RECs will not represent additional 
RES-E generation, they will be counted as contributing to the RET’s target. 
In February 2010, after subdued RECs prices were experienced throughout 2009 
(discussed further in ss5.2.4 below), the federal government announced changes to the 
RET. The main change was a splitting, from 1st January 2011, of the RET into two 
separate markets and targets: the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET), 
covering large RES-E generators, and the Small-scale Renewable Energy Target 
(SRET), mainly covering household generation of RES-E. The LRET will have a 
target of 41 TWh/yr by 2020 and the SRET will have an uncapped target of 4 TWh/yr 
by 2020. The LRET will operate much as the RET and the MRET did. However, the 
SRET will operate differently: it will purchase all RECs from small generators at a 
fixed price of A$40 each, if there are willing buyers, otherwise SRET tradable 
certificate sellers will be able to sell in an unregulated spot market. If it fails to meet 
its target, its shortfall will be added to the LRET’s target; however, if it exceeds its 
target that will add to the overall combined SRET/LRET target. Any banked RECs, 
created under either the MRET or the RET, will only be used to discharge the liability 
of electricity retailers under the LRET, not the SRET (Environment, Communications 
and the Arts Legislation Committee 2010). The aim of the SRET/LRET split market 
was to arrest, and hopefully increase, RECs prices. However, because solar water 
heater and solar PV RECs created before January 2011 can be banked and only used 
under the LRET, and because there has been a level of RECs creation far in excess of 
the MRET/RET target needs, RECs prices may not significantly increase under the 
LRET for at the better part of two years (RECs creation, price and banking are 
discussed in ss5.2.3 and s5.2.4) (Livingston 2010). 
 
5.2.2 Electricity and RES-E generation performance in Australia 
When Australia’s RPS commenced, it was thought that, when combined with 
pre-MRET RES-E generation of 16.6 TWh/yr, the mechanism would lift the RES-E 
share of grid-connected electricity generation (equal to about 90% of all national 
electricity generation) from 10.5% to 12.5%. However, because electricity  
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consmption increased at a faster rate than anticipated, and because drought has until 
recently reduced hydro-electric generation, it is unlikely that RES-E will have a 
greater generation share in 2010 (once generation data is available) than it had in 2001  
 despite the increase in RES-E generation induced by the MRET. By 2008-09, 
Australia’s RES-E was equal to 7.3% of all grid and off-grid electricity generation 
(265 TWh/yr) after being 8.7% in 1999-2000. It is impossible to calculate the RES-E 
generation share of grid-connected electricity (only) from data made available by the 
ABARE (2010b and 2011b). Division 2 of Part 4 of the Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Act 2000 dealt with the MRET’s target but did not specify any generation 
share that it should reach. This means the 12.5% target was only ever a government 
aspiration and never had any legislative backing. 
The aspiration that the MRET would lift Australia’s grid-connected RES-E 
electricity generation share to 12.5% by 2010 was based on a projection that grid-
connected generation would reach 205 TWh/yr by 2010 (Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia 2000: 9). However, as shown in Table 5.2, this level was 
reached in 2002-03 (ABARE 2009b: 19) and by 2009-10 it is likely to be at least 230 
TWh/yr. It follows, then, from this experience, that RPS mechanism targets are best 
expressed as generation share targets and not generation targets as Australia’s is. At 
the very least, RPS generation targets need to be periodically reviewed. The high rate 
of growth in Australia’s electricity generation since 1997-98 also highlights the 
desirability of having meaningful electricity demand management programs 
accompanying RES-E support policies. Better electricity demand management in 
Australia could be achieved through higher electricity prices, government 
subsidisation of insulation etc, as well as better electricity information provided to 
electricity users through energy audits and internal household meters. 
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Table 5.2: Grid-connected electricity generation in Australia, 1997-98 to 2007-08. 
Year Grid-
connected 
generation: 
TWh/yr (1) 
Increase on 
previous year (2) 
1997-98 170  
1998-99 186 9.4% 
1999-2000 193 3.7% 
2000-01 199 3.1% 
2001-02 201 1.0% 
2002-03 206 2.5% 
2003-04 213 3.4% 
2004-05 217 1.9% 
2005-06 220 1.4% 
2006-07 227 3.2% 
2007-08 229 0.8% 
Source: ABARE 2005a, 2009 and 2010b (col. 1), author calculations (col. 2). 
 
 
The RET’s and the LRET/SRET’s 20%-by-2020 aspiration assumes annual grid-
connected electricity generation will reach 300 TWh/y by 2020 (of which 60 TWh/yr 
is 20%). This projection implies an average rate of generation growth of 2.1%/yr 
between 2007 and 2020. This is in line with projections by the ABARE 2007a, and is 
above the annual growth of 1.8%/yr projected in the ABARE 2010a (p. 31) between 
2007-08 and 2029-2030. However, Table 5.2 shows that the ABARE’s predicted 
1.8%/yr growth between 2007-08 and 2029-2030 is well below the average annual 
rate of growth between 1997-98 and 2007-08 of 3.1% although, between 2003-04 and 
2007-08, the average annual rate of growth was only 1.83%/yr. It is possible, then, 
that the average annual rate of electricity generation growth in Australia will fall to 
the rate predicted in the RET’s and the LRET/SRET’s target, but much will depend on 
the price of electricity (including carbon pricing) and the effect it has on increasing 
electricity usage efficiency and on electricity demand growth. Given this, at the very 
least, the RET’s and the LRET/SRET’s TWh targets need periodic review to ensure 
they remain consistent with the 20%-by-2020 aspiration.  
Australia’s rate of electricity generation growth since the mid 1990s has been 
higher than for many other developed economies. Table 5.3 compares total electricity 
generation growth in Australia between 1997 and 2007 with the USA, the EU and 
some of the EU countries discussed in chapters 3 and 4. Over the ten year period, 
Australia’s growth was twice that of the EU or the USA, about three times that of 
Germany and the UK, and about 12 times that of Denmark. However, its growth was 
62% that of Spain’s over the same period. This means, of course, that RES-E  
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generation needed to grow significantly faster in Australia and Spain than in the other 
countries or regions over the period just to maintain a constant generation share. It 
also means that RES-E development, in the absence of electricity demand 
management programs, can be very challenging if the aim is to significantly increase 
RES-E generation share. 
 
Table 5.3 Electricity generation growth in Australia, USA, and  
major EU countries between 1997 and 2007 
 
Country/ 
region 
Australia USA European 
Union (27) 
Germany United 
Kingdom 
Denmark Spain 
1997 
generation: 
TWh/yr (1) 
 
183 
 
3,492 
 
2,843 
 
549 
 
 
362 
 
37 
 
187 
2007 
generation: 
TWh/yr (2) 
 
251 
 
4,157 
 
3,372 
 
621 
 
401 
 
38 
 
297 
 
1997 to 2007 
% growth (3) 
 
37% 
 
19% 
 
19% 
 
13% 
 
11% 
 
3% 
 
59% 
 
Source: EIA 2010, EC 2010a and ABARE 2009c (rows 1 and 2), author calculations (row 3). 
 
 
The inability of the MRET to reach 12.5% of Australia’s electricity supply by 
2010 has been compounded by the lacklustre generation performance of the RES-E 
generation that existed before the MRET began. Pre MRET RES-E generation 
equalled 16.6 TWh/yr in 1997, 94% of which came from hydro-electric sources 
(ABARE 2009b: 35). Until mid 2010, it was thought quite possible, if not likely, that 
by 2010 hydro generation would be significantly below its 1997 level because of 
drought conditions. As shown in Table 5.4, although it remained above its 1997 
generation level between 2001-02 and 2005-06, it fell below it in 2006-07 and was 
well below it in 2007-08. However, in October 2010 Australia received the third 
highest level of rainfall for that month that the nation had ever recorded and there was 
optimism that hydro generation would be higher than its 2007-08 level in at least 2010 
and 2011 (Green Energy Markets 2010a: 4). If hydro generation falls, again, after 
2011 it will negatively affect RET’s target because it will not generate most of the the 
quarter of the RET and the LRET/SRET target of 60 TWh/yr-by-2020 it is assumed it 
will generate. If hydro generation falls after 2011, the pre-MRET part of the RET’s 
and the LRET/SRET’s target will shrink and ensuring that the overall RPS target 
reduces because the mechanism does not provide for another part of its target to 
expand if another contracts. This means, ideally, that pre-MRET RES-E generation 
should be excluded from the RET’s and the LRET/SRET’s targets and the 15 TWh/yr  
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 it is meant to account for should be added to the LRET’s target of 41 TWh/yr-by-
2020, making it 56 TWh/yr-by-2020. 
 
Table 5.4: Hydro electricity generation in Australia,  
2001-02 to 2007-08. 
 
Year Hydro generation: 
TWh/yr 
2001-02 16.0 
2002-03 16.3 
2003-04 16.3 
2004-05 15.6 
2005-06 16.0 
2006-07 14.5 
2007-08 12.1 
Source: ABARE 2009a, 2010b. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.1, Australian RES-E generation has remained dominated 
by hydro despite the introduction of the MRET. In 2001, hydro accounted for 94% of 
Australian RES-E generation, by 2007-08 it still accounted for 64% of it (ABARE 
2005a and 2011d).  
 
Figure 5.1: Generation of different RES-E types in Australia, 2000 to 2009. 
 
Source: ABARE 2005, 2011b. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2, the national electricity generation share of hydro 
remains much higher than the generation share of non-hydro RES-E in Australia. 
Non-hydro generation share has shown erratic growth but by 2009 was still only 56% 
of hydro’s generation share. Hydro’s generation share of overall electricity  
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 generation in Australia declined from 8.1% in 2000-01 to 4.7% in 2008-09 (ABARE 
2005b and 2011d).  
Figure 5.2: Hydro and non-hydro RES-E generation shares of electricity in 
Australia, 2000 to 2009. 
 
 
Source: ABARE 2005b, 2011b. 
 
 Unlike Germany, Spain and Denmark, Australia does not impose an obligation 
on grid operators to purchase and distribute output from RES-E generators regardless 
of demand conditions (a ‘purchase obligation’, described in ss4.3.2, ss4.4.2 and 
ss4.5.2 for the three aforementioned European countries). This creates less revenue 
certainty than is the case for RES-E generators in Gremany, Spain and Denmark for 
RES-E generators in grids that are not part of Australia’s National Electricity Market 
(NEM) (especially those in Western Australia and the Northern Territory). For RES-E 
generators that are situated within the NEM, however, RES-E generators, along with 
fossil fuel ones, make frequent supply offers, at specified prices, to the NEM which 
are then used in ascending price order to satisfy forecast demand (AEMO 2010c: 8). 
Since RES-E generators have low marginal generation costs, they are generally able 
to undercut fossil fuel generators in NEM bids and therefore do not need a purchase 
obligation to ensure their supply is always accepted by the NEM.  
 
5.2.3 Tradable certificate creation and RES-E generation share performance of 
Australia’s RPS 
Superficially, it seems that the MRET has been successful at supporting a 
broader range of RES-E than the RPS mechanism has in the other RPS countries  
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 covered in chapter 3. As shown in Figure 5.3, solar hot water, solar PV and wind are 
the non-hydro RES-E types in Australia that had been the major beneficiaries of the 
mechanism by the end of 2010. The significant level of solar hot water generation is 
not a product of the MRET mechanism alone. It has also been supported by a range of 
federal, state and local government installation subsidies as well as by the availability 
of off-peak electricity tariffs for overnight boosting. Similarly, the generation of solar 
PV RECs has been boosted by a federal government subsidy that existed until 2009, 
the ‘Solar Credits’ RECs multiplier that exists in the RET (discussed in ss5.2.1), as 
well as the state and territory FITs in Australia (covered in s5.3). Once these are 
considered, Australia’s MRET has not performed that differently to the RPS 
mechanism in the other countries in chapter 3.  
 
Figure 5.3: Total RECs created by different RES-E types under the MRET and 
the RET, 2001 to 2010. 
 
Source: Green Energy Markets 2010a. 
 
 
 Another major point highlighted by Figure 5.3 is that solar water heaters (which 
includes heat pumps) have created a large proportion of all the RECs created under 
the MRET and the RET. By end of 2010 they had created 23% of all RECs (Green 
Energy Markets 2010a). This is a large proportion for a technology which does not 
generate RES-E. Their large number of RECs will have a long term effect on RECs 
prices even after the LRET beings in January 2011. This is because solar water heater 
RECs created before January 2011 can be banked, then used by electricity retailers to  
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discharge their liabilities under the LRET, even though it is a mechanism designed for 
large scaled RES-E. Another pernicious effect of the solar water heater RECs is that, 
because the technology does not generate RES-E, all the RECs it has created do not 
increase the RES-E generation share in Australia (although, by reducing electricity 
demand, they make it easier for RES-E to maintain generation share). These two 
negative effects highlight the desirability of removing unusual RES-E types from RPS 
mechanisms (especially from the LRET) and of placing restrictions on the banking of 
RPS tradable certificates. If solar water heaters have to be included in Australia’s 
RPS, then the RECs they create should be added to its target so that they do not affect 
the performance of more authentic types of RES-E. Solar water heaters should, 
ideally, be supported separately to RES-E under an energy efficiency support 
mechanism. 
The RES-E sources that have not been support by the MRET mechanism, to 
date, have been solar thermal (the ‘solar-non PV’ category of Figure 5.3) and hot rock 
geothermal: the two RES-E types with very large generating potentials in Australia 
(see ss2.3.6). Of the 90.8 million RECs created by the end of 2010, only 14 had been 
created by solar thermal and none had been created by geothermal technology (Green 
Energy Markets 2010a). The failure of Australia’s MRET to support a variety of  
RES-E types highlights why RPS mechanisms need to be augmented with either a 
complementary mechanism, like the FIT, or modifications, like carve-outs or banding, 
if higher cost RES-E types are to be supported in order to make major reductions in 
Australia’s electricity generation GHG emissions. 
There have been major changes in the composition of valid RECs created under 
the MRET since it began in 2001. As shown in Figure 5.4, hydro was the largest 
source of RECs in 2001 to 2005 but by 2009 to 2010 it was a minor source. Wind was 
a relatively minor source in 2001 to 2005, but by 2009 to 2010 it was the third largest. 
In 2001 to 2005, solar water heaters and solar PV were minor sources but by 2009 to 
2010 they were the dominant sources accounting for 72% of all RECs created in those 
two years (Green Energy Markets 2010a).  
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Figure 5.4: Total RECs created by different RES-E types under MRET and 
RET, 2001 to 2005, 2006 to 2008 and 2009 to 2010. 
 
Source: Green Energy Markets 2010a. 
 
 
The RES-E generation performance of Australia’s RPS needs to be viewed in 
the broader context of the generation share performance of Australian RES-E in the 
three decades before the mechanism commenced. As shown in Figure 5.5, the RES-E 
generation share in Australia reached an all-time high of about 23% in 1965 but 
declined to about 9% by 2000 (MRET Review Panel 2003: 10). This was largely 
because hydro development in Tasmania and the Snowy Mountains stopped in the 
1970s and the 1980s and very little non-hydro RES-E development took place in the 
last two decades of the twentieth century.  
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Figure 5.5: Australia’s RES-E generation share, 1960-61 to 2000-01. 
 
Source: MRET Review Panel 2003. 
 
 
 
5.2.4 The tradable certificate price and tradable certificate creation performance of 
Australia’s RPS  
Like the tradable certificates in many US RPS states, the price of them under the 
MRET has experienced significant volatility, as shown in Figure 5.6. The RECs spot 
market, however, only trades about 20% of all created RECs (MMA 2007a: 18): the 
remaining 80% is transacted via contracts between electricity retailers and RES-E 
developers. According to Ernst and Young (2008a: 6), between 40% and 60% of the 
income received by an RES-E generator comes from the sale of wholesale electricity, 
with the balance coming from RECs. Kann (2009:3145) argues that contracts between 
RES-E generators and electricity retailers typically discount the value of RECs 
compared to the spot market because of regulatory risk.  
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Figure 5.6: RECs prices under theMRET and theRET,  
June 2003 to September 2010. 
 
Source: Green Energy Markets 2010a 
 
The RECs price has been significantly influenced by the perceived political 
future of Australia’s RPS. Its price significantly declined between June 2004 and 
October 2006 after the federal government failed to adopt the recommendation of the 
2003 MRET Review that its target should be increased from 9.5 TWh/yr in 2010 to 20 
TWh/yr in 2020. A sharp increase in the number of RECs created by solar water 
heaters also contributed to the price decrease (Ernst and Young 2008a: 4). However, 
in November/December 2006, and in 2007, the price began to rise when it became 
clear that both the federal government and the opposition were considering an 
extension to the MRET beyond 2010. Between March and September 2009, the RECs 
price fell from A$52 to A$28 after the RECs market became flooded with certificates 
created by solar water heaters. Their high level of RECs creation was prompted by a 
significant increase in the national government subsidy they received in February 
2009. In early 2010, the RECs price recovered, slightly, when it was announced that 
the RET would be split into separate markets for large and small RES-E (see ss5.2.1) 
but then began falling, again, between March and September 2010. On 22nd  
December 2010 the RECs price was A$29.30, close to the lowest point it has ever 
reached (Green Energy Markets 2010b). 
The high level of solar water heater RECs creation in 2009 was prompted by a 
significant increase in the national government subsidy they received in February  
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 2009 (the subsidy was subsequently reduced in February 2010). Saddler (2009) 
argues that 25% of all RECs could be received by water heaters over the period from 
2009–2020. Their RECs creation may fall after the subsidy goes back to its pre 
February 2009 level (by 2012), but the possible future phase-out of off-peak electric 
water heating may keep the demand for solar and electric heat pump water heaters 
high. The large number of Solar PV RECs created in 2009 and 2010 was prompted by 
the Solar Credits scheme along with state and territory FITs (discussed in s5.3). 
 
Table 5.5: Proportion of total RECs creation under the MRET  and the RET 
accounted for by solar hot water heaters 2001 to 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Green Energy Markets 2010a,  
                                                     Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator 2002 to 2010a. 
 
The large number of RECs created by solar water heaters and solar PV have 
contributed to a significant level of excess RECs creation under Australia’s RPS. As 
shown in Table 5.6, by end of 2010 62% more RECs had been created under the 
MRET and the RET than were needed to meet their liability up to that time (including 
voluntary RECs surrender). Even though this proportion is lower than in 2001 to 
2005, it was still high and has increased since 2008. As previously mentioned, the 
allowance of unlimited banking will mean that the large number of solar water heater 
and solar PV RECs created in 2009 and 2010 (discussed in ss5.2.2) are likely to keep 
RECs prices low throughout 2011 and 2010 (Livingston 2010). However, had RECs 
banking been limited, then current RECs prices would have been lower than they are: 
this means the main depressing influence is the excess of RECs, not the ability to  
 
 
RECs creation 
year 
Proportion of all 
RECs created by 
solar water 
heaters and heat 
pumps 
2001 24% 
2002 22% 
2003 15% 
2004 24% 
2005 21% 
2006 20% 
2007 24% 
2008 37% 
2009 45% 
2010 11% 
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 indefinitely bank them. After the commencement of the SRET and the LRET in 
January 2011, the ratio of surplus RECs to the number required to meet the 
cumulative RPS target (including voluntary surrender) will fall because solar water 
heater and solar PV RECs created after 1st January 2011 cannot be used under the 
LRET. This means that by about 2013 the ratio of surplus RECs should return to 
sustainable levels and the RECs price should start to increase from about that time 
(Green Energy Markets 2010a: 19). However, in the meantime the ratio of surplus 
RECs is likely to remain reasonably high and the RECs price reasonably low. 
 
Table 5.6: MRET and RET RECs cumulative creation and surpluses,  
2001 to 2010 
Source: Green Energy Markets 2010a (cols 1 and 2), author calculations (cols 3 and 4). 
 
 
 
5.2.5 Possible RES-E resource constraints on the attainment of the RET’s and the 
LRET/SRET’s targets 
The RET generation target of 60 TWh/yr by 2020 is a theoretical generation 
goal that may be challenging for Australia’s RES-E sector to reach. In attaining the 56 
TWh/yr large RES-E (LRET) part of it, the conventional view is that wind generation 
will increase to take up at least half of the 37.7 TWh/yr difference between the 2008 
level of Australian large RES-E generation and the 2020 target (MMA 2007a: 53). To 
achieve this, the installed wind generating capacity in Australia will need to increase 
five-fold from the 2008 level of 1.3 GW to about 8.6 GW (assuming a 30% capacity 
factor). Reaching this capacity will require a 17% compound rate of annual growth  
 
Period Valid 
cumulative 
RECs created 
by period end: 
1,000s (1) 
RECs required to be 
surrendered to meet 
cumulative compulsory 
and voluntary MRET 
and RET obligation by 
period  end: 1,000s (2) 
Cumulative 
surplus RECs 
(3) 
Ratio of col 3 to 
col 2 (4) 
2001 1,662 300 1,332 444% 
2002 4,441 1,454 2,987 205% 
2003 8,798 3,392 5,406 159% 
2004 12,201 6,163 6,038 98% 
2005 17,023 9,833 7,190 73% 
2006 22,216 14,829 7,387 50% 
2007 28,503 21,585 6,918 32% 
2008 37,336 30,405 6,931 23% 
2009 54,661 41,238 13,423 33% 
2010 90,789 56,099 34,690 62% 
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between 2008 and 2020. As can be seen from Table 5.7, this is below the rate of 
growth that wind generation achieved under MRET between 2001 and 2005 (from a 
very low base), and between 2007 and 2009, but is above what it achieved between 
2006 and 2007.  
Table 5.7: Australian wind energy generation capacity 2001 to 2009 
Year Australian wind 
generating capacity: 
MW (1) 
% capacity 
increase from 
previous year(2) 
2001 73  
2002 105 44% 
2003 198 89% 
2004 380 92% 
2005 708 86% 
2006 817 15% 
2007 824 1% 
2008 1,306 58% 
2009 1,712 31% 
Source: Global Wind Energy Council 2009a (col. 1), author calcs (col. 2). 
 
Beyond wind, most of the balance to reach the 2020 large RES-E RPS target is 
expected to come from biomass and hot rock geothermal generation (MMA 2007a: 
53). However, this depends, a lot, on the future cost of geothermal and additional 
biomass generation. If they end up being significantly more expensive than predicted, 
wind may come to generate more than half the increased target. At this stage, both the 
biomass and geothermal industries think they can deliver the non-wind balance of the 
large RES-E RPS target. The biomass sector says it can generate 10.6 TWh/yr of 
electricity by 2020, which would be about 9.2 TWh/yr more than it currently 
generates. It expects to generate most of its 2020 electricity from bagasse (sugarcane 
waste), wood waste and landfill gas from about 1.8 GW of installed capacity: about 
1.2 GW more capacity than it currently has (Clean Energy Council 2008: 20). The 
geothermal sector currently generates no electricity for the Australian National 
Electricity Market, but believes it can have 1.0 – 2.2 GW of installed capacity by 2020 
generating 7.7–17 TWh/yr of electricity (assuming a 90% capacity factor) (MMA 
2008a:1). However, modelling done for the federal government’s Treasury department 
predicted that there would only be about 1.0 GW of geothermal capacity by 2020 
(MMA 2008b: 17).  
Significant problems may be encountered in reaching the RES-E generation 
levels detailed above. Apart from the possible constraint of the inability of wind  
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 capacity to expand at the required rate, the expansion of biomass generation from 
sugarcane waste may be thwarted by fluctuating global sugar prices as well as  
by concerns about the ongoing viability of the sugar industry (Ernst and Young 2008a: 
12). There is also restricted capacity to expand landfill gas generation in the country. 
In addition, drought could limit the use of biomass residues from the wheat industry.  
The generation of geothermal electricity in Australia from hot rock technology 
has its own set of constraints: although there is a huge resource in the country, the 
technology is in its infancy, is very capital intensive (and therefore subject to the 
vagaries of the equity and debt markets), and will require the construction of long 
transmission lines to be able to feed into Australia’s National Electricity Market grid 
(as will be seen in s5.6).  
If biomass and hot rock geothermal generation do not expand at the rate their 
industries predict, then wind generation will have to expand faster. This would require 
a reasonably high RECs price but, as discussed in ss5.2.3 above, RECs prices are 
currently not particularly high because of a large number of certificates created by 
solar PV and solar water heaters and their price probably will not significantly recover 
until about 2013.  
However, it is likely that there will be a reasonable level of solar development in 
Australia that could help fill at least part of any large RES-E RPS target shortfall left 
by biomass and geothermal. The subsidies provided by the federal government’s Solar 
Flagship and Renewable Energy Demonstration Program initiatives (discussed in 
s5.5) are expected to result in about 1,060 MW of new solar capacity by 2017 
(Bloomberg 2010: 6). Using an assumed 40% capacity factor for this new large scaled 
solar capacity, it should result in about 3.7 TWh/yr by 2017. However, the Solar 
Flagships program, by June 2010, had only committed to having 400 MW of large 
scale solar capacity built by about 2015. 
All of these possible constraints will be magnified if RECs prices remain 
relatively low. This means that there should be more connection between Australia’s 
RPS RECs prices and the attainment of the mechanism’s goals.  
 
5.2.6 General conclusions about the effectiveness of the RPS in Australia 
In general terms, the Australian MRET mechanism has not performed much 
differently to the RPS mechanism in other countries covered in this thesis. It has only  
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 supported a fairly narrow range of RES-E sources and its RES-E generation share did 
not increase between 2001 and 2008. The high number of solar water heater and solar 
PV RECs that have been created in recent years is likely to hold down the price of 
RECs under the new LRET once it begins operating in 2011 for at least 2011 and 
2012. This, along with low long term hydro generation, and possibly high rates of 
electricity consumption increase, may make Australia’s RPS 60 TWh/yr-by-2020 
target difficult to reach, particularly if biomass and hot rock geothermal do not expand 
at anticipated rates. In general terms, Australia’s RPS has made a worthwhile start to 
non-hydro RES-E development in the country but needs significant refinement if it is 
to one day play a major part in making deep cuts to the country’s electricity 
generation GHG emissions through radical RES-E expansion. 
 
 
5.3 Use of the FIT in Australia 
 
 This section discusses the state and territory FITs in Australia that provide 
subsidiary support to the country’s RES-E, alongside its RPS. 
5.3.1 Design of Australia’s FITs 
Unlike RET and LRET/SRET, Australia’s FIT mechanisms have been 
developed by state and territory governments and there is no nationally managed FIT. 
This is because the federal government is reluctant to establish a national FIT; the 
situation is somewhat analogous to the absence of a national RPS in the USA 
(discussed in s3.3). This is unusual amongst countries that have the FIT (Mendonça et 
al 2010: 96). The first state/territory FITs began operating in Australia in 2008. They 
are generally restricted to solar PV generation and are all currently restricted to small-
scaled generators. However, in 2011 the ACT is planning to introduce an auction-
based capped FIT for large solar generators, and in July 2010 the Victorian 
government announced its intention to introduce a dedicated large-scaled solar FIT 
that will aim to generate 5% of the state’s electricity by 2020 (Parkinson 2010). The 
two exceptions to the generally narrow applicability of the Australian state/territory 
based FITs are the ACT’s one, which applies an undifferentiated tariff across all RES-
E types (although, in reality, it will probably only be applied to solar PV and wind 
given the ACT’s restricted RES-E resources), and NSW’s FIT which can be used for  
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 both solar PV and small scaled wind. All this means that the Australian FITs are 
different to the Danish, German and Spanish FITs discussed in chapter 4 which can be 
used by any type of  RES-E and at any scale of generation. Also, all, except the ACT 
and NSW FITs, are based on the net amount of electricity fed into the relevant grids 
(total generation less household use), not the gross amount. The ACT Department of 
the Environment, Climate Change, Energy and Water estimates that net FITs provide 
about 65% of the benefit of a gross FIT with the same subsidy rate if equal generation 
volumes are compared (ACT Department of the Environment, Climate Change, 
Energy and Water 2009: 7). However, the comparison between net and gross FIT 
rates can be affected by the frequency of RES-E supply to the grid. Defenders of net 
FITs argue they can enhance electricity use efficiency by encouraging households to 
use less electricity, thereby increasing their net generation, although detractors argue 
they result in unreasonably low FIT subsidies and can just shift household electricity 
demand. The ACT’s FIT is also the only one to include degression (determined by 
annual government review). The Australian state and territory based FITs announced 
are shown in Table 5.8.  
The Greens have proposed a federal gross FIT legislation which was considered 
by an inquiry conducted by the Senate Standing Committee on Environment, 
Communications and the Arts in 2008. In its final report the inquiry recommended the 
implementation of a ‘nationally uniform and consistent’ FIT framework developed 
through the COAG but also recommended that the Greens’ FIT legislation not 
proceed (Senate Standing Committee on Environment 2008: vii). To overcome the 
inconsistencies between Australia’s state and territory FITs, it would none-the-less be 
desirable to have a national FIT for small to medium scaled RES-E generation as the 
UK has had since April 2010 (Mitchell et al 2011). As well as replacing state/territory 
FITs, such a national FIT should also replace the RPS Solar Credits scheme 
(discussed in ss5.2.1). However, given the significant differences in RES-E resource 
quality around the country, particularly of solar and wind, such a national FIT would 
need to be differentiated according to location, otherwise it would encourage 
concentration of RES-E development in the areas with the best RES-E resources. 
Zahedi (2009) has argued that solar PV FIT rates should vary according to location in 
Australia and that a single, undifferentiated national FIT rate is inappropriate. 
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Table 5.8: Australian state and territory FITs, December 2010 
State/territory Commence-
ment 
date 
Maximum size Rate/kWh Duration Net or 
Gross 
FIT 
Techno- 
logy 
covered 
Victoria 2009 5kW 60c 15 years, 
capped at 
100,000 new 
homes or 
100MW of new 
capacity 
Net Solar PV 
South 
Australia 
July 2008 10kW: 
residential, 
30kW: 
industrial. 
44c 20 years Net Solar PV 
ACT March 2009 
(tariff for 
>30kW capacity 
yet to 
commence) 
10kW for 
premium 
price, 30kW 
for non-
premium.  
Premium: 45c 
<30kW 
capacity (2010 
rate) 
Non-
premium: 
40.04c 
>30kW 
capacity 
20 years Gross All RES-E 
types 
Tasmania 2009 To be 
confirmed 
20c  Net Solar PV 
Northern 
Territory 
2008 To be 
confirmed 
Alice Springs: 
50.05c up to 
$5/day then 
23.11c 
Elsewhere in 
NT: 14.38 
 Net Solar PV 
Western 
Australia 
July 2010 Household 
only. 
40c  Net  Solar PV 
Queensland July 2008 10kW: 
residential, 
30kW: 
industrial. 
44c 20 years, 
capped at 8MW 
of new capacity 
Net Solar PV 
New South 
Wales 
January 2010 10kW 60c until 
27.10.10, 20c 
after 27.10.10, 
closed 13.5.11 
60c/kWh rate: 7 
years, capped at 
50 MW of new 
capacity 
Gross Solar PV, 
Wind 
Source: Australian Parliamentary Library 2009, Energy Matters 2009, Robins 2009, ACT Department of the 
Environment, Climate Change, Energy and Water 2009. 
 
 
The proposed ACT FIT for large-scaled RES-E generators is an interesting 
grafting of RPS design features on to the FIT. From 2011, the ACT government will 
auction rights to qualify for the FIT from generators with a 200 kW, or greater, 
capacity. The auctions will occur in tranches up to a capacity limit of 210 kW (Corbell 
2010). A similar FIT practice has been pursued in India and Brazil. It makes the FIT 
much like the RPS because markets set the level of the subsidy (via the auctions) 
while governments set the quantity of RES-E generation (via the FIT capacity caps). 
There is a danger under this innovation, however, that some tenders will be too low 
and will never be constructed (as happened under the the UK’s Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation: see s3.4) and that the government will not use its FIT subsidy setting  
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 powers to drive RES-E generation cost reductions, as Germany has done with its FIT 
(discussed in ss4.3.3). However, the device belongs to an expanding group of FIT and 
RPS design hybridisation developments that includes RPS banding and carve-outs, as 
used in the UK and the USA (discussed in ss3.3.5 and ss3.4.2), and flexible FIT 
degression, as used in Germany and Spain (discussed in ss4.3.1 and ss4.4.1). 
 
5.3.2 Australian FIT rates 
The A44c/kWh net FIT paid in South Australia and Queensland is equal to about 
three times the household retail price of electricity while the A60c/kWh net rate paid 
in Victoria is equal to about four times the household retail price of electricity. The 
rates are quite generous but the amount of electricity they are applied to is not 
(because they are based on the net amount of generation). This means there is scope 
for making the FITs gross ones but paying a lower kWh subsidy.  
The barrier to the adoption of gross FITs appears to be perceived cost. The 
Victorian government considered a gross FIT, which its Department of Sustainability 
and Environment estimated would increase average household electricity expenditure 
by 2% per year. However, the state rejected it in favour of its net FIT after its 
Department of Primary Industry and Energy said the real cost increase would be more 
like an extra 10% per year (Millar 2009a). In May 2009, the Victorian government 
said it would abandon an FIT altogether rather than agreeing to a gross FIT (Morton 
2009). This political sensitivity appears to be part of a broader reluctance by 
Australian governments to take initiatives that will increase electricity prices during a 
time when electricity prices are already increasing at a rapid rate because of the need 
for increased investment in distribution infrastructure. Another example of the 
political sensitivity to the perceived impact of FIT rates on electricity prices was an 
overnight decision by the New South Wales government in October 2010 to reduce its 
gross FIT rate from A60c/kWh to A20c/kWh. In May 2011, the 60c/kWh FIT in  the 
state  was retrospectively lowered to 40c/kWh, for installers who had qualified for it, 
and the scheme was closed to new installers. FIT subsidies should, ideally, be based 
on gross, and not net, generation if they are to have serious effectiveness and should 
not be subject to severe capacity limits.  
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5.4 Proposals for emissions trading in Australia 
 This section discusses Australia’s proposed emissions trading scheme (ETS) and 
the role it could play in supporting RES-E in the country. The thesis does not analyse 
RES-E capital cost or research and development subsidies. This is because a proper 
analysis of the effectiveness of these RES-E support instruments would require detailed 
examination beyond the scope of the thesis. 
 
5.4.1 Major design elements and evolution of Australia’s Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme (CPRS) 
Australia’s CPRS is a proposed type of GHG emissions trading scheme. Like the 
RET, it was a campaign pledge by the Labor Party in the 2007 federal election. The 
CPRS has gone through four major design stages. By November 2009 its major 
proposed elements were: 
● the CPRS will commence in July 2011; 
● the CPRS permit price will be fixed at A$10/tonne from July 2011 to June 2012, 
then will be subject to a price cap for the following four years that will begin at 
A$40/tonne rising by 5% pa; 
● the CPRS will issue emission permits along a trajectory designed to achieve a 
reduction in national GHG emissions of between 5% and 25% below 2000 
emissions by 2020, subject to the outcome of UNFCCC negotiations in December 
2009 and subsequent negotiations; 
● the CPRS will cover approximately 75% of Australia’s GHG emissions but will 
indefinitely exclude agriculture; 
● emission-intensive, trade-exposed companies that release at least 2,000t CO2e 
per A$1m of revenue, or 6,000t CO2e per A$1m of value-added, will receive free 
permits covering 94.5% of their emissions while companies that release at least 
1,000t CO2e per A$1m of revenue, or 1,999t CO2e per A$1m of value-added, 
will receive free permits covering 66% of their emissions. Both levels of 
assistance will reduce by 1.3% pa; 
● emission-intensive ‘strongly affected’ coal-fired generators will receive 228.7 
million free permits for the first ten years of the CPRS valued at A$7.3 billion; 
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● A$1.5 billion will be provided in transitional assistance to the coal sector over 
five years (A$1.23 billion in the form of free emission licences) and A$1.1 billion  
will be provided as compensation for electricity price increases born by medium 
and large businesses over two years;  
● overseas emission trading certificates will be eligible for use to discharge CPRS 
liabilities, there will be no limit on the extent of their usage; and 
● low and middle income families will receive a combination of one-off 
pension/allowance increases, and personal tax decreases, to compensate for the 
cost-of-living increases that the CPRS will incur. Assistance will also include 
reductions in petrol excise tax during the first three years of the CPRS that will 
fully compensate for the petrol price increases it would have resulted in without 
the reductions (Department of Climate Change (DCC) 2008e: 1-30, Prime 
Minister 2009: 1-2, DCC 2009b).  
The CPRS’s legislation was rejected by the Senate (upper house of the federal 
parliament) in August and December 2009. In December 2009, the federal opposition 
declared it would not support the CPRS in any form. In April 2010, the Australian 
media reported that the federal government had postponed its introduction until 2013, 
at the earliest. This was later confirmed by the government which said the 
postponement was due to the failure of the CPRS’s legislation to pass in the Senate 
and the lack of meaningful global movement on GHG reduction. The 2010 federal 
government budget papers said: ‘The government will not introduce the CPRS until 
after the end of the current commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and only when 
there is greater clarity on the actions of major economies, including the US, China and 
India’ (Kerr 2010). However, immediately after the August 2010 federal election, the 
minority Labor government signed an agreement with the Greens and some lower 
house independent parliamentarians that included a commitment to establish a 
parliamentary committee that would consider how to introduce a price on Australia’s 
GHG emissions. As well as considering the CPRS proposal, the committee appears 
likely to consider a carbon tax. An interim, pre CPRS, carbon tax was proposed by the 
Greens before the 2010 federal election. The Greens proposed an interim carbon tax 
level of at least A$23/t which, as shown in Table 5.9, is equal to the GHG emission 
license price level projected by Treasury (2008: 139) to be the commencing carbon 
price to flow from a 5% reduction of Australian GHG emission levels on their 2000  
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 level by 2020 under a system that allowed unlimited importation of GHG emission 
licences. There was media speculation in October 2010 that, after the parliamentary  
 committee’s deliberations, the federal government would introduce legislation for 
either a carbon tax, or an ETS, in late 2011 that would include a fixed commencing 
price of A$10/t to A$15/t kept to such a level in order to minimise its cost impact on 
electricity prices (Coorey 2010). 
 
5.4.2 The RES-E support likely from different CPRS targets in Australia 
In October 2008, the Rudd government released its Treasury (2008) modelling 
of the economic impact of national GHG reduction under an ETS like the CPRS. The 
carbon prices forecast by the modelling gave the first hint of what effect emissions 
trading would have on supporting RES-E in Australia. The modelling focused on the 
economic impact of four different Australian GHG reduction scenarios where, 
compared to the country’s 2000 level of GHG emissions, reductions of 5%, 10%, 15% 
and 25% were made by 2020. The CPRS White Paper (DCC 2008e), released in 
December 2008, stipulated that the maximum GHG emissions cut that would be made 
by Australia would be 15% by 2020: this would occur only if enough other countries 
made major GHG emission reduction commitments. However, in May 2009, the 
federal government indicated that it would consider a GHG emission cut of 25% on 
2000 levels by 2020 if other developed countries undertook similar reductions at 
UNFCCC negotiations (Rudd et al 2009). The initial CPRS carbon prices that 
Treasury’s modelling found would be associated with the 5%, 15% and 25% 
reduction scenarios are given in Table 5.9 (quoted in nominal prices). Treasury’s 
carbon prices assumed there would be a global GHG emission licence market whose 
licence prices would significantly affect licence prices in Australia because an 
unlimited amount of foreign licences could be used to discharge domestic licence 
obligations (discussed in ss5.4.1). The carbon costs would have been much higher if 
such foreign licences were not allowed to be used in Australia. 
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Table 5.9: Emissions trading carbon prices modelled by Treasury under 5%, 15% 
and 25% reduction scenarios. 
Commencement 
date 
5% GHG emission 
reduction by 2020 
carbon price: 
A$/tCO2e 
15% GHG 
emission reduction 
by 2020 carbon 
price: A$/tCO2e 
25% GHG emission 
reduction by 2020 
carbon price: 
A$/tCO2e 
2010 or 2013 (for 
25% reduction) 
$23 $32 $52 
Source: Treasury 2008. 
 
Table 5.10 takes the RES-E and generating costs used in Figure 2.12 then adds 
in Treasury’s 5%, 15% and 25% 2020 GHG reduction carbon prices shown in Table 
5.9, taking account of the carbon intensities of the non-RES-E types. Table 5.10 
shows that only a carbon price associated with a 25% reduction in Australian GHG 
emissions by 2020 would be high enough to make the lowest cost type of RES-E, 
wind, competitive with black and brown coal generation. At that carbon price, 
biomass and hot rock geothermal would also be competitive with brown coal 
electricity generation. However, if the generating costs in Table 5.10 without a carbon 
price underestimate the prices of wind and biomass electricity, as Diesendorf’s 
(2007c) table B.2 suggests, then even the carbon prices associated with the 25% 
reduction would not be high enough to make wind competitive with black and brown 
coal.  
 
Table 5.10: 2007 fossil fuel and RES-E generating costs with carbon costs 
associated with zero, 5%, 15% and 25% Australian GHG reductions by 2020 
Electricity 
generation 
technology 
GHG emission 
intensity: 
tCO2e/MWh 
(1) 
Generating 
cost without 
carbon price: 
A$/MWh (2) 
Generating 
cost with 5% 
cut by 2020 
carbon price 
A$/MWh (3) 
Generating 
cost with 15% 
cut by 2020 
carbon price 
A$/MWh (4) 
Generating 
cost with 25% 
cut by 2020 
carbon price 
A$/MWh (5) 
Black coal 0.9 $38 $59 $67 $85 
Brown coal 1.2 $35 $63 $73 $97 
Gas 0.6 $44 $58 $63 $75 
Wind 0 $79 $79 $79 $79 
Solar thermal 0 $156 $156 $156 $156 
Biomass 0.15 $82 $85 $87 $90 
Hot rock 
geothermal 
0 $89 $89 $89 $89 
Source: CSIRO 2006 (col. 1), Graham et al 2008 (col. 2), author calculations (cols. 3, 4 and 5). 
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As shown by the author calculations in Table 5.11, a carbon price of 
A$131/tonne would be needed to make solar thermal’s generating cost competitive 
with black coal using the generating costs shown in Table 5.10. However, a carbon 
price of only about half this amount is needed to make biomass and hot rock 
geothermal competitive with black coal generation in Australia. It is a working 
assumption of this thesis that carbon prices of the order of A$131/tonne are politically 
untenable in Australia, at least in the short term, and that, therefore, alternative 
support mechanisms are needed to spur development of the full range of RES-E in the 
country.  
 
Table 5.11: Carbon prices needed to make RES-E types competitive with black 
coal electricity generation in Australia, 2007 
Electricity generation 
technology 
GHG emission 
intensity: 
tCO2e/MWh 
(1) 
Generating 
cost without 
carbon price: 
A$/MWh (2) 
Carbon price 
needed to make 
RES-E type 
competitive with 
black coal  (3) 
Black coal 0.9 $38  
Wind 0 $79 $46 
Solar thermal 0 $156 $131 
Biomass 0.15 $82 $59 
Hot rock geothermal 0 $89 $57 
Source: CSIRO 2006 (col. 1), Graham et al 2008 (col. 2), author calculations (col. 3). 
  
5.4.3 The interrelationship and complementarity of an RPS combined with an ETS 
The interplay of using an RPS alongside an ETS can be subtle and is much 
debated. Linares et al (2008: 380, 382, 383) argue that, because RPS tradable 
certificate prices represent the difference between the perceived long-run marginal 
cost of RES-E and that of non-RES-E electricity, an increase in non-RES-E electricity 
generation costs through emissions trading should lower the RPS tradable certificate 
price. If this is correct, it means the RPS is a better RES-E support instrument than the 
FIT with respect to integration with an ETS or carbon taxes. This is because an FIT 
will not automatically adjust to a rise in fossil-fuel generation cost caused by an 
increase in the price placed on GHG emissions, as an RPS would. However, Linares 
et al (2008) also argue that if the size of the RES-E market is large, compared to that 
of the emissions trading market, the relationship can work in reverse: an increase in 
the tradable certificate price can lower the ETS carbon price. Most commentators  
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 assume this will be the case, in the short term, if Australia’s ETS operates alongside 
its RPS mechanism from 2012 but not in the long term after about 2020.  
Opinion is divided about whether the net effect of the change in carbon prices 
and tradable certificates, from the combined operation of ETS and an RPS, is to  
increase or decrease total electricity prices compared to the price that would exist 
without one of the mechanisms. Amundsen and Mortensen (2001) argue that RPS 
tradable certificate prices should decrease more than ETS carbon prices increase when 
the two mechanisms are used together. However, others, such as Hindsberger et al 
(2003) and Unger and Ahlgren (2006), argue tradable certificate price reductions will 
be larger than carbon price increases because, under their assumptions, carbon prices 
are low as a result of a large RES-E market. The final relationship between the two 
therefore depends a lot on the relative size of the RES-E and emissions trading 
markets in question.  
Some argue that, even if the net effect of an RPS and an ETS is to increase 
electricity prices, in addition to lowering the carbon price of an ETS market, an RPS 
mechanism can also lower the non-carbon wholesale price of non-RES-E electricity. 
This happens because the demand for non-RES-E electricity is reduced and, when this 
effect is factored in, the overall impact of an RPS and an ETS can be to lower 
wholesale electricity prices (Rathmann 2007). This ‘merit order’ impact of RES-E 
support in Germany was discussed in ss4.3.3. After inclusion of the cost of RPS 
tradable certificates, however, this does not necessarily mean that the retail price is 
reduced. Much depends in this analysis on the marginal cost, and elasticity, of RES-E 
and non-RES-E electricity demand and supply. Jensen and Skytte (2002: 434) argue it 
is hard to be conclusive about the final electricity price impact while Linares et al 
(2008: 384) argue that reduced demand for non-RES-E electricity can increase 
oligopoly prices. Linares et al (2008: 389, 390) also found that, when modelled in an 
EU context, the combination of an RPS and an ETS resulted in slightly higher 
generation and consumer electricity costs which made almost no difference to GHG 
emissions reduction compared to an ETS alone. However, they also found that the 
combination of an RPS and an ETS resulted in significantly higher RES-E investment 
across a wide range of RES-E types. De Miera et al (2008: 3351, 3352) analysed the 
effect of wind electricity on wholesale and retail electricity prices in Spain. They 
found that even though the introduction of RES-E can cause reductions in both the 
wholesale and retail prices of electricity, this reduction does not necessarily last  
Chapter 5: The Use of Emissions Trading, the Renewable Portfolio Standard, the Feed-in Tariff and  
RES-E government subsidies in Australia 
158 
 
 beyond the short to medium term. They concluded that, in the long term, the shortage 
of peak load generation capacity, and the surplus of baseload generation capacity that 
the introduction of RES-E induces, will be relieved by investment in new peak load 
capacity and the retirement of baseload capacity. Once this ‘new equilibrium’ is  
 achieved, the market price of electricity will be similar to what it would have been in 
the absence of the forced introduction of RES-E via an RPS, they argue. 
The desirability of non-neutral RES-E support mechanisms operating alongside 
neutral ones like an ETS, is controversial. In Australia, this issue has been considered 
by two major reviews: Garnaut (2008a) and Wilkins (2009). 
 The 2008 Garnaut Climate Change Review broadly concluded that the clash of 
objectives that results from having both an RES-E support mechanism and an ETS 
operating together would be detrimental to electricity users, as well as electricity 
producers. It argued that an ‘aggressive’ ramp-up in Australia’s RES-E support target 
would ‘cannibalise’ an ETS (Garnaut 2008a: 354, 355). By cannibalise the Review 
meant that the RES-E support mechanism would take over much of the GHG 
reduction role of an ETS. The Review did, however, acknowledge that ‘far reaching 
innovation’ would be needed for deep GHG emissions cuts, and that an ETS may only 
have a limited impact on energy research and development (Garnaut 2008a: 425, 441). 
The 2009 Wilkins Review gave the most in-depth consideration of the two reviews to 
the issue of RES-E support/ETS complementarity. In general terms, it did not consider 
direct subsidies for the deployment of low emission technologies to be 
complementary to an ETS. It said RES-E support mechanisms dictate how part of the 
GHG abatement task should be achieved and they therefore distort decisions about 
which abatement opportunities should be utilised (Wilkins 2009: 139). However, it 
qualified this stance by saying ‘It is not clear that the ‘market pull’ provided by 
emissions trading will be sufficient, by itself, to bring through the range of 
technologies required to meet future emissions targets, particularly in the energy 
sector’(Wilkins 2009: 132).  
The Garnaut and Wilkins Reviews raised a fundamental question about the 
reliance that should be placed on an ETS to support diffusion of immature low 
emission energy technologies. The two reviews implied that a lot of faith can be 
placed in emissions trading to fulfill these functions, but there are opposing views. 
Montgomery and Smith (2005) argue emissions trading is ill-suited to the support of 
both research and development and early-stage diffusion of low emission  
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 technologies. They argue there are two fundamental problems with relying on 
emissions trading to fulfil the afore-mentioned functions. The first is that the carbon 
price needed to induce them will, invariably, have to be higher than the price needed 
once the immature technologies become mature. But they argue carbon prices that are  
 sufficiently high to achieve this impose unnecessary burdens on all of an economy 
and will not be credible. More fundamentally, they posit that there is a ‘dynamic 
inconsistency’ in the innovation and early stage diffusion incentives embodied in 
emissions trading. They say that governments will always be motivated to achieve 
major emission reductions at the lowest possible carbon price. But governments 
cannot know what reduction levels, and resultant carbon prices, can be expected 
before the technologies the reductions are dependent on have been invented and 
diffused.  
Both the Garnaut and Wilkins reviews failed to adequately consider the dynamic 
efficiencies that can be built into an ETS by bringing forward RES-E generating cost 
reductions (discussed in ss2.3.3). They also failed to consider Montgomery and 
Smith’s credible arguments that carbon pricing can impose the costs of innovation in 
one sector on several other unrelated sectors, and that it is impossible to know how 
low carbon pricing can be kept before the technological innovation it depends on has 
taken place. Basically, the Garnaut and Wilkins reviews had valid views but they were 
based on a fairly narrow consideration of the role of emissions trading. 
 
5.5 Use of RES-E government subsidies in Australia 
 
 
This section discusses the role of subsidies in supporting RES-E development in 
Australia paid for by government budgets and not by increased electricity prices as 
FIT and RPS subsidies are. Like Australia’s FITs and proposed ETS, such subsidies 
can augment the RES-E support given by its RPS. Whilst this thesis describes the 
subsidies in this section, it does not devote any analysis to RES-E capital cost or 
research and development subsidies in Australia. This is because a proper analysis of 
the effectiveness of these RES-E support instruments would require detailed 
examination beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In addition to FIT or RPS mechanisms and emissions trading, RES-E can also be 
supported through government subsidisation that is not paid per kWh of electricity  
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 generated (directly as with an FIT, or indirectly as with an RPS). There has been 
limited use of this type of RES-E support in Australia. It needs to be viewed in 
separate research/development and diffusion categories. In the research and 
development category, current federal government RES-E subsidies are mainly 
extended through the federal government’s Australian Centre for Renewable Energy 
and the Australian Solar Institute. There is also some state government subsidisation 
of RES-E. In September 2010, for instance, the Western Australian government  
 announced it would provide about A$20m towards the construction of the country’s 
largest grid-connected solar generator (The Age 2010). 
The Australian Centre for Renewable Energy manages subsidies designed to 
bring embryonic RES-E technologies to commercial stage development, mainly  
through its Renewable Energy Demonstration Program. It also manages some RES-E 
subsidies designed to promote research and development in specific areas, including: 
the Geothermal Drilling Program, the Wind Energy Forecasting Capability Program 
(designed to support wind forecasting software development), and the Advanced 
Electricity Storage Technologies Program (designed to support technologies that can 
store RES-E energy from sources such as solar and wind). The Australian Solar 
Institute manages subsidies designed to advance innovation in CST and solar PV 
development. Although the competition for the programs’ subsidies is strong, their 
funding is not significant so they only make a limited contribution to RES-E research 
and development in Australia. The Renewable Energy Development Program, for 
instance, had A$235 million in funding in 2009 while the Australian Solar Institute 
had A$100 million for the four year period between 2008 and 2012 (Department of 
Energy, Resources and Tourism 2010). By way of contrast, estimated federal 
government spending on the Defence Science and Technology Organisation in 2009-
10 was A$433m and government spending on the Commonwealth, Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation in the same year was A$727m (Department of 
Innovation, Industry, Science and Research 2010). 
 The federal government’s RES-E diffusion subsidies are also limited. Examples 
of these programs include the Solar Homes and Communities Program, which 
subsidised solar PV panel installation for households and community buildings 
between 2000 and 2009; the Renewable Remote Power Generation Program, which 
subsidised remote RES-E installation (terminated in 2009); and the Solar Flagships 
Program, which subsidises the installation of large scaled solar technology. The Solar  
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Flagships Program is the most significant of these in terms of the amount of new 
generating capacity it aims to help finance. It began in 2009 and aims to (eventually) 
install 1,000 MW of new large-scaled solar (both CST and concentrating PV) 
generating technology with A$1.6 billion in funding over six years (Department of 
Energy, Resources and Tourism 2010). Many commentators believe this level of 
funding will only help finance about an extra 700 to800 MW in new solar capacity; 
with storage this could eventually generate about 5 TWh/yr. The potential  
vulnerability of RES-E support delivered from government budgets was demonstrated 
during the 2010 federal election when A$220m of Solar Flagships funding (equal to a 
quarter of its committed funding at the time) was withdrawn and diverted to another 
GHG emission reduction program (Australian Labor Party 2010). In early 2011, 
further funding was withdrawn from the program then much of its remaining funding 
was pushed back by several years in the 2011 federal budget. So there seems little  
doubt that until emissions trading commences in Australia, most RES-E 
research/development and diffusion will be directly, or indirectly, supported through 
its RPS and FIT mechanisms. Even when emissions trading begins, its support will 
depend on its carbon price (discussed in ss5.4.2). 
  
5.6 Transmission issues in Australia 
 
 
Although transmission is not a direct form of RES-E support, it can hugely 
influence the effectiveness of RES-E support mechanisms, particularly in Australia. 
Transmission issues are complex, and deserve deep analysis beyond the scope of this 
thesis. A more complete dissection of the impact that transmission has in Australia on 
RES-E generation would require an engineering and technical perspective that this 
thesis does not pretend to have.  This section is intended to give a broad idea of the 
RES-E transmission challenges in Australia to make clear that transmission has a 
significant impact on RES-E generation in the country and needs to be considered 
alongside the design of RPS support provided through electricity tariffs. It is not 
intended to be a thorough examination of the issue which, probably, an entire thesis 
would need to be devoted to to be authoratitive.  
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5.6.1 The unique characteristics of Australia’s transmission network 
As shown in Figure 5.7, Australia has a long, thin transmission network 
structure covering long distances at low density. It has been built around state  
electricity generation and demand markets and therefore has had weak links between 
state grids (if they exist at all). Only the eastern and southern states/territories of 
Queensland, New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory, Victorian, South 
Australian and Tasmanian grids are joined by interconnectors that make up the 
National Electricity Market (NEM) but the south-west Western Australian and 
Northern Territory grids are stand-alone ones (as are some smaller town/district-only 
grids). The country’s thin, extended nature makes it unique in the developed world 
(Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2009: 125). The Australian 
Energy Market Operator (2010b: 6) says the NEM is ‘the longest alternating current 
(AC) system in the world’ (although the link between the mainland and Tasmania is 
direct current (DC)) that stretches 5,000 km from the North of Queensland to 
Tasmania and includes about 40,000 km of transmission lines and cables. As will be 
analysed in ss5.6.2, there is proportionally less electricity trade between the states that 
have transmission connection in Australia than there is between major EU countries 
and between US states. And in 2007-08, 14% of all the electricity generated in 
Australia (36 TWh/yr out 265 TWh/yr) was generated by remote generators not 
connected to any type of grid (ABARE 2010b: 21, 22). The AEMO (2010b: 6) says 
Australia’s transmission system is ‘long and linear compared to Europe and North 
America where the power systems are generally more strongly meshed’. 
All of the country’s intra-regional electricity transmission is supplied by 
monopoly suppliers that are privately owned or leased (in Victoria and South 
Australia) or are publicly owned (in all other states and territories). The six 
transmission interconnectors between eastern states and territories are not always 
operated by a single owner but may have an oligarchy of owners. Transmission 
charges are regulated in Australia (by the Australian Energy Regulator, AER), as in 
other countries that also have monopolistic, or near monopolistic, transmission 
ownership. 
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Figure 5.7: Map of Australia’s transmission infrastructure 
 
 
 
Source: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2004. 
NT: Northern Territory, WA: Western Australia, QLD: Queensland, 
SA: South Australia, VIC: Victoria, TAS: Tasmania, NSW: New South Wales 
 
 
5.6.2 Interconnector constraints in Australia compared to the USA and the EU  
Australia’s transmission system has a relatively short history of linkage between 
state and territory based grids. As recently as 1995 there was no interconnector 
between Queensland and New South Wales (AER 2010a). As shown in Figure 5.8, the 
only state/territory interconnectors with any significant capacity are the New South 
Wales–Snowy–Victoria and Victoria–Tasmania (Basslink) interconnectors. The rest 
have modest capacities compared to the state/territory grids they service. This  
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 subsection analyses how transmission in Australia compares to transmission in the 
USA and the EU. 
 
Figure 5.8: Electricity capacities of the states and interconnectors that make up 
the National Electricity Market, 2004 (MW capacity). 
 
 
Source: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2004. 
 
 
Table 5.12 shows that the five states that make up the NEM (along with the 
Australian Capital Territory, which is integrated into the New South Wales grid) had a 
similar amount of net trade of electricity, expressed as a proportion of state 
consumption, between them in 2009 as did 19 major EU countries, listed in Table  
5.13, in 2007. Net trade is the amount of electricity exported from a regional or 
national grid over a time period less the amount imported (expressed, in the case of 
this thesis, as a percentage of the annual, local electricity demand of the relevant 
jurisdiction). However, net electricity trade figures do not give a complete picture of 
electricity trade which can best be gained with gross trade figures (electricity imports 
and exports added together, also expressed as a percentage of the annual, local 
electricity demand of the relevant jurisdiction). Gross electricity trade figures are not 
available for the USA, but are available for Australia and the EU and are included in  
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Tables 5.12 and 5.13. Denmark’s electricity trade figures show how significant the 
distinction between net and gross electricity trade figures can be. While its 2007 net 
electricity trade was only 3.0% of its domestic electricity demand in 2007, its gross  
trade was 64.7% (IEA 2009b: 11.4). This high level of electricity trade mainly flows 
back and forth between Denmark and Norway, Sweden and Germany. Hydro-
generated electricity in Norway, in particular, provides rapid back-up to fluctuations 
in Denmark’s wind generation which, in 2007, accounted for 19% of the country’s 
electricity generation (Diesendorf 2010: 5, EC 2010a).  
 
Table 5.12: Net and gross electricity trade, and state consumption, of states in the 
Australian National Electricity Market, 2009 
State 2009 state 
electricity 
demand:  
TWh/yr 
(1) 
Net 
interstate 
electricity 
trade in 
2009:  
TWh/yr 
(2) 
Net interstate 
electricity 
trade as % of 
2009 
electricity 
demand 
(3)  
Gross 
interstate 
electricity 
trade in 2009: 
TWh/yr 
(4) 
Gross 
interstate 
electricity 
trade as % of 
2009 electricity 
demand (5) 
Queensland 48.5 4.6 9.6% 4.9 10.0% 
New South Wales 71.3 2.7 3.8% 8.6 12.1% 
Victoria 44.8 2.5 5.5% 5.5 12.2% 
Tasmania 10.5 1.6 15.1% 2.6 25.2% 
South Australia 13.4 0.5 3.9% 1.7 12.8% 
Total 188.4 11.9  23.3  
Total weighted 
average 
 
 
  
6.3% 
  
12.4% 
Total unweighted 
average 
   
7.6% 
  
14.5% 
Source: Australian Energy Market Operator 2010 (cols. 1, 2 and 4), author calcs. (cols 3 and 5). 
 
When gross electricity trade is compared, the author’s calculations in Table 5.12 
show that Australia’s weighted 2009 gross trade percentage (of state electricity 
demand) was only 59% of the weighted gross trade percentage between major EU 
countries in 2007 detailed in Table 5.13. Similarly, if the relative net electricity trade 
between NEM states in 2009 is compared to that between US states in 2008, as shown 
in Table 5.14, the connectedness between Australian NEM states is also shown to be 
fairly modest. The weighted proportion of 2009 net electricity trade between 
Australian NEM states was only 33% of the equivalent 2008 net trade between US 
states. Tables 5.12-4 make it clear, then, that the amount of electricity trade between 
Australian NEM states is fairly small, at least when compared to the EU and the USA. 
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Table 5.13: Net inter-country electricity trade, and country electricity demand, of 
major European Union countries, 2007 
Source: IEA 2009a (cols. 1, 2 and 4), author calcs. (cols. 3 and 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country National 
electricity 
demand: 
TWh/yr 
(1) 
Net electricity 
trade with 
other 
countries:  
TWh/yr 
(2) 
Net electricity 
trade with 
other countries 
as % of 2007 
national 
electricity 
demand (3) 
Gross 
electricity 
trade with 
other 
countries:  
TWh/yr (4) 
Gross 
electricity 
trade with 
other countries 
as % of 2007 
national 
electricity 
demand (5) 
Austria 58.3 6.6 11.3% 37.6 64.5% 
Belgium 82.9 6.8 8.2% 24.8 29.9% 
Czech Republic 57.2 16.2 28.3% 36.6 64.0% 
Denmark 33.7 1 3.0% 21.8 64.7% 
Finland 86.1 12.5 14.5% 17.3 20.1% 
France 425.9 56.8 13.3% 78.4 18.4% 
Germany 527.4 16.5 3.1% 108.5 20.6% 
Greece 55.2 4.3 7.8% 8.5 15.4% 
Hungary 33.7 4.0 11.9% 25.4 75.4% 
Ireland 26.1 1.3 5.0% 1.5 5.7% 
Italy 309.3 46.3 15.0% 51.5 16.6% 
Luxembourg 6.7 3.9 58.2% 9.7 147.8% 
Netherlands 106.8 17.5 16.4% 28.7 26.9% 
Poland 114.5 5.3 4.6% 20.9 18.3% 
Portugal 49.0 7.4 15.1% 11.8 24.1% 
Slovak Republic 24.6 1.7 6.9% 25.5 103.7% 
Spain 258.1 5.7 2.2% 23.3 9.0% 
Sweden 131.1 1.4 1.1% 30.8 23.5% 
United 
Kingdom 
341.9 5.2 1.5% 12.0 3.5% 
Weighted av.   8.1%  21.1% 
Unweighted av.   12.0%  39.6% 
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Table 5.14: Net interstate electricity trade, and state electricity demand, of US 
states, 2008 
Source: EIA 2010 (cols. 1 and 2), author calcs. (col. 3). 
 
5.6.3 Consequences of Australian interconnector constraints 
The low level of connectedness between Australian NEM states means they 
behave, and are viewed, as relatively independent electricity generation and demand 
markets; and it can make it difficult for different states to take advantage of 
concentrations of RES-E generation in other states. If Australia is to achieve radical 
RES-E expansion consistent with deep cuts in electricity generation GHG emissions, 
it will need stronger state/territory interconnectors. This is particularly so given that 
existing interconnectors currently  
 
State/ 
District 
State 
electricity 
demand:  
GWh/yr (1) 
Net 
electricity 
trade with 
other 
states:  
GWh/yr (2) 
Net 
electricity 
trade as % 
of 2008 
state 
electricity 
demand (3) 
State/District State 
electricity 
demand:  
GWh/yr (1) 
Net 
electricity 
trade with 
other 
states:  
GWh/yr (2) 
Net 
electricity 
trade with 
other as % 
of 2008 
state 
electricity 
demand (3) 
Alabama 100.3 45.5 45.3% Montana 20.5 9.3 45.4% 
Alaska 7.1 0.3 4.2% Nebraska 31.3 1.1 3.5% 
Arizona 82.7 36.9 44.6% Nevada 36.4 1.2 3.3% 
Arkansas 51.7 3.3 6.4% New 
Hampshire 
12.7 11.4 89.8% 
California 310.3 97.0 31.3% New Jersey 89.8 26.1 29.1% 
Colorado 57.0 3.6 6.3% New Mexico 24.0 13.0 54.2% 
Connecticut 34.6 2.0 5.8% New York 157.0 0.02 0.01% 
Delaware 13.3 5.7 42.9% North 
Carolina 
141.8 16.6 11.7% 
District of 
Columbia 
12.7 12.6 99.2% North Dakota 14.7 19.5 132.7% 
Florida 248.2 28.6 11.5% Ohio 170.9 17.5 10.2% 
Georgia 152.7 16.6 10.9% Oklahoma 63.2 13.1 20.7% 
Hawaii 11.4 .01 .08% Oregon 54.1 5.2 9.6% 
Idaho 26.7 14.7 55.1% Pennsylvania 164.7 58.5 35.5% 
Illinois 157.5 42.1 26.7% Rhode Island 8.0 0.007 0.09% 
Indiana 120.8 8.7 7.2% South 
Carolina 
87.7 13.3 15.2% 
Iowa 49.0 4.1 8.4% South Dakota 11.9 4.8 40.3% 
Kansas 43.1 3.5 8.1% Tennessee 111.2 20.5 18.4% 
Kentucky 99.3 1.4 1.4% Texas 406.0 0.2 .05% 
Louisiana 107.7 15.2 14.1% Utah 31.5 15.1 47.9% 
Maine 16.4 2.5 15.2% Vermont 7.0 2.3 32.9% 
Maryland 69.5 22.1 31.8% Virginia 117.8 45.1 38.3% 
Massachusetts 62.0 16.3 26.3% Washington 103.1 10.7 10.4% 
Michigan 121.0 0.3 0.2% West Virginia 37.7 53.4 141.6% 
Minnesota 74.9 11.4 15.2% Wisconsin 78.0 14.5 18.6% 
Mississippi 54.7 6.5 11.9% Wyoming 19.1 27.5 144.0% 
Missouri 90.6 0.6 0.7% Total 4,175.1 801.44  
    Weighted 
average 
  19.2% 
    Unweighted 
average 
   
29.1% 
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 reach full capacity (are constrained) about 20% of the time (AER 2010a). The reason 
for this is that, as broadly shown in Figure 2.13, Australia’s RES-E resources and 
generation are not evenly spread throughout the country. As shown in Figure 2.18, 
Australia’s best wind resources are in the south of the country in southern WA, SA, 
Vic and Tas; as shown in Figure 2.19, the country’s biomass resources are 
concentrated in NSW, Vic and southern WA; as shown in Figure 2.20, its best solar 
resources are in Qld, NT and WA; and as shown in Figure 2.21, the country’s best hot 
rock resources are located in south-west Qld and north-east SA. However, Australia’s 
population is rarely located close to its best RES-E with 65% of the nation’s 
population located in the south-east corner states of South Australia, Victoria and 
New South Wales (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009b). 
The most constrained interconnector is the DirectLink one from New South 
Wales to Queensland that was constrained for 285 hours in 2005-06 (Garnaut 2008a: 
447). The AEMO has identified the Queensland–NSW, NSW–Victoria and Victoria–
South Australian interconnectors as all needing augmentation in a low carbon 
emissions generation market (AEMO 2009: 3-19). In the AEMO’s National 
Transmission Network Development Plan (2010b), released in December 2010, it 
called for A$8.3 billion in augmented transmission interconnector investment between 
southern Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania, shown in Figure 5.9. This level 
of investment is equal to 57% of the combined Regulated Asset Bases (depreciated 
asset values used by the Australian Energy Regulator for transmission price decision 
purposes) and unregulated asset bases of all the regional and interconnector 
transmission networks that made up the NEM in 2008 (AER 2009: 127). This means 
the AEMO’s proposed investment is enormous compared to the current value of NEM 
transmission. Diesendorf (2010: 6) has advocated a major upgrading of the South 
Australian–Victorian interconnector capacity along with a major new interconnector 
from South Australia to New South Wales via Broken Hill (costed in ss5.6.5). 
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Figure 5.9: Australian transmission network augmentation proposed by the 
AEMO in 2010. 
 
Source: AEMO 2010b. 
The current AER investment test that transmission network owners have to 
satisfy to be able to increase interconnector capacity and charge the cost to all its 
customers (the ‘Regulatory Investment Test’) does not appear to encourage major new 
interconnector investment. In 2008, the two owners of the interconnector system 
either side of the Queensland/New South Wales border  TransGrid and Powerlink  
proposed to upgrade it, but this failed the Regulatory Investment Test (AER 2010a). 
However, there is currently a new move by the two owners to apply for permission to 
invest to increase its capacity. A relaxation of the regulatory investment test is 
probably needed to allow increased interconnector investment based on possible 
future usage growth. An alternative is partial government subsidisation of the cost of 
new interconnectors.  
A deeper problem, that may inhibit interconnector development, lies in the 
relationship between interconnector owners and the owners of state regional 
transmission networks. Sometimes they are the same entities but if they are not, the 
interconnector owners have to ultimately rely on the cooperation of state regional 
network owners for their connections. However, Mountain and Swier (2003: 73) 
argue the two have not always happily coexisted, and interconnector owners may in  
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 some cases pose a threat to state regional network owners that rely on significant 
wholesale electricity price differences between states. Mountain and Swier say a long-
running dispute between TransGrid and Murraylink (transmission owners either side 
of the Victorian/South Australian border) was an example of the poor relationship the 
two can have. If this points to a deep, structural problem in the financing of increased 
interconnector capacity in Australia, there may be a need for over-riding government 
directive, or coercive, powers when it comes to new interconnector development. As 
with transmission network expansion, there may also be an argument for government 
involvement in at least the temporary financing of increased interconnector capacity 
before secure customers for the new capacity can be found. Government assistance 
could take the form of partial subsidisation of the cost of interconnectors (anywhere 
between 0% and 100% of their cost).  
The main consequence of the lack of significant interconnector capacity between 
Australia’s states and territories is that each is viewed separately by potential 
electricity generator investors. Key factors are the size of each state’s electricity 
market, the growth of each state’s electricity demand market (both historic and 
future), the existing state RES-E generation share and the state’s wholesale electricity 
price (Ernst and Young 2008a). Between 40% and 60% of the income received by an 
RES-E generator comes from wholesale electricity, with the balance from the sale of 
RPS tradable certificates. As shown in Tables 5.15 and 5.16, South Australia has a 
high wholesale electricity price, as well as a high projected rate of future electricity 
consumption growth, but also has a high current RES-E generation share. Without 
improved interconnector access to the Victorian and New South Wales electricity 
generation and demand markets, future RES-E investment in South Australia is likely 
to be much less than it has been in the past (Ernst and Young 2008a: 13). Connection 
of the state’s large hot rock geothermal resource to its state electricity grid, without 
increased interconnector capacity, will exacerbate this problem (Australia’s hot rock 
generating potential was discussed in ss2.3.6). Queensland is also considered a poor 
investment state for future RES-E because, as also shown in Tables 5.15 and 5.16, it 
has a low wholesale electricity price and low(ish) projected electricity demand 
growth. This is despite the fact that the state has a significant biomass generating 
potential (discussed in ss2.3.5) (Ernst and Young 2008a: 8). Although Victoria has a 
low wholesale electricity price, and relatively low predicted future demand growth, it  
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 is considered a good generation market for RES-E investment because it is a large 
market with a good wind resource (discussed  in ss2.3.5) (Ernst and Young 2008b: 
10). The other three state generation markets are all considered fairly attractive for 
RES-E investment although the Western Australian and Tasmanian markets are 
dominated by a small, existing group of electricity generators (Ernst and Young 
2008a: 8, 11).  
 
Table 5.15: Wind and non-wind/hydro RES-E shares of electricity generation in 
Australian states, 2007  
 NSW Victoria Queens-
land 
South 
Australia 
Western 
Australia 
Tasm- 
ania 
Electricity demand: 
TWh/yr (1) 
 
80 
 
59 
 
57 
 
15 
 
29 
 
13 
Wind generation:  
GWh/yr (2) 
 
49 
 
364 
 
35 
 
2,010 
 
546 
 
391 
Wind electricity 
generation share (3) 
 
0% 
 
1% 
 
0% 
 
13% 
 
2% 
 
3% 
Non-wind or hydro 
RES-E generation:  
GWh/yr (4) 
 
 
596 
 
 
406 
 
 
1,415 
 
 
119 
 
 
370 
 
 
18 
Non-wind or hydro 
RES-E generation 
share (5) 
 
1% 
 
1% 
 
2% 
 
1% 
 
1% 
 
0% 
Total non-hydro  
RES-E generation 
share (6) 
 
1% 
 
1% 
 
3% 
 
14% 
 
3% 
 
3% 
Source: ABARE 2009a, 2009d (rows 1, 2 and 4), author calcs (rows 3, 5 and 6). 
 
 
Table 5.16: 1997-98 to 2007-08 Australian state or territory electricity demand 
growth, projected 2007-08 to 2029-30 annual growth and 2008-09 wholesale price 
 NSW Victoria Queens
-land 
South 
Australia 
Western 
Australia 
Tas-
mania 
1997-98 electricity 
demand: TWh/yr 
(1) 
 
66 
 
44 
 
42 
 
12 
 
20 
 
10 
2007-08 electricity 
demand: TWh/yr 
(2) 
 
80 
 
59 
 
57 
 
15 
 
29 
 
13 
1997-98 to 2007-08 
electricity demand 
increase (3) 
 
 
23% 
 
 
34% 
 
 
35% 
 
 
29% 
 
 
50% 
 
 
28% 
Projected 2007-08 
to 2029-30 annual 
electricity demand 
Increase (4) 
 
 
 
2.2% 
 
 
 
0.9% 
 
 
 
1.6% 
 
 
 
3.4% 
 
 
 
2.1% 
 
 
 
1.6% 
2008-09 volume 
weighted average 
wholesale 
electricity 
price:A$/MWh (5) 
 
 
A$39 
 
 
 
 
A$42 
 
 
A$34 
 
 
A$51 
 
 
A$45 
 
 
 
A$59 
Source: ABARE 2009d, 2010a (rows 1, 2, 4 and 5), author calcs (row 3). 
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In the short term, the separateness of the RES-E investment attractiveness of 
Australia’s states means that, without significant upgrade of interconnector capacity, 
South Australia and Queensland are likely to be the major losers from the lack of 
interconnector capacity. In the longer term, unless the state generation markets 
become more interconnected, the use of Australia’s RES-E generating potential will 
be constrained, and will probably not be able to reach generation shares consistent 
with a global agreement to stabilise global GHG concentrations at about 450 CO2e 
ppm. Several commentators, including Diesendorf (2007c: 122) and Kamel (2009: 7), 
have argued that improved interconnector capacity between Australian states can 
either help the country access increased RES-E potential capacity and/or alleviate 
RES-E intermittency and generation time-of-day problems. However, this will not 
happen without increased interconnector capacity. 
 
5.6.4 Policy for connecting remote RES-E generators in Australia to transmission 
To date, if a new RES-E generator in Australia is located close to existing 
transmission lines it only has to pay for the cost of connecting to the transmission 
network in order to commence generating into the grid. Any costs associated with 
reinforcing the transmission network, as a result of the connection, are generally met 
by the transmission network owner and are passed on to all of its customers (Ernst and 
Young 2008a: 6). However, sometimes RES-E generators are called on to pay for grid 
connection studies and sometimes they have to pay for transmission augmentation 
needed to allow their connection (Kallies 2010: 6, 7, 8). If grid augmentation costs are 
not paid for by an RES-E generator, then its connection charges are ‘shallow’, as 
opposed to ‘deep’ where the generator pays for grid augmentation costs as well as 
connection costs, or ‘super shallow’ where the generator does not even pay to connect 
to the nearest transmission. In Victoria, considered the state with the best transmission 
connection regime in the country, the time a transmission network owner can take to 
connect a new electricity generator is negotiated between the generator and the owner: 
no maximum time seems to exist (AEMO 2007). Unlike in many European countries, 
there is no obligation on a transmission owner in Australia to connect a new RES-E 
generator (Kallies 2010: 7). 
If an RES-E generator is located a significant distance from the nearest 
transmission line, it has to pay all of the costs associated with extending the  
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 transmission network to a point where it can connect (costs associated with increasing 
transmission connection between state/territory grids are covered in ss5.6.5, below).  
Compared to the rest of the world, this is not unusual: in most developed countries 
RES-E developers have to pay the cost of extending transmission to their point of 
generation. The only exception to this is offshore wind development in Denmark and 
Germany where, to create a greater development incentive, the transmission owner 
must extend the transmission network to the offshore generators at its own expense 
(hence a ‘super shallow’ connection charge; Mendonça et al 2010: 33). In some cases, 
the cost of connecting to the nearest transmission line can render an RES-E project 
unviable in Australia (Ernst and Young 2008a: 6). Transmission regulators in 
Australia are aware that if such a connection policy continues, it could make for 
inefficient transmission expansion. The Australian Energy Market Commission 
(AEMC) (2009: 15) has argued that different transmission lines built to different  
RES-E generators in close proximity to eachother could end up costing about double 
what it would cost to build a shared transmission line. However, the AEMC has also 
argued (2009: 15) that under current arrangements there is ‘no potential reward and 
potentially significant cost’ for a transmission network owner if it expands its system 
without guaranteed customers for the new transmission lines. This is because, under 
current price setting rules, the owner is not necessarily allowed to pass its transmission 
expansion costs on to all of its customers if its new transmission capacity is not fully 
utilised. However, the AER (2010a) argues this has not been tested. Because of this 
perceived risk, the AEMC (2009:16) has proposed that transmission owners be 
allowed to pass on the full cost of underutilised, expanded transmission capacity to all 
their customers. The federal-state Ministerial Council on Energy has accepted this 
recommendation; it is expected the AEMC will publish a final ruling on it in early 
2011 (AER 2010a).  
It is intended that the new AEMC ruling will sit under a new transmission 
planning regime where the AEMO will identify potential clusters of sites where it 
thinks new RES-E generators are likely to locate. Possible RES-E sites include the 
wind areas of north-west Tasmania and the Eyre Peninsula in South Australia; the 
geothermal zone of north-east South Australia; and the solar zones of western New 
South Wales and Queensland (see figures 2.18 (Australian wind), 2.20 (Australian 
solar) and 2.21 (Australian hot rock geothermal) (AEMC, 2009: 108). Transmission 
network owners will then have to develop, and publish, credible connection options  
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for the clusters identified by the AEMO. This will be part of a new national 
transmission planning function for the AEMO. The first National Transmission  
Development Plan was published in December 2010. The transmission network 
clusters identified in the plan (which include clusters covering non-RES-E generation) 
are shown in Figure 5.10. 
 
Figure 5.10 Future RES-E and non-RES-E generation and transmission network 
clusters identified by the AEMO, 2010. 
 
Source: AEMO (2010b). 
 
The new network expansion proposals put forward by the AEMC and the 
AEMO essentially keep network expansion in Australia transmission demand market 
driven. However, some have proposed that there may be a role for government in 
network expansion. The Garnaut Review (2008a: 448) argued that current network 
expansion rules set up a ‘first-mover disadvantage’ where generators seeking network 
expansion are encouraged to hold back to see if another generator is willing to finance 
the cost of expansion (ie to wait and see if another generator creates a transmission 
positive externality). The Garnaut Review (2008a: 451) argued that where such first-
mover problems are significant, there could be a case for using government 
infrastructure funds to initially finance network expansion (with care taken that there 
was no crowding out of privately financed network expansion). In July 2010, the  
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 Prime Minister of Australia announced that, if re-elected (which it was), her 
government would make available A$1 billion over ten years for RES-E connections 
that fail the current regulatory investment tests (Gillard 2010). This will help alleviate 
RES-E connection cost challenges but will probably not make a huge different given 
the sums involved (see ss5.6.5, below and ss5.6.3, above). It is therefore desirable that 
there be an early, credible test of the new rules. If they do not work, serious 
consideration may need to be given to either using significant government subsidies to 
assist transmission expansion and/or allowing the cost of expansion to be levied 
across all national electricity consumers if the expansion is in the national interest. 
 
5.6.5 Cost of transmission expansion in Australia: South Australia–Victoria–New 
South Wales interstate connector case study 
The cost of increasing interconnector capacity between Australia’s states and 
territories is high; the cost of transmission expansion within them is also high. As a 
case study, Table 5.17 gives an approximate costing of the transmission upgrades in, 
and between, South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales advocated by 
Diesendorf (2010: 6, 7) which seek to better utilise their RES-E resources. The table 
uses the same transmission costings used in MMA (2008a: 8) and IEA (2009a: 1.24). 
Based on these costings, Table 5.17 also uses an imputed costing for double circuit 
500 kV transmission lines of A$1m/km. As can be seen from Table 5.17, the 
approximate cost of Diesendorf’s suggested new transmission is equal to 24% of the 
existing value of all the combined Regulated Asset Bases in South Australia, Victoria 
and New South Wales. The Regulated Asset Base is the transmission asset valuation 
the AER uses when determining the maximum charge transmission owners can levy. 
It includes depreciation, so transmission investments made decades ago will have an 
insignificant value associated with them. Normally, a large increase in the Regulated 
Asset Base translates into a large increase in the allowed transmission charge (AER 
2010a).  
Were the proposed new transmission infrastructure detailed in Table 5.17 to be 
financed solely by electricity customers in South Australia, Victoria and New South 
Wales, this would place a large cost impost on those customers. The AEMO (2010b: 
6) says the NEM ‘can be costly to upgrade because of the long distance and resulting  
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high capital costs’. This further suggests that national financing of strategically 
important new transmission infrastructure, across all of the nation’s electricity 
customers, is justified. However, since South Australia, Victoria and New South 
Wales account for 65% of the nation’s population (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2009b), national financing of the transmission expansion would not significantly 
reduce the cost for those three states. Transmission expansion is intrinsically 
expensive, no matter how it is financed. 
 
Table 5.17: Costing of South Australia to New South Wales transmission upgrade 
as proposed by Diesendorf, 2010. 
Transmission section Type of transmission 
line (1) 
Approximate 
length: km 
(2) 
Approximate 
cost/value: 
A$m (3) 
Proposed new transmission:    
Buronga to Robertstown Single circuit 275 kV 300 $150 
Yass to Wagga Wagga Single circuit 330 kV 150 $75 
Heywood to Mt Gambier Double circuit 500 kV 100 $100 
Port Augusta to Broken Hill Double circuit 500 kV 350 $350 
Broken Hill to Dubbo 800 kV DC 675 $1,100 
Dubbo to Wollar Double circuit 500 kV 80 $80 
Port Lincoln to Port Augusta Double circuit 275 kV 330 $230 
Total proposed (equal to 
24% of the existing 
combined transmission) 
  $2,085 
Existing transmission:    
TransGrid NSW transmission 12,486 $4,064 
Energy Australia NSW transmission 885 $1,013 
ElectraNet SA transmission 5,620 $1,284 
SP AusNet Victoria transmission 6,553 $2,232 
Total NSW/Vic/SA existing   $8,593 
Source:  MMA 2008 (cols 1 and 2),  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2009 (cols 1 and 2),   
IEA 2009b (cols 1 and 2),  Diesendorf 2010 (cols 1 and 2),  author calcs (col. 3). 
 
 
5.6.6 Conclusions 
 This section has shown that the relative lack of transmission between Australian 
states is a major problem for RES-E development in the country because its RES-E 
resources are unevenly distributed and are often located a long way from population 
centres. It has also shown that the problem will be relatively expensive to fix, and may 
require some government intervention into the mainly transmission demand market 
based system of transmission investment that Australia has. Without significant 
expansion of transmission in the country, both between states and within states, 
significant amounts of Australia’s RES-E generating potential will not be able to be  
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developed. This is particularly the case for solar and hot rock geothermal. Because of 
the high cost of  transmission, Australia needs to be careful where it builds new 
transmission infrastructure, and it is not cost effective to build new transmission in all 
parts of the country. However, without significantly improved transmission, the country 
has little chance of radical RES-E expansion in order to be able to make deep cuts in its 
electricity sector GHG emissions. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
The most significant overall conclusion one can make about current RES-E 
support in Australia is that most of it currently occurs, and can be expected to mainly 
occur in the short to medium term, through the country’s RPS. In theory, emissions 
trading could play a significant part in the country’s RES-E support, but it will 
probably not start in Australia until at least 2012 and would need reasonably high 
carbon prices to enable even the least expensive types of RES-E to be able to compete 
with brown and black coal electricity generation in the country. In theory, too, 
government subsidies could also play a significant part in RES-E support in Australia 
but, to date at least, they have only been used to a minor extent and are subject to the 
vagaries of government budget constraints.  
 Even though Australia’s RPS is the main means through which RES-E support 
is delivered in the country, it is subject to a number of limiting factors including a 
very large number of tradable certificates created by technologies that have a 
questionable claim to being RES-E ones, hydro generation that until recently has been 
declining, historically rapid expansion in national electricity demand and an RES-E 
generation share which has not risen over the past decade. RES-E development in 
Australia is also significantly limited by the relatively modest amount of transmission 
in the country and the high cost of expanding it. Most of these issues, and others that 
impact on the effectiveness of Australia’s RPS, are further explored and analysed in 
chapter 7. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Cross-country Analysis of the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard and Feed-in Tariff Mechanisms 
 
Chapter 6: Cross-country Analysis of the Renewable Portfolio Standard and Feed-in Tariff Mechanisms 
 
179 
Chapter 6 contents 
 
6.1 Introduction........................................................................................................180 
 
6.2 RES-E generation analysis of the USA, the EU and Australia ......................181	  
6.2.1 RES-E generation analysis of the USA, the EU and Australia ................................................... 181	  
6.2.2 RES-E generation analysis of US RPS states, EU RPS countries and Australia ........................ 183	  
6.2.3 Generation performance comparison between the FIT and the RPS in Western Europe ........... 184	  
6.2.4 RES-E generation analysis of US states that do, and do not, use an RPS................................... 187	  
6.2.5 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 188 
 
6.3 RES-E generating potential performance........................................................188	  
6.3.1 Analyses of the use of RES-E generating potential in the EU .................................................... 189	  
6.3.2 RES-E generating potential performance in Australia ................................................................ 192	  
6.3.3 Wind generating potential performance in the USA................................................................... 193	  
6.3.4 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 195 
 
6.4 Diversity of RES-E generation analysis ...........................................................195	  
6.4.1 Analysis of the diversity of RES-E generation in the USA, the EU and Australia..................... 196	  
6.4.2 Analysis of the diversity of RES-E generation in the EU ........................................................... 197	  
6.4.3 Analysis of the diversity of RES-E generation in the USA ........................................................ 201	  
6.4.4 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 203 
 
6.5 RES-E mechanism price analysis .....................................................................204	  
6.5.1 RPS and FIT wind subsidy analysis of Spain, Germany, the UK and Australia ........................ 204	  
6.5.2 RPS and FIT solar PV subsidy analysis of Spain, Germany, the UK and Australia................... 207	  
6.5.3 Studies of FIT and RPS RES-E support levels ........................................................................... 210	  
6.5.4 Reasons for different RES-E support levels under the RPS and the FIT mechanisms ............... 214	  
6.5.5 Comparing political realities ....................................................................................................... 217	  
6.5.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 218 
 
6.6 Conclusions .........................................................................................................218 
 
Chapter 6: Cross-country Analysis of the Renewable Portfolio Standard and Feed-in Tariff Mechanisms 
 
180 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter, and chapter 7, compare the countries discussed in the past three 
chapters in cross-country analyses. This chapter is mainly a statistical cross-country 
analysis of the effectiveness of the RES-E support mechanisms used in the countries 
discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5. By comparing different RES-E performance 
indicators from those countries beside eachother, this chapter aims to draw 
conclusions about which elements of the RES-E support systems used in the countries 
are effective, and which are not. Through comparison of major RPS design elements 
used in different jurisdictions, chapter 7 will examine changes that could be made to 
Australia’s RPS that would make it more effective at supporting radical RES-E 
expansion. This chapter is mainly statistical whereas chapter 7 is mainly policy based; 
this chapter compares RPS and FIT jurisdictions whereas chapter 7 just compares RPS 
jurisdictions. Published analysis of RPS and FIT mechanisms have tended to be fairly 
narrow in their scope. Most have concentrated on Europe and most have concentrated 
on either generation or price performance. This chapter therefore aims to provide a 
breadth of analysis not included in past RPS or FIT evaluations. 
Section 6.2 analyses the generation performance of FIT and RPS mechanisms in 
the USA, Western Europe and Australia; s6.3 analyses their performance in terms of 
utilising RES-E generating potential. Section 6.4 analyses the success, or otherwise, 
of the RES-E mechanisms of the USA, Western Europe and Australia in terms of 
diversity; s6.5 analyses the subsidy price performance of the FIT and the RPS in 
select countries, as well as commentary of their price performance. Section 6.6 
concludes the chapter. 
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6.2 RES-E generation analysis of the USA, the EU and Australia 
 This section is an analysis of the generation performance of the RPS support 
mechanisms used in the USA, the EU and Australia. Such an overarching analysis is 
necessary before particular aspects of RES-E generation performance in the three areas 
are considered in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
6.2.1 RES-E generation analysis of the USA, the EU and Australia 
In analysing the RES-E generation of the USA, the EU and Australia (both 
absolutely and relative to non-RES-E generation), this subsection compares the USA, 
which has states that do and do not use an RPS, with the EU, which has both FIT and 
RPS countries, as well as with Australia which has national RPS coverage. This mix 
of RES-E mechanisms and jurisdictions enables a broad RES-E generation 
comparison to be made, although it cannot tell a lot about the generation effectiveness 
of the different RES-E mechanisms (because of the mix of RES-E mechanisms and 
mix of jurisdictions that do, and do not, have RES-E mechanisms). However, it can 
tell something of the different contexts of RES-E generation in each area. The 2001 to 
2008 period was selected because the RPS mechanism was not used very much (or at 
all) in the USA, the EU or Australia before 2001 and 2008 is the latest year for which 
data is currently available for all three areas. 
Table 6.1’s author calculations show that Australia had significantly higher 
electricity generation growth between 2001 and 2008 than the USA or the EU (see, 
also, Table 5.3). This means RES-E generation had to increase faster in the country 
than in the other two areas to maintain a constant generation share over the period. 
Table 6.1 also shows that in 2008, Australia’s RES-E generation share was 
significantly lower than the USA’s and the EU’s. Between 2001 and 2008, the USA 
had a larger increase in RES-E generation, and RES-E generation share, than the EU 
and Australia. Over the period Australia’s RES-E generation did not increase at all. 
The superior US performance was significantly influenced by hydro generation which 
fell in both the EU and Australia but rose in the USA over the period. The rise in US 
hydro generation performance probably had little to do with RES-E support 
mechanisms in the country. 
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Table 6.1: RES-E generation indices for the USA, the EU and Australia, 2001 and 
2008. 
 2001 (1) 2008(2) 2001/2008 change (3) 
USA 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 3,737 4,119 +10% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 288 375 +30% 
RES-E generation share 7.7% 9.1% +18% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 217 248 +14% 
Non hydro RES-E generation: TWh/yr 71 126 +77% 
Non hydro RES-E generation share 1.9% 3.1% +63% 
European Union 27 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 3,113 3,374 +8% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 447 563 +26% 
RES-E generation share 14.4% 16.7% +16% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 373 359 -4% 
Non hydro RES-E generation: TWh/yr 74 204 +176% 
Non hydro RES-E generation share 2.4% 6.0% +150% 
Australia 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 218 265 +22% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 18 18 +0% 
RES-E generation share 8.2% 6.8% -17% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 17 12 -29% 
Non hydro RES-E generation: TWh/yr 1 6 +500% 
Non hydro RES-E generation share 0.5% 2.2% +340% 
 
Sources: EIA 2010 and Eurostat 2010 (cols. 1 and 2), ABARE 2010d (cols. 1 and 2),  
author calculations (col. 3). 
 
In contrast to the USA’s superior RES-E generation and RES-E generation share 
performance, it was the worst performer of the three areas in terms of non-hydro  
RES-E generation and non-hydro RES-E generation share growth over the 2001 to 
2008 period. Australia had the highest relative increase of non-hydro RES-E 
generation between 2001 and 2008. The higher increase in non-hydro RES-E in 
Australia and the EU, compared to the USA, is probably due to the fact that both have 
RES-E support mechanisms in all their jurisdictions, whereas only half of the USA’s 
state jurisdictions do (see s3.3). In 2008, hydro generation was significantly higher 
than non-hydro RES-E generation in all three areas though in the EU the difference 
was significantly less than in the other two areas. 
The broad conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis are that RES-E in 
the EU, the USA and Australia is still very dependent on hydro generation. None can 
yet claim to have significant amounts of non-hydro RES-E generation, and all are still 
very exposed to rain-induced (and, therefore, climate change induced) fluctuations in 
hydro generation. If Australia wants to make deep cuts in its electricity generation 
GHG emissions through radical RES-E expansion, then it faces a bigger challenge 
than the EU or the USA because in 2008 it had a lower RES-E generation share and 
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between 2001 and 2008 it had higher electricity generation growth than the other two 
areas. 
 
6.2.2 RES-E generation analysis of US RPS states, EU RPS countries and Australia  
This subsection compares the RES-E generation performance of jurisdictions in 
the USA and the EU that use the RPS mechanism with Australia. The European RPS 
countries are the three countries profiled in chapter 3 as well as Poland and Romania. 
Since this comparison is only concerned with RPS jurisdictions, it can tell something 
of the generation effectiveness of the RPS mechanism as used in the three areas.  
 
Table 6.2: RES-E indices for jurisdictions that use the RPS mechanism in the EU,  
the USA and Australia, 2001 and 2008. 
 
 2001 (1) 2008 (2) 2001/2008 
change (3) 
USA RPS states 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 1,851 2,166 +17% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 205 294 +43% 
RES-E generation share 11.1% 13.5% +17% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 160 203 +22% 
Non hydro RES-E generation: TWh/yr 45 91 +102% 
Non hydro RES-E generation share 2.4% 4.2% +75% 
European Union RPS countries 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 1,157 1,165 +6% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 168 188 +3% 
RES-E generation share 14.5% 16.1% -2% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 148 147 -17% 
Non hydro RES-E generation:TWh/yr 20 41 +150% 
Non hydro RES-E generation share 1.7% 3.5% +141% 
Australia 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 218 265 +22% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 18 18 +0% 
RES-E generation share 8.2% 6.8% -17% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 17 12 -29% 
Non hydro RES-E generation 1 6 +500% 
Non hydro RES-E generation share 0.5% 2.2% +340% 
Source: EIA 2010 (cols. 1 and 2), EC 2010a (cols. 1 and 2), ABARE 2010d (cols. 1 and 2), author calculations 
(col. 3). 
 
In Table 6.2, the author calculations show that the RPS jurisdictions of the USA 
had a higher increase in RES-E generation, and RES-E generation share, between 
2001 and 2008 than either EU RPS countries or Australia. Again, this was largely due 
to the fact that hydro generation significantly increased in the USA over the period 
while it fell in both European Union RPS countries and Australia. However, the 
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relativities between the 2008 RES-E generation shares of the three areas are quite 
different in Table 6.2 than they are in Table 6.1. In Table 6.2, the USA’s 2008 RES-E 
generation share is significantly higher than in Table 6.1: this reflects the fact that the 
Table 6.1 US RES-E generation share is diluted by the low RES-E generation shares 
of states that do not use the RPS. 
 When non-hydro RES-E performance is considered, Australia again has the 
highest increase in both non-hydro RES-E generation, and non-hydro RES-E 
generation share, in Table 6.2, as it did in Table 6.1. However, its non-hydro RES-E 
generation share is still small compared to the other two areas. This reflects the fact 
that non-hydro RES-E generation shares are generally high in the EU countries that 
use the FIT (see ss6.2.3, below) and are generally low in US states that do not use the 
RPS (see ss6.2.4).  
 The broad conclusions that can be drawn from this comparison are that 
Australia’s RPS had a better performance between 2001 and 2008, when it came to 
increasing non-hydro RES-E generation, than RPS jurisdictions in Western Europe or 
the USA, but it did so from a lower non-hydro RES-E generation base in 2001.  
 
6.2.3 Generation performance comparison between the FIT and the RPS in 
Western Europe 
Europe is an ideal region in which to compare the generation performance of the 
FIT and RPS mechanisms since countries that have used the two exist alongside one 
another and there is good data availability for the area. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 give key 
generation performance indicators for the four Western European RPS countries 
profiled in chapter 3, as well as the three FIT ones profiled in chapter 4. A 
commentary follows the tables.  
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Table 6.3: RES-E generation indices for four European RPS countries, 2001, 2004 
and 2008 
Source: Eurostat 2010 (cols. 1, 2 and 3), author calculations (cols 4 and 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2001 
(1) 
2004 
(2) 
2008 
(3) 
2004/ 
2008 
change 
(4) 
2001/ 
2008 
change 
(5) 
United Kingdom 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 385 394 389 -1% +1% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 10 15 22 +46% +120% 
RES-E generation share 2.5% 3.7% 5.6% +51% +124% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 6 7 9 +29% +50% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation share 1.0% 2.0% 3.3% +65% +230% 
Sweden 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 162 152 150 -1% -7% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 87 70 83 +18% -5% 
RES-E generation share 54.1% 46.1% 55.5% +20% +3% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 79 60 69 +15% -13% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation share 4.9% 6.6% 9.3% +41% +90% 
Belgium 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 88 93 85 -9% -3% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 2 2 5 +150% +150% 
RES-E generation share 1.6% 2.1% 5.3% +152% +231% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 2 2 2 +0% +0% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation share 0% 0% 3.5%   
Italy 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 279 303 319 +5% +14% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 47 48 53 +10% +13% 
RES-E generation share 16.8% 15.8% 16.6% +5% -1% 
Hydro generation: GWh/yr 47 48 47 -2% +0% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation share 0% 0% 1.1%   
All profiled Western European RPS countries 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 914 942 943 +0% +3% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 146 135 163 +21% +11% 
RES-E generation share 16.0% 14.3% 17.3% +21% +8% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 134 117 127 +9% -5% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation share 1.3% 1.9% 3.8% +100% +192% 
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Table 6.4: RES-E generation indices for three European FIT countries,  
2001, 2004 and 2008 
 
 2001  
(1) 
2004  
(2) 
2008  
(3) 
2004/ 
2008 
change 
(4) 
2001/ 
2008 
change 
(5) 
Germany 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 586 617 637 +3% +9% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 38 59 98 +66% +158% 
RES-E generation share 6.5% 9.5% 15.4% +62% +137% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 27 28 27 -4% +0% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation share 1.5% 5.0% 11.1% +122% +640% 
Spain 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 238 280 314 +12% +32% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 49 52 65 +25% +33% 
RES-E generation share 20.7% 18.5% 20.6% +11% -1% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 44 34 26 -24% -41% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation share 2.1% 6.4% 12.4% +94% +490% 
Denmark 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 38 40 36 -10% -5% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 7 10 11 -10% +57% 
RES-E generation share 17.3% 27.1% 28.7% +6% +66% 
Hydro generation: GWh/yr 28 26 26 +0% -7% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation share 17.3% 27.1% 28.7% +6% +68% 
All profiled FIT countries 
Electricity generation: TWh/yr 862 937 987 +5% +15% 
RES-E generation: TWh/yr 94 121 174 +44% +85% 
RES-E generation share 10.9% 12.9% 17.6% +36% +61% 
Hydro generation: TWh/yr 71 62 53 -14% -25% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation share 2.7% 6.3% 12.2% +94% +351% 
Source: Eurostat 2010 (cols. 1, 2 and 3), author calculations (cols 4 and 5). 
 
In overall RES-E generation share terms, the RPS and FIT countries compared 
in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 had roughly the same shares in 2008, but the FIT countries had a 
much higher non-hydro RES-E generation share, and had nearly double the increase in 
non-hydro RES-E generation share between 2001 and 2008. However, the 2001-8 
period is not an entirely appropriate period over which to compare the two sets of 
countries. By 2001, only one RPS country, Italy, had its RES-E support mechanism in 
place; the UK did not start its RPS until 2002, Sweden commenced its in 2003, and 
Belgium started its in 2002 and 2004 (in different parts of the country). Therefore, the 
2004-8 period is a better one over which to compare the two groups of countries. Over 
that period, the RES-E generation share of the FIT countries increased significantly 
more than for the RPS ones. However, if one focuses just on non-hydro RES-E 
generation share between 2004 and 2008, it increased by more or less the same 
proportion in the two sets of countries over the period. 
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The key conclusion that can be drawn from this subsection is that, at least 
between the European countries profiled in chapters 3 and 4, there was no 
overwhelming evidence that the FIT mechanism was superior to the RPS in 
supporting increases in non-hydro RES-E generation share, at least over the period 
when all seven countries had their support mechanisms in place.  
 
6.2.4 RES-E generation analysis of US states that do, and do not, use an RPS 
The USA is an ideal country within which to test the effectiveness of the RPS 
mechanism because it has states that do, and do not, use the mechanism. As shown in 
Table 6.5, the US states that use an RPS mechanism generate roughly the same 
amount of electricity (from all sources) as the states that do not use it, so a reasonable 
comparison can be made between the two. A commentary on the indices follows the 
table. The 2001 to 2008 period was chosen because few US states used the RPS 
mechanism before 2001 (see s3.3).  
 
Table 6.5: RES-E generation indices for RPS and non-RPS US states, 2001 and 
2008. 
 2001 
(1) 
2008 
(2) 
2001/2008 
change (3) 
States that use an RPS 
Electricity generation: GWh/yr 1,851 2,049 +11% 
RES-E generation: GWh/yr 205 284 +39% 
RES-E generation share 11.1% 13.9% +25% 
Hydro generation: GWh/yr 160 199 +24% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation: GWh/yr 44 85 +93% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation  share  2.4% 4.1% +71% 
States that do not use an RPS 
Electricity generation: GWh/yr 1,886 2,070 +10% 
RES-E generation: GWh/yr 74 88 +19% 
RES-E generation share 4.0% 4.3% +8% 
Hydro generation: GWh/yr 48 47 -2% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation: GWh/yr 26 40 +54% 
Non-hydro RES-E generation share  1.4% 1.9% +36% 
Source: EIA 2010 (cols 1 and 2), author calculations (col. 3). 
 
Table 6.5’s author calculations show that between 2001 and 2008 RES-E 
generation share, and RES-E generation, increased significantly more in US states that 
used the RPS than in states that did not use it. However, this was largely due to the 
fact that hydro generation fell in states that did not use an RPS while it rose in states 
that did use the mechanism mainly because of changes in rainfall. This had little, if 
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anything, to do with the RPS mechanism and is therefore no validation of its 
effectiveness. 
 When one looks at the narrower measure of non-hydro RES-E generation, Table 
6.5 shows that both this measure, and non-hydro RES-E generation share, were lower 
in non-RPS states in 2008 than in the RPS states and increased more over the 2001 to 
2008 period in the RPS states. This is a major validation of the generation 
effectiveness of the RPS as used in US states. 
 
6.2.5 Conclusions 
The broad conclusions that can be reached from this section are, firstly, that the 
EU, the USA and Australia all remain dependent on hydro for a large proportion of 
their RES-E generation. Secondly, although Australia significantly increased its non-
hydro RES-E generation between 2001 and 2008, it remained well behind the EU and 
the USA in terms of overall RES-E generation share and releasing itself from RES-E 
hydro dependency. Thirdly, US RPS states were significantly more effective at 
increasing the generation of non-hydro RES-E over 2001-8 than non-RPS states. 
Fourthly, although the selected EU FIT countries had greater increases in non-hydro 
RES-E generation, and RES-E generation share, during 2001-8 than the selected RPS 
countries, there is no overwhelming evidence that their FIT mechanisms were 
manifestly better at increasing non-hydro RES-E generation over the 2004-8 period 
when all had RES-E support mechanisms in place. 
 
6.3 RES-E generating potential performance 
This section analyses the use that has been made of RES-E generating potential 
in the EU, Australia and the USA. Generating potential is the maximum capacity of a 
country to generate a type of RES-E before it starts experiencing steep increases in 
marginal generating costs because of resource constraints (limited good wind sites, 
finite biomass resource etc). This analysis is important because it tests how close 
RES-E generation is in those three areas to a point where it starts to experience 
sharply increasing marginal generating costs (see Figure 2.17 for representation of 
different marginal cost curves for different RES-E types). Such testing demonstrates 
how capable these countries are of generating significantly increased RES-E before 
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experiencing rising costs. It demonstrates how practical it is to significantly reduce 
GHG emissions in the three areas through radical RES-E expansion. 
6.3.1 Analyses of the use of RES-E generating potential in the EU 
Table 6.6 analyses the use made of RES-E generating potential by the four 
Western European RPS countries profiled in chapter 3 while Table 6.7 analyses the 
same for the three FIT EU countries profiled in chapter 4. A commentary follows. 
 
Table 6.6: Use of RES-E generating potential in four European RPS countries, 
2001 and 2007 
Country / RES-E type RES-E generating 
potential:  
TWh/yr (1) 
RES-E generating 
potential realised 
in 2001 (2) 
RES-E generating 
potential realised 
in 2007 (3) 
2001/2007 
change (4) 
United Kingdom 
Hydro 7.8 52.0% 65.2%  
Wind 344.0 0.3% 1.5%  
Biomass 30.7 16.2% 32.6%  
Solar PV 7.8 0.0% 0.1%  
Geothermal 0.3 0.0% 0.0%  
Total RES-E 390.6 2.6% 5.2% +100% 
Non-hydro RES-E 382.8 1.6% 34.0% +203% 
Sweden 
Hydro 90.0 87.8% 73.5%  
Wind 63.5 0.8% 1.5%  
Biomass 80.4 4.8% 13.2%  
Solar PV 3.7 0.0% 0.0%  
Geothermal 1.3 0.0% 0.0%  
Total RES-E 238.9 34.9% 32.7% -6% 
Non-hydro RES-E 148.9 2.9% 8.1% +179% 
Belgium 
Hydro 0.3 148.3% 129.6%  
Wind 13.0 0.3% 3.8%  
Biomass 7.3 12.9% 42.6%  
Solar PV 2.1 0.0% 0.3%  
Geothermal 0 0.0% 0.0%  
Total RES-E 22.7 6.3% 17.6% +179% 
Non-hydro RES-E 22.4 4.4% 16.1% +267% 
Italy 
Hydro 65.0 72.0% 50.5%  
Wind 79.0 1.5% 35.1%  
Biomass 46.1 5.6% 14.7%  
Solar PV 17.6 0.1% 0.2%  
Geothermal 19.6 23.0% 28.4%  
Total RES-E 227.3 24.2% 21.7% -11% 
Non-hydro RES-E 162.3 5.1% 10.1% +898% 
All Western European RPS countries 
Hydro 163.1 79.9% 64.0%  
Wind 499.5 0.5% 2.2%  
Biomass 164.5 7.5% 18.5%  
Solar PV 31.2 0.0% 0.2%  
Geothermal 21.2 21.2% 26.3%  
Total RES-E 879.5 17.0% 17.3% +2% 
Non-hydro RES-E 716.4 2.7% 6.6% +144% 
Source: EC 2010a and Renewenergy 2009 (col 1), author calculations (cols. 2, 3 and 4). 
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Table 6.7: Use of RES-E generating potential in three European FIT countries, 
2001 and 2007 
Source: EC 2010a and Renewenergy 2009 (col 1), author calculations (cols. 2, 3 and 4). 
 
In 2001 and 2007, the RPS countries in Table 6.6, and the FIT countries in Table 
6.7, both used a roughly similar proportion of their overall RES-E generating 
potential. However, in both years the FIT countries used a significantly higher 
proportion of their non-hydro RES-E generating potential than the RPS countries did 
(but it was still only a small fraction of their overall RES-E generating potential). The 
increase in the use of non-hydro RES-E generating potential over the period was 
higher for the FIT countries than for the RPS ones, but not hugely so.  
The only instance where a country had used more than half of its non-hydro 
RES-E generating potential was Denmark which, by 2007, had used 58.5% of its 
biomass generating potential. Apart from this instance, none of the country non-hydro 
Country / RES-E type RES-E  
generating 
potential:  
TWh/yr (1) 
RES-E generating 
potential realised 
in 2001 
(2) 
RES-E 
generating 
potential 
realised in 2007 
(3) 
2001/ 
2007change 
(4) 
Germany 
Hydro 26.0 87.4% 80.4%  
Wind 262.0 4.0% 15.2%  
Biomass 87.0 6.0% 34.6%  
Solar PV 23.4 0.5% 13.1%  
Geothermal 28.2 0.0% 0.0%  
Total RES-E 426.6 9.0% 22.0% +93% 
Non-hydro RES-E 400.6 3.9% 18.2% +246% 
Spain 
Hydro 41.0 100.0% 67.7%  
Wind 93.0 7.5% 29.6%  
Biomass 40.4 4.9% 9.0%  
Solar PV 19.5 0.1% 2.6%  
Geothermal 28.2 0.0% 0.0%  
Total RES-E 222.1 22.5% 26.8% +19% 
Non-hydro RES-E 181.1 4.9% 17.5% +257% 
Denmark 
Hydro 0 0.0% 0.0%  
Wind 55.0 7.8% 13.0%  
Biomass 6.6 32.0% 58.5%  
Solar PV 1.3 0.0% 0.2%  
Geothermal 0 0.0% 0.0%  
Total RES-E 62.9 10.2% 17.6% +73% 
Non-hydro RES-E 62.9 10.2% 17.5% +72% 
All profiled Western European FIT countries 
Hydro 67.0 95.2% 72.7%  
Wind 410.0 5.3% 18.2%  
Biomass 134.0 6.9% 28.0%  
Solar PV 44.2 0.3% 8.1%  
Geothermal 56.4 0.0% 0.0%  
Total RES-E 711.6 13.3% 23.1% +74% 
Non-hydro RES-E 644.6 4.8% 17.9% +273% 
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generating potentials had been sufficiently used by 2007, so radical RES-E expansion 
would be unlikely to cause increases in marginal generating costs because of resource 
constraints for all types of RES-E in all the selected countries apart from biomass in 
Denmark. However, when it came to the use of hydro generating potential, all seven 
countries had realised about 60%, or more, of their hydro generating potential by 2007 
where such capacity existed (not in Denmark). This means all have probably used 
most, if not all, of their relatively inexpensive hydro resource and there is probably 
little capacity for increasing hydro RES-E generation without experiencing 
significantly increasing marginal costs in all seven European countries. This means 
radical RES-E expansion in all seven countries can only feasabily occur using non-
hydro RES-E types.  
One would expect the RPS countries to have used a greater proportion of their 
wind and biomass generating potentials than the FIT countries had by 2007. This is 
because these two types of RES-E are the most mature, and least expensive, of all 
RES-E types which undifferentiated RPS mechanisms favour (as already discussed in 
s3.2). However, the four RPS countries had realised 21.1% of their combined 
wind/biomass generating potential by 2007 compared to 20.5% for the three FIT 
countries. This similar penetration may be because of the longer operation of the FIT 
mechanism in its host countries than of the RPS mechanism in its host countries. The 
recent stalling in new Danish wind capacity (noted in ss4.5.2 above) suggests the 
country is reaching the limit of its relatively inexpensive wind resource, but by 2007 it 
had only developed 13.0% of its wind generating potential which suggests the stalling 
may have other causes (like inadequate wind FIT subsidies). 
Table 6.8 analyses the utilisation of the EU’s RES-E generating potential by all 
its 27 current members between 1990 and 2007. A commentary follows. 
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Table 6.8: Proportion of the EU27 RES-E generating potential used in 1990 and 
2007. 
 
Source: EC 2010a and Renewenergy 2009 (col. 1), author calculations (cols. 2, 3 and 4). 
 
 
Table 6.8’s author calculations show that for the 27 members of the EU, by 2007 
there remained a very large amount of unused RES-E generating potential. The 
abundance of unexploited RES-E potential is even more apparent when non-hydro 
generating potential was considered. Considering tables 6.1 and 6.8 together, it is 
clear that RES-E could supply all of the EU’s current electricity demand without any 
demand-reducing management. This is because in Table 6.1 the EU has a 2008 RES-E 
generation share of 16.7% but in Table 6.8 it had only used 9.2% of its total RES-E 
generating potential by 2007. It is also clear from Table 6.8 that the EU has a 
particularly large way to go in realising a significant proportion of its photovoltaic and 
geothermal generating potentials: in both cases, by 2007 it had realised less than 2% 
of the relevant generating potential of these two RES-E types. 
 
6.3.2 RES-E generating potential performance in Australia 
Table 6.9 analyses the use Australia had made of its RES-E generating potential 
by 2008. A commentary follows. The generating potentials used in Table 6.9 are the 
same as those listed in Table 2.13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RES-E type  EU 27 
generating 
potential: 
TWh/yr (1) 
1990 EU 27 
generation 
% of 
potential (2) 
2007 EU 27 
generation 
% of 
potential (3) 
1990 to 2007 
increase: % 
(4) 
Hydro  908 31.8% 34.1% +7% 
Biomass  764 2.3% 13.3% +435% 
Wind  1,517 0.1% 6.9% +680% 
Solar PV 154 0.0% 2.4% 0% 
Geothermal  667 0.5% 0.9% +80% 
Total RES-E  5,738 5.4%  9.2% +70% 
Total non-hydro  RES-E 4,830 
 
0.7% 7.0%       +900% 
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Table 6.9: The 2008 use made of Australia’s RES-E generating potential 
RES-E type Annual RES-E 
generating 
potential: TWh/yr 
(1) 
2008 RES-E 
generation:  
TWh/yr 
(2) 
2008 RES-E 
generation as % of 
annual RES-E 
generating 
potential (3) 
Hydro 18  12.1 67% 
Wind 200 3.9 2% 
Biomass 92  2.3 3%  
Solar 16,170  0.1 ~0% 
Hot rock geothermal 8,212,495 0 0% 
Source: CSIRO 2006 and Table 2.12 (cols. 1 and 2), author calcs (col. 3). 
 
Table 6.9 shows that, by 2008, Australia has used two-thirds of its hydro 
generating potential and is now at a point where increased hydro generation would 
probably incur significantly increased marginal costs (although there is some 
unexploited small hydro generation capacity in Australia, see ss2.3.5). With regard to 
the generating potential of the other RES-E types, however, Australia had used a very 
small proportion by 2008 and was a long way from experiencing rising marginal costs 
because of RES-E resource constraints. However, some of the RES-E generating 
potential in Table 6.9 is likely to be constrained by transmission limitations (discussed 
in s5.6). A comparison between Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 reveals that, by 2008, 
Australia had used a larger proportion of its hydro generating potential than the EU 
had, but a much lower proportion of its wind, biomass, solar, geothermal and total 
RES-E generating potential. A comparison of tables 6.1 and 6.9 reveals that, unlike 
the EU, Australia could generate its current electricity generation many times over if 
most of its RES-E generating potential was utilised. This means that, more than for 
the EU, radical RES-E expansion can only occur in Australia using non-hydro RES-E 
types. 
 
6.3.3 Wind generating potential performance in the USA 
RES-E generating potential data is not available for all RES-E types in the USA 
so the level of analysis of its use of RES-E generating potential cannot be as 
comprehensive as it can be for the EU and Australia. However, wind generating 
potential data is available for the USA. Table 6.10 analyses the use made of the wind 
generating potential of the 20 windiest states in the USA in 2008. A commentary 
follows.  
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Table 6.10: Wind generation performance in the 20 US states with the largest wind 
generating potential in 2008 
State RPS target Annual wind 
generating 
potential: 
TWh/yr (1) 
2008 wind 
generation  
GWh/yr 
(2)  
2008 wind 
generation 
% of annual 
wind 
generating 
potential (3) 
North Dakota Voluntary 1,210 1,693 0.1% 
Texas about 4.2% by 2015 1,190 16,225 1.4% 
Kansas None 1,070 1,759 0.2% 
South Dakota None 1,030 145 0.01% 
Montana 15% by 2008 1,020 593 0.06% 
Nebraska None 868 214 0.02% 
Wyoming None 747 963 0.1% 
Oklahoma None 725 2,358 0.3% 
Minnesota 25 or 30% by 2020-25 657 4,355 0.7% 
Iowa about 2% by 1999 551 4,084 0.7% 
Colorado 20% by 2020 481 3,221 0.7% 
New Mexico 20% by 2020 435 1,643 0.4% 
Idaho None 73 207 0.3% 
Michigan Voluntary 65 141 0.2% 
New York 24% by 2013 62 1,251 2.0% 
Illinois Voluntary 61 2,337 3.8% 
California 20% by 2020 59 5,385 9.1% 
Wisconsin 10% by 2015 58 487 0.8% 
Maine 30% by 2000 56 132 0.2% 
Missouri Voluntary 52 203 0.4% 
Total   10,470 47,396 0.5% 
Compulsory RPS 
states   4,569 37,376 0.8% 
Non RPS states  5,901 10,020 0.2% 
Source: American Wind Energy Association 2008 (col. 1), EIA 2010 (col. 2), author calcs (col. 3). 
 
Table 6.10 shows that, amongst the 20 US states with the largest wind 
generating potential, half are ones that were compulsorily using the RPS mechanism 
in 2008. Those that compulsorily used the mechanism utilised, on average, four times 
the proportion of their wind generating potential that non-RPS states did in 2008 
(although both sets of states had developed less than 1% of their wind generating 
potential). Table 6.10 also makes clear how much more wind generation could be 
developed if the USA had a national RPS mechanism. Amongst the 20 windiest US 
states, those that were compulsorily using the RPS mechanism in 2008 only accounted 
for 44% of the total wind generating potential of all 20 states. The low proportion of 
annual wind generating potential that had been developed by non-RPS states shows 
why it is important for the USA to adopt a national RPS mechanism, without it the 
country cannot seriously support significant additional RES-E generation. 
 
Chapter 6: Cross-country Analysis of the Renewable Portfolio Standard and Feed-in Tariff Mechanisms 
 
195 
6.3.4 Conclusions 
The broad conclusions from this section are that although the EU and Australia 
have used a significant proportion of their hydro generating potential, they have only 
used a small proportion of their non-hydro RES-E generating potential (with the 
exception of biomass in Denmark and Belgium). This means both areas are a long 
way from experiencing increases in the marginal costs of their non-hydro RES-E due 
to resource constraints. It also means both areas necessarily have to look to non-hydro 
RES-E types for radical RES-E expansion if they are to avoid sharply increasing  
RES-E marginal generating costs. Australia has developed a larger proportion of its 
hydro generating potential than the EU but has developed a much lower proportion of 
its non-hydro RES-E generating potential. Similarly, the USA has only used a very 
small proportion of its wind generating potential with states that compulsorily use the 
RPS mechanism utilising a greater proportion of their wind capacity than states that 
do not compulsorily use it. Amongst the Western EU FIT and RPS countries profiled 
in chapters 3 and 4, by 2008 the FIT ones had utilised more of their non-hydro RES-E 
generating potential than the RPS ones but had a similar increase in its use since 2004. 
The similar increase since 2004 did not show any major, superior, ability of the FIT 
mechanism to utilise non-hydro RES-E generating potential. All of this broadly means 
that the USA, Australia and the EU have significant capacity for deep GHG cuts 
through radical expansion of all RES-E types, except hydro, before such generation is 
likely to experience rising marginal generating costs. 
 
 
 
6.4 Diversity of RES-E generation analysis 
This section analyses the diversity of RES-E generation in the EU FIT and RPS 
countries profiled in chapters 3 and 4 as well as in the USA and Australia. The RES-E 
generation diversity index used in this section is an inverse of the Herfindahl 
concentration index: that is, 1 divided by the sum of the squares of the shares of  
RES-E generation of each RES-E type in a jurisdiction in a given year (ie if two  
RES-E types each accounted for half of the RES-E generation of a jurisdiction in a 
given period its diversity index would be equal to 1 divided by (0.52 + 0.52)). The 
higher the index, the more diverse (less concentrated) is the overall mix of RES-E 
types. RES-E diversity is important to consider because it shows how successful 
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different RES-E support mechanisms have been, in different jurisdictions, at 
developing a range of different RES-E types. 
 
6.4.1 Analysis of the diversity of RES-E generation in the USA, the EU and 
Australia 
Table 6.11 shows the RES-E generation diversity indices for the USA, all EU 
countries and Australia in 2001 and 2007. A commentary follows. 
 
Table 6.11: RES-E diversity indices for the USA, all EU countries and Australia, 
2001 and 2007. 
Source: EIA 2010 (cols. 1 and 2), EC 2010 (cols. 1 and 2), ABARE 2010d (cols. 1 and 2), author calcs (cols 1, 2 
and 3). 
 
Table 6.11 shows that the EU’s RES-E diversity index was significantly higher 
than that of the USA and Australia by 2007 and rose further than either over the 2001 
to 2007 period. By 2007, Australia still had the least diverse RES-E generation of the 
three areas reflecting the fact that Australia’s RES-E generation was more dominated 
by hydro generation than RES-E generation was in the other two areas.  
Having analysed the overall RES-E generation diversity of the EU, the USA and 
Australia, Table 6.12 analyses the RES-E generation diversity of those jurisdictions in 
the three areas that use the RPS mechanism, only. A commentary follows. Table 6.12 
covers RES-E diversity indexes for 2003 and 2007 because state-based RES-E 
generation data is not currently available for specific US states before 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jurisdiction 2001 (1) 2007 (2) 2001/2007 
change (3) 
USA 
RES-E diversity index 1.70 1.89 +11% 
European Union 27 
RES-E diversity index 1.41 2.35 +67% 
Australia 
RES-E diversity index 1.13 1.69 +50% 
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Table 6.12: RES-E diversity indices for jurisdictions in the USA, Western Europe 
and Australia that use the RPS mechanism, 2003 and 2007 
RPS jurisdiction 2003 2007 2003/2007 
change 
USA RPS states 
RES-E diversity index 1.52 1.72 +13% 
Western European RPS countries 
RES-E diversity index 1.50 1.83 +22% 
Australia 
RES-E diversity index 1.31 1.69 +29% 
Source: EIA 2010 (cols. 1 and 2), EC 2010 (cols. 1 and 2), ABARE 2010d (cols. 1 and 2), author calcs (cols 1, 2 
and 3). 
 
Unlike in Table 6.11, in Table 6.12, the RES-E diversity index rose further in 
Australia than it did in the EU and the USA (although Table 6.12 covers 2003-7, 
whereas Table 6.11 covered 2001-7). This result echoes the result of Table 6.2, that 
showed that Australia’s non-hydro RES-E generation and generation share rose 
further in the country between 2001 and 2008 than it did in EU and US jurisdictions 
that use the RPS. However, in 2007 Australia also had the lowest RES-E diversity 
index in Table 6.12 though it was only slightly lower than the USA’s and was not as 
low compared to the EU’s as it was in Table 6.11. The modest change in the US RPS 
state RES-E diversity index between 2003 and 2007 suggests that the poor overall US 
RES-E generation diversity index result shown in Table 6.11 was not due to a poor 
performance in non-RPS US states, alone. 
 
6.4.2 Analysis of the diversity of RES-E generation in the EU  
Tables 6.13 and 6.14, below, analyse the RES-E diversity indices for the 
Western European FIT and RPS countries profiled in chapters 3 and 4, a commentary 
follows. 
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Table 6.13: RES-E generation diversity indices for four European RPS countries, 
2001 and 2007 
Source: EC 2010a (cols. 1 and 2), author calcs (cols. 1, 2 and 3). 
 
 
Table 6.14: RES-E generation diversity indices for three European FIT countries, 
2001 and 2007 
Source: EC 2010a (cols. 1 and 2), author calcs (cols. 1, 2 and 3). 
 
 
Tables 6.13 and 6.14 show that, as a group, the three FIT countries in Table 6.14 
recorded about the same increase in RES-E diversity as the four RPS ones did over 
the 2001 to 2007 period. However, the three Table 6.14 FIT countries had a 
significantly higher RES-E diversity in both 2001 and 2007 than the Table 6.13 RPS 
countries did. This could be because the FIT mechanism had been operating for longer 
in the FIT countries than the RPS mechanism had in its host countries by 2007. A 
larger increase should have been expected in the Table 6.14 FIT countries, compared 
to the Table 6.13 RPS ones, given that the FIT subsidy is differentiated according to 
RES-E type, whereas the RPS’s subsidies are not (unless banding or carve-outs are 
used). The fact that the diversity did not increase any faster in the FIT countries casts 
some doubt on whether the FIT mechanism, as used in the three chapter 4 countries, is 
necessarily significantly supporting high-cost RES-E. However, as argued in chapter 
4, it could be that the FIT’s support of solar PV and offshore wind, in particular, does 
Country / indicator description 2001 (1) 2007 (2) 2001/2007 
change (3) 
United Kingdom 
RES-E diversity index 2.38 2.7 +13% 
Sweden 
RES-E diversity index 1.11 1.36 +23% 
Belgium 
RES-E diversity index 1.85 1.59 -14% 
Italy 
RES-E diversity index 1.37 2.07 +51% 
All profiled European RPS countries 
RES-E diversity index 1.32 1.92 +45% 
Country / indicator description 2001 
(1) 
2007 
(2) 
2001/2007 
change (3) 
Germany 
RES-E diversity index 2.27 3.0 +32% 
Spain 
RES-E diversity index 1.45 2.29 +58% 
Denmark 
RES-E diversity index 1.82 1.85 +2% 
All western European FIT countries 
RES-E diversity index 1.96 2.89 +47% 
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not have a long enough history, yet, for their generation to have a major diversity 
influence (particularly, in the case of solar PV, up to 2007). 
 Diversity indices only deal with the quantity of RES-E diversity, not its quality. 
Tables 6.15 and 6.16 analyse the changes in the different types of RES-E generation 
recorded by the Western European FIT and RPS countries profiled in chapters 3 and 4 
with a following commentary. 
Table 6.15: Changes in generation of non-hydro RES-E types in four European 
RPS countries, 2001, 2004 and 2007 
Country / RES-E type RES-E 
generated in 
2001: 
GWh/yr (1) 
RES-E 
generated in 
2004: GWh/yr 
(2) 
RES-E 
generated in 
2007: GWh/yr 
(3) 
2004/ 
2007 
change (4) 
2001/ 
2007 
change (5) 
United Kingdom 
Wind 965 1,935 5,247 +171% +444% 
Biomass 4,984 7,878 9,999 +27% +101% 
Solar PV 3 4 11 +175% +267% 
Geothermal 0 0 0 +0% +0% 
Total non-hydro RES-E 5,952 9,817 15,257 +55% +156% 
Sweden 
Wind 482 850 1,430 +68% +197% 
Biomass 3,881 7,943 10,578 +33% +173% 
Solar PV 1 0 0 +0% +0% 
Geothermal 0 0 0 +0% +0% 
Total non-hydro RES-E 4,364 8,793 12,008 +37% +175% 
Belgium 
Wind 34 129 491 +281% +1344% 
Biomass 945 1,535 3,107 +102% +229% 
Solar PV 0 1 6 +500%  
Geothermal 0 0 0 +0% +0% 
Total non-hydro RES-E 979 1,664 3,598 +116% +268% 
Italy 
Wind 1,179 1,847 4,034 +118% +242% 
Biomass 2,586 5,359 6,770 +26% +162% 
Solar PV 19 29 39 +34% +105% 
Geothermal 4,507 5,437 5,569 +2% +24% 
Total non-hydro RES-E 8,291 12,672 16,412 +29% +98% 
All Western European RPS countries 
Wind 2,660 4,761 11,202 +135% +321% 
Biomass 12,396 22,715 30,454 +34% +146% 
Solar PV 23 34 56 +65% +143% 
Geothermal 4,507 5,437 5,569 +2% +24% 
Total non-hydro RES-E 19,586 32,947 47,281 +44% +141% 
Source: EC 2010a (cols. 1, 2 and 3), author calcs (cols. 3 and 4). 
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Table 6.16: Changes in generation of non-hydro RES-E types in three European 
FIT countries 2001, 2004 and 2007 
Source: EC 2010a (cols. 1, 2 and 3), author calcs (cols. 3 and 4). 
 
The Table 6.15 RPS countries had larger overall growth in wind generation than 
the Table 6.16 FIT countries over both the 2004 to 2007, and 2001 to 2007 periods: 
this is to be expected since the RPS mechanism is focused on the support of least-cost 
RES-E (which wind is, discussed in s3.2). The increase in biomass generation over the 
two periods was higher in the Table 6.16 FIT countries than in the Table 6.15 RPS 
ones. The RES-E type that performed overwhelming better in the FIT countries was 
solar PV generation. The increase in solar PV generation in the FIT countries, 
between 2001 and 2007, was 17 times that of the RPS countries and between 2004 
and 2007 was seven times greater. The large increase in solar PV generation in 
Germany was not due to the FIT alone: the country also extended a government fiscal 
subsidy for PV installation over the period (discussed in ss4.3.1). However, solar PV 
generation in the Table 6.16 FIT countries by 2007 was still relatively modest 
compared to wind and biomass being 10%, or less, of the generation of either in all of 
Country / RES-E type RES-E 
generated in 
2001:  
GWh/yr (1) 
RES-E generated 
in 2004: GWh/yr 
(2) 
RES-E generated 
in 2007:  
GWh/yr (3) 
2004/2007 
change (4) 
2001/2007 
change (5) 
Germany 
Wind 10,456 25,509 39,713 +56% +280% 
Biomass 5,250 11,473 30,078 +162% +473% 
Solar PV 116 557 3,075 +452% +2,551% 
Geothermal 0 0 0 +0% +0% 
Total non-hydro 
RES-E 
15,822 37,539 72,866 +94% +361% 
Spain 
Wind 6,966 15,601 27,509 +76% +295% 
Biomass 1,964 4,133 3,635 -12% +85% 
Solar PV 24 56 501 +794% +1,988% 
Geothermal 0 0 0 +0% +0% 
Total non-hydro 
RES-E 
8,954 19,790 31,645 +60% +253% 
Denmark 
Wind 4,306 6,583 7,173 +9% +67% 
Biomass 2,110 3,562 3,860 +8% +83% 
Solar PV 1 2 2 +0% +100% 
Geothermal 0 0 0 +0% +0% 
Total non-hydro 
RES-E 
6,417 10,147 11,035 +9% +72% 
All Western European FIT countries 
Wind 21,728 47,693 74,395 +56% +242% 
Biomass 9,324 19,168 37,573 +96% +303% 
Solar PV 141 615 3,578 +482% +2,438% 
Geothermal 0 0 0 +0% +0% 
Total non-hydro 
RES-E 
31,193 67,476 115,546 +71% +270% 
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the countries (although this proportion will rise in later years). This explains why the 
diversity index did not increase much more for the Table 6.14 FIT countries between 
2001 and 2007 than it did for the Table 6.13 RPS ones. 
From this subsection one can conclude that, of the Western European FIT and 
RPS countries profiled in chapters 3 and 4, the FIT ones had higher RES-E diversities 
in 2007 but the increase in the RES-E diversities of the RPS ones was of the same 
magnitude compared to the FIT countries over the 2001 to 2007 period. This suggests 
that, despite having differentiated subsidies for high-cost types of RES-E, the FIT 
countries had not significantly supported them by 2007. However, in 2008 and 2009 
Spain and Germany’s FIT supported rapidly increasing levels of solar PV generation, 
but off low bases (discussed in ss4.3.2 and ss4.4.2). 
A well established major difference between the FIT and the RPS mechanism is 
that the RPS mechanism is not good at supporting immature, more expensive types of 
RES-E. Virtually noone argues with this premise. Midttun and Gautesen (2007: 1420) 
say RPS mechanisms can ‘plausibly lead to a technological lock-in to mature 
renewable technology without stimulating future next generation technologies’. As 
argued in ss3.2.1, the inability of the RPS to support high-cost RES-E is not 
necessarily an unconscious design flaw of the mechanism, it was unambiguously 
designed to support least-cost RES-E. This means that if it is deemed important to 
support a variety of RES-E, then the RPS mechanism necessarily has to be augmented 
by the FIT for higher cost types of RES-E. Alternatives to this within the RPS 
mechanism are ‘banding’ (already discussed in ss3.4.3 and ss3.5.2) or carve-outs 
(ss3.3.5). Midttun and Gautesen (2007: 1420) argue that ‘early development’ of  
RES-E can ‘probably best be supported by targeted measures such as feed-in tariffs or 
specialised auctions’. 
 
6.4.3 Analysis of the diversity of RES-E generation in the USA  
As previously mentioned, the USA is a good country within which to test the 
diversity effectiveness of the RPS mechanism (ie its effectiveness at increasing the 
diversity of the types of RES-E used by a jurisdiction to generate its RES-E) because 
it has states that do and do not use the mechanism. RES-E generation data for specific 
RES-E types in specific US states is not available for years before 2003. A 
commentary follows the following table. 
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Table 6.17: RES-E diversity indices for RPS and non-RPS US states, 2003 and 
2008. 
Type of RPS state 2003 
(1) 
2008 
(2) 
2003/2008 
change (3) 
States that use an RPS:   
RES-E diversity index 1.52 1.79 +18% 
States that do not use an RPS:   
RES-E diversity index 1.77 2.28 +29% 
Source: EIA 2010 (cols 1 and 2), author calcs (cols 1, 2 and 3). 
 
The surprising result of Table 6.17 is that US states that did not use an RPS had 
a higher RES-E diversity index in 2008 than those that did use the mechanism. They 
also had a greater increase in the index between 2003 and 2008. This calls into 
question the effectiveness of the RPS mechanism as used in US states although, as 
shown in Table 6.5, US RPS states have a much higher level of hydro generation than 
non RPS states so the lower RES-E diversity in RPS states may be partly an accident 
of history (although this does not explain the greater increase in RES-E diversity 
between 2003 and 2008 in non RPS states). 
Of the 25 US states that used an RPS by 2009, 11 used carve-outs. Carve-outs 
are the preferred US RPS design feature used to achieve RES-E diversity or a 
portfolio approach to RES-E development (see ss3.3.5). Table 6.18 tests the 
effectiveness of carve-outs at increasing the diversity of US RES-E generation by 
comparing the RES-E diversity index of RPS states that use them to the other RPS 
states that do not.  
Table 6.18: RES-E diversity indicies for US states that use an RPS mechanism with 
and without carve-outs, 2003 and 2008 
Type of RPS state 2003 
(1) 
2008 
(2) 
2003/2008 
change (3) 
RPS states that use carve outs 2.03 2.5 +23% 
RPS states that do not use carve outs 1.44 1.79 +24% 
         Source: EIA 2009 (cols 1 and 2), author calcs (cols 1, 2 and 3). 
 
Table 6.18 shows that the US states that used carve-outs had higher RES-E 
diversity indexes, in both 2003 and 2008, than the states that did not use them. 
However, the diversity indices rose by about the same amount in the carve-out RPS 
states over the period as in the non carve-out RPS ones. Superficially, at least, this 
result casts some doubt on the RES-E diversity effectiveness of carve-outs, as used in 
US states because they do not seem to be increasing the RES-E diversity of RPS states 
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that use the device. Table 6.19 looks at the particular types of RES-E generated in 
carve-out and non carve-out states in 2003 and 2008 with a following commentary. 
 
Table 6.19: Changes in RES-E generation in US RPS states that do, and do not, use 
carve-outs, 2003 and 2008 
 2003 generation: 
GWh/yr (1) 
2008 generation: 
GWh/yr (2) 
2003/2008 change: 
%(3) 
RPS states that use carve-outs: 
Hydro 19,929 16,292 -18% 
Wind 295 2,535 +759% 
Biomass 10,634 11,498 -8% 
Solar 0 161  
Geothermal 1,066 1,383 +30% 
Total RES-E 31,924 31,866 -1% 
RPS states that do not use carve-outs: 
Hydro 184,894 184,768 -1% 
Wind 8,699 39,843 +358% 
Biomass 15,185 15,620 +3% 
Solar 534 703 +32% 
Geothermal 13,975 13,228 +1% 
Total RES-E 223,287 254,162 +14% 
Source: EIA 2009 (cols 1 and 2), author calculations, (col. 3). 
 
Table 6.19 shows that hydro generation was a major part of the reason why in 
Table 6.18 RPS states that use carve-outs had a higher RES-E diversity in 2003 and 
2008. Hydro generation formed a larger part of the RES-E generation of US RPS 
states that do not use carve-outs than states that do, in both 2003 and 2008, and its 
generation fell more, in relative terms, in the carve-out states than it did in the non 
carve-out states over the period. The change in hydro generation almost certainly had 
little to do with the use of carve-outs and much to do with rainfall change. The carve-
out states had a larger increase in wind, solar and geothermal generation than the non 
carve-out states, though in each case off a very low base.   
 
6.4.4 Conclusions 
Several broad conclusions can be drawn from this section. First, Australia’s 
RES-E generation is relatively undiverse and, in 2007, was less diverse than that of 
the USA or the EU. Second, although RES-E generation diversity is higher in the 
USA than in Australia, it barely changed in the USA between 2001 and 2007. Also, 
US states that do not use an RPS had more RES-E diversity in 2008 than states that do 
and recorded a greater increase in their RES-E diversity indicies between 2003 and 
2008 than states that use the RPS. This calls into question the effectiveness of the RPS 
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mechanism as used in the USA, although it is partly a product of US RPS states 
generating more hydro electricity than non RPS ones. US states that use carve-outs 
with their RPS mechanisms had a higher RES-E generation diversity than those that 
did not use the feature in 2008 but this was mainly due to the much larger amount of 
hydro generation in non-carve out states and there is little evidence of the effective 
use of carve-outs in US RPS states to support high-cost RES-E. The third conclusion 
is that the Western European FIT and RPS countries profiled in chapters 3 and 4 had 
similar increases in their RES-E diversities between 2001 and 2007, although the FIT 
countries had a higher diversity in 2007 than the RPS countries. All of this shows that 
Australia is less advanced in its RES-E development than the USA or the EU and that, 
despite their very different subsidy structures, FIT mechanisms have not necessarily 
been overwhelmingly better at developing a broad range of RES-E types than RPS 
mechanisms in the countries examined in this thesis (although their solar PV 
generation may soon show up in generation data as significant). 
 
 
6.5 RES-E mechanism price analysis 
This section analyses the subsidy price performance of the FIT and the RPS 
mechanisms. Such an analysis is important because the cost of the RES-E subsidies 
provided by the two mechanisms is a key benchmark by which they are judged. In 
fact, it is often the most important benchmark by which they are judged. Subsection 
6.5.1 analyses the cost of FIT and RPS subsidies for low-cost wind in four countries 
examined in this thesis while ss6.5.2 does the same for high-cost solar PV. Subsection 
6.5.3 discusses general commentary on the reasons for different subsidy costs for the 
FIT and the RPS mechanisms while ss6.5.4 examines specific reasons for their 
different subsidy cost levels. Subsection 6.5.5 discusses the political realities of the 
use of the RPS and FIT while ss6.5.6 concludes. 
 
6.5.1 RPS and FIT wind subsidy analysis of Spain, Germany, the UK and Australia 
Table 6.20 uses the average wind capacity factors between 2002 and 2006 
shown in Appendix 1 as the basis for author calculations that compute the return on 
one MW of installed wind capacity in Spain, Germany, the UK and Australia using 
RPS or FIT wind subsidies available in those countries. The method is the same as 
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that used in Toke (2005: Table 1) but his analysis was only extended to Germany and 
the UK and his capacity factors were based on the average for the years 2001 to 2003. 
This subsection, and the following one, make a contribution to knowledge by 
extending Toke’s analysis to more countries, by making it more up-to-date, by 
excluding wholesale electricity prices from the analysis, and by extending it to solar 
PV subsidies. 
The ‘FIT and wholesale electricity price’ used in Table 6.20 for ‘Germany: first 
5 yrs’ is the premium onshore wind FIT subsidy for Germany listed in Table 4.2 and 
the ‘Germany: long term’ rate is the non-premium onshore rate listed in Table 4.2. 
The Spanish rate is the 2007 fixed tariff onshore wind subsidy listed in Table 4.4 and 
the UK rate is the summer 2009 average RES-E tradable certificate price for the UK 
shown in Figure 3.9. The ‘Australia: 2009 high’ high rate uses the maximum RECs 
price reached in Australia in 2009 of A$52 while the ‘Australia: low’ uses the 
minimum RECs price reached in 2009 of A$28. In Table 6.20, both the ‘high’ and 
‘low’ Australian RECs prices are added to the average wholesale price of electricity in 
New South Wales and Victoria in 2008-09 of A$40.20/MWh (ABARE 2010b: 20). A 
commentary follows. 
 
Table 6.20: Capacity factor adjusted annual return, including wholesale electricity 
price, on installed wind capacity in Spain, Germany, United Kingdom and 
Australia, 2009. 
Country Tradable 
certificate price 
or FIT subsidy 
and wholesale 
electricity price: 
local 
currency/MWh 
(1) 
Tradable 
certificate price or 
FIT subsidy and 
wholesale 
electricity price: 
A$/MWh* (2) 
Average 
capacity 
factor: 2002 to 
2006 (3) 
Annual A$ return per 
MW of installed 
capacity (4) 
Spain FIT €73.20/MWh A$103.10/MWh 26.1% A$235,724/MW 
Germany FIT: 
first 5 yrs 
€92.00/MWh A$129.58/MWh 18.1% A$205,457/MW 
Germany FIT: 
long term 
€50.20/MWh A$70.70/MWh 18.1% A$112,099/MW 
United Kingdom 
RPS 
£93.30/MWh A$158.14/MWh 29.4% A$407,280/MW 
Australia RPS: 
2009 high RECs 
price 
A$92.20/MWh A$92.20/MWh 25.7% A$207,571/MW 
Australia RPS: 
2009 low RECs 
price 
A$68.20/MWh A$68.20/MWh 25.7% A$153,540/MW 
* using conversion of A$ = €0.71 and £0.59 (June 2010 rates) 
Source: Spanish Government 2004 (col. 1), BMU 2008a (col. 1), Green Energy Markets 2009 (col. 1), author 
calcs. (cols. 2, 3 and 4). 
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The results in Table 6.20 could be a product of the FIT or RPS subsidies and/or 
they could be a product of wholesale electricity prices. Table 6.21 therefore just 
considers FIT or RPS subsidies excluding wholesale electricity prices.  
 
Table 6.21: Capacity factor adjusted RES-E subsidy annual return, excluding 
wholesale electricity price, on installed wind capacity in Germany, United 
Kingdom and Australia, 2009.  
Country Tradable certificate price 
or FIT subsidy 
without wholesale 
electricity price: 
local 
currency/MWh (1) 
Tradable 
certificate price or 
FIT subsidy rate 
without wholesale 
electricity price: : 
A$/MWh* (2) 
Average 
capacity 
factor: 2002 
to 2006 (3) 
Annual A$ subsidy 
return per MW of 
installed capacity 
(4) 
Spain FIT €33.20/MWh A$46.76/MWh 26.1% A$106,910/MW 
Germany FIT: first 
5 yrs 
€60.00/MWh A$84.51/MWh 18.1% A$133,996/MW 
Germany FIT: long 
term 
€18.20/MWh A$25.63/MWh 18.1% A$40,638/MW 
United Kingdom 
RPS 
£46.30/MWh A$78.47/MWh 29.4% A$202,095/MW 
Australia RPS: 2009 
high RECs price 
A$52/MWh A$52/MWh 25.7% A$117,069/MW 
Australia RPS: 2009 
low RECs price 
A$28/MWh A$28/MWh 25.7% A$63,037/MW 
* using conversion of A$ = €0.71 and £0.59 (June 2010 rates) 
Source: Spanish Government 2004 (col. 1), BMU 2008a (col. 1),  Green Energy Markets 2009 (col. 1),  author 
calcs. (cols. 2, 3 and 4). 
  
The most interesting finding is that in both tables the Australian results produce 
the third and second lowest rates of return. This contradicts the argument of many 
commentators that RPS mechanisms tend to result in higher wind subsidies than the 
FIT ones because they have higher levels of investor risk (see ss6.5.3, below). It also 
suggests that, in reaching this conclusion, many commentators have failed to consider 
the RPS experience of non-European countries. The two different Australian returns 
in both tables also demonstrate that high tradable certificate prices can yield very 
different subsidy results than low ones, a result that average tradable certificate prices 
can hide. Another point worth noting, with regard to Australian wind returns, is that in 
Table 6.20 the low Australian RECs price of A$28/MWh produced the lowest income 
per MWh (in column 2) and was only brought above the German long term FIT wind 
rate, as a return per MW (in column 4), by its higher average wind capacity factor. 
However, the higher average Australian wind capacity factor is largely a product of 
the fact that a much smaller proportion of Australia’s wind generating potential has 
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been developed, to date, than Germany’s. This means Australia’s wind development, 
so far, has mainly concentrated on areas with prime wind resources close to 
transmission but, as more wind is developed, it is likely less windy sites will be 
developed and that the average capacity factor difference between the two countries 
will narrow. As the capacity factor difference narrows, a low level of MWh income in 
Australia is less likely to be lifted above a low level of MWh income in Germany, in 
terms of return per MW, by its higher average capacity factor. The exclusion of 
wholesale electricity prices in Table 6.21 does not change the relativities between the 
per MW returns for most countries, apart from Australia. For instance, in Table 6.20, 
the per MW return of the high Australian RECs price is 88% of the Spanish return and 
51% of the the UK return but in Table 6.22 it has higher relativities being 110% of the 
Spanish return and 58% of the UK per MW return. This is a product of Australia’s 
wholesale electricity price being lower than that of the European countries in the two 
tables: it was, for instance, only half that of the UK’s wholesale electricity price in 
2009 (after conversion to a common currency). 
 
6.5.2 RPS and FIT solar PV subsidy analysis of Spain, Germany, the UK and 
Australia 
It is worth applying an analysis similar to the previous subsection to solar 
photovoltaic generation in the same countries. This is because wind is one of the least 
expensive types of RES-E (in generating cost terms), while solar PV is one of the 
most expensive. Tables 6.22 and 6.23 apply such an analysis, respectively inclusive 
and exclusive of the wholesale cost of electricity in each country. Instead of using 
capacity factors as in Tables 6.20 and 6.21, Tables 6.22 and 6.23 use global solar 
radiation rates as measured by the World Radiation Data Centre. A 14% conversion 
efficiency is applied to the radiation: the same conversion rate used in Table 2.12. The 
radiation data used is global solar irradiance data, which includes both direct and 
diffuse solar radiation. The net FIT rates for Australia have been calculated as 65% of 
the equivalent gross FIT rates (see ss5.3.2).  
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Table 6.22: Solar radiation adjusted annual return, including wholesale electricity 
price, on installed solar PV capacity in Spain, Germany, United Kingdom and 
Australia, 2009. 
Country Tradable certificate price 
or FIT subsidy 
with wholesale 
electricity price: 
local 
currency/MWh 
(1) 
Tradable certificate 
price or FIT subsidy 
rate without 
wholesale electricity 
price: A$/MWh* (2) 
 Global 
annual solar 
radiation:  
MWh/m2 (3) 
Annual A$ 
return per sq m 
of solar PV 
panel (4) 
Spain FIT €440.40/MWh A$620.28/MWh 1.58/m2 A$137/m2 
Germany FIT €430.00/MWh A$605.63/MWh 1.008/m2 A$85/m2 
United Kingdom 
RPS (banded: 2 
ROCs /MWh) 
£186.60/MWh A$316.27/MWh 0.94/m2 A$42/m2 
United Kingdom 
FIT (less than 
4kW rate) 
£361.00/MWh A$611.86/MWh 0.94/m2 A$81/m2 
Australia RPS: 
2009 high RECs 
price 
A$92.20/MWh A$92.20/MWh 1.57/m2 A$20/m2 
Australia RPS: 
2009 low RECs 
price 
A$68.20/MWh A$68.20/MWh 1.57/m2 A$15/m2 
Australia gross 
FIT (New South 
Wales to October 
2010) 
A$600.00/MWh A$600.00/MWh 1.57/m2 A$132/m2 
Australia net FIT 
(South Australia 
and Queensland) 
A$286.00/MWh A$286.00/MWh 1.57/m2 A$63/m2 
* using conversion of A$ = €0.71 and £0.59 (June 2010 rates) 
Source: World Meteorological Organisation, 2010 (col. 3), Spanish Government 2007 (col. 1), BMU 2008a (col. 
1), Green Energy Markets 2009 (col. 1), author calcs (cols. 2 and 4). 
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Table 6.23: Solar radiation adjusted annual return, excluding wholesale electricity 
price, on installed solar PV capacity in Spain, Germany, United Kingdom and 
Australia, 2009.  
Country Tradable certificate price or FIT subsidy 
without wholesale 
electricity price: 
local currency/MWh 
(1) 
Tradable 
certificate price or 
FIT subsidy rate 
without wholesale 
electricity price:  
A$/MWh* (2) 
Global 
annual solar 
radiation:  
MWh/m2 (3) 
Annual A$ 
return per sq 
m of solar PV 
panel (4) 
Spain FIT €400.40/MWh A$563.94/MWh 1.58/m2 A$125/m2 
Germany FIT €398.00/MWh A$560.56/MWh 1.008/m2 A$79/m2 
United Kingdom 
RPS (banded: 2 
ROCs /MWh) 
£139.60/MWh A$236.61/MWh 0.94/m2 A$31/m2 
United Kingdom 
FIT (less than 4kW 
rate) 
£314/MWh A$532.20/MWh 0.94/m2 A$70/m2 
Australia: 2009 
high RECs price 
A$52.00/MWh A$52.00/MWh 1.57/m2 A$11/m2 
Australia: 2009 
low RECs price 
A$28.00/MWh A$28.00/MWh 1.57/m2 A$6/m2 
Australia gross FIT 
(New South Wales) 
A$559.80/MWh A$559.80/MWh 1.57/m2 A$123/m2 
Australia net FIT 
(South Australia 
and Queensland) 
A$245.80/MWh A$245.80/MWh 1.57/m2 A$54/m2 
* using conversion of A$ = €0.71 and £0.59 (June 2010 rates) 
Source: World Meteorological Organisation, 2010 (col. 3), Spanish Government 2007 (col. 1), BMU 2008a (col. 
1), Green Energy Markets 2009 (col. 1), author calcs (cols. 2 and 4). 
 
The author calculations in Tables 6.22 and 6.23 show that the solar PV subsidy 
extended by the FIT in Spain and Germany is many times that of the subsidy extended 
by the RPS in Australia and the UK (even with banding), a result unaffected by the 
exclusion of the wholesale cost from subsidy calculations. In Table 6.22, Spain’s 
subsidy is 3.3 times that of the UK’s banded RPS subsidy while it is 4.0 times that of 
the UK’s banded RPS subsidy in Table 6.23 (a difference which shows up how 
relatively high UK wholesale electricity prices are). Tables 6.22 and 6.23 also show 
that the highest solar PV FIT rate extended in Australia (the New South Wales one 
until October 2010) was roughly similar to the radiation-adjusted Spanish solar PV 
subsidy but that the FIT rates in South Australia and Queensland in 2009 were well 
below those of Spain and Germany and were somewhat less significantly below the 
UK resource-adjusted FIT rate. The UK’s resource adjusted solar PV FIT is also 
shown to be similar to Germany’s but well below Spain’s. Tables 6.20 and 6.21 
showed that the UK’s RPS extended a greater capacity factor adjusted wind subsidy 
than Spain or Germany’s FIT ones, but Tables 6.22 and 6.23 are unequivocal that 
Chapter 6: Cross-country Analysis of the Renewable Portfolio Standard and Feed-in Tariff Mechanisms 
 
210 
Spain and Germany’s FIT resource-adjusted solar PV subsidies are much higher than 
the UK or Australia’s resource-adjusted RPS ones.  
 It should be noted, however, that Tables 6.22 and 6.23 do not factor in long-term 
adjustments in FIT solar PV subsidies. The German FIT subsidy is degressed 
(reduced) over time, as is the non-premium Spanish one (ie the type of Spanish FIT 
not linked to wholesale electricity prices). The UK solar PV FIT subsidy, however, is 
degressed for new generators but is inflation-adjusted each year over its 25 year 
lifetime. The Australian FIT rates in most states and territories are fixed (apart from in 
the ACT) so that they neither increase nor decrease over time. These different 
adjustment factors mean that, eventually, the UK’s solar PV FIT will probably 
become the most generous one in the group, depending on the differences in 
degression rates, while the Australian New South Wales would have become the 
second most generous one (until it was reduced in October 2010). The German and 
Spanish ones, however, will probably eventually become the least generous (again, 
depending on the relativities between degression rates).  
 
6.5.3 Studies of FIT and RPS RES-E support levels 
Several government organisations and academics have attempted to compare the 
RES-E subsidy levels of EU FIT countries with those of EU RPS ones. One of the 
most authoritative EU government comparisons is EC 2008b which significantly drew 
on Ragwitz et al 2007. When considering wind support, the report found that 
Germany, Denmark and Spain had the most effective subsidies because they offered 
long-term investor security (and also had low administrative barriers and favourable 
RES-E grid access) (EC 2008b: 26). As shown in Figure 6.1, the report found that the 
EU RPS countries of the United Kingdom, Poland, Italy and Belgium extended 
subsidies significantly higher than operating costs with a gap between the two 
generally larger than for the EU FIT countries. This was not true, however, for the two 
RPS countries of Sweden and Romania. 
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Figure 6.1: Price ranges for direct support of onshore wind generation 
amongst EU members compared to long-term marginal generation costs 
(Belgium:BE, Italy:IT, Sweden:SE, Great Britain:UK, Poland: PL, Romania: RO) 
 
Source: EC 2008b. 
 
 The report also concluded that for wind, at least, EU RPS countries tended to 
extend less effective support than EU FIT countries and that the high subsidy rates of  
EU RPS countries often resulted in generators than earned larger profits than ones in  
EU FIT countries, as shown in Figure 6.2 (although Sweden was an exception). 
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Figure 6.2: Effectiveness of onshore wind support compared to expected 
generator profitability amongst EU countries in 2006 
(Belgium:BE, Italy:IT, Sweden:SE, Great Britain:UK, Poland: PL) 
 
Source: EC 2008b. 
 
Discussion about whether RPS or FIT mechanisms have, in practice, entailed 
higher RES-E subsidies has prompted several comparisons of their subsidy prices: 
particularly comparisons between the UK RPS tradable certificate price and the FIT 
subsidy price in several continental European countries. Toke (2005: 30) compared 
the RPS subsidy extended to UK wind to the FIT subsidy extended to German wind. 
He concluded ‘The evidence does not support any contention that the RO [UK RPS 
mechanism] supplies renewable electricity more cheaply than a feed-in tariff’. Exactly 
the same comparison was undertaken by Butler and Neuhoff (2004: 12, 31). They 
reached much the same conclusion as Toke. They said: ‘the price paid to wind 
generation in the first half of the 1990s is higher in Germany than in the UK, but falls 
below the UK level in the second half of the decade’. This led them to argue that, over 
the lifetime of an RES-E generator, the resource-adjusted cost of the German FIT was 
lower than that of the UK RPS. They speculated that German wind prices were higher 
than the UK ones in the first half of the 1990s because degression (as defined in s4.2) 
had not been introduced into the German FIT nor had differentiation according to 
RES-E type.  
In 2008, the accounting firm, Ernst and Young (2008b: 13), also published a 
comparison of the relative RES-E support costs of the UK RPS and the German FIT 
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mechanisms. It found the per kWh consumer cost of RES-E in 2005/2006 was 23% 
higher in the UK than the equivalent cost in Germany. This is consistent with the 
conclusions of Toke, and Butler and Neuhoff (at least for the second half of the 
1990s), as well as the findings of Tables 6.20 and 6.21.The EC (2005: 28) concluded 
that wind subsidies in the EU RPS countries tend to be higher than those in FIT ones 
because investors demand a higher risk premium under RPS mechanisms and the 
mechanism was generally less mature than the FIT was.  
In 2008, the IEA (2008: 17) published a report on the deployment of renewable 
energy that reached a similar conclusion to the EC (2005 and 2008b). In relation to the 
cost of supporting wind generation amongst countries it surveyed, it said: ‘The highest 
levels of remuneration on a per-unit-generated basis for wind amongst the countries 
studied are in Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom’. 
The findings of Toke, Butler/Neuhoff, Ernst and Young, the EC and the IEA all 
therefore concluded that the RPS mechanism did not provide support to wind 
generation at less subsidy cost than the FIT mechanism. However, some of these 
findings need to be treated with caution. The timing of the Butler and Neuhoff study 
meant it mainly compared German FIT wind support to the UK wind support under its 
competitive tendering system that operated before its RPS mechanism began in 2002 
(discussed in ss3.4.1). Also, RPS tradable certificate prices are significantly directly 
influenced by the degree of RES-E generation increase they seek to achieve, whereas 
FIT subsidies are only indirectly influenced by RES-E targets, depending on the mood 
of their governments; the above-mentioned studies did not try to compare wind 
support levels under similar targets of RES-E generation increase. Also, as argued 
above in ss6.5.1, a rigorous comparison of equivalent RPS and FIT subsidies needs to 
separate wholesale electricity prices from RES-E subsidies and needs to consider both 
premium and long term FIT subsidies. There is also a need to include non-European 
countries in such comparisons which, as shown in Tables 6.20 and 6.21, can radically 
alter the conclusion about whether the FIT or the RPS necessarily results in the lowest 
level of wind subsidy. The comparison of RPS and FIT subsidies is necessarily 
fraught and complex, some of the studies did not give it the intellectual depth it needs. 
Most of the above mentioned studies only compared the UK RPS subsidies against 
another country’s FIT subsidy, and the EC comparisons found that Sweden and 
Romania did not necessarily extend more generous wind subsidies than most EU FIT 
countries. The comparisons therefore did not necessarily answer the question of how 
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much the different subsidy levels were due to design of a particular mechanism in a 
particular country versus how much was inherent in the choice of mechanism.  
 
 
6.5.4 Reasons for different RES-E support levels under the RPS and the FIT 
mechanisms 
This subsection discusses the two most commonly quoted reasons for 
differences in FIT and RPS subsidy prices. These are differences in the way the two 
allocate surpluses to RES-E generators and the different RES-E investor risk 
premiums demanded under each. Understanding these influences is central to 
understanding why each might have different subsidy prices. 
 
Generator surplus comparison 
Not withstanding the above comparison of RPS and FIT RES-E subsidy rates, it 
is sometimes argued that FIT mechanisms necessarily extend more generous subsidies 
to RES-E generators than RPS ones. This is because, it is argued, the RPS forces 
RES-E generators to pass on savings to consumers, whereas the FIT allows RES-E 
generators to keep most of them. Mentenau et al (2003: 805) posit that ‘with quantity-
based approaches, the surplus that goes to the producers is limited’. However, some 
argue that both mechanisms have some form of surplus extended to RES-E 
generators. Toke (2007: 283) says because RPS mechanisms have a homogenised 
tradable certificate price, they tend to oversubsidise mature, inexpensive RES-E types 
while undersubsidising more expensive types. However, Midttun and Gautesen (2007: 
1420) argue that FITs can oversubsidise early, less efficient incarnations of RES-E 
types. They argue that keeping the FIT at a constant level for too long risks slowing 
down the technological development of that RES-E type because RES-E owners have 
no incentive to lower their costs. The potential existence of excessive subsidies for 
least-cost RES-E types under the RPS, and for early stage development under an FIT, 
leads Toke (2007: 286) to observe that both mechanisms include some kind of 
potentially over-generous subsidy, they are just arranged differently in each. If this is 
correct, then the best way to limit excessive RPS subsidies is to have different 
weights, or bands, or sub-markets, for different RES-E types, or to separately support 
the development of more expensive RES-E types (through an FIT, for instance). The 
best way to limit FIT subsidies is to include degression (declining subsidy levels for 
more recent installations of a type of RES-E generator) so that learning-by-doing 
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advances do not lead to excessive producer surpluses for owners of early stage 
technologies. Haas et al (2004: 838) argue that ‘In later market stages, these [FIT 
technological development] surpluses should be reduced’. The decline in Germany’s 
per unit FIT subsidies, between 2001 and 2008, is a salient demonstration of how 
influential degression can be in reducing FIT subsidies (detailed in Table 4.1). 
There seems to be significant justification for Toke’s view that both the RPS and 
FIT mechanisms involve some form of potentially overly generous subsidy which is 
arranged differently under each. Therefore, there is a strong case for differentiating 
the RPS through the use of banding or carve-outs, if such overly generous subsidies 
are to be avoided.  
 
Investor risk comparison 
Some commentators, including the EC, argue RPS mechanisms have more 
inherent investor risk than FIT ones. Finon (2006: 329), for instance, argues that 
supporters of the RPS mechanism ‘underestimate the need for contractual security’ on 
the part of RES-E investors. He says without such security, these investors have to 
deal with the double uncertainty of the wholesale electricity market and the tradable 
certificates market. Mitchell et al (2006: 302) similarly posit that the RPS ‘does not 
remove risks’. Held et al (2006: 13) observe that ‘the results show that certificate 
[RPS] systems lead to higher producer revenues than FITs, which compensates for 
higher investment risks’. Toke and Lauber (2007: 682) similarly argue that, under an 
RPS, RES-E investors have expected, and have received, large ‘risk premia’ to 
compensate for the fact that both the future prices of RPS tradable certificates, and of 
wholesale electricity prices, are uncertain. Toke (2005) further argues that in order to 
secure electricity supply contracts with electricity retailers  ‘the renewable energy 
generators have to exchange part of the value of the ROCs [UK RPS tradable 
certificate] for the security that is offered by a long term contract’. 
Despite being intuitively appealing, the judgement that the RPS is inherently 
more risky for an RES-E investor needs qualification, and is not correct in all 
instances. There are five major features of an RPS that can, potentially, lessen its 
investor risk (but do not necessarily make it less risky than the FIT): its potential use 
of contracts; its non-compliance penalties; its targets; its potential use of banking; and 
the negative correlation between generation volume and tradable certificate prices.  
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 Long term contracts dominate many RPS markets  like those of Sweden, Texas 
and Australia  and mitigate the RES-E investor risk in those electricity generation 
markets. In other RPS markets  such as that of Massachusetts  their absence has 
held back development of RES-E (see ss3.3.4). Agnolucci (2007: 3356) argues long-
term contracts are a ‘guarantee that plants built today will not be undercut by future 
entrants’. However, the stabilising influence of contracts can be overstated. Toke 
(2005: 282, 286) observes that contracts can have inbuilt uncertainty because they can 
be linked to tradable certificate prices. Kann (2009:3145) also argues that RPS 
tradable certificate contract prices are linked to spot market certificate prices (but are 
generally discounted).  
Another influence that can mitigate RPS investor risk is non-compliance 
penalties. This is particularly the case in the USA where, as detailed in ss3.3.5, only 
five out of its 26 RPS states do not have a provision that limits compliance costs. Gipe 
(2006) argues that ‘in US states where long-term contracts are not the norm, 
certificate prices are driven more by penalty prices than by supply and demand’. 
Penalty costs blur the differences between the FIT and the RPS mechanism because 
they are set by governments, not by electricity generation markets, just as FIT 
subsidies are. Agnolucci (2007: 3352) even argues that ‘as long as existing capacity is 
smaller than the quota [in an RPS market], TGCs [tradable certificates] do not differ 
from a feed-in law with a tariff equal to the fine’. 
 Another feature of the RPS mechanism that can mitigate its investor risk is the 
use of short and long term targets which are a design feature not always present in 
FITs. Dinica (2006: 471) argues that long-term RPS RES-E quantity trajectories 
increase the confidence investors can have in recovering their costs. Like contracts, 
however, the risk-reducing influence of RPS targets needs to be qualified. Fouquet 
and Johansson (2008: 4083) say that RPS targets only create an incentive for RES-E 
investors to develop capacity up to the RPS target but create no incentive to go further 
because the tradable certificate price can collapse once the target is reached. 
 The banking of tradable certificates is another potential risk-reducing feature of 
the RPS mechanism. Meyer (2003: 669) says the banking of tradable certificates can 
reduce the tendency for certificate prices to fall when there is excess RES-E capacity 
and to rise when there is no such capacity. 
 The fifth potentially stabilising influence in RPS markets is the negative 
correlation that exists between RES-E generation volume and tradable certificate 
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prices. Because tradable certificate prices generally go up when RES-E volumes are 
low, and visa versa when volumes are high, Lemming (2003: 25) argues that the 
negative correlation ‘will actually decrease revenue fluctuations’. The ability of this 
negative correlation to reduce volatility depends, however, on the relative size of the 
tradable certificate market: thin markets are not likely to be significantly stabilised by 
this phenomenon. 
 Klessman et al (2008: 3654) say that risk reduction can be critical to the 
effectiveness of an RES-E mechanism because it reduces the cost of capital. However 
true this might be in a capital-intensive industry like the RES-E one, the five potential 
stabilising features of an RPS mechanism discussed above make it uncertain that FIT 
markets are necessarily less risky for an investor than RPS markets are in all cases. 
However, not all of the stabilisers are necessarily present in RPS markets (eg contracts 
and banking) and some (like the negative correlation between RES-E generation 
volume and tradable certificate price) depend on the nature of the particular RPS 
market. This means the verdict on whether RPS markets are more, or less, risky to the 
investor than FIT ones depends, a lot, on the particular design of an RPS. 
 
6.5.5 Comparing political realities 
However fiercely supporters of either the RPS or the FIT mechanism might 
defend the relative merits of either, an over-riding political reality is that both have 
become entrenched in different parts of the world. In nearly all FIT countries there is 
little interest in changing to the RPS, and in RPS countries there is little interest in 
changing to the FIT (although it will be interesting to see if the UK abandons its 
banded RPS and switches to the FIT for all its RES-E support as its Energy and 
Climate Change Secretary suggested it might in December 2010 (discussed in 
ss3.4.2)). Even if there is a case for changing from the RPS to the FIT, or visa versa, 
governments are loath to change for fear of reducing RES-E investor certainty. 
Although about a decade younger than the FIT, the RPS has now been operating for 
nearly ten years in countries that were early adopters of it like the UK, Australia and 
some US states. Whatever its failings, it is entrenched in those jurisdictions and is 
unlikely to be scrapped. Rickerson et al (2007: 12, 14) observe that ‘the RPS has 
come too far for it to be undermined by counter-proposals for feed-in tariffs’. They 
also say ‘there is little organized advocacy for feed-in tariffs in the US’.  All of this 
means that it is fairly pointless arguing whether the RPS or the FIT is inherently 
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better: it is far better to recognise that both mechanisms are here to stay and to work at 
correcting their different design failings.  
 
 
6.5.6 Conclusions 
From this section one can broadly conclude that the wind subsidy provided 
under Australia’s RPS, under low tradable certificate price conditions, provides a lower 
return than Spain’s FIT, or the UK’s RPS, but a slightly higher return than Germany’s 
long-term FIT. However, it is only higher than Germany’s long-term FIT wind subsidy 
because average wind capacity factors are currently higher in Australia than in Germany 
but as more wind is developed, this not likely to remain the case to the same extent. At 
the moment, the maximum the UK solar PV FIT subsidy is significantly less than the 
Spanish one, and Australia’s maximum solar PV FIT subsidy (in New South Wales) 
was roughly equivalent to the Spanish rate (before the NSW one was scrapped), while 
the UK solar PV FIT is roughly the same as the German one. However, these relativities 
will change over time because of different uses of degression and inflation adjustment. 
One can also conclude that RPS mechanisms do not necessarily deliver a lower, overall 
subsidy to RES-E generators than the FIT mechanism but tends to distribute it 
differently. RPS mechanisms tend to oversubsidise least-cost RES-E types, like wind, 
while FITs can overcompensate early stage development of an RES-E type if it does not 
include degression. Although RPS mechanisms probably have higher inbuilt investor 
risk than FIT mechanisms, their risk is mitigated by the use of contracts, the use of non-
compliance charges, the use of banking, the use of targets and the negative correlation 
between tradable certificate prices (if adaptations of the mechanism include these 
features). 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
There is an increasing tendency for comparisons between the FIT and the RPS 
mechanism to be less adversarial than was once the case, and to recognise each has 
different strengths and weaknesses, as well as a lot of similarities. The analysis in this 
chapter has shown that in crucial areas such as overall RES-E generation, generation 
of non-hydro RES-E, diversity of RES-E generation, utilisation of RES-E generating 
potential, investor risk and support of immature RES-E technologies, the two 
mechanisms are not as (potentially) far apart as they sometimes appear, or at least 
Chapter 6: Cross-country Analysis of the Renewable Portfolio Standard and Feed-in Tariff Mechanisms 
 
219 
have potential design features that can narrow their differences. However, much 
depends on the specific design of individual RPS and FIT mechanisms: with poor 
design they can be quite dissimilar to eachother, but with good design their 
differences can become blurred. 
If one assumes that the difference-reducing design features will not necessarily 
be employed, then it is possible to generalise that the FIT is better for early-stage 
development of an RES-E type than an undifferentiated RPS while an undifferentiated 
RPS is better for later-stage RES-E development once an RES-E type has become 
commercially competitive. However, it should be stressed that this is only the case if 
the RPS mechanism is undifferentiated and the FIT mechanism is significantly 
differentiated in favour of less mature types of RES-E.  
There are several design features that both the RPS and the FIT can adopt that 
significantly blur the differences between the two. These include, in the case of the 
RPS, the adoption of banding or carve-outs, the use of contracts as well as tradable 
certificate price floors. In the case of the FIT, such design features include connecting 
the level of RES-E subsidy more closely to RES-E generation performance than has 
traditionally been the case in many FIT countries (through flexible degression, for 
example), and setting short term generation targets around which FIT subsidy rates 
should attempt to induce commensurate RES-E generation. If banding or carve-outs, 
in particular, are incorporated into an RPS, the mechanism becomes more suitable for 
early stage RES-E development and the generalisation that it is best suited to later 
stage RES-E development no longer holds. 
On the specific comparison made in this chapter between the use of the FIT and 
the RPS mechanism in the jurisdictions discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5, several 
conclusions stand out. Firstly, although each has a different RES-E generation share, 
the EU, the USA and Australia are all still reasonably dependent on hydro RES-E 
generation for much of their RES-E generation and all have some way to go before 
their RES-E is not dependent on hydro. Secondly, especially once one considers that 
the FIT has been operating for a longer time than the RPS, there is no overwhelming 
evidence that the FIT mechanisms have necessarily been inherently better at 
developing a range of RES-E types, or making greater use of RES-E generating 
potential, than RPS mechanisms have been, at least in the countries studied in this 
thesis. However, the FIT has been successful at supporting a significant increase in 
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solar PV generation in Spain and Germany, though off small bases, and this is starting 
to show up in their RES-E generation data. 
Thirdly, it seems clear, both from calculations in this thesis and in other studies 
done on the topic, that the wind subsidy in the UK RPS is higher than the equivalent 
subsidies in Germany, Spain and Australia. This casts doubt on any argument that 
suggests that RPS mechanisms necessarily deliver RES-E generation at less cost than 
FIT ones but does not prove that RPS always deliver it at higher costs, either. The 
calculations in this chapter show that a low RPS tradable certificate price in Australia 
delivers a low wind subsidy compared to Germany, Spain and the UK, but it is 
somewhat compensated by the country’s currently high average wind capacity factor. 
Fourthly, there are good reasons to think that the FIT mechanisms generally 
have lower RES-E investor risk than RPS ones, although the RPS risk is mitigated by 
some of its design features. 
Fifthly, a political reality that both types of mechanisms have to operate within 
is that they are entrenched in those countries that already use them and there is little 
likelihood that countries will change to the other type of mechanism. 
And sixthly, the analysis in ss6.2.2 and ss6.4.1 showed that the development of 
Australia’s RES-E is less advanced than it is in either the USA or the EU. Australia’s 
RES-E generation share in 2008 was lower than that of both the USA and the EU 
(either generally or just the RPS jurisdictions in those two areas) and its non-hydro 
RES-E generation share was also lower in 2008 than in the other two areas. However, 
between 2001 and 2008, the growth of Australia’s non-hydro RES-E was higher than 
the equivalent growth in either the EU or the USA. In 2008, Australia’s RES-E was 
less diverse, however, and more dependent on hydro generation, than was the case in 
either the USA or the EU. The lesser development of RES-E in Australia means the 
country faces a greater challenge if it wants to develop RES-E to the extent needed for 
it to make deep cuts in its electricity GHG emissions through radical RES-E 
expansion. In both the EU and Australia, the fairly large utilisation of their hydro 
generating potentials means that both areas will have to mainly look to non-hydro 
RES-E types if they want to significantly further develop their RES-E without 
incurring sharply increasing marginal generating costs. 
Many commentators argue that the design of the RPS or the FIT is more 
important, in terms of determining their generation and cost effectiveness, than the 
choice of mechanism. The conclusions to this chapter generally support this view:  the 
Chapter 6: Cross-country Analysis of the Renewable Portfolio Standard and Feed-in Tariff Mechanisms 
 
221 
effectiveness of both the RPS and the FIT mechanism depends more on their specific 
design elements than on the choice of mechanism. Through comparison of major RPS 
design elements used in different RPS jurisdictions, chapter 7 will examine changes 
that could be made to Australia’s RPS that would make it more effective at supporting 
radical RES-E expansion.
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7.1 Introduction 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 considered RES-E mechanism design in overseas countries 
independently of the equivalent design in Australia. This chapter is a cross-country 
analysis of RPS mechanism design. Chapter 6 was a cross-country statistical analysis 
embracing both FIT and RPS jurisdictions, whereas this chapter is a cross-country 
design analysis embracing only RPS jurisdictions (apart from in ss7.2.1). Chapter 6 
was, essentially, a statistical comparison of RPS and FIT jurisdictions in the USA, 
Western Europe and Australia whereas this chapter compares RPS design elements, 
only, across those jurisdictions. Chapter 6 was basically a quantitative chapter 
whereas this is largely a qualitative chapter. Chapter 5 described the major design 
elements, and evolution, of Australia’s RPS but this chapter compares those design 
elements to equivalent ones in other RPS mechanisms. The comparison is used as a 
basis from which desirable changes to Australia’s RPS are suggested. 
Overseas RPS mechanisms were rare when Australia’s RPS, the MRET, began 
in 2001 so there were few examples to reference when designing it. However, the 
mechanism is extensively used now, so there were many overseas experiences that 
could have been considered when the design of Australia’s successors to the MRET, 
the RET and the LRET/SRET, were determined in 2009 and 2010. However, this was 
not done. The RET and the LRET/SRET largely perpetuated the design of the MRET 
without re-evaluating it. It is therefore desirable to evaluate the design of the RET and 
the LRET/SRET against that of overseas RPS mechanisms. Overseas RPS design does 
not necessarily equal best practice, but it can be revealing. Such a comparison reveals 
what could, and probably should, be changed in Australia’s RPS. Broadly speaking, if 
an RPS feature works in another country there is generally no reason why it could not 
work in Australia (although there may be exceptions to this). 
Section 7.2 analyses the size of Australia’s RES-E target, as well as the way it is 
expressed; s7.3 considers the allowance of banking in Australia’s RPS compared to 
overseas RPS mechanisms. Section 7.4 compares the exemptions and penalties in 
Australia’s RPS while s7.5 compares treatment of RES-E generation that existed 
before Australia’s RPS began, as well as its treatment of generation of unusual RES-E 
types. Section 7.6 discusses Australia’s support of higher cost (immature) types of 
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RES-E compared to overseas practise, s7.7 concludes the chapter and s7.8 lists 
desirable RPS and FIT design features both generally and for Australia. 
 
7.2 Australia’s RPS target 
 
7.2.1 Australia’s RPS target size compared to overseas countries 
An obvious starting point, when comparing the design of Australia’s RPS to 
those overseas, is the size of its target. As detailed in ss5.2.1, the MRET, the RET and 
the LRET/SRET aim to lift the RES-E generation share of grid connected electricity 
generation in Australia from 9% in 2001, when MRET began, to 20% in 2020. A lot of 
publicity is given to the final target RES-E generation share that support mechanisms 
aim to achieve. However equally important, when assessing the ambition of an RES-E 
target, is the size of the RES-E generation share when it commenced as well as the 
period of time allowed for it to reach its final target. Figure 7.1 compares the ambition 
of RES-E mechanism targets (both RPS and FIT) in 18 US states, 17 Western 
European countries and in Australia using these parameters. It shows the average 
annual increase in RES-E generation share needed to reach each country’s RES-E 
generation share target, by each’s planned final target year, as a proportion of each’s 
2001 RES-E generation share.  
In Figure 7.1, Australia is in the lower half of the group of countries. Its 
6.43%/yr increase on 2001 generation levels, needed to reach its 20%-by-2020 RES-E 
target, is about half the average for the group of 14.1%. This is mainly because 
Australia’s RPS started with a generation share of 45% of its final target and aims to 
take 19 years to reach its final targeted RES-E generation share. This means a large 
part of the relatively poor target performance of Australia’s RPS, compared to the 
other jurisdictions in Figure 7.1, is due to the fact it did not lift its RES-E generation 
share during the first half of its 19 year operating period up to 2020. Australia’s poor 
performance means, at least in comparative terms, that there is a case for an increase 
in the target of its RPS (all other considerations aside). Given the relatively high 
proportion of Australia’s GHG emissions accounted for by electricity generation, and 
the high GHG intensity of its economy (as detailed in ss2.2.3), there is therefore a 
strong case for lifting its RPS target.  
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Figure 7.1: Average RES-E generation share increase needed to reach final 
generation share target in designated year as a percentage of 2001 renewable 
energy electricity generation share for 18 US states, 17 EU countries and 
Australia. 
 
 
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists 2009, EC 2009a. 
 
  
 
7.2.2 Australia’s RPS target size in terms of GHG reduction 
The optimum level of Australia’s RES-E target should not, of course, be 
determined by comparison with overseas countries alone. Since the main advantage of 
RES-E is its GHG reduction potential, the ideal RES-E generation share target should 
be determined by GHG emission analysis of Australia’s electricity sector. 
Unfortunately, there has been little coordination, to date, between Australia’s RES-E, 
GHG and ETS policies; each has been shaped independently of the others. 
 As shown in Table 7.1, the 207.5 TWh/yr of electricity generated in 2000 in 
Australia emitted 177.4 Mt C02e GHG emissions. If the country’s grid, and off-grid, 
electricity generation increases by 1.8%/yr between 2008 and 2020, as predicted by 
the ABARE (2010a: 31), then by 2020 the nation will be generating 328 TWh/yr: 24% 
more than in 2008. In Scenario A of Table 7.1, this is generated by the same amount of 
coal and oil generation that the nation used in 2000 while 60 TWh/yr is generated by 
RES-E because of the country’s RPS target. All of the balance of the electricity 
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predicted to be generated by 2020 comes from gas. Under this scenario, total 
electricity GHG emissions increase to 227.4 Mt CO2e/yr: 28% more than the 2000 
level of emissions. Scenario B of Table 7.1 is more optimistic: it assumes that by 2020 
only one-third of the 2000 level of brown coal electricity will be generated, along with 
two-thirds of the 2000 level of black coal generation (with the same level of oil 
generation). Even under this optimistic scenario, electricity generation GHG emissions 
are only reduced by 16% between 2000 and 2020 despite the UNFCCC GHG global 
agreement to limit global warming to 2˚ C, signed by Australia in Copenhagen in 
2009, and reaffirmed at the 2010 Cancun UNFCCC meeting, which would require the 
nation to reduce its GHG emissions by 25%, across all sectors, between 2000 and 
2020 (Garnaut 2008a: 296, see ss2.2.1). A 16% reduction of the 2000 level of 
electricity generation GHG emission by 2020 is not consistent with this order of 
decrease, nor is it consistent with the argument of an issues paper published for the 
Garnaut Climate Change Review (2008c: 3) that said ‘[Australia’s] stationary energy 
sector is expected to provide the greatest and earliest reductions in emissions’ 
(stationary energy includes electricity and heat generation). So RES-E needs to be 
used to drive deeper cuts than even the optimistic projection of Scenario B if Australia 
is to play its part in limiting human induced global warming under the UNFCCC 
agreement to no more than 2˚ C. 
 
Table 7.1: 2000 and scenarios for 2020 generation and GHG emissions from 
Australia’s electricity generation sector. 
Electricity 
generation 
technology 
GHG 
emission 
intensity: 
tCO2e/ 
MWh (1) 
Australian 
generation 
in 2000: 
TWh/yr (2) 
2000 
GHG 
emissions: 
MtCO2e/ 
yr (3) 
Scenario A 
Australian 
generation 
in 2020: 
TWh/yr (4) 
Scenario 
A GHG 
emissions 
in 2020: 
MtCO2e/ 
yr (5) 
Scenario B 
Australian 
generation 
in 2020: 
TWh/yr (6) 
Scenario 
B GHG 
emissions 
in 2020: 
MtCO2e/ 
yr (7) 
Brown coal 1.2 50.3 60.4 50.3 60.4 16.8 20.2 
Black coal 0.9 110.2 99.2 110.2 99.2 73.5 66.2 
Gas 0.6 26.2 15.7 104.8 62.9 100.0 60.0 
Oil 0.75 2.7 2.0 2.7 2.0 2.7 2.0 
Biomass 0.15 0.7 0.1 2.5 0.4 2.5 0.4 
Non-
biomass 
RES-E 
0                   17.3 0 57.5 0 132.5 0 
Total  207.5 177.4 328 224.9 328 148.8 
Source: CSIRO 2006 (col 1), ABARE 2010a (col 2), Australian Greenhouse Office 2006b (total of col 3), author 
calculations (cols 4, 5, 6 and 7). 
 
Table 7.1 makes it clear that Australia’s current RES-E target of 60 TWh/yr by 
2020 is not high enough, by itself, to be able to contain its electricity sector GHG 
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emissions at 2000 levels. This is because the target will increase RES-E by 42 TWh/yr 
over the period but this is only 35% of the 120 TWh/yr increase in overall electricity 
generation predicted for 2000 to 2020. Table 7.1 also makes it clear that for 
Australia’s electricity sector GHG emissions to be reduced, either RES-E and/or gas 
will have to displace some electricity currently generated by brown and black coal. At 
a minimum, then, Australia’s RES-E target should be increased to a level where it 
absorbs all the increase in the nation’s generation between 2000 and 2020, unless a 
price is put on GHG emissions that can drive part of the electricity sector GHG 
emission reduction (see below). Using the ABARE’s (2010a) 1.8%/yr projected 
increase in electricity generation between 2008 and 2020, this would require 
Australia’s RPS target to be increased to about 138 TWh/yr by 2020, which is 42% of 
the 328 TWh/yr of electricity Australia is projected to be generating by 2020 (grid and 
off-grid generation). A 42%-by-2020 target is obviously a much higher target than 
Australia’s current 20%-by-2020 one. Such a significantly increased target would put 
much more upward force on its tradable certificate price than has been the case over 
the past two years and it would help raise the country’s currently subdued RPS 
certificate price (detailed in ss5.2.4). It would therefore have an influence similar to 
the UK’s guaranteed headroom device (discussed in ss3.4.3) and would significantly 
decrease the investor risk currently associated with Australia’s RPS tradable certificate 
prices by putting a significant upward force on RECs prices. 
The 42%-RES-E-by-2020 target assumes that a politically acceptable carbon 
price will not reach high enough levels to drive major GHG emission reduction in the 
electricity sector over the next ten years. However, Table 7.2 (which reproduces part 
of Table 5.10) shows that a A$52/tonne CO2e carbon price  the carbon price 
projected by Treasury (2008: 139) to immediately flow from a 25% reduction of 
Australia’s GHG emissions on 2000 levels by 2020 under the ETS model proposed by 
the Australian government in 2009 and detailed in s5.4  would make wind (but not 
other types of RES-E) competitive with electricity generated by brown and black coal. 
A higher carbon price would make other RES-E types competitive with fossil fuel 
generation. Table 7.3 (which reproduces Table 5.11) shows that while a carbon price 
of A$46/t is needed to make wind competitive with black coal generation in Australia, 
a price of A$57/$59 is needed to make biomass and hot rock geothermal competitive. 
As the carbon price moves up through these different thresholds the long-run marginal 
cost difference fossil-fuel generated electricity and RES-E will reduce and, therefore, 
Chapter 7: Cross-country design analysis of Australia’s RPS with overseas RPS mechanisms: what 
improvements should be made? 
 
229 
the price of Australia’s tradable certificates will reduce in response (as discussed in 
ss5.4.3). This means that, as ETS carbon prices increase, Australia’s RPS target need 
not change because the price of its tradable certificates will automatically change in 
response to changing carbon pricing circumstances. What is most important, however, 
is that the RPS target and the national carbon pricing system are closely connected: as 
previously mentioned, to date there has been little planning given to ensuring the two 
work, effectively, towards the same GHG emission reduction goals. 
Table 7.2: 2007 fossil fuel and RES-E generating costs with carbon costs associated 
with zero and 25% Australian GHG reduction on 2000 levels by 2020 
Electricity generation 
technology 
GHG emission 
intensity: 
tCO2e/MWh 
(1) 
Generating 
cost without 
carbon price: 
A$/MWh (2) 
Generating 
cost with 25% 
cut by 
2020/A$52/t 
carbon price 
A$/MWh (3) 
Black coal 0.9 $38 $85 
Brown coal 1.2 $35 $97 
Gas 0.6 $44 $75 
Wind 0 $79 $79 
Solar thermal 0 $156 $156 
Biomass 0.15 $82 $90 
Hot rock geothermal 0 $89 $89 
Source: CSIRO 2006 (col. 1), Graham et al 2008 (col. 2), author calculations (cols. 3). 
 
Table 7.3: Carbon prices needed to make RES-E types competitive with black coal 
electricity generation in Australia, 2007 
Electricity generation 
technology 
GHG emission 
intensity: 
tCO2e/MWh 
(1) 
Generating 
cost without 
carbon price: 
A$/MWh (2) 
Carbon price 
needed to make 
RES-E type 
competitive with 
black coal:  
A$/t CO2e (3) 
Black coal 0.9 $38  
Wind 0 $79 $46 
Solar thermal 0 $156 $131 
Biomass 0.15 $82 $59 
Hot rock geothermal 0 $89 $57 
Source: CSIRO 2006 (col. 1), Graham et al 2008 (col. 2), author calculations (col. 3). 
 
 
7.2.3 Definition of Australia’s target in GWh/yr not generation share 
Australia’s RPS target is expressed in generation-hour terms (see ss5.2.1), but as 
Table 7.4 makes clear, this is unusual when compared to the practice of the RPS 
countries discussed in chapter 3. Of the 28 jurisdictions that use RPS mechanisms 
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listed in Table 7.4 only one, Texas, does not use a generation share target (it uses a 
capacity target). This means that, at least when compared to other US and Western 
European RPS jurisdictions, there is a case for Australia changing its RPS target to a 
generation share one. If a generation hour target is retained, then the target should be 
reviewed fairly frequently, and should be periodically readjusted to make sure it does 
not get out of line with the RES-E generation share it aspires to reach. A generation 
share target need not be more challenging for an RPS administrator to manage than a 
generation hour one. In both cases, the administrator has to project the likely amount 
of electricity generation in a forthcoming year then foreshadow to electricity retailers 
what proportion of their sales they have to source from tradable certificates; the 
change in target does not change the need to match targets against projections. 
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Table 7.4: The targets of the USA and Western European jurisdictions that use 
compulsory RPS mechanisms 
Jurisdiction RPS target 
US compulsory RPS states 
Arizona 15% by 2026 
California 30% by 2020 
Colorado 20% by 2020 
Connecticut 10% by 2020 
Delaware 20% by 2020 
Hawaii 20% by 2020 
Illinois 25% by 2025 
Maine 30% by 2000 
Maryland 20% by 2022 
Massachusetts 4% by 2009 
Minnesota 25% by 2025 
Montana 15% by 2015 
Nevada 20% by 2015 
New Hampshire 23.8% by 2025 
New Jersey 22.5% by 2021 
New Mexico 20% by 2020 
New York 24% by 2013 
North Carolina 10% by 2018 
Oregon 25% by 2025 
Pennsylvania 18% by 2020 
Rhode Island 16% by 2019 
Texas Extra 10TW by 2025 
Washington  15% by 2020 
Washington DC 20% by 2020 
EU RPS countries 
Belgium 6% by 2010 
Italy 25% by 2010 
Sweden 51% by 2010 
United Kingdom 15.4% by 2026 
                                      Source: Union of Concerned Scientists 2009, Coenraads et al 2008. 
 
 
 
7.3 Banking in Australia’s RPS 
 
A significant design feature of Australia’s RPS is its allowance of unlimited 
banking of tradable RPS certificates. Unlimited banking means being able to use an 
RPS tradable certificate to discharge an electricity retailer’s RPS liability any time 
after the certificate has been created. As detailed in ss5.2.1, this is a feature of the 
MRET originally recommended by the federal-state working group that developed 
many of Australia’s RPS design features.  
The ability to bank an unlimited quantity of RECs was justified in the 2008 
Council of Australian Governments’ (COAG) RET design options discussion paper 
(2008: 8) on the grounds that it created a ‘strong early-mover incentive for investors’ 
and ‘will help reduce the overall cost of the scheme’. However, the intertemporal 
influences of unlimited banking are complex, and it could be argued that an early 
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mover incentive is only created at the potential cost of creating a disincentive for late 
RES-E movers. Academic commentary on the banking of tradable certificates includes 
the argument by Amundsen et al (2006) that it can significantly reduce the price 
volatility of tradable certificates. Morthurst (2000) also argues that without banking, 
non-compliance charges are likely to be more frequently used because there is an 
increased probability that there will be deficits of tradable certificates. However, 
academic commentary also includes some warnings about tradable certificate banking. 
Kildegaard (2008) says that when there is over investment in RES-E banking, it can 
lead to a ‘prolonged depression of certificate prices until the excess capacity is 
depreciated away’. There is a strong case, then, for having some degree of tradable 
certificate banking, but the case for unlimited banking has never been convincingly 
argued in Australia. This means there is no obvious reason for banking to be different 
in the country than in other RPS jurisdictions which, as Table 7.5 makes clear, 
generally put some restrictions on certificate banking.  
In Table 7.5, of the 27 RPS jurisdictions covered in chapter 3, only two allow 
banking for an unlimited period of time. Most allow some amount of banking but the 
majority restrict it to five years or less. Only four jurisdictions in Table 7.5 allow 
banking for longer than five years (in addition to the two that allow unlimited 
banking). There is therefore a strong, comparative argument for Australia limiting the 
ability to bank RECs to no more than about three years. The need for such restricted 
banking has been heightened by the large number of RECs created by solar and heat 
pump water heaters in 2009 and 2010 and the depressing effect they have had on 
RECs prices and are likely to have for at least another two years (discussed in 
ss5.2.3). However, restricting the banking of solar and heat pump water heater RECs 
will not remove their depressing effect on RECs prices, it will just make it more 
pronounced over a shorter period.  
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Table 7.5: The treatment of tradable certificate banking in selected US and 
Western European jurisdictions that use compulsory RPS mechanisms 
Jurisdiction Tradable certificate banking policy 
US compulsory RPS states 
Arizona Unlimited 
California Unlimited 
Colorado Maximum of 5 years  
Connecticut Maximum of 15months  
Delaware Maximum of 3 years  
Illinois Electricity authority discretion 
Maine Maximum of 1 year  
Maryland Maximum of 3 years  
Massachusetts Maximum of 2 years  
Minnesota Maximum of 4 years  
Montana Maximum of 2 years  
Nevada Maximum of 4yrs  
New Hampshire Maximum of 3 years 
New Jersey Maximum of 15 years 
New Mexico Maximum of 4 years  
New York None 
North Carolina Maximum of 10 years  
Oregon Maximum of 2 years  
Pennsylvania Maximum of 2 years  
Rhode Island 30% can be maximum of 2 years 
Texas Maximum of 3 years  
Washington  Maximum of 3 years 
Washington DC Maximum of 3 years 
 EU RPS countries 
Belgium Maximum of 10 years 
Italy Maximum of 15 years 
Sweden Maximum of 15months 
United Kingdom 25% can be maximum of one year 
                          Source: Union of Concerned Scientists 2009, Coenraads et al 2008. 
 
 
7.4 Exemptions and penalties in Australia’s RPS 
 
7.4.1 Electricity customer exemptions in Australia’s RPS  
A salient feature of the RET and the LRET/SRET (the incarnations of 
Australia’s RPS from 2009 onwards) is the exemption they extend to electricity 
intensive electricity consumers for that part of their target that is additional to (pre-
2009) MRET’s RES-E target, as well as the cost of complying with the MRET’s 
target above a $40 RECs price. The MRET did not have any customer exemption, this 
feature is unique to the RET and the LRET/SRET.  
The December 2008 RET design options paper, published by the COAG 
Working Group on Climate Change and Water, justified the exemptions on the 
grounds that the RET ‘will increase the electricity cost impact’ of the mechanism and 
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that this impact will be most felt by electricity intensive industries. This is because, it 
was argued, they are unable to pass on their full RET costs because the prices of their 
products are set internationally (COAG 2008: 6–12). However, the exemptions are not 
connected to any empirical analysis of Australia’s electricity prices compared to its 
major trading partners nor any analysis of future RECs prices. The exemptions 
increase the RET’s and the LRET/SRET’s compliance burden on non-electricity 
intensive electricity consumers and they reduce the incentive for exempted companies 
to become more efficient electricity users.  
Australia’s RPS exemptions are out of step with overseas practice. As shown in 
Table 7.6, only seven of the 28 listed RPS jurisdictions discussed in chapter 3 grant 
any sort of customer exemption under their RPS mechanisms, and only four grant 
exemptions to electricity intensive customers. There is, therefore, a strong 
comparative case for removing the customer exemptions of electricity intensive 
customers. 
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Table 7.6: The use of customer exemptions in US and Western European 
jurisdictions that use compulsory RPS mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists 2009, Coenraads et al 2008. 
 
  
 
7.4.2 Non-compliance charges in Australia’s RPS  
Under the MRET, the non-compliance charge for electricity retailers that did not 
purchase the RECs required to discharge their annual liability was A$40/MWh. The 
charge was not indexed for inflation over time and was not tax-deductible. The non-
compliance charge is generally only levied when an electricity retailer’s RECs 
shortfall equals 10%, or more, of its total annual RECs liability (Intelligent Energy 
Systems 2007: 4). Because the MRET’s non-compliance charge was not tax-
deductible, it was generally considered an effective charge, in terms of profit impact, 
of A$57/MWh (MRET Review Panel 2003: 4). Under the RET and the LRET/SRET, 
the non-compliance charge is/will be A$65/MWh, and will also not be indexed for 
Jurisdiction Customer exemption 
US compulsory RPS states 
Arizona None 
California None 
Colorado None 
Connecticut None 
Delaware Some: if peak load>1,500kW 
Hawaii None 
Illinois Some: ineligible retail customers 
Maine Some: for pre 2001 contracts 
Maryland Some: if annual sales> 300TWh 
Massachusetts None 
Minnesota None 
Montana None 
Nevada None 
New Hampshire Some: for pre 2007 contracts 
New Jersey None 
New Mexico None 
New York Some 
North Carolina None 
Oregon None 
Pennsylvania None 
Rhode Island None 
Texas Some: large industrial customers 
Washington  None 
Washington DC None 
EU RPS countries 
Belgium None 
Italy None 
Sweden Some: electricity intensive companies 
United Kingdom None 
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inflation, nor be tax-deductible (hence equivalent to a A$93/MWh tax-deductable 
charge). To date, the non-compliance charge has rarely been levied because the 
MRET had a high level of compliance.  
As shown in Table 7.7, amongst the RPS jurisdictions discussed in Chapter 3, 
there is a wide variety of non-compliance charges. Eight have high charges, ten leave 
the charge to the discretion of the relevant electricity management authority, three 
have a charge equal to the tradable certificate price, three have no specific charge and 
four have low charges.  
Table 7.7: The non-compliance charges in US and Western Europe jurisdictions 
that use compulsory RPS mechanisms 
Jurisdiction Non-compliance charge 
US compulsory RPS states 
Arizona Payment of tradable certificate value 
California US5c/kWh 
Colorado Payment of tradable certificate value 
Connecticut US5.5c/kWh 
Delaware US$25/MWh 
Hawaii Electricity authority discretion 
Illinois Electricity authority discretion 
Maine US$57.12/MWh 
Maryland Unspecified 
Massachusetts US$50/MWh 
Minnesota Payment of tradable certificate value 
Montana US$10/MWh not recoverable 
Nevada Electricity authority discretion 
New Hampshire Between US$28.72 and US$153.84/MWh 
New Jersey Electricity authority discretion 
New Mexico Electricity authority discretion 
New York Not applicable 
North Carolina Electricity authority discretion 
Oregon Electricity authority discretion 
Pennsylvania Electricity authority discretion 
Rhode Island Electricity authority discretion 
Texas US$50/MWh 
Washington  US$50/MWh 
Washington DC Alternative compliance mechanism 
EU RPS countries 
Belgium €75 to €125/MWh 
Italy Electricity authority discretion 
Sweden 150% of average certificate value 
United Kingdom UK£30/MWh + inflation 
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists 2009, Coenraads et al 2008. 
 
 
When analysing what an appropriate level of non-compliance charge should be, 
like the issues of unlimited banking and exemptions for electricity-intensive 
customers, that of the non-compliance charge depends a lot on future RECs prices. 
There are strong arguments for setting the non-compliance charge well above 
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expected maximum RECs prices to stop it becoming an alternative compliance 
mechanism. But there is no point setting it very high if RECs prices fall over time, as 
predicted by MMA (2009: 38). Therefore, it makes sense to relate the non-compliance 
charge to actual RECs prices. As discussed in ss3.5.2, Sweden sets its RPS non-
compliance charge at a rate of 150% of the average tradable certificate price for the 
most recent accounting period (ie 50% more than the average certificate price) (Van 
der Linden 2005: 34). It would make sense, then, for Australia to set its non-
compliance charge similarly.  
 
7.5 Treatment of pre-existing and unusual RES-E generation in 
Australia’s RPS 
 
7.5.1 Treatment of pre-existing RES-E generation in Australia’s RPS  
Another significant design feature of Australia’s RPS is its inclusion of some of 
the output from RES-E generators that existed before MRET commenced, particularly 
hydro ones. Pre-MRET RES-E generation is included in Australia’s RPS target in two 
ways: 1. if it generates above historic baselines it can create RECs and 2. it makes up 
a quarter of the RET and the LRET/SRET target of 60 TWh/yr-by-2020 target (see 
Table 5.1). Inclusion of pre-MRET RES-E generation in the RET and the 
LRET/SRET has been criticised on the grounds it crowds out generation from post-
MRET generators. It has also been argued that the MRET’s baselines are too low, and 
that RECs should be withdrawn from pre-existing generators in years when their 
output is below their baselines if they are allowed to create them in years when they 
exceed them (MRET Review 2003: 150, 152).  
Table 7.8 shows overseas practice on this issue. Of the 28 compulsory RPS 
jurisdictions, nine allow no output from generators that existed before their RPS 
mechanisms began to create tradable certificates. Only seven allow all pre-mechanism 
generation to create tradable certificates and the other 12 allow some amount. So a 
majority allow some, or all, generation from pre-existing generators to be included in 
their RPS target. This means the issue is not as clear cut, in comparative terms, as 
unlimited banking. Although there is no comparative consensus on the treatment of 
pre-existing RES-E generation, there is none-the-less a strong case for excluding such 
generation, or withdrawing RECs if pre-existing generators produce below their 
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baselines if they are allowed to create them when they generate above them. This is 
because RES-E generation that began before an RPS started crowds out other RES-E 
if there is above-baseline generation and lowers the RET’s and the LRET/SRET’s 
targets if there is below-baseline generation. Its inclusion in the targets of the RET 
and the LRET/SRET also means new RES-E has to generate less electricity for the 
target to be reached than if pre-MRET generation was excluded.  
 
Table 7.8: The treatment of pre RPS RES-E generation in selected US and  
Western European jurisdictions that use compulsory RPS mechanisms 
 
Jurisdiction Eligibility of pre RPS generation 
US compulsory RPS states 
Arizona None: incremental generation only 
California Some: small and geothermal only 
Colorado All 
Connecticut Some 
Delaware Some: only 1% 
Hawaii All 
Illinois All 
Maine Some 
Maryland Some 
Massachusetts Some 
Minnesota All 
Montana None 
Nevada All 
New Hampshire None: incremental generation only 
New Jersey All 
New Mexico Some: not old hydro 
New York Some 
North Carolina Some: only small hydro 
Oregon None: incremental generation only 
Pennsylvania None 
Rhode Island None: incremental generation only 
Texas None 
Washington  None 
Washington DC Some 
EU RPS countries 
Belgium Some: in Flanders 
Italy Some: only post 1999 generators 
Sweden All until 2012 
United Kingdom None 
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists 2009, Coenraads et al 2008. 
 
7.5.2 Unusual energy sources included in Australia’s RPS target  
There are a number of energy sources that can create RECs in Australia’s RPS 
that have a contestable claim to being RES-E technologies, and for convenience, will 
be labelled here as ‘unusual energy’. These include: landfill gas, municipal solid 
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waste, solar water heaters, heat pumps, food and food processing waste and coal mine 
methane. The justification for including these sources in Australia’s RPS is similar, in 
most cases, to the justification used by the 1999 Renewables Target Working Group 
for including solar water heaters in the MRET. It argued that their inclusion created ‘a 
positive greenhouse gas benefit’ and that it reduced the amount of electricity used for 
hot water heating (Renewables Target Working Group 1999: 56). An argument 
against their inclusion is that they reduce the target for energy sources that have a 
stronger claim to being truly renewable. It makes little sense to establish an RES-E 
support mechanism if it is diluted by unusual energy sources, governments might as 
well just rely on GHG emission trading carbon pricing to support RES-E.  
As shown in Table 7.9, inclusion of unusual energy sources in compulsory RPS 
mechanisms is common overseas: only three of the 23 jurisdictions in the table do not 
include any unusual sources. Some, like Connecticut, Hawaii and North Carolina, 
include electricity efficiency measures while Pennsylvania even includes waste coal 
and coal gasification. 
The issue of the inclusion of unusual energy sources is similar to the issues of 
the inclusion of pre-MRET generation and the size of the MRET’s and the RET’s 
target. It is ultimately connected to how important it is to source deep cuts in 
Australia’s GHG emissions through radical RES-E expansion. If deep GHG 
reductions are eventually likely, and if significant RES-E generation will probably be 
called upon to provide much of them, then providing early and strong support to  
RES-E types that have a large generating potential is important and the inclusion of 
unusual energy sources in Australia’s RPS works against this. For that reason, heat 
pumps, solar water heaters and coal methane, at the very least, should be excluded 
from the RET and the LRET/SRET. Their inclusion has a long-term deleterious 
impact on the generation effectiveness of the mechanisms. The separation of small 
scaled RES-E generation, under the SRET, from large scaled RES-E generation, under 
the LRET, from January 2011, is an improvement on the RET, but it would have been 
better if the SRET’s target was made additional to the RET’s target and not a subset of 
it and if solar and heat pump water heater RECs created before January 2011 were not 
useable under the LRET. Solar and heat pump water heaters should be supported 
under a national electricity efficiency mechanism, not an RES-E one. As argued in 
ss5.3.1, there is a strong case for Australia having a national FIT covering small to 
medium sized RES-E generation as the UK has had since April 2010. As also argued 
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in ss5.3.1, such a national FIT should be differentiated according to location and if 
implemented, would completely remove small scaled RES-E from Australia’s RPS 
and would do away with the inconsistencies between the country’s current state and 
territory based small scaled RES-E FITs. 
 
Table 7.9: The treatment of unusual RES-E types in selected United States and 
Western European jurisdictions that use compulsory RPS mechanisms 
Jurisdiction Unusual RES-E types included in RPS 
US compulsory RPS states 
Arizona Renewable energy fuel cells, solar heating 
California Biomass industrial waste 
Colorado RES-E/fossil fuel cofiring, recycled electricity 
Connecticut 
Combined heat/power, electricity savings, waste 
heat recovery  
Delaware Renewable energy fuel cells  
Hawaii 
Electricity savings, heat pumps, RES-E/fossil 
fuel cofiring 
Illinois None 
Maine Renewable energy fuel cells, solar arrays 
Maryland Renewable energy fuel cells, incinerated waste 
Massachusetts Renewable energy fuel cells 
Minnesota RES-E/fossil fuel cofiring 
Montana None 
Nevada 
RES-E/fossil fuel cofiring, waste heat, gas and 
water pressure 
New Hampshire Solar hot water 
New Jersey Renewable energy fuel cells, tyre combustion 
New Mexico Renewable energy fuel cells 
New York None 
North Carolina Energy efficiency measures  
Oregon RES-E/fossil fuel cofiring 
Pennsylvania 
Renewable energy fuel cells, coal methane, 
waste coal, energy efficiency, coal gasification 
Rhode Island Renewable energy fuel cells, 
Texas Solar hot water  
Washington  Solar hot water 
EU RPS countries 
Sweden Peat 
United Kingdom RES-E/fossil fuel cofiring 
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists 2009, Van der Linden 2005. 
 
 
 
 
7.6 Australia’s support of immature RES-E 
 
7.6.1 RPS support of immature RES-E in overseas countries 
As discussed in ss3.2.1, the RPS mechanism was unashamedly designed to 
support least-cost RES-E types and was never designed to support higher cost, less 
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mature, RES-E types. So it is therefore something of a contradiction in terms to expect 
the RPS to support higher cost RES-E types. Ideally, the RPS should be reserved for 
mature types of RES-E and the FIT should be used to support less mature RES-E 
types. However, as discussed in ss6.5.5, the reality is that most countries that already 
use RPS or FIT mechanisms will stick with them and will want to use the mechanism 
they already have to support all types of RES-E.  
 It is possible that some countries may use the FIT to support higher cost RES-E 
types alongside their RPS mechanisms. As detailed in chapter 3, this is done in Italy 
with its solar PV FIT (see ss3.5.2), Australia is also doing it for small scaled solar PV 
with its state/territory based FITs (see s5.3) and since April 2010 the UK has also 
done it for RES-E with capacities under 5MW (see s3.4). However, assuming an FIT 
is not used alongside an RPS, one refinement that can be made to an RPS to support 
higher cost RES-E is to have a discrete part of it that can only have a particular type, 
or types, of RES-E used within it. These are known as ‘carve-outs’: as mentioned in 
ss3.3.5, they are used in some US RPS states. Another type of refinement that can be 
made to an RPS to support higher cost RES-E types is ‘banding’: these are tradable 
certificate multipliers that award more certificates to higher cost RES-E types than to 
lower cost types. As detailed in ss3.4.3, the UK introduced RES-E banding in April 
2009 with significantly differentiated multipliers. Also, as detailed in ss3.5.2, Italy has 
used banding since 2008 but with modest differentiation between its multiplier rates.  
Banding is a newer type of RPS refinement than carve-outs and the UK’s 
experience of it has not been long enough, yet, to reach any firm conclusion about its 
effectiveness. What can be said with some authority, however, is that both banding 
and carve-outs make the RPS more like the FIT and less like what the RPS was 
originally designed to be.  
Like an FIT’s subsidy rates for different types of RES-E, the effectiveness of the 
different tradable certificate multipliers used in banding depends on their relationship 
to the generating cost difference between the higher cost RES-E types they are mainly 
targeted at and lower cost types of RES-E. Table 7.10 shows the relationship between 
the 2009 the UK RPS banding rates and the medium-range 2006 and projected 2020 
levelised generating costs determined by accountants Ernst and Young in 2007 (net of 
the wholesale price of electricity) on which the UK banding rates were originally 
based. The 2006 (2009) generating cost for offshore wind was contained in a report 
Ernst and Young published in 2009, which had a significantly higher present-day 
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generating cost for that RES-E type than its 2007 report did (although its predicted 
medium term generating costs were similar).  
When establishing the banding rates, the United Kingdom government grouped 
RES-E technologies into four classes: ‘established’, ‘reference’, ‘post-demonstration’ 
and ‘emerging’ which largely drove the determination of the banding rate for each 
RES-E type (Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2008: 8). 
Table 7.10 also shows which of these four categories each RES-E type was placed in 
by the UK government. When setting the rates, the government made it clear that it 
was not its intention ‘to provide all projects with exactly the support level they need’. 
It argued that doing so would not necessarily incentivise RES-E developers or 
recognise the future limits of the resources some of the RES-E types rely on 
(Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2008: 8). The banding 
rates broadly applied to new RES-E generators that received accreditation after 
banding was foreshadowed in July 2006. RES-E generators accredited before this date 
were generally grandfathered with one tradable certificate per MWh of generation. 
The exceptions to this were biomass and mixed waste generators and generators with 
50 kW capacity or less (Department of Energy and Climate Change 2008: 17 to 20). 
Under an RPS, RES-E generators derive their income from two sources: the 
wholesale price of electricity, which all electricity generators receive, and the sale of 
tradable certificates (by contract or on spot market), that only RES-E generators 
receive. This means RPS tradable certificates cover the part of RES-E generating costs 
that is not covered by the wholesale price of electricity. Table 7.10 therefore shows 
the 2006 (or 2009 in the case of offshore wind) RES-E generating costs determined by 
Ernst and Young, as well as their projected 2020 generating costs, less the average 
wholesale price of electricity in the UK in the first quarter of 2009 (£47/MWh). It also 
shows the relationship of those net generating costs to the net generating cost of the 
reference large onshore wind and how that relationship compares to that of the 
different tradable certificate multiplier rates compared to large onshore wind’s. 
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Table 7.10: Current and future estimated RES-E generating costs of selected  
RES-E types and relationship to their United Kingdom 2009 banding rates. 
 
RES-E type 2006 or 2009 
medium 
levelised 
generating 
cost less 
wholesale 
price of 
electricity: 
£/MWh (2007 
or 2009 £)(1) 
Ratio of 
2006 RES-
E 
generating 
cost to 
2006 large 
onshore 
wind 
generating 
cost (2) 
2020 
medium 
levelised 
generating 
cost less 
wholesale 
price of 
electricity: 
£/MWh 
(2007 £)(3) 
Ratio of 
2020 RES-E 
generating 
cost to 2020 
large 
onshore 
wind 
generating 
cost (4) 
2009 tradable 
certificate 
multiplier 
rates 
(tradable 
certificates 
per MWh of 
generation)(5) 
UK govern-
ment classific-
ation of RES-E 
type (6) 
Sewage gas 16.1 0.77 16.1 0.83 0.5 Established 
Landfill gas 1 0.05 1 0.05 0.25 Established 
Large 
onshore wind 
(high and low 
wind average) 
 
21 
 
1.0 
 
19.5 
 
1.0 
 
1.0 
 
Reference 
Regular 
biomass 
                43                  
2.05 
    48                  
2.46 
                   
1.5 
Post-
demonstrat- 
ion 
Offshore 
wind 
97 4.62 38 1.95 2.0 Post-
demonstrat- 
ion 
Tidal 134 6.38 90 4.62 2.0 Emerging 
Wave 152 7.24 104 5.33 2.0 Emerging 
Solar PV 588 28.0 397 20.36 2.0 Emerging 
Source: Ernst and Young 2007, 2009 (cols. 1 and 3), Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
2008 (cols. 5 and 6), author calculations (cols. 2 and 4). 
 
The author calculations in Table 4 show that for all non onshore wind types of 
RES-E, apart from landfill gas, the ratio of their banding rates to that of onshore wind 
is lower than the ratio of their 2007 (or 2009) net generating cost to onshore wind’s. 
When it comes to net 2020 generating costs, the ratio of banding rates to onshore 
wind’s is still lower than that of net generating costs for all RES-E types apart from 
landfill gas and offshore wind. Those two RES-E types are therefore the ones that the 
UK’s banding is most generous to. The poor relationship of the banding rates of the 
other RES-E types, when compared to net generating costs, especially solar PV’s, is 
probably a product of the UK government wanting to create an ongoing incentive to 
develop decreasing generating costs for those RES-E types, as well as a possible fear 
that a high banding rate would make the scheme very costly. It may also reflect a 
prediction that most solar PV generators, and some generators of the other RES-E 
types, will elect to be subsidised under a new FIT for generators up to 5 MW in 
capacity that began in April 2010. The UK government intends to review the banding 
rates roughly as often as the European Union ETS is reviewed (approximately every 
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four or five years) (Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2008: 
16). 
Table 7.11 shows the change in the RES-E generation covered by the UK RPS 
between 2006, when banding was announced, and 2009, the year when it commenced, 
it is different to Table 3.9 because it only includes UK RES-E generation covered by 
the country’s RPS whereas Table 3.9 covered all RES-E generation in the UK. The 
largest increases in generation were recorded by offshore wind, onshore wind and 
biomass. Of these, offshore wind and biomass are the standouts because onshore wind 
did not receive any increase in tradable certificates per unit of generation under 
banding. So while there is too little significant data to say definitively say how 
successful the UK’s banding has been at putting the country on a path to achieving its 
ambitious unofficial 2020 RES-E generation share goal (of 30%-by-2020, discussed in 
s3.4.1), the Table 7.11 results suggest a credible start has been made. It should be 
noted that solar PV in the UK during the 2006 to 2009 period was assisted through a 
government grants program and its RPS was not necessarily the key driver of its 
increased generation. Also worthy of note is that co-firing is limited to a maximum of 
12.5% of the generation accounted for by the UK’s RPS (Mitchell et al 2011). 
Table 7.11: Change in RES-E generation under the United Kingdom RPS,  
2006 and 2009 
 
RES-E type 2006 
generation: 
GWh/yr (1) 
2009 
generation: 
GWh/yr (2) 
2006 to 
2009 
change(3) 
Hydro 2,447 2,614 +7% 
Landfill gas        4,424             4,952             +12% 
Sewage 447 638 +43% 
Co-firing 2,528 1,806 -29% 
Biomass 797 1,729 +117% 
Offshore wind 651 1,740 +167% 
Onshore wind 3,574 7,564 +111% 
Solar PV 11 20 +82% 
Total 14,879 21,063 +42% 
RES-E diversity index 4.81 4.51 -7% 
 
Source: Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010, (cols. 1 and 2);, 
author calculations, (col. 3). 
 
The great strength of banding is its flexibility: it allows different RES-E types to 
develop without boundaries being set on their expansion by a government. Another 
strength is that it is (arguably) simpler than a carve-out system because it revolves 
around a single tradable certificate price (although the need to factor in the appropriate 
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multiples of the tradable certificate price make it more complex than an 
undifferentiated RPS). The great weakness of banding is that depends on governments 
setting appropriate banding rates (although this weakness is no different to the 
government determination of subsidy rates under an FIT). Some commentators argue 
that the government setting of banding rates potentially makes it vulnerable to 
political manipulation. Lauber (2010b: 39), for instance, argues that banding cannot 
help achieve stable RES-E growth because banding rates can fall victim to ‘political 
strife’. This is a valid criticism, but it is just as valid to argue that FIT subsidy rates 
can also be exposed to politically driven change. This has certainly been the case with 
German and Spanish solar PV FIT rates over the past two years (discussed in ss4.3.1 
and ss4.4.1). Another weakness of banding is that, also like FITs, it does not deliver a 
predictable amount of generation of an RES-E type although it does deliver a 
predictable amount of overall RES-E generation. A further weakness can be that the 
extra tradable certificates given to each MWh of generation can, effectively, erode the 
overall RPS target as is the case with the Australian RET ‘Solar Credits’ scheme (see 
ss5.2.1). In the UK, this problem is overcome by fixing its RPS target between a 
minimum (currently 10.4%), and a maximum (currently 20%), in a way that factors in 
the extra tradable certificates generated by immature RES-E under banding 
(Department of Energy and Climate Change 2009b). However, its RPS target could be 
eroded if there was a significant purchase of tradable certificates from immature  
RES-E that resulted in the total amount of RES-E moving above the maximum limit. 
If this happened, the price of the UK tradable certificates could fall and the guaranteed 
headroom device in the UK RPS (discussed in ss3.4.3) would be impotent. This 
means that keeping RPS targets ahead of their likely tradable certificate demand is an 
important part of reducing RPS investor risk, a key weakness of the RPS mechanism 
(discussed in ss6.5.4). 
Table 7.12 lists the details of the carve-outs used by 2009 in 11 RPS states in  
the USA (Washington DC also uses carve-outs but no details were available for that 
jurisdiction). As can be seen from Table 7.12, only three states use carve-outs that 
significantly affect their RES-E mixes: New Hampshire, New Mexico and 
Pennsylvania. The other states do not use carve-outs that significantly impact the 
RES-E mix of their RPSs and most states use carve-outs just for solar RES-E. This 
means that the potential of the device is generally underutilised in the USA. Table 
7.12 also makes it clear that, like the use of banding in the UK and Italy, the use of 
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carve-outs in the USA is a relatively recent phenomenon with all but one of the carve-
outs commencing in 2004 or later. 
 
Table 7.12: Details of the carve-outs used in US RPS states, 2009 
State Carve-out 
commencement 
year 
Overall RPS 
RES-E  target 
(% of all 
generation) 
Carve-out target and details 
Colorado 2007 20% by 2020 
for private 
generators 
At least 4% of RES-E in all years must be solar (ie 
at least 0.8% of all generation by 2020) 
Connecticut 2004 23% by 2020 At least 3% of all generation by 2020 must be 
waste, pre 1998 biomass and/or pre 2003 small 
hydro 
Delaware 2007 20% by 2019 At least 2.005% of all generation by 2019 must be 
solar PV 
Maine 2008 40% by 2017 At least 10% of all generation by 2017 must come 
from new RES-E 
Maryland 2006 20% by 2022 At least 2% of all generation by 2022 must be solar 
Nevada 2005 20% by 2015 At least 1% of all generation by 2015 must be solar 
New 
Hampshire 
2008 20.8% by 
2022 
At least 0.3% of all generation by 2025 must be 
solar, at least  6.5% of all generation by 2025 must 
be methane or small/medium biomass and at least 
1% of all generation by 2025 must be small hydro 
New Jersey 2001 20.365% by 
2019 
At least 1.836% of all generation by 2019 must be 
solar  
New Mexico 2011 20% by 2020 
for private 
generators 
 At least 5% of public generator generation by 2020 
must be wind, at least 5% of public generator 
generation by 2020 must be solar and at least 0.6% 
of public generator generation by 2020 must be 
distributed 
North 
Carolina 
2010 12.5% by 
2020 for 
private 
generators 
At least 0.2% of all generation by 2012 must be 
solar, at least 0.2% by 2021 must be swine waste 
and at least 900 TWh/yr by 2021 must be poultry 
waste 
Pennsylvania 2006 18% by 2020 At least 0.5% of all generation by 2020 must be 
solar and at least 10% of all generation by 2020 
must be waste coal, distributed generation, large 
hydro, municipal waste or gasified coal 
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists 2009. 
 
Table 7.13 shows the aggregated change in RES-E generation between 2003 and 
2008 in US RPS states that do, and do not, use carve-outs. It confirms the contention 
that carve-outs are not being extensively used in US RPS states to support high-cost 
RES-E. It shows that the only RES-E types whose generation grew significantly better 
over the period in the carve-out RPS states, compared to the non carve-out RPS states, 
were wind and geothermal. But wind is a low-cost type of RES-E so its growth is no 
testament to the potential for carve-outs to support high-cost types of RES-E. All the 
geothermal generation in carve-out RPS states took place in Nevada, which does not 
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have a dedicated carve-out for geothermal generation. In both sets of RPS states, the 
higher cost RES-E types of solar and geothermal made up less than 6% of the overall 
RES-E mix in 2008.  
 
Table 7.13: Changes in RES-E generation in US RPS states that do, and do not, use 
carve-outs, 2003 and 2008 
 2003 generation: 
GWh/yr (1) 
2008 generation: 
GWh/yr (2) 
2003/2008 change: 
%(3) 
RPS states that use carve-outs: 
Hydro 19,929 16,292 -18% 
Wind 295 2,535 +759% 
Biomass 10,634 11,498 -8% 
Solar 0 161  
Geothermal 1,066 1,383 +30% 
Total RES-E 31,924 31,866 -1% 
RPS states that do not use carve-outs: 
Hydro 184,894 184,768 -1% 
Wind 8,699 39,843 +358% 
Biomass 15,185 15,620 +3% 
Solar 534 703 +32% 
Geothermal 13,975 13,228 +1% 
Total RES-E 223,287 254,162 +14% 
Source: EIA 2009 (cols 1 and 2), author’s calculations (col. 3). 
 
On balance, banding is a better way of using an RPS to support higher cost types 
of RES-E if FITs are not used. This is because it is (potentially) more flexible, simpler 
and retains greater tradable certificate liquidity than carve-outs do. As can be seen in 
Table 7.14, 15 of the 28 listed jurisdictions that use compulsory RPS mechanisms in 
the USA and Western Europe have some form of complementary mechanism 
designed to increase generation from more expensive, and less mature, types of  
RES-E. This means Australia’s practice of having no mechanism for large-scaled 
support of higher-cost RES-E types is somewhat out of step with a large number of 
RPS jurisdictions.  
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Table 7.14: The use of carve-outs, banding or feed-in tariffs in the USA and 
Western European jurisdictions that use compulsory RPS mechanisms 
Jurisdiction Use of carve-outs, 
multipliers or FITs 
US compulsory RPS states 
Arizona None 
California None 
Colorado Carve-outs 
Connecticut Carve-outs 
Delaware Carve-outs 
Hawaii None 
Illinois None 
Maine Carve-outs 
Maryland Carve-outs 
Massachusetts None 
Minnesota None 
Montana None 
Nevada Carve-outs 
New Hampshire Carve-outs 
New Jersey Carve-outs 
New Mexico Carve-outs 
New York None 
North Carolina Carve-outs 
Oregon None 
Pennsylvania Carve-outs 
Rhode Island None 
Texas None 
Washington  None 
Washington DC Carve-outs 
EU RPS countries 
Belgium Feed-in tariff 
Italy Banding and feed-in tariffs 
Sweden None 
United Kingdom Banding and feed-in tariffs 
                             Source: Union of Concerned Scientists 2009, Coenraads et al 2008. 
 
 
7.6.2 Australia’s support of immature RES-E  
As detailed in ss5.2.2, the MRET has not supported a wide variety of RES-E 
types in Australia. Solar hot water, solar PV and wind are the non-hydro RES-E that 
have been the main beneficiaries of the MRET and the RET. The RES-E types that 
have not generated a significant number of RECs to date have been solar thermal and 
geothermal. As discussed in ss5.3.1, all the state and territory FITs announced in 
Australia, apart from the ACT and NSW ones, are based on the net amount of 
electricity generators fed into the grid, and all, except for the ACT and NSW ones, 
only subsidise solar PV generation and all are only aimed at small-scaled generation. 
Similarly, the extra RECs to be given to small-scaled generators under RET’s Solar 
Credits arrangement between 2009 and 2014 are not expected to give a major boost to 
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development of the more expensive, and less mature, RES-E types because it is also 
subject to a low capacity limit and will only last for five years. As discussed in s5.5, 
there is limited use of government budget subsidies to help develop RES-E but its use 
is relatively insignificant and subject to ongoing budget constraints. This all means 
that Australia currently lacks a mechanism that will significantly support solar thermal 
and hot rock geothermal generation despite their very significant generating potential 
(as quantified in Table 2.13). It also means that the country is not well placed to one 
day be able to make deep cuts in its electricity generation GHG emissions through 
radical RES-E expansion.  
 
7.7 Conclusions about the design of Australia’s RPS 
 
Before detailing the conclusions that can be drawn from this chapter, it is worth 
reiterating that the RET, and the LRET/SRET that takes over from it in 2011, are 
Australia’s quantity-based RES-E support mechanisms. Under them, the Australian 
government mandates how much RES-E should be generated each year and the 
tradable certificate market determines the price of the certificates that operate within 
the mechanism. RECs are the tradable certificates that operate within it. 
As detailed in Table 7.15, two of the eight major design features discussed in 
this chapter − low non-compliance charge and electricity intensive customer 
exemptions − will only have a long term deleterious impact on the generation 
effectiveness of Australia’s RPS if RECs prices remain high. If RECs prices fall in the 
medium term, as MMA (2009) predict, then these two design features will only have a 
short term deleterious effect. Similarly, the expression of Australia’s RPS target in 
generation hour terms will only have a long term negative impact if the country’s 
electricity consumption continues to grow at a high rate.  
All of this means that the negative impact on Australia’s RPS, of three of the 
eight design elements in Table 7.15, is contingent. The more important negative 
impacts are those not dependent on specific conditions, which come from the 
remaining five design features: low target, lack of effective immature RES-E support 
mechanism, unlimited banking, tradable certificate creation by unusual energy 
sources, and inclusion of pre-MRET RES-E generation.  
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Table 7.15: Potential of MRET, RET and LRET/SRET design features to reduce 
their long-term generation effectiveness 
MRET, RET, LRET/SRET 
design feature 
MRET, RET or LRET/SRET conditions 
that need to be present for design features 
to have long-term negative impact 
Low target, lack of effective 
immature RES-E 
mechanism, inclusion of 
pre-MRET generation, 
unlimited RECs banking, 
tradable certificates created 
by unusual energy sources 
None 
Low non compliance 
charge, electricity intensive 
customer exemptions 
RECs prices need to be high 
Target expression in 
generation hour terms 
Electricity consumption and generation 
growth needs to be high 
 
 
7.8 Desirable FIT and RPS design elements 
 
This section summarises desirable RPS or FIT design elements highlighted 
above: it is a summation of desirable RPS or FIT design elements identified in this 
and the previous five chapters. After listing desirable RPS and FIT design 
improvements that apply to all countries using RPS mechanism in ss7.8.1, ss7.8.2 
then applies the RPS and FIT improvements to Australia. 
 
 
7.8.1 RPS and FIT design improvements applicable to all countries 
In the following list of 19 RPS and FIT suggested improvements , the first two 
groups  ‘providing basic support of new RES-E’ and ‘ensuring old and new RES-E 
do not adversely affect eachother’  are desirable refinements if the RPS or the FIT 
aims to develop a relatively modest amount of RES-E. They are refinements needed if 
a final RES-E generation share is to be less than about 20%. However, as enunciated 
in ss2.2.5, radical RES-E expansion is likely to be needed in developed countries like 
Australia if they are to make deep cuts in their GHG emissions. If radical RES-E 
expansion is required, the second two groups of refinements  ‘major support of new 
RES-E’ and ‘major support of higher-cost RES-E’  will probably be necessary.  
In some countries, like Denmark and the UK, a large variety of RES-E types 
with significant generating potentials are not available (disussed in ss3.4.2 and 
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ss4.5.2). However, in Australia a large variety of RES-E types is available (discussed 
in ss2.3.2, ss2.3.5 and ss2.3.6) including the less mature, and higher cost, RES-E types 
of hot rock geothermal and solar, which have significantly higher generating 
potentials than the lower cost, more mature RES-E types of wind, biomass and hydro 
(see Table 2.13). Therefore, to develop these higher cost RES-E types, Australia will 
need an RES-E support mechanism that extends a higher subsidy to those types than 
to lower cost RES-E types, rather than just higher RES-E support all round, for 
reasons discussed at length in ss2.3.4. This type-specific support is best done through 
a separate FIT tariff or a banded RPS (see discussion of banding in the UK in ss3.4.2).  
In many developed countries (including Australia) radical RES-E expansion is 
likely to require RPS and FIT mechanisms to become more like each other. This is 
because undifferentiated and unrefined RPS mechanisms do not deliver enough  
RES-E investor certainty and are not designed to support higher cost types of RES-E. 
It is also because unrefined FIT mechanisms do not deliver predictable quantities of 
RES-E generation and can be insufficiently responsive to price and generation 
conditions.  
The 19 suggested RPS and/or FIT refinements derived from above are: 
Providing basic support to new RES-E  
1. Both the RPS and the FIT mechanism need to be buttressed by demonstrated 
political support otherwise they lose credibility (as has been the case in Italy: see 
ss3.5.2). Weak RES-E political support results, ultimately, in weak RPS or FIT 
effectiveness. 
2. Both RPS and FIT subsidies should be seen as temporary support to be phased 
out as RES-E becomes competitive with fossil-fuel generated electricity. This 
phase-out should be planned for, as it is in Germany (see ss2.3.3). If RPS and 
FIT subsidies are seen as permanent, then RES-E technologies have no incentive 
to become fully competitive with fossil-fuel generated electricity. 
3. Both the RPS and the FIT should be designed to support new RES-E capacity 
and should not include RES-E capacity that existed before the mechanisms 
began (as is the case with RPS mechanisms in Sweden, Maine and 
Pennsylvania, see ss3.3.5 and ss3.5.2). The inclusion of pre-existing RES-E 
capacity in an RPS or an FIT mechanism either decreases tradable certificate 
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prices, thus reducing new RES-E support, or increases overall FIT subsidies 
thereby increasing the subsidy’s cost. 
4. FIT and RPS mechanisms need to be accompanied by meaningful electricity 
demand management programs otherwise they may face the difficult challenge 
of increasing RES-E generation share in an environment of rapidly increasing 
electricity demand (as has been the case in Spain and Italy: see ss3.5.1 and 
ss4.4.2). 
5. The RES-E generation share performance of the FIT mechanism should be 
benchmarked against interim RES-E generation targets. One of the strengths of 
the RPS is that it delivers (or should deliver) a certain, and predictable, level of 
RES-E generation. The FIT mechanism does not have this generation certainty. 
Therefore, it should be managed in conjunction with one- or two- yearly RES-E 
targets with subsidy levels periodically readjusted if the targets are likely to be 
significantly undershot (as has been the case in Spain: see ss4.4.2), or overshot. 
There is no point setting an RES-E generation share target and simply hoping it 
will be reached with the FIT’s starting subsidies: they need to be finetuned to 
ensure final targets are met by achieving interim ones. This means a quantity 
analysis needs to inform the RES-E pricing philosophy of the FIT mechanism 
and may require more frequent adjustment of FIT subsidies than has historically 
been the case. This refinement makes the FIT more like an RPS. 
6. RPS markets that express their RES-E targets in generation-hour or capacity 
terms  like those of Texas, Iowa or Australia should be changed so that their 
RES-E targets become generation share ones. At the very least, they should be 
benchmarked against such targets and should be periodically adjusted if they are 
likely to be significantly undershot or overshot.  
7. RPS or FIT subsidies should be financed through electricity consumption levies, 
payable by all consumers, rather than dedicated funds that can limit the amount 
of the subsidies (like those in Massachusetts, Nevada and California, see 
ss3.3.5). Dedicated, finite funds limit the amount of RES-E that can be 
supported and therefore limit the effectiveness of RPS and FIT subsidies. 
8. The use of targets, in either RPSs or FITs, needs periodic review for their 
relationship to subsidy levels and generation performance. If needs be, they 
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should be adjusted, with adequate notice (to reduce investor risk), so a better fit 
with these indicators can be achieved. RPS tradable certificate prices, or FIT 
subsidies, can become significantly unaligned with their RES-E targets. 
Examples include the high tradable certificate prices in Rhode Island (see 
ss3.3.3) and the UK (see ss3.4.3). Such prices or subsidies need review against 
the RES-E generation results they result in. 
Ensuring old and new RES-E do not adversely affect eachother 
9. RPS mechanisms should place restrictions on the ability of RES-E generators to 
bank tradable certificates (as the UK and most US states do, see ss3.4.4 for 
discussion of the UK situation). Tradable certificate banking should be limited 
to no more than three years. Although certificate banking can help reduce the 
volatility of RPS tradable certificate markets, it can also create a negative 
environment for late-stage RES-E investors if early tradable certificate prices 
were low. This creates a disincentive to develop more efficient RES-E 
technology. 
10. The FIT should incorporate degression (as in Germany, see ss4.3.3) if it is to 
disallow windfall profits going to owners of later-stage RES-E technology. A 
balance needs to be struck, however, between degression rates and incentivising 
technological improvement. Degression helps the phase-out of RES-E support 
mechanisms. It could be argued that the RPS mechanism has degression 
automatically built into it because later-stage RES-E technology, if more 
competitive than early stage technology, should be able to undercut early stage 
technology in tradable certificate markets because of their higher productivity 
(however, this can be undermined by certificate banking: see point 9). 
Major support of new RES-E 
11. There should be no exemptions to RPS or FIT obligations (as there are for 
government owned utilities in many US RPS states: see ss3.3.5) unless there are 
extreme circumstances. RPS or FIT exemptions either dilute RES-E targets or 
increase the cost of RES-E development born by electricity consumers not 
covered by the exemptions; in either case the adjustment task is made more 
difficult. 
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12. Unusual energy sources should not be subsidised in the RPS or the FIT. In the 
case of the RPS, including unusual energy sources, as Australia has with solar 
water heaters, has lowered tradable certificate prices because the tradable 
certificate market has been overwhelmed with the certificates the heaters have 
created (see ss5.2.3). This has reduced the support able to be given to energy 
sources that have a valid claim to being classed as RES-E. 
13. RPS non-compliance charges should be set at a sufficiently high level that they 
do not effectively become a low ceiling on RPS tradable certificate prices. The 
non-compliance charge should be significantly higher than the likely short to 
medium term peak of the tradable certificates price (as in Sweden: see ss3.5.2). 
If RPS non-compliance charges are too low they become a ceiling on tradable 
certificate prices (as in Massachusetts, see ss3.3.5). 
14. The RPS should be applied nationally, not on a state-by-state basis (as is the 
case in the USA, see s3.3). You could extend the logic of this by arguing that the 
EU should be covered by the same RES-E mechanism. However, as shown in 
Figure 3.5, nearly all countries in the EU use some form of RES-E support 
mechanism, whereas about half of US states do not, so the EU’s situation is not 
analogous to the USA’s. A discussion about whether a group of legislatures 
should be covered by the same RES-E support mechanism is a different one to 
whether they should all have some form of RES-E support. 
15. RPS mechanisms should include a tradable certificate price floor system. A 
major strength of the FIT mechanism is that it delivers a predictable level of 
subsidy for RES-E. By their very nature, RPS tradable certificate markets can 
never provide the same subsidy certainty as the FIT, but the volatility of RPS 
tradable certificate markets  of the sort found in Texas and Massachusetts (see 
ss3.3.3)  can undermine RES-E investor confidence, a large measure of which 
is needed for radical RES-E expansion. Reduced RPS tradable certificate 
volatility can be achieved explicitly through a minimum certificate price like the 
one Sweden had between 2003 and 2007 or the minimum tradable certificate 
prices that operate in Belgium (see ss3.5.2 for discussion of both schemes). 
Reduced volatility can also be achieved implicitly by keeping upward pressure 
on tradable certificate prices as the United Kingdom has done with its new 
‘guaranteed headroom’ system which, effectively, ensures that short-term RPS 
Chapter 7: Cross-country design analysis of Australia’s RPS with overseas RPS mechanisms: what 
improvements should be made? 
 
255 
targets always keep ahead of likely tradable certificate demand (see ss3.4.3). The 
implicit method is probably the better one but it cannot be achieved without a 
fairly ambitious RPS target (because, otherwise, tradable certificate target 
generated demand will not keep ahead of the supply of certificates). This 
innovation makes an RPS more like an FIT. 
16. In some cases, FIT subsidies need to be more responsive to price and generation 
conditions, particularly when they are inducing sharp increases in RES-E 
capacity (as has been the case with solar PV in Spain and Germany (see ss4.3.1 
and ss4.4.1)) or when they are not inducing enough RES-E capacity increase (as 
has been the case with wind in Denmark (see ss4.5.2)). This may result in more 
frequent adjustment of FIT subsidy rates than has historically been the case. It 
could be argued that this might erode RES-E investor confidence but radical 
after-the-event changes in subsidy rates, as happened with Spanish and German 
solar PV FIT subsidies in 2008 and 2010, can potentially do more to erode such 
confidence. More frequent changes to FIT subsidy rates make the mechanism 
more like an RPS.  
Major support of higher-cost RES-E 
17. If the RPS mechanism is to be relied upon to support early stage RES-E 
technological development, it needs to be made type-specific, either through the 
use of banding (multipliers)  as used in the UK (see ss3.4.3)  or the use of 
carve-outs (dedicated sub-markets)  as used in US states like Nevada, Arizona, 
Maine, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania (see ss3.3.3). Banding is a preferable 
mechanism to carve-outs because it is more flexible. Alternatively, if an RPS 
mechanism is to be undifferentiated, it should be complemented by a separate 
FIT for the less mature RES-E technologies. Banding and carve-outs make an 
RPS more like an FIT. 
18. As far as possible, both FIT and RPS mechanisms should aim to develop a range 
of RES-E types though this will not always be possible at a national level. Some 
countries, such as the UK (see ss3.4.2) and Denmark (see ss4.5.2), necessarily 
have to source all, or nearly all, of their increases in RES-E from wind because 
they have no other significant RES-E resources. This means they do not have the 
option of developing a range of domestic RES-E types though in Europe, at 
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least, transmission connection between countries means that problems that might 
come with a narrow RES-E base can be ameliorated by importing electricity 
from neighbouring countries. 
19. If grid operators in a country are not under an obligation to purchase and 
distribute output from RES-E generators, regardless of demand conditions (ie are 
not subject to an RES-E ‘purchase obligation’), then, in terms of providing a 
secure flow of income to an RES-E generator, it is desirable that they have such 
an obligation. 
 
In general terms, the RPS and the FIT experiences of the eight countries 
examined in chapters 3 and 4 show that the great strength of FITs is the RES-E 
investor certainty the mechanism delivers as well as its ability to support a wide range 
of RES-E types, including high-cost types. They also show that the great strengths of 
an RPS are its ability to deliver a fairly certain level of RES-E generation as well as its 
responsiveness to price and generation conditions. An overriding conclusion to be 
drawn from chapters 3 to 7 is that all these strengths are needed in a single mechanism 
if radical RES-E expansion needs to be developed as part of a deep GHG cuts strategy. 
Therefore, the challenge of RES-E support mechanism design is to adapt each of the 
two types of mechanism so that they take on the strengths of the other (along the lines 
advocated in the above 18 points). It remains to be seen just how much an RPS and an 
FIT can become like eachother. It will only be possible to pass a fairly authoritative 
judgement on this once flexible degression, as recently introduced for solar PV FIT 
subsidies in Germany and Spain (discussed in ss4.3.1 and ss4.4.1), and significant 
banding, as recently introduced in the UK (discussed in ss3.4.3), have been operating 
for a few more years. 
 
 
7.8.2 RPS and FIT design improvements applicable to Australia 
Before reaching conclusions about what should be changed in the design of 
Australia’s RPS, it is worth reiterating that, compared to both the EU and the USA, 
Australia had a low RES-E generation share in 2008 (see ss6.2.1). In 2007, Australia’s 
RES-E was also less diverse than was RES-E generation in either the EU or the USA 
(see ss6.4.1), reflecting the fact that its RES-E generation was more dependent on 
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hydro generation that that of RES-E generation in the EU or the USA. Also, even 
though Australia had high growth of non-hydro RES-E compared to the EU and the 
USA between 2001 and 2008, in 2008 it had a low non-hydro RES-E generation share 
compared to the other two regions (see ss6.2.1). When it comes to the support that 
Australia’s RPS gives to RES-E, Table 6.22 showed that, at the current low level of 
RECs prices, its level of return per megawatt of installed wind generating capacity 
was lower than that of the UK and Spain (but slightly higher than Germany because of 
higher average capacity factors). All of these results point to the fact that Australia’s 
RES-E development lags behind that of the EU in particular and currently has little 
chance of reaching comparable levels of RES-E generation share to the EU. But, as 
detailed in ss2.2.3 and ss2.2.5, Australia has very high levels of per capita GHG 
emissions and the country will probably have to support radical RES-E expansion if it 
is to achieve deep cuts in its electricity GHG emissions. To have RES-E generating 
most, if not all, of Australia’s electricity its higher-cost, less mature, types of RES-E 
(especially hot rock geothermal and solar RES-E) will need to be supported since they 
have much higher generating potentials than the country’s other types of RES-E (see 
ss2.3.5 to ss2.3.7). With this statement of Australia’s RES-E generation and 
generating potential in mind, the following is a list of desirable improvements to the 
country’s RPS based on the 18 desirable RPS and FIT design features listed in ss7.8.1. 
(a) point 3: Both the RPS and the FIT should be designed to support new RES-E 
capacity and should not include RES-E capacity that existed before the mechanisms 
began. As detailed in ss7.5.1, Australia’s RPS allows above-baseline pre MRET  
RES-E generation to earn RECs and includes 15 TWh/yr of pre MRET RES-E 
generation in its target. Both of these should be removed from Australia’s RPS or, if 
that is not possible, pre-MRET RES-E generation should lose RECs if it generates 
below baselines considering it is allowed to earn them when generating above them. 
Also, other parts of Australia’s RPS target should expand if its pre-MRET RES-E 
target portion suffers long-term decline because of rainfall decreases. A different 
option would be to include pre-MRET RES-E in Australia’s RPS target but to give it a 
low RECs multiplier in a banded RPS.  
(b) point 4: FIT and RPS mechanisms need to be accompanied by meaningful 
electricity demand management programs. As detailed in ss5.2.2, Australia’s grid-
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connected electricity generation, since the late 1990s at least, has grown at over 3%/yr 
which has meant that the country’s RES-E had to expand at the same rate to maintain 
a constant generation share. In order to give RES-E a better chance of not only 
maintaining, but expanding, its generation share, meaningful electricity demand 
management programs should be introduced in Australia. 
(c) point 6: RPS markets that express their RES-E targets in generation-hour or 
capacity terms should be changed so that their RES-E targets become generation 
share ones. As detailed in ss7.2.3, Australia’s RPS target is expressed as a number of 
GWh/yr, rather than as a generation share. This resulted in the MRET’s RES-E target 
producing no increase in RES-E generation share between 2001 and 2009 (see 
ss5.2.2). If Australia is to source deep cuts in its electricity GHG emissions through 
radical RES-E expansion, this should be rectified by its RPS target being converted to 
a generation share one. If this change is not possible, then the country’s RPS target at 
least needs to be periodically readjusted against RES-E generation share benchmarks.  
(d) point 9: RPS mechanisms should place restrictions on the ability of RES-E 
generators to bank tradable certificates. As detailed in s7.3, Australia allows 
unlimited banking of its RPS tradable certificates. This can erode the propensity of 
later-stage RES-E developers to invest if the price of tradable certificates rises over 
time, or if there is a significant surplus of tradable certificates in an RPS mechanism. 
It is important to allow some flexibility in the use of tradable certificates, but under 
Australia’s RPS, banking of tradable certificates should be limited to no more than 
three years. 
(e) point 11: there should be no exemptions to an RPS or an FIT obligation. As 
detailed in ss7.4.1, electricity intensive businesses are exempted from that part of 
RET’s target obligation that is additional to MRET as well as part of the MRET 
obligation if RECs prices rise above $40 (if Australia’s CPRS legislation is passed). 
Major RPS exemptions like these are relatively unusual amongst jurisdictions that use 
an RPS and make the adjustment burden heavier on those electricity users not covered 
by them. They also make it less attractive for electricity intensive businesses to 
become more efficient in their use of electricity. For these reasons, this exemption 
should be removed from Australia’s RPS.  
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(f) point 12: unusual energy sources should not be subsidised in an RPS or an 
FIT. Australia should cease allowing heat pumps, solar water heaters and coal 
methane to create RECs. As detailed in ss5.2.3, solar water heaters, in particular, have 
created a large number of tradable certificates in Australia’s RPS and have lowered 
the price of its tradable certificates thereby diminishing the support they give to 
energy sources that have a more legitimate claim to being RES-E. 
(g) point 13: RPS non-compliance charges should be set at a sufficiently high 
level that they do not effectively become a low ceiling on RPS tradable certificate 
prices. As detailed in ss7.4.2, Australia’s current RPS has a non tax-deductable non-
compliance penalty of A$65/MWh. Although this is equal to a tax-deductable non-
compliance charge of A$93/MWh, the charge is not connected to any maximum 
possible tradable certificate price and it is not inconceivable that future tradable 
certificate prices will exceed it. If this happens, it may effectively become a RECs 
price ceiling. Australia should emulate the Swedish practice of setting its non-
compliance charge at a rate of 150% of the average tradable certificate price for the 
most recent accounting period (ie 50% more than the average certificate price: see 
ss3.5.2). Also, the non-compliance threshold above which non-compliance charges 
are applied should be reduced in Australia from 10% to about 4%. 
(h) point 15: RPS mechanisms should include a minimum tradable certificate 
price system. As detailed in ss5.2.4, from late 2008 to late 2009, Australia’s RPS 
tradable certificate prices experienced a significant decline. This eroded RES-E 
developer confidence and was largely due to the inclusion of solar water heaters and 
heat pumps in Australia’s RPS. Australia’s RPS should, therefore, guarantee a 
minimum price for RECs (as Sweden had between 2003 and 2007 and which Belgium 
has in its RPSs, see ss3.5.2) or use a ‘guarantee headroom’ target setting feature to 
keep RECs prices above minimum levels as done in the United Kingdom (see 
ss3.4.3). An implicit/guaranteed headroom type of ceiling is preferable, and can be 
best achieved in Australia by removing solar water heater RECs from its RPS and by 
increasing its RPS target so that it can at least absorb all the increase in electricity 
demand between 2000 and 2020 (as detailed in ss7.2.2). These changes would ensure 
that tradable certificate demand in Australia keeps ahead of supply and that their 
prices remain fairly high thereby inducing a large degree of RES-E investor 
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confidence. This change would make Australia’s RPS more like an FIT (as would (i), 
below). 
(i) point 17: If the RPS mechanism is to be relied upon to support early stage 
RES-E technological development, it either needs banding or carve-outs. 
Undifferentiated RPS mechanisms are not designed to support higher cost, less mature 
types of RES-E. Ideally, they should be supported with a separate FIT but, if that is 
not done, then the best way the RPS mechanism can support higher cost types of  
RES-E is through banding (ie the use of tradable certificate multipliers). In order to 
support hot rock geothermal and solar RES-E, Australia’s RPS should incorporate 
banding along the lines of its use in the UK RPS (see ss3.4.3). Banding is a preferable 
way of supporting higher-cost RES-E to carve-outs because they are more flexible and 
can keep RPS tradable certificate market more liquid. This change to Australia’s RPS 
is crucial if RES-E is one day used to source deep cuts in its electricity GHG 
emissions. This change would make Australia’s RPS more like an FIT (as would (h), 
above). 
 The most important of the above-mentioned changes, in terms of Australia 
sourcing deep electricity GHG emission cuts through radical RES-E expansion are:  
a) no RPS support to pre-existing RES-E;  
b) RES-E mechanisms should be accompanied by meaningful electricity demand 
management programs;  
f) unusual energy sources (especially solar water heaters) should not be 
subsidised in Australia’s RPS; 
h) Australia’s RPS should have a feature that provides a tradable certificate 
floor; and 
i) Australia’s  RPS should support immature RES-E through banding. 
In addition to these changes, and as detailed in ss7.2.2, Australia’s RPS target 
should be increased to a level where it absorbs all the increase in the nation’s 
electricity generation between 2000 and 2020, unless a price is put on GHG emissions 
that can drive part of the electricity sector GHG emission reduction. This would 
probably require Australia’s RPS target to be increased to about 138 TWh/yr by 2020, 
which is 42% of the projected 328 TWh/yr of electricity Australia is projected to be 
generating by 2020 (both on grid and off grid). It is also desirable to amalgamate all 
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of Australia’s various state and territory based FITs into a single gross FIT for small 
to medium scaled RES-E generation, as discussed in s5.3 and has occurred in the UK. 
This would remove the anomalies that exist between the country’s different FITs. To 
stop such an FIT concentrating RES-E in the areas with the best RES-E resources, it 
would need to be differentiated according to location. Such a national FIT should also 
be gross and not net so that there is no incentive to earn more from it by shifting 
household electricity use. 
Australia’s RPS was something of a trailblazer when it began in 2001, and many 
of the aforementioned issues had less importance then, but they are significant now 
that major GHG reduction is being increasingly called for. An important opportunity 
was lost to review the MRET’s major design features in a meaningful way when the 
RET’s legislation was passed in 2009, and when the the LRET/SRET was created in 
2010, but the opportunity will need to be found, again, if Australia wants to make 
deep cuts in its electricity GHG emissions through radical RES-E expansion.
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8.1 Main thesis findings 
 
The design of policies to support renewable electricity (RES-E) is at a crucial 
stage worldwide. Originally, the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS, which 
subsidises given RES-E quantities) and the Feed-in Tariff (FIT, which subsidises 
given RES-E prices) mechanisms were designed to develop relatively modest amounts 
of RES-E. Now they are being increasingly called upon to perform fairly radical  
RES-E expansion as a major part of urgently reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, and the design of the mechanisms has had to evolve and change to meet 
this new expectation. Australian RES-E support policy design is also at a crucial 
stage: in 2001, the country introduced its RPS, which remains its main form of RES-E 
support, but it has not kept abreast of contemporary RPS design. In this thesis I have 
shown that Australia's RPS is currently not capable of delivering the radical RES-E 
expansion needed if the country is to make deep cuts in its high electricity GHG 
emissions (where radical RES-E expansion and deep cuts are phrases defined 
precisely at the start of chapter 1). This broad conclusion was reached in several 
stages. I considered the design, and effectiveness, of the RPS and the FIT RES-E 
support mechanisms in eight overseas countries compared to the use of the 
mechanisms in Australia. I also examined the place of emissions trading (the trading 
of GHG emission licenses) and government subsidies in supporting RES-E 
development in Australia, as well as transmission issues in the country compared to 
those in the EU and the USA. The purpose of these comparisons was to determine 
what changes will be needed to Australia’s RES-E support mechanisms if they are to 
deliver radical RES-E expansion in order to make deep cuts in the country’s electricity 
GHG emissions. 
The research questions I addressed in the thesis were: 
● Is the RPS or the FIT necessarily more effective at supporting radical RES-E 
expansion? 
● If the RPS is to be relied upon to deliver most of Australia’s RES-E support 
under a radical RES-E expansion scenario, what can overseas experience tell us 
about changing it to make this possible? 
● Is there a case for Australia’s RPS supporting currently high-cost, as well as 
low-cost, types of RES-E?   
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● To what extent can emissions trading be relied upon to support RES-E in 
Australia? 
● What can overseas experience tell us about changing Australia’s state-based 
FITs so that they are more effective at supporting RES-E?   
● What can overseas experience tell us about the level of transmission 
connectivity in Australia and its consequences for RES-E support?  
Chapter 2 established the context for the thesis by discussing the climate change 
issue, Australia’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the Australian generating 
potentials of different types of RES-E and the inter-related issues of RES-E generating 
costs, maturity (stage of commercial readiness), learning curve (economies of scale) 
cost reductions, and long-term rising marginal electricity generating costs (the cost of 
the last unit of generation). Chapters 3 to 5 examined the use of the RPS and the FIT 
mechanism in the USA, the UK, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Denmark 
and Australia, as well as the use of government RES-E subsidies and proposed use of 
emissions trading in Australia. Chapter 5 also compared transmission in Australia to 
transmission in the EU and the USA. Chapters 6 and 7 were cross-country 
comparisons between the EU, the USA and Australia that examined RES-E generation 
performance, RES-E diversity, RES-E generating potential use and different key RPS 
design elements.  
After analysing the eight overseas countries listed above, an overarching 
conclusion I reached is that there is no clear evidence that that either the RPS, or the 
FIT, is theoretically more effective – in terms of either increasing RES-E generation 
share or delivering low subsidies – than the other. This seemingly inconclusive 
conclusion is important, given the frequency and strength of arguments in the 
literature, some based more on ideology than evidence, that one of the RPS and the 
FIT is intrinsically much more effective than the other, and must always remain so. It 
is also important because there is significant institutional inertia behind both 
mechanisms with countries that have been using them for some time reluctant to 
abandon them. However, clearer evidence could yet emerge of superior effectiveness 
of one of the mechanisms, once the flexible degression of solar PV FIT subsidies in 
Spain and Germany, and banding of RPS ones in the UK – both aimed at encouraging, 
but not over-encouraging, high-cost types of RES-E – have had a few more years of 
generation history.  
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A key contribution of the thesis has been to develop a list of 18 desirable design 
features needed to allow either the RPS or the FIT to deliver radical RES-E expansion 
(in ss7.8.1). The list inherently shows that the major weaknesses of the RPS – its lack 
of RES-E investor certainty and its inability to support the full range of RES-E types – 
can best be overcome by making the mechanism more like an FIT. This can occur 
through the establishment of tradable certificate price floors and introduction of  
RES-E type-specificity (differentiation) in its subsidy support, preferably through 
banding (tradable certificate multipliers for different types of RES-E). These are 
needed because the mechanism, in its pure form, does not offer enough subsidy level 
certainty and because low-cost types of RES-E (which a pure RPS most supports) do 
not always have the highest RES-E generating potentials. Conversely, the list of 
desirable RPS and FIT design features also shows that the major weaknesses of the 
FIT – its uncertain RES-E generation performance and lack of responsiveness to 
electricity price and generation conditions – can best be overcome by making it more 
like an RPS. This can occur through connecting FIT subsidy rates to interim RES-E 
generation targets and by making FIT rates more price and generation responsive. 
This is needed so that FIT subsidies can deliver the generation results they are 
intended to deliver at lowest cost, and so that the mechanism’s subsidies result in 
reasonably predictable generation outcomes. Basically, a reduction of the differences 
between the two mechanisms is necessary for them to become capable of achieving 
radical RES-E expansion as part of a strategy to make deep cuts in GHG emissions. 
This reduction of differences means that the type-neutral (ie offering the same support 
to all types of RES-E) RPS needs to become type-specific (ie offering different levels 
of support to different types of RES-E) and the type-specific FIT needs to become 
more electricity price and generation responsive; overall this means both need to 
become price/generation-responsive type-specific. 
Consistent with this need to reduce the differences between the two 
mechanisms, several countries I have examined in this thesis have introduced changes 
to their RPS or FIT mechanisms that have made them more like the other. The United 
Kingdom’s introduction of banding into its RPS (which involves different tradable 
certificate multipliers for different RES-E types) was a major step in this direction 
(see ss3.4.3). The guaranteed minimum tradable certificate price schemes in Sweden 
and Belgium (see ss3.5.2), and the guaranteed headroom innovation introduced to the 
UK RPS (see ss3.4.3), are other RPS innovations that made the mechanism more like 
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the FIT. On the FIT side, Spain’s recent capping of its solar PV subsidies, Germany’s 
recent reduction of its solar PV subsidies, and the introduction of performance-linked 
flexible degression rates in both countries (discussed in ss4.3.1 and ss4.4.1) 
demonstrated the desirability for some FIT subsidies, particularly of high-cost 
immature RES-E types, to be more closely tied to electricity price and generation 
conditions. Similarly, the earlier failure of Spain’s FIT to increase the country’s  
 RES-E generation share demonstrates the need to connect FIT subsidies to generation-
based targets. Overall, the Spanish and German experience shows how a pure (non-
price/generation-linked) FIT system is liable to either under- or overshoot a desirable 
target for RES-E generation. 
I have shown in the thesis that Australia faces significant RES-E support policy 
challenges. This is because it has a high level of electricity GHG emissions largely 
caused by its high electricity generation dependency on coal and its large ongoing 
electricity demand increases (see ss2.2.3). Also, its type-neutral RPS mechanism 
favours the least-cost RES-E types of wind and biomass, but the more expensive solar 
and geothermal types have the major generating potentials needed to significantly 
reduce Australia's electricity-based GHG emissions. Australia is also disadvantaged 
by a system of uncoordinated state-based FITs (detailed in s5.3), and a transmission 
system that allows only limited electricity trade between connected states and 
territories (detailed in s5.6), which the thesis showed resulted in significantly less 
electricity trade in the country than occurs in the EU and the USA.  
I also showed that Australia is less than advanced in its RES-E development 
than either the EU or the USA evidenced by its lower overall RES-E and non-hydro 
RES-E generation share, although it has had a higher growth in non-hydro RES-E 
generation share than the other two regions (off a very low base). I further found (in 
s6.4) that Australia’s RES-E is less diverse, and more dependent on hydro generation, 
than that of the EU or the USA. A further contribution was a finding that Australia’s 
wind and solar PV subsidies are generally lower than those of Germany, Spain and the 
UK. 
In general terms, the thesis found that Australia has made a worthwhile start to 
RES-E development, but now needs to make major changes to its RPS and 
transmission regimes if it is to achieve the radical RES-E expansion necessary for 
making deep cuts in its electricity GHG emissions. 
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Section 8.2 now gives a chapter-by-chapter summary of the thesis's more 
detailed findings, culminating in a list of recommended RPS and FIT design attributes 
for all countries, and then a list of more specific recommendations for Australia; then 
Section 8.3 discusses further research questions that flow from the thesis. 
 
8.2 Specific thesis findings and recommendations 
 
8.2.1 Thesis chapter findings 
Chapter 2 set the context for the thesis: in it I explained the climate change issue 
and the part that RES-E support policy can play in it, especially in Australia. The 
chapter also considered the different types, generating costs, and Australian 
generating potentials of RES-E as well as the aims and justifications for its support. A 
contribution in the chapter was an Australia-specific case for focusing GHG 
abatement policy on a radical expansion of RES-E generation, and hence for 
supporting RES-E by more than just a carbon price, and within RES-E for supporting 
solar thermal and geothermal more strongly than other types of RES-E because of 
their high generating potentials in Australia. In the chapter I answered the research 
question ‘Is there a case for Australia’s RPS supporting high-cost, as well as low-cost, 
types of RES-E?’ by finding that there is such a case. 
Chapter 3 discussed the experience of the RPS mechanism in the USA, the UK, 
Italy, Sweden and Belgium. The chapter part answered the questions: ‘If an RPS is to 
be relied upon to deliver most of Australia’s RES-E support under a radical RES-E 
expansion scenario, what can overseas experience tell us about changing it to make 
this possible?’ and ‘Is the RPS or the FIT necessarily more effective at supporting 
radical RES-E expansion?’ In the chapter I showed that the RPS in the USA had 
suffered from a lack of national application and weak non-compliance charges and 
penalties, and that the RPS in Italy had suffered from a lack of political support. 
However, the chapter also showed that the UK and Italy had introduced differentiated 
RES-E support levels into their RPSs through banding (different amounts of tradable 
certificate multipliers) and that Sweden, Belgium and the UK had made their RPS 
subsidy levels more predictable by either introducing minimum tradable certificate 
prices or by exerting an ongoing upward influence on their prices through guaranteed 
headroom adjustments (that incorporated extra certificate demand in addition to 
anticipated demand).  
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Chapter 4 discussed the evolution of the FIT mechanism and its experience in 
Germany, Spain and Denmark. It partly answered the questions: ‘Is an RPS or an FIT 
necessarily more effective at supporting radical RES-E expansion?’ and ‘What can 
overseas experience tell us about changing Australia’s state-based FITs so that they 
are more effective at supporting RES-E?’ The chapter found that the FIT has 
supported a significant amount of increased wind, biomass and solar PV generation in 
the three countries. It also found that the mechanism had suffered from insufficient 
connection to electiricty price and generation conditions, in the case of solar PV 
subsidies in Germany and Spain, as well as in the case of wind subsidies in Denmark. 
The Spanish and German experience shows how a pure (non-price/generation-linked) 
FIT system is liable to either under- or overshoot a desirable target for RES-E 
generation. The chapter also showed that large electricity demand increases had 
thwarted the RES-E generation share performance of Spain’s FIT. 
Chapter 5 discussed the major design elements of all the RES-E support 
mechanisms used in Australia: its RPS, state-based FITs, proposed emission trading 
mechanisms, and government budget RES-E subsidies. It also compared transmission 
in Australia to transmission in overseas countries. In the chapter I answered the 
questions: ‘To what extent can emissions trading be relied upon to support RES-E in 
Australia?’ and ‘What can overseas experience tell us about the level of transmission 
connectivity in Australia and what are its RES-E support consequences?’ The chapter 
found that, although some RES-E support is provided through the country’s state-
based FITs, as well as through federal government budget subsidies, its RPS remains 
its main form of support. A contribution in the chapter was a finding that the low to 
medium GHG emission reduction starting carbon prices projected for Australia’s 
proposed ETS will not make even the least expensive form of RES-E, wind, 
competitive with black coal electricity generation. Another finding (in ss5.2.2) was 
that solar water heating, small scaled solar PV, wind and hydro have been the major 
beneficiaries of Australia’s RPS and that the mechanism has failed to support a broad 
spectrum of RES-E types in the country. Finally, I showed that weak transmission 
links between states in Australia have resulted in a lower, relative level of electricity 
trade than between major EU countries, or between US states.  
In chapter 6 I drew on data from chapters 3 to 5 to compare the generation and 
price performance of the RPS and the FIT mechanisms across the countries 
considered there. The main research question answered in that chapter was: ‘Is an 
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RPS or an FIT necessarily more effective at supporting radical RES-E expansion?’ 
The chapter found that the non-hydro RES-E generation share growth in selected 
Western European FIT countries was much the same as the equivalent growth of 
selected Western European RPS ones. Similarly, the rise in the RES-E diversity 
indexes of both sets of countries over the period examined was much the same. The 
only area where the Western European FIT countries clearly had a better generation 
performance than the RPS ones was in solar PV generation. This was because their 
subsidies are differentiated according to RES-E type and therefore have a higher 
subsidy for solar PV. The innovative subsidy cost analysis in the chapter (in ss6.5.1 
and ss6.5.2) surprisingly found that, although several studies have concluded that FIT 
subsidies are relatively lower than equivalent RPS ones, the capacity-factor adjusted 
return on one megawatt of installed wind capacity in Australia – an RPS country – 
was lower than that of Spain and only marginally higher than in Germany, both FIT 
countries.  
Chapter 7 compared major design elements of RPS mechanisms referenced in 
Chapters 3-6 to answer the research question: ‘If an RPS is to be relied upon to deliver 
most of Australia’s RES-E support under a radical RES-E expansion scenario, what 
can overseas experience tell us about changing it to make this possible?’ In the 
chapter I compared six different RPS design elements across 28 jurisdictions that use 
RPSs. In answering the chapter’s research question, I found (in s7.2 to s7.7) that 
Australia’s RPS had the following flaws: 
● a low target;  
● an unusual way of expressing its target (as a generation-hour target); 
● unusually generous tradable certificate banking provisions; 
● a large number of tradable certificates created by unusual energy sources 
(especially solar water heaters); 
● generous customer exemptions; and  
● a relatively low non-compliance charge. 
The above mentioned analysis was used to develop the list of desirable RPS and 
FIT design features listed in the next subsection. This was one of the most significant 
contributions made by my thesis. 
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8.2.2 Recommended RPS and FIT design attributes for all countries  
 The most significant contribution of the thesis, in s7.8 of chapter 7, was an 
original list of desirable RPS and FIT design attributes needed for radical RES-E 
expansion developed from the experiences of the eight countries profiled in chapters 3 
and 4. These attributes were: 
 Providing basic support to new RES-E  
● both RPS and FIT mechanisms should be designed to support new RES-E 
capacity and should not include RES-E capacity that existed before an RPS or an 
FIT mechanism began operating. This is because including such pre-existing 
capacity dilutes the support of the RPS or the FIT extended to new RES-E; 
● both RPS and FIT mechanisms need to be accompanied by meaningful 
electricity demand management programs. Without such programs, RES-E can 
struggle to increase generation share; 
● the RES-E generation share performance of the FIT mechanism should be 
benchmarked against, and connected to, interim RES-E generation targets. The 
absence of interim generation targets can allow FIT subsidies to become 
disconnected from price and generation realities; 
● RPS RES-E targets expressed in generation-hour or capacity terms should be 
changed to generation share targets. This is to avoid an experience, like that of the 
MRET in Australia, where high demand growth meant RES-E generation targets 
did not translate into increased generation share; and 
● the use of targets, in either the RPS or the FIT mechanism, needs periodic 
review for their relationship to subsidy levels and generation performance. Such 
review ensures targets do not become disconnected from electricity price and 
generation fundamentals. 
Ensuring old and new RES-E do not adversely affect eachother 
● RPS mechanisms should place restrictions on the ability of RES-E generators to 
bank tradable certificates. Without such restriction, tradable certificates created 
early in the life of an RPS can undercut those created by later developed 
generators; and 
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● FIT mechanisms should incorporate degression (decreases in subsidy rates 
applied to new RES-E generators). Degression ensures that technological 
advancement savings are passed on to electricity customers. 
Major support of new RES-E 
● there should be no major exemptions to an RPS or an FIT obligation. 
Exemptions increase the compliance cost of non-exempted customers; 
● RPS non-compliance charges should be set at sufficiently high levels that they 
do not effectively become low ceilings on RPS tradable certificate prices; 
● RPS mechanisms should include implicit, or explicit, tradable certificate price 
floors. This ensures RPS subsidy levels are fairly predictable thereby allowing 
RES-E investor confidence to be increased; and 
● some FIT subsidies need to be more responsive to electricity price and 
generation conditions. This is to ensure that they do not under- or overshoot 
desirable targets for RES-E generation. 
Major support of higher-cost RES-E 
● if the RPS mechanism is to be relied upon to support immature RES-E 
technological development, it either needs banding (tradable certificate 
multipliers) or carve-outs (parts of an RPS market dedicated to particular types of 
RES-E). This is to ensure that RPS mechanisms support both low-cost and high-
cost types of RES-E. 
As mentioned several times in this thesis, many of these changes make the RPS 
and FIT mechanisms more like each other and allow the strengths of each to be grafted 
onto the other. 
 
 
8.2.3 Recommended design attributes for Australia's RPS mechanism 
As the thesis’s final significant contribution, I derived from the above 
recommendations a further list of changes to Australia’s RPS (in ss7.8.2) likely to be 
needed if RES-E support is to be relied upon to deliver radical RES-E expansion in 
this country, as follows: 
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
273 
● Australia’s RPS non-compliance charges should be increased so they do not 
effectively become low ceilings on its RPS tradable certificate prices; 
● Australia’s RPS target should be expressed as a generation share, rather than a 
level of overall RES-E generation, to avoid an experience where high demand 
growth means RES-E generation targets do not translate into increased RES-E 
generation shares; 
● Australia’s different state and territory based FITs should be replaced by a 
single national gross FIT for small to medium scaled RES-E generation that is 
differentiated according to location. This would get rid of the anomalies that exist 
between the different FITs and could also replace the country’s RPS ‘Solar 
Credits’ scheme; 
● restrictions should be placed on the ability to bank tradable certificates in 
Australia’s RPS so that tradable certificates created early in the life of an RPS do 
not undercut those created by later developed generators; 
● there should be no exemptions to Australia’s RPS obligations, which increase 
the compliance cost of non-exempted customers; 
● RES-E capacity that existed before Australia’s RPS began should be removed 
from contributing to the mechanism’s target so that its support of new RES-E is 
not diluted;  
● unusual energy sources like solar water heaters should not be supported in 
Australia’s RPS, this would ensure increased support to energy sources that are 
authentic RES-E types; 
● Australia’s RPS should be accompanied by a meaningful demand reduction 
program so that high growth of electricity demand does not erode its chances of 
achieving a high RES-E generation share; 
● Australia’s RPS should have some kind of a tradable certificate price floor, to 
boost RES-E investor confidence; 
● Australia’s RPS certificate generation should be banded with higher multipliers 
for less mature, and more expensive, types of RES-E so that it can properly 
support those RES-E types; and 
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● Australia’s RPS target should be part of an overall plan to cut the nation’s 
electricity GHG emissions, and should at least be increased so that it is capable of 
absorbing all the increase in the country’s electricity generation between 2000 and 
2020 so that the country can make meaningful cuts in its electricity GHG 
emissions. 
Of these, the most important are the last six, to do with pre-existing RES-E 
capacity, demand reduction programs, inclusion of unusual energy sources, tradable 
certificate price floors, banded certificate multipliers, and an RPS target that is part of 
an overall plan to reduce Australia’s electricity GHG emissions. The thesis also 
recommended that if coordinated planning between transmission companies cannot 
increase the country’s transmission capacity quickly enough, consideration should be 
given to either using significant government subsidies to assist transmission expansion 
and/or allowing the cost of transmission expansion to be levied across all national 
electricity consumers if the expansion is in the national interest. 
 
8.3 Further research issues 
This thesis has, inevitably, opened many doors to potential further research. 
There is much further research needed into FIT and RPS subsidies, in particular, as 
highlighted in ss6.5.1 and ss6.5.2. This should include jurisdictions outside the 
European countries on which most RES-E subsidy research has focused to date, and 
should also include RES-E types other than wind (which has been the main subject of 
subsidy research so far). It is also desirable that such research examine the influence 
that RES-E targets have on RPS subsidy levels, often they are divorced from such this 
influence. Once banding has been in place in the UK for at least three years (in 2012: 
see ss3.4.2), a detailed examination needs to be made of its impact on the composition 
of the country’s electricity generation in general and its RES-E in particular. It would 
be useful if similar research was done into the impact of Spain and Germany’s new 
flexible degression of solar PV FIT subsidies. It would also be desirable to test, in 
some detail, the influence that different FIT subsidy levels have on RES-E generation.  
Many general assumptions are made in the literature about the ability of GHG 
emissions trading to change generation capital stocks (discussed in ss5.4.3) but they 
need to be tested against real-life situations. There is, therefore, a need for a thorough 
examination of the ability of ETS to change Australia’s electricity capital stock. Such 
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research needs to forensically examine the age, and historic generating cost, of the 
country’s existing fossil fuel electricity generator. It also needs to examine the 
realistic prospects for the future capital cost reduction of both fossil fuel and RES-E 
technologies under different carbon cost scenarios and how the two might relate to 
eachother.  
There is also a need for detailed examination of the impact that different major 
RPS design differences – like those of non-compliance charges, customer exemptions 
and inclusion of unusual energy types – have on the attainment of RPS targets 
(discussed in s7.4 and s7.5). There is also a need for detailed examination of RES-E 
research and development, and capital, subsidies which this thesis has described, in an 
Australian context, but has not examined. These RES-E subsidies can have a  
significant effect on the bringing forward of RES-E capital cost reductions and 
deserve a lot of detailed analysis in their own right. 
As acknowledged at the start of s5.6, this thesis only gave a general treatment to 
the examination of the influence of transmission on RES-E generation in Australia. 
Transmission will have a major impact on RES-E development in the country, 
particularly if very significant quantities of RES-E come to be generated. Therefore, 
there is a need for further, dedicated, research into the augmentation of transmission 
in Australia. Such research should, ideally, include an engineering perspective.  
Finally, as mentioned in ss2.3.1, this thesis mainly analysed RES-E support 
policy in Australia through the narrow perspective of the policy needed to 
significantly increase RES-E, mainly through electricity tariff subsidies, whilst 
minising the total discounted social cost, over the long run, of achieving a given 
amount of GHG emission reduction in the electricity sector in the country. However, 
RES-E policy in particular, and energy/electricity policy in general, can be analysed 
through many other perspectives including ones of energy security and local industry 
development. It is desirable, then, that Australia’s RES-E support policy be analysed, 
by other researchers, through different perspectives which may well draw different 
conclusions. 
RES-E support policy is still relatively poorly understood despite its experience 
of more than a decade in many countries. The greater expectations that are being 
placed upon it deserve a lot more future research to ensure it remains credible and able 
to play a meaningful part in global GHG emission mitigation. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Average wind capacity factors in Spain, Germany, United Kingdom and Australia, 
2002 to 2006.  
 
 
Year 
beginning 
capacity: 
MW (1) 
 
 
Year end 
capacity: 
MW (2) 
 
 
 
Weighted 
average 
capacity: 
MW (3) 
 
 
 
Annual 
generation: 
GWh/yr (4) 
 
 
 
 
Annual 
capacity 
factor 
(5) 
 
 
 
 
Average 
capacity 
factor for 
the period 
(6) 
 
 
Spain 
2006 10,027 11,623 10,559 23,297 25.2%  
2005 8,263 10,027 8,851 21,219 27.4%  
2004 6,203 8,263 6,890 15,601 25.9%  
2003 4,825 6,203 5,284 12,075 26.1%  
2002 3,337 4,825 3,833 8,704 25.9% 26.1% 
Germany 
2006 18,415 20,622 19,151 30,710 18.3%  
2005 16,629 18,415 17,224 27,229 18.1%  
2004 14,609 16,629 15,282 25,509 19.1%  
2003 11,994 14,609 12,866 18,859 16.7%  
2002 8,754 11,994 9,834 15,856 18.4% 18.1%% 
United Kingdom 
2006 1,353 1,962 1,556 4,225 31.0%  
2005 888 1,353 1,043 2,904 31.8%  
2004 648 888 728 1,935 30.3%  
2003 552 648 584 1,285 25.1%  
2002 474 552 500 1,256 28.7% 29.4% 
Australia 
2006 708 817 763 1,638 24.5%  
2005 380 708 544 1,434 30.1%  
2004 198 380 289 527 20.8%  
2003 105 198 152 350 26.4%  
2002 73 105 89 208 26.7% 25.7% 
Source: Global Wind Energy Council 2008a (cols 1 and 2); European Commission 2009a (col. 4); ABARE 2010b 
(col. 4); author calcs (cols. 3, 5 and 6). 
 
Toke (2005: Table 1) argued that, for climatic reasons, about twice as much new 
wind capacity is typically installed in European countries in the second six months of 
a year, compared to the first six months, so he weighted his average annual capacity 
by adding a third of the capacity built during the year to the capacity at the start of the 
year (‘year beginning capacity’). Table appendix 1 uses the same annual capacity 
weighting method for Spain, Germany and the UK but the method is not used to 
compute Australia’s average annual wind capacity: a midpoint is taken for that 
country’s capacity between its year-beginning and year-end figures because it does 
not have the same climatic influences. 
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